THE MORAL SELF

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THE MORAL SELF

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

BY

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PREFACE

Several good reasons have influenced the author to contribute another textbook to the already long list of books before the reading public. Chief of these is the seeming inadequacy of any book, in the writer's opinion at least, to serve all the needs of an elementary course in ethics. The average text errs in the direction of being too difficult for the beginner. What perhaps is a more serious grievance, it would be no less difficult to find a text that adequately combines the essentials of moral judgment, which is the foundation of a course in the science of ethics, with a practical solution of the everyday problems of the moral self. The present volume attempts to present the problems of the moral self in as untechnical a manner as possible. Likewise is the attempt made to trace the genesis of the moral self, in terms of its essential features, from biological foundations to metaphysical implications.

A few words will be valuable in enabling the student to grasp a running conception of the treatment of the successive chapters. The first, or introductory, chapter briefly sets forth the more general problems of the moral self: its meanings, relations, forms of unity, and types of classification are all briefly though concretely passed in review in Chapter I. Since the present volume undertakes to present the genesis of the moral self, Chapters II and III naturally consider the self as biologically conditioned, its tendencies and capacities. He who would direct the destiny of moral personality must first acquaint himself with those laws which condition its growth.

In Chapters IV and V the psychological laws and conditions which determine the forms of the moral self are explained and exemplified. Five types of organization are assumed to determine the direction and nature of moral growth, namely, the

mechanical, logical, organic, purposeful, and self-conscious types of mental organization. Chapter IV differs from Chapters II and III chiefly in presenting the fact that the self is partly, at least, determined from within, consciously, although biologically speaking, its growth is beyond conscious control, biologically conditioned. Chapter V is continuous in treatment with Chapter IV, though emphasizing the influences of feeling, cognition, and volition in the development of moral character, both in its normal and abnormal manifestations.

Chapters VI and VII deal largely with the factors determining social experience and realization. Chapter VI summarizes reasons why man is naturally or unconsciously social, whereas Chapter VII is interested in the reasons why man assumes purposeful social obligations. The virtues and vices incident to the forms of individual and social interaction — sympathy, imitation, and suggestion — are also explained.

Chapters VIII and IX, the most theoretical part of the book, deal exclusively with eight different aspects of moral judgment. Chapter X presumes to set forth a constructive philosophy of moral personality.

It is fitting that the author express his appreciation for the privilege of quoting so liberally from numerous writers on ethics and kindred subjects. The courtesy of the publishers in granting formal permission to use excerpts from their publications is gratefully acknowledged.

My colleague, Professor W. E. Kirk, has read all the proofs. His constructive suggestions have helped to make the book presentable. Foremost among those instrumental in preparing this book for the press, and the one to whom unqualified thanks are due, is my wife. It is only through her persistency in typing the whole manuscript, combined with her critical and ever-worthy counsel, that the author hopes to be able to offer to the public a theme worthy of moral import.

C. L. S.

Salem, Oregon

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Significance of a principle of interpretation

It has often been noted within the experience of both student and teacher that progress seems to be relatively slow and reluctant. Memory, for instance, instead of being a ready servant to a creative intellect, becomes little more than the mechanical outpouring of unassimilated facts. But how often have we as students and teachers observed sudden changes taking place within the range of inner experience. Something seems to happen within the mind of the learner. An interest in principles is substituted for barren facts. Such emergent principles not infrequently become the foundation of an anticipated science or even a tentative philosophy of life. Surely nothing less than this must take place in the mind of every earnest student of the mental and moral sciences. Such phenomena are not casual and fortuitous but are the results of a principle of interpretation.

He who has enjoyed the fascination of such a mental experience as that mentioned in the preceding paragraph not only will recall with joy the synthetic ordering of details within his own mind, but will likewise perceive a corresponding explanation of like phenomena in the objective world. For instance, when one has become interested in applying an accepted philosophy or principle in the interpretation of his own mental life, it is not uncommon for him to make a similar application to the mental processes of others. Two further examples will make my meaning clear: the transition from history as a mere

collection of facts to history as a theory of human progress, and the transition from psychology as a vague name for that which has to do with our mental life to psychology as a term applied to the interpretation of a unified self.

Various methods have been employed to make clear the rather hazy dividing line between facts and their meanings. The average student of psychology finds it more to his liking and inclination to read psychology than to psychologize. Any student may read philosophy, but not more than one in a dozen sees fit to philosophize. Though it may be true that all men are disciples either of a Plato or of an Aristotle, the fact still remains that not all are enamored of Platonic love or remotely attracted to Aristotelian forms. Since the days of Locke it should no longer be necessary to enlarge upon the distinctions between knowledge and wisdom; and although such a distinction is clear enough to all those who have eyes to see, nevertheless it is one thing to perceive differences in the meaning of terms, and quite another thing to embody such differences in one's own experience.

Secrecy in the growth of personality

Modern educators and writers on pedagogy never tire of portraying the vices of the instructor and the virtues of the real teacher, to the effect that the instructor has but his subject matter to present, whereas the teacher has a personality to develop. Perhaps no proof is required when the assertion is fully understood that there is nothing within the whole category of human experience which sets to work with greater secrecy than the growth and development of personality. If it be granted that such secrecy is slowly though constantly working at the roots of personality (whether it be as the worm whose destructiveness is proportional to its secrecy or whether it be the normal unfolding of the plastic self gradually organizing the soft, rich loam of human experiences), personality, consciously or unconsciously, continues on its way. On the one hand, it soon withers and decays, from what cause we are not always aware; on the other hand, its growth is continuous

and its mellowed fruit is always in evidence. That such secrets hold true of the moral self is one of the chief purposes of this little book to maintain.

Content of the self

It is not to be supposed that the subject matter or the content of the self is to differ radically from the ordinary subject matter of psychology. He who has an understanding of the ordinary subject matter of psychology is likely to be well versed in almost any treatment of the self. The chief difference will be found in the method of treatment; the subject is treated from a specified point of view, — a point of view that will lend itself freely to one interested in the self from the standpoint of morals or ethics. He who sets out, for the first time, to master and absorb the intricacies of philosophy soon finds, to his great surprise, that the subject matter of philosophy, especially philosophy with a pragmatic twist, contains very little that is really not found in the ordinary physical and mental sciences. It may be said that the subject matter of the self is to the subject matter of psychology what the subject matter of philosophy is to the subject matter of the sciences. In both cases the added factor is largely a matter of interpretation and a certain unified point of view.

Experience really teaches us that the facts that impinge on our senses during the second half of life do not differ radically from the experiences that present themselves during our earlier years, although there are broad differences in such experiences when measured in terms of values and meanings. Thus, MacDougall remarks: "The world ceaselessly alters under the gaze of the developing self, in consequence of modifications which are taking place in its own nature." [1] As the world changes under the gaze of the developing self, so may one's conception of the self undergo similar changes. It is this developing self in its relations with an ever-changing world that will continue to attract our attention more generally in the present chapter and more specifically in the chapters that are to follow.

[1] The General Problems of Psychology, p. 238.

Forms of mental organization:
1. Emotional
2. Logical
3. Philosophical
4. Moral

Having set forth the slight distinction between the content of the self to be used in this work and the content of the average text in psychology, a word may be added concerning the moral self. Here again the difference is largely a matter of value, points of view, and degree of organization. The psychological self has value only in the sense that it makes possible the groundwork of the functioning personality. So far as our cognitive and affective processes are concerned, each is normally more or less securely housed in its own water-tight compartment, as the modern psychologist would aptly express it. This statement is not to imply that there is any such thing as a pure and unadulterated feeling, knowing, or willing. The psychologist is well aware that these processes are variously combined. Though all of this remains psychologically true and in harmony with life experiences, nevertheless the fact remains that emotional consistency is not logical consistency, and logical consistency does not necessarily imply philosophical consistency, the highest type of consistency which the human mind may attain so far as the self is considered from the purely psychological point of view.

Although there is a considerable tendency for one's intellectual and moral nature to cohere and to unify, nevertheless wide gaps frequently occur between our intellectual ability and our moral integrity; and it is this moral integrity, or moral nature functioning on the basis of a well-organized psychological self, that makes one's moral consistency a higher form of consistency than any that the rules of thought can supply.

The last paragraph has endeavored to make it clear that, according to the thesis which is to be maintained in this book (namely, that all the various forms of consistency so far mentioned, such as the emotional, logical, and philosophical, which may or may not be consistent with one another, are but preliminary to a higher form of consistency, which is the consistency of the moral self), the highest type of moral consistency, the most consistent moral self, cannot exist except on the foun-

dations of a mind that is emotionally, logically, and philosophically consistent. Mere half-hearted goodness without all or any of the forms of unity mentioned may well exist without this highest form of mental synthesis. Conscience as ordinarily conceived does not imply such highly organized forms of experience; but conscience is not the highest moral category.

The self as the resultant of adjustment to environment not sufficient

The time has come to formulate a working conception of the self from the empirical point of view. No attempt will be made at this time to deal with the so-called logical self or with any other phase of its nature than that which seems to be the result, as Spencer would say, of the adjustment of internal relations to external relations. Such a definition of the mind is good so far as it goes. It simply does not go far enough, as we shall have ample opportunity to note in due season. Since the time of James it would seem almost unwise to endeavor to formulate anything new concerning the self. Even successful imitation would be out of the question. Then let it be strictly understood that originality and uniqueness in the treatment of the subject at hand are not the aim of the present writer.

James somewhere tells us that all definition and classification are teleological, or purposeful. The present-day educator would not dispense with the old in fact and in theory, but much of his endeavor is directed to the new interpretation of the old. Again I quote from MacDougall: "New knowledge acts as a ferment upon the old."[1] To the mind that truly apperceives, the term *old* as applied to old material is a misnomer. Much of the boredom that exists in the life of the average student of today is due to his inability to think, to grasp new points of view. Hobhouse tells us that intellectual journeys are the most delightful of all journeys, and Horne would have the earnest student believe that it is his bounden duty to enroll in the university of the universe. Also Herbart would add the moral touch to our ever-expanding self when he tells us that the aim of education is the moralization of the universe. Surely any mind that is capable

[1] The General Problems of Psychology, p. 432.

of entertaining such conceptions as these just mentioned will find but little ennui and boredom, and it is just such a self as this that I shall now proceed to describe.

Relations of self to environment and past mental processes

It is a matter of common observation that there is a very close relation existing between the complexity of the mental processes and the complexity of the environment; that is, the mind that has succeeded in adjusting itself is as complex as the environment to which it is adjusted. And not only is there a marked relation between the mind and its environment, but there is also more or less of a relation between any mental process and all past mental processes of the same order. Some such correlation and unity seem to hold true for the present and past states of all orders of psychic life. With the organized mind is it not true that there is a tendency to think with all that we have thought, to feel with all that we have felt, and to will with all that we have willed? Or, more technically phrased, all cognition, all affection, and all volition, respectively, seem to reënforce one another.

Priority of mental order

It may be of considerable value to the reader if another form of unity be mentioned, — a form of unity that obtains between the self and the objective world. From a certain point of view it is almost a truism to say that that which is to be observed in the objective world must first be observed introspectively within the self. At this point in our study it will not be my purpose to consider whether such a correlation is the result of our experience with the environment or whether the possibilities of such relations have another source. We are simply concerned with the light that such a principle casts upon the nature of the moral self. If it be true, first, that such tendencies toward unity seem to hold between the complexity of the mind or self and its environment, secondly, that each succeeding mental state, whether it be cognitive, affective, or conative, seems to be colored by all past mental states, and, thirdly, that mental unity seems to be prior to world unity, then such conceptions would lead us to believe that self is that state of consciousness that most nearly

incorporates our present and past experiences. The term *self* is sometimes used interchangeably with *character* or *personality*, even with *individuality*.

Professor James used the word *self* to express one's material, social, and spiritual interests. Though the term is made to function in a multitude of ways, and no individual writer is exactly sure of his footing when he essays to give it a prescribed meaning, nevertheless it is generally conceded that the self is that which tends to bring unity, continuity, and identity into our everyday mental life.

Restatement of the three relations

Perhaps it will not be amiss if a few words are offered in the effort to make more concrete the three forms of relation mentioned in the previous paragraphs. As will be recalled, the three relations may be summarized as follows: (1) the relation of the complexity of the mind to the complexity of any phase or phases of the environment; (2) the relation of any complex state of mind to all other states of the same order, or perhaps of all orders that have preceded it; (3) the relations that exist between that which we may introspectively observe within the walls of our own consciousness and what we are likely to discover and to formulate concerning certain phases of the cosmos. It must be held firmly in mind (and this is the fact that most deeply concerns us) that such correlations may exist not only in the realm of our more purely intellectual processes but also in our moral experiences.

The first order of relations is equally true of all phases of human experience, whether largely intellectual, social, or more specifically moral. In the first place, we are justified in the use of the expression "intellectual sensitiveness," or, as John Dewey has so nicely put it, "the power of mental attack"; and by the power of mental attack we are to understand the ability of the individual to adjust himself to a complex and novel situation. Adjustment to one's social environment may require a degree of mental organization as complex as that required to adjust one's self to his most intricate intellectual environment. Social ad-

justment is probably of a higher order, qualitatively speaking, than intellectual adjustment; and if we may be privileged to make a distinction between the social order and the moral order (and the plan of the present thesis requires such a distinction), we shall readily see that moral sensitiveness represents the acme of mental organization.

In a future chapter we shall be led to see that moral adjustment, especially in its highest form, will require a degree of organization that is really creative, which is probably not true of any other form of our mental experience. If we can be led to believe that some phases of our higher intellectual nature cannot be well accounted for by any intricacy of neural organization, it will be easy to believe that the neural mechanism would be still less capable of affording a sufficient foundation for the higher moral self.

The second order of relations, or the relation of the present mental state to past mental states, may be easily exemplified. This means nothing more or less than the fact that we ordinarily learn through experience. Though such is the rule rather than the exception, sufficient examples could easily be adduced to show that not all people are capable of profiting by experience, whether intellectual or moral. An experienced teacher could cite any number of instances in which students have failed on account of their own negligence but have nevertheless not profited by such experience. This is likewise true of moral delinquencies. One moral delinquency is usually followed by another; one slip from the strait and narrow path is likely to be followed by others.

The nature of an experience

At this point in our discussion it might be well to say a little concerning the psychology of experience. What is meant by real experience in its relation to the moral self? Surely it is quite inconceivable that the moral self should not profit by its mistakes. In the strict sense of the term no one has ever failed to profit by his experiences. When we have occasion to point out concrete examples, in which some specific individual falls successively into one error after another, in which one punishment is shortly succeeded by another, *ad libitum*, or in which

one failure in the classroom succeeds another in rapid succession, the conclusion to be drawn is not to the effect that the individual concerned has failed to profit by his experiences, but rather that such an individual has had no real experience. It is true that he has been the recipient of pain and perhaps of superficial humiliation. If we were to analyze his moral self, we should be sure to find that no true moral motive had been developed; no new desire had been inculcated. In other words, no feeling or motive or desire had penetrated the depth of the self to occasion a new organization, the only true source of higher moral values.

In this opening chapter only a word need be said concerning the relation of the self to the world. Well-known writers on social questions (such as Baldwin, Dewey, and William McDougall) have made it clear to us that much of what we call conscience is social consciousness; but from this truth we are not to infer that the whole of one's moral nature is but the result of social approval or disapproval. If this were the case, there would be no possibility of any individual's rising above his social environment. That occasionally isolated individuals do manage to rise head and shoulders above that which is sanctioned by their surroundings, either immediate or mediate, could be verified by pointing to some of the world's greatest characters. Goldsmith's characterization of the village preacher may be a case in point:

> As some tall cliff that lifts its awful form,
> Swells from the vale, and midway leaves the storm,
> Though round its breast the rolling clouds are spread,
> Eternal sunshine settles on its head.

The principle that I wish to make clear is that much which we are to discover, to accomplish, or to bring to fruition in many phases or aspects of the surrounding world (whether it be intellectual, or social, or purely spiritual) must be more or less clearly recognized as a fact or ideal within our own self. We usually discover only that which we are looking for, and it is not often that great inventions or great ideas are the result of chance or

providence. But, on the other hand, he who is fortunate enough to discover within his own self some latent but dynamic ideal has already achieved a greater success than the vast majority of mankind may expect. Mankind today seems to be suffering from a dearth of ideals. We are more likely to be shocked by the nature of our ideals than by the discovery of an ideal. Social and moral ideals are not mere mental products that have been by chance merely hit upon, or even the result of having come into contact with an agreeable social milieu, but the natural result of a growing and expanding self, the truly apperceptive self. Good things come from within. Morally speaking, nothing ever happens to the self; nothing ever happens within the self; but everything happens on account of the self.

Experience as a feeling of moral enlargement

So far the chief subject of this chapter has been described in terms of fundamental relations, and in the last few paragraphs we have endeavored to explain the meaning of experience, first as we ordinarily understand the term, and secondly in a more restricted sense, and not merely as that which comes within the range of perception or as that which occasions some association or mental process, but as that which occasions expansion within the self, a feeling of moral enlargement, a sense of growth. Unless otherwise stated, the reader must understand that it is in this restricted sense that the term *experience* is to be used throughout these pages. It would appear that in no other way may the dignity of the moral self be established and maintained. There may be an inner sense of dignity, if not from the Kantian point of view, then from the point of view of a personality or self that strives to attain the best. Anyone who is at all interested in the phenomena of the moral self will readily perceive that the thesis here maintained is not at all in sympathy with the pseudo-self of the ultrabehaviorists.

Threefold embodiment of the self:
1. Truth
2. Art
3. Volition

We must now dispense with the use of abstract terms and come into closer quarters with the function and content of the self. I shall say as little as possible about the origin of the content, as this is to be taken up in the following chapters, but shall

endeavor simply to reflect the content as we find it. The ordinary text or treatise on psychology describes such content under the heading of cognition, affection, and conation, or, more simply stated, the knowing, feeling, and willing processes. These three forms of mental experience exhaust all the possibilities of our subjective life. The psychologist is interested in the analysis of each of these three forms of mental life. We whose interest, for the present at least, is not that of the psychologist are interested in the products of cognition or truth; likewise we are interested in art, the concrete embodiment of the feelings; while volition as the conscious issue of the active self is the only true foundation of one's constructive nature. It may seem unwise to make any attempt to distinguish between the various aspects of the self. So far as the self is really a self, and not a mere group or aggregate of facts, associations, images, memories, etc., its content may be described as cognitive, affective, or volitional in accordance with that particular phase of its functioning.

Moral self an attitude

From what has already been said it is to be inferred that one's moral nature is not to be radically distinguished from any other phase of his nature or mental make-up. Every act, whether it be cognitive, affective, or volitional, possesses moral possibilities. Instead of describing one's moral self in terms of intellectual, emotional, and volitional experiences it would be better to describe it in terms of a qualitative attitude which is always turned in the direction of the reciprocal interests of society and of self. It may be well to say a few words concerning the origin and direction of such a reciprocal attitude, — an attitude which I have seen fit to call moral.

Four requisites of the moral self: 1. Ideals 2. Feelings 3. Tendencies 4. Organization

At this stage of our discussion of one's moral nature it will be well to mention four requisites of the moral life, the absence of any one or more of which would seriously interfere with a true moral self. First we would mention the significance of moral ideas or ideals. A second indispensable factor is moral feeling; a third requisite is the tendencies in the direction of approved or moral behavior. Although these three factors are absolutely

necessary as constituent elements in every dependable character whose interests are said to be moral, or benevolent, or just, nevertheless the absence of a fourth factor would be sufficient to convert a saint into a sinner. The fourth factor to be mentioned, which is likely to come rather late in one's moral experience, if indeed it ever comes at all, is the factor of mental organization; and by mental organization we are to understand the unification of all our moral ideas, ideals, feelings, and tendencies to action. Until the union of ideals, feelings, and tendencies toward virtuous behavior has been largely attained, there is no moral nature or moral self in any true sense of the word.

Unity, consistency, harmony

Unity, consistency, harmony, is the order of the moral self no less than in the realm of art, science, philosophy, and the cosmos. Thought, whether it be purely intellectual or moral, must always be burdened with a sense of unity. Perhaps an example will help to make an abstract conception concrete.

It is not at all uncommon to meet people who seem to be well endowed with intellectual capacity, whose emotional endowment may rightly be described as kindly and affable, and, so far as human observation is concerned, who are well endowed with will power; but further analysis will sometimes reveal the fact that the real unified moral self is as conspicuously absent as its raw materials are clearly present. The lack of proper association or organization seems to offer a sufficient explanation. It is true that moral delinquency is often traced to the absence of mental content, but such an explanation is not to be resorted to in the case of a highly endowed mind. It would sometimes seem that the actuality of a highly organized moral character is inversely proportional to the possibilities of a moral character in terms of its raw materials. A heap of costly and varied raw materials is not to be identified with a stately cathedral. The cathedral is the resultant of bricks and stones and marble put together in accordance with an ideal plan. It is easier to build a stately castle than to create a moral personality. The moral personality constructs itself. The castle is constructed by other selves.

Moral self demands permanent moral environment

The question may well be asked, How is it possible to account for the essential elements of the higher self, right ideas, right feelings, and even goodly intentions (alas, with the consummated moral action often left out)? At this stage of our discussion but one answer will be ventured. Every science requires a unit of measure, at least a standard that remains relatively permanent for a considerable length of time. A constantly changing environment, especially during the early years of childhood and of youth, makes a set standard of behavior impossible. The principle still remains true even though the ever-changing environment be considered strictly moral. It is not so much the fact that the child's surroundings are interchangeably good or bad as the fact that there is constant change. A varied social environment is a requisite for the unification of a well-ordered moral economy, but heterogeneous experiences are disastrous if too freely met with early in one's moral career. We may well agree with the view suggested by the so-called social realists (John Milton and others), but not too many stimuli, social or otherwise, are to be advocated before the age of adolescence. Perhaps the reconcilers of old Parmenides and Heraclitus can still be of some service to us. Who knows but that the adage of the golden mean may help to keep us from trying to adjust a growing moral nature to a too varied social environment? How else can we account for the rather unstable and flickering moral make-up of large numbers of theatrical perambulators if not by the principle just mentioned?

There is some truth in the statement that the individual is at the mercy of his associations, but the inadequacy of associations to account for all the virtues and vices of which the human soul is heir will be fully considered in due season. We shall say more about this later.

Classification of types relative and not absolute

Now, after having noted some of the more conspicuous attributes of the mind or self (and it will be observed that so far no very definite attempt has been made to distinguish the meaning of these terms), or perhaps the absence of such attributes, it

remains for us to mention some of the different types of character on the basis of the absence or presence of a particular mental trait. Again let us remember, as we have before observed, that an absolute or objective classification has no real existence. There are no fixed types. In this day and age it is almost dangerous to classify human tendencies. How many psychologists have made out fine lists of instincts and emotions? We are even told not only that it is futile to classify instincts, but that it is puerile even to postulate the very existence of instincts. But let it be remembered that the present writer is rather old-fashioned in his views. It will be necessary to beg the pardon of the extreme behaviorists. Perhaps it would not be well to follow the rule of the old Stoics and set up the categories of the fool and the philosopher. Perhaps some of my readers will see fit to combine the two! Nevertheless philosophers do exist, as Plato would have us believe; but whether philosophy is based on wonder or whether philosophy is the mental resultant of a full stomach, as MacDougall suggests, we can only leave experience to decide. In whatever way the question may be decided, this book will seek to set forth the essential steps in the development of a moral philosophy of life. No aim other than this will be considered worth while. There are, indeed, many philosophies of life, but as yet we are not ready to set out on the task of examining them all. It will be better to return to the specific subject with which we began this paragraph.

Criminality not primarily anthropological

Modern anthropologists are no longer willing to abide by the decision of the older anthropologists, such as Cesare Lombroso, in their endeavor to resolve mankind into two types, — those who by their physiognomy are born to be criminals and those who are not. Surely no normal human being is born to be a criminal.

It is a sorry thing when social workers, and moralists, and even philosophers see fit to attribute criminality and wrongdoing to biological inheritance. Such a way of explaining wrongdoing is a close analogy to rationalization, — a term used by

modern writers on abnormal psychology to indicate a species of false reasoning. How often do we hear the statement, "It runs in the family." Such a statement may be true, but it is not true in the sense in which it is made. Criminality, vice, and all forms of delinquency may run in the family, but it runs in the family not primarily on account of biological considerations, but rather on account of evil influences, unwholesome associations, that are the natural accompaniment of a vicious environment.

Substantial moral self may be attributed to lack of early training

Early training has much to do with the molding of character, but the lack of early training may have as much to do in the development of a substantial moral self as the early inculcation of the choicest of virtues. Clearly to perceive such a principle would be sufficient to establish its verity. Is it not true that early education may be the greatest enemy of education? Early specialization is often disastrous and far-reaching in its consequences. Early technical education may be altogether detrimental in biasing the mind for all time to come, but early moral specialization may lead not only to the narrowing of the thought processes, but, what is of more moment, to permanent mental disorder.

Respective contributions of nature and nurture not well established

As the present purpose is to classify persons only in so far as such classifications have a bearing on moral problems, it will be well to set forth a few more types that will be of considerable importance in helping us to understand human nature in its various ramifications. It still remains true, as Pope said long ago, that the proper study of mankind is man; but, although we are fully engaged in such a study, it is well enough to be aware that we are not always sure of the dividing line between that which constitutes original human nature and that which is an acquisition of human nature. To establish clearly such a dividing line is surely a task with which the modern psychologist may well wrestle. Great and momentous issues await its solution; and until such a dividing line between nature and nurture is fully established, the problems of the sociologist, the moralist, and the philosopher will remain indefinite and confused.

Some types of humanity

So far the various writers in the field of education and morals have offered, it would seem, little more than intelligent guesses concerning the respective contributions of nature and nurture to the science of man-making. The psychology of the older order and that of the newer order seem to be engaged in a life-and-death struggle, and as to the outcome we may not yet be privileged to guess. However that may be, we may still continue to believe that man will remain the master of his destiny; and we must keep in mind the uncertainties in regard to the respective contributions of nature and nurture to the science of man-making when we are trying to account for those more or less opposed types of humanity whom we have seen fit to call pessimist and optimist, extrovert and introvert, egoist and altruist, individualist and socialist, etc., — names that would seem to imply various ethical qualities.

I have consciously chosen the more or less opposed terms common to ethical literature as manifestations of the self, not only because such terms are in common use and everyone is acquainted with their meaning and significance, but because of the very fact that they are symbols of a unified self. The very term *self* always implies unity and consistency, and the pessimist and the optimist are always to be depended upon so far as their decisions relative to the world are concerned. The mere intellect of man may err and fall into all sorts of axiomatic absurdities.

Optimism and pessimism are temperamental productions

Our ideals and feelings may unconsciously flit from one extreme to another, apparently without reason; our wills may seem powerful in our decisions today and correspondingly weak and passive tomorrow; but alas! the pessimist is always pessimistic, and the optimist is always optimistic. Ordinarily the pessimist and the optimist are not overendowed with mental possibilities. Perhaps their consistency and dependableness are sufficient to compensate for their weaknesses. The fervent spirit of the optimist is not daunted though his prayers be unanswered. The ecstasies of divine fellowship were sufficient for a Schleiermacher. The beaming nature of a David Hume still continued

to shine though his books fell dead from the press. Emerson tells us that consistency has no place in the life of a great man. What a great man may formulate in accordance with theory an ordinary pessimist may negate in terms of practice. Pessimism and optimism are pseudo-philosophies of life. They are temperamental productions rather than intellectual creations.

Within the literature of the pessimist and the optimist we are not able to discover a healthy philosophy of life; nevertheless it is in the writings of the great pessimists that one may discover the keenest delineations of human nature. In evidence of such a fact we need only to turn to the writings of Hobbes, Schopenhauer, or even Nietzsche.

The introvert and the extrovert

With the introvert and the extrovert we are not here especially concerned. Such terms are more applicable as attributes of the abnormal mind than of the normal mind. So far as we are concerned with the self that looks within rather than without, it would perhaps be better to employ the phrases *subject-minded* and *object-minded*, *the introspectionist* and *the observationist*. Such mental practices are not primarily of moral significance; for it is true, though not necessarily true, that he who is busily engaged in observing the affairs of the world and of man may be an individual with a character spotless and unsullied, while his brother, forever looking within and searching his conscience for intuition and counsel, may never find time to perform a single moral act.

That the man of thought and the man of action do not ordinarily reside in the same personality James has long ago made clear to us. The very fact that the power of observation and the power of introspection do not ordinarily reside in the same personality is another reason why we should postulate unity as the essential element of the moral self. Fortunate is the mind that is facile in observing both itself and the world.

The doctrine of apperception

It is only when our interests are concerned with the advancement of the range and content of the self that introspection and self-consciousness become of primary importance as compared

with observation. In our treatment of the relation of the self to the objective world, as has already been noted, little of interest is to be discovered in the world unless such interest is in some form already resident within us. Upon reflection it would seem that such a principle must be at the foundation of much of our best pedagogical and moral instruction. This is a simple statement of the doctrine of apperception, — apperception not only in accordance with the doctrine as formulated by Herbart and his disciples, which seemingly is little more than mere mental assimilation, but apperception as expounded by such writers as Stout and McDougall. In this form of the doctrine each newly acquired idea or moral impulse is immediately converted into usable mental or moral tissue.

Plato's doctrine of an organized state as analogous to an organized mind is an example, from the political point of view, of the general thesis set forth in the preceding paragraph. Any number of concrete examples will readily occur to the average reader. It is comparatively easy to become acquainted with the world about us when we have become acquainted with our mental mechanism. One's real thought-out knowledge of the world is to a considerable extent but the accrued interest on the self. There is some truth in the saying that no one ever discovers anything worth while in the world until he discovers something worth while in himself. We cannot respect others until we respect ourselves. As William McDougall somewhere says, there is still hope for the drunkard so long as a spark of self-respect remains. If such statements as I have set forth are at all in accordance with established fact, it certainly behooves the earnest student to become thoroughly acquainted with himself.

Developing interest in mental sciences

No one seems to deny significance to our knowledge of the cosmos in terms of the laws of coexistence and sequence, but all significance seems to lapse when it comes to spending a lifetime in an endeavor to discover and to formulate the real nature of the self. The signs of the times seem to be changing, however, and a great number of students are directing their attention to

various phases of the mental and social sciences. Some seem to be interested in the mental processes only from the standpoint of pure science, caring little for the practical applications to everyday life. But the vast majority of those who have become enamored of the intricacies of the human mind are spending their time not so much in trying to discover new laws of the human mind as in applying the laws that have already been formulated. Even ministers of the gospel have resorted to the laboratory for the latest prescription that would tend to pacify the mind of their doubting congregations. No longer is the Bible alone in the field for furnishing a suitable text for the Sunday-morning theme. Psychology has become a friend rather than an enemy of the Scriptures. Who knows but that psychology may become the handmaiden of religion, though not of theology?

Significance of mental therapeutics

In addition to the educational, religious, and business organizations — in nearly every phase of individual and social interest — psychology has recently entered the realm of the abnormal. Psychotherapeutics has become one of the most fascinating subjects of the day. Such a subject is not only fascinating and interesting but practical for suffering mankind. It would seem that every weakness of the self will find its cure in some modern or future discovery of the laws that determine the self. The discoveries and practical applications of the modern psychologist have already far surpassed the most enthusiastic dreams of Utopia. Our best hopes for man lie largely in his discoveries in the near future. The storehouses of the mind have scarcely been tapped.

Prejudice as the foundation of character

In a previous paragraph, in which an attempt was made to classify ordinary humanity in terms of pessimism and optimism, introvert and extrovert, etc., it was explained that such types were chosen as representatives or manifestations of the self from the very fact that the pessimist was always consistently a pessimist, the optimist always consistently an optimist. Now, when a person is classified as an individualist or a socialist or collectivist, the same principle of consistency seems to hold true.

Once a confirmed individualist, always a confirmed individualist. No one has ever known a person who was an individualist to become converted to the principles of socialism. This book will not stress individualism or socialism as such; it is not a treatise on sociology. The thing to be noted is that whenever the mind or self or ego or some other substantial aspect of one's mental life takes a certain turn or set or bias or prejudice early in life, such an experience, whether it be conscious or unconscious, colors and becomes the principle of interpretation throughout life. A prejudice early in life may be sufficient to become the background of a permanent philosophy of life. It is likely that prejudice is the foundation for most moral natures even of the very highest order. Prejudice is strictly honest. But beyond the early states of one's moral experience it should have no further rôle to play. It can give us conscience; it can make us fairly respectable citizens; but it can never lift us much above the environment in which we happen to be born. It is never creative.

The true self is the social self

Beyond the fact that individualism and socialism stand as representatives of rather distinct social and moral philosophies of life, and that each represents the functioning of a mental type, and beyond the further inference that prejudice or early training, rather than heredity, is really at the basis of such distinction, there are historic reasons why such types of self are appropriate for discussion. Moral philosophers of all ages, but more especially of modern times, have vied with one another in respect to the virtues and vices of one or the other of these philosophies. Not only have extreme individualists endeavored to uphold individualism and thereby make the interests of society incidental thereto, but the socialists and collectivists have been equally extreme in the presentation of their views. Still others with broader vision would reconcile the interests of the individual with the interests of society. Herbert Spencer tells us that the reconciliation of the interests of the individual and the interests of society is the crux of the whole moral problem; and

Immanuel Kant, writing many years before Spencer was born, seems to find sufficient proof for a special moral faculty in the supposed fact that the interests of the individual were necessarily antagonistic to the interests of society. Nothing more will be said at this time concerning the rights and interests of the individual and the rights and interests of society as a whole. In due time it will be amply demonstrated that the true individual moral self can be nothing else than the true social moral self.

Self-observation important for self-evaluation

Two other phases of moral integrity remain to be discussed in our introductory chapter: self-consciousness and the sources of the sense of self-unity. Self-consciousness will first be considered, and by self-consciousness we are not to understand that form of consciousness that interferes with the performance of tasks, nor that ability on the part of the trained psychologist which enables him to disassemble and reassemble the simplest elements of consciousness, — in other words, to introspect; nor is it to be implied that consciousness by its very nature presupposes self-consciousness, or that objective reference necessarily demands subjective reference, as some psychologists would have us believe; but by self-consciousness is to be understood the ability of the individual to look at himself, to evaluate his ideals and motives, to consider himself a moral agency, and to estimate himself in terms of real worth. Such a form of self-observation and self-evaluation might and should imply that consciousness accompanies much of our intellectual, moral, and even physical functioning; but such an accompanying consciousness is not to be confused with self-embarrassment, — a kind of consciousness that militates against skill and efficiency.

Self-criticism a real sign of intelligence

Perhaps it will be well to mention other more intimate values of self-consciousness. Surely there is no other practice in one's mental life more indicative of moral integrity than the attempt at moral self-evaluation. Some writers on psychological subjects make self-criticism a true sign of intelligence. It may be dogmatically stated that without self-criticism there is little worth-while intelligence and no true morals. We may say with Kant that

actions may be performed in accordance with duty but not from duty. Perhaps it will be well to summarize some of the more intimate values of self-observation. There can be no true volition without self-consciousness. This in itself, of course, does not make such a volition a moral volition. We should like to believe that to know what is right is to do what is right, but actual human behavior seems to run counter to such a cherished ideal. Then again, there is probably no true moral sympathy that is not based on self-observation. Such a sympathy is an abiding sympathy, — a sympathetic sentiment and not a mere emotional sympathy. Such a sympathy, if it exists, is an acquired mental product. How is it possible for one to look within himself and to note carefully his real interests without finding them in some way or other related to the interests of others? That which one clearly perceives to be worth while for himself he will perceive to be worth while for other selves.

Real moral freedom must be earned

Perhaps no one will see fit to deny the assertion that self-consciousness is the first step in the establishment of human freedom. In a later chapter it will be more fully explained that freedom is not given but earned. It would seem that the highest products of the self must be earned. No one may ever attain freedom without a real desire for freedom. Any teacher of experience is well aware that his chief function is to develop in his pupils the desire to learn. But alas! how often is he doomed to failure!

Observation is natural in the growing self

From what has been said relative to the values of the consciousness of self in the development of moral personality it is not to be inferred that the chief task of the teacher is the development of such a consciousness at the expense of observation. Observation is natural to child nature and should be encouraged in the earliest stages of the educative process. In accordance with actual fact, object consciousness is the rule and subject consciousness the exception. Carlyle even goes so far as to say that the beginning of self-observation is the beginning of disease. Surely the self that does not advance beyond its own borders

for information will not do very much to make the world a better place in which to live. The influence of Socrates was probably limited by the fact that his interests were largely devoted to the microcosm and by his conscious neglect of the objective world.

Self-consciousness not grounded on basis of evolution

But, on the contrary, he who is normally encouraged to take an interest in the world about him may in due season develop a degree of inner consciousness that will be sufficient for all ordinary purposes. It is much better to be a normal human being with normal objective interests than to become a psychologist. The great psychologist is not normally a psychologist because he elects or chooses to be; he is a psychologist because some inherited tendency toward introspection usually forces him to be. So our conclusion is that any precocious tendency toward inner observation is not best. Evolution furnishes us no principle which says that self-consciousness should take precedence over world-consciousness. Everyday experience would tend to prove that there is much in our acquired ability to observe consciousness that would assist one in developing his own moral self and the moral self of others. We will now discuss some of the various sources of the sense of mental unity. The sources of such unity have taxed the insight and ingenuity of psychologists of all ages.

Some forms of thought

Philosophers, psychologists, and thinkers through all the ages have played with the words *unity* and *diversity*, *permanence* and *change*, *one* and *the many*, *singularism* and *pluralism*, and other pairs of terms with more or less opposed meanings. These pairs of terms have been used to characterize the nature of the mind; they have been employed no less to make concrete the nature of the world. Such expressions have likewise played an important rôle in describing the relation of the mind to the body and the relation of the body to the mind. Indeed, oneness and manyness seem to be the chief categories of thought. Perhaps we may be able to discover some good reason why thought seems to take such ready-made forms. It is true that such terms are easy to understand. It is likewise true that consciousness always tends

in the direction of least complexity and greatest simplicity. Thought forces no less than physical forces tend to follow the line of least resistance. That such a principle holds true even when we come to trace the moral forces in the field of ethics is no great surprise to students of the self.

Thought unifies itself and the world

Perhaps we may come into closer quarters with the word *unity*. In what sense is unity more characteristic of the mind than diversity? So far as the mental processes are concerned, every real act of thought must occasion unity. Thought in its very essence is a unifying agency. Thinking, as Spencer would say, must be a matter of relating, and relating must always bring about some sort of logical affinity. Every constructive act of the mind brings unity into the world. Not only does every constructive thought process help to convert heterogeneity into homogeneity, dissimilarities into similarities, manyness into oneness in the thought relations themselves, but the same procedure at the same time points out similar relations in the objective world. So far only an attempt has been made to say that thought unifies the objective world and thought unifies itself; but now another question may be asked, What is the source of that unity which is the essence of the self? This is the unity in which we are especially interested. In the very degree to which such a unity is attained or maintained lies the chief distinction between the normal mind and the abnormal mind. There are numerous ways and byways in which the self may lose its unity and identity, but first of all it will be necessary to show how the mind develops into a self or selves.

Sources of selfhood:
1. Sensations
2. Purposes
3. Associations

There are three fundamental sources of selfhood. The first two will be explained in this opening chapter; the third will be taken up in detail in the body of this book. The three sources of selfhood are (1) general bodily sensations, (2) fundamental purposes, and (3) mental associations. No attempt will now be made to estimate or evaluate the older conceptions of the self as maintained by some philosophers and theologians. Our purpose will be to trace the growth of unity in the self as

Herbert Spencer traced its growth from common knowledge into scientific knowledge and from scientific knowledge into philosophic knowledge.

Organic sensation as background of self

Some of the older psychologists (James and Ribot and others) and many present-day psychologists, who either were or are no longer interested in searching for the so-called pure self for psychological purposes, have readily hit upon other sources of unity. Such a self satisfies all the demands of the empiricists, though it may not be sufficient to meet the needs of the rationalist. This, to be sure, implies the nonexistence of the pure ego with its innate unity. There is a unity, but it is empirical in its very nature. Such a self, we are told, may attain any height of distinction and purity. It may function in terms of a good will that is just as unique as that of Kant. And the question may rightly be asked, Why is that unity which is claimed to be founded upon everyday experience any the less a oneness than the oneness that is not based on everyday experience? The extreme empiricist or sensationalist believes that there is nothing in the mind but that which comes through sensation. He finds not only that the mind is entirely composed of sensations or their copies but also that the so-called bodily and organic sensations form the background and foundation for that sense of mental unity which is called the self. This is the doctrine of the sensationalist in a nutshell, both as to content and as to form. We need not discuss such a contention. It contains a goodly degree of truth. Organic sensations serve well as a foundation. Possibly it may be well to state that such a unity is not a constituent element in the self itself, but simply the most dependable and reliable background. The verity of such a thesis requires no further explanation than the experience of the self upon the occasion of sudden changes in the bodily and organic sensations. Pathology offers numerous examples.

Significance of ideals and purposes

If sensations both muscular and organic serve as a background of insulation for the self, what are we to say concerning the origin of the form and structure of the self? Here we come to

higher forms of experience. Must we go beyond the reach of everyday empirical fact? This question must be answered in the negative. The most highly organized self is woven from the strands of our most persistent ideals and purposes. These are the threads upon which our higher life experiences are strung. Our personalities are continuous with our ideals and purposes. The growth, development, and decay of personality means little more than the growth, development, and decay of life's ideals. When such elements of higher human experiences are absent, personality must be correspondingly absent. Ideals and purposes are the advance agents, true messengers of the oncoming moral self. Without such signboards the self never reaches its rightful destination. Success in life is little more than the choosing of proper signboards.

As the mind takes on its finishing touches, duty, obligation, and virtue no longer remain duty, obligation, and virtue. He who develops the sense of duty no longer possesses the sense of duty. Duty has lost its sting. Duty is that mental drill with which we tap new storehouses of moral energy. The moral self has no moral obligations as such. Moral obligation is a contradiction in terms.

Perhaps enough has been said concerning a certain phase or aspect of the mind called the self. Much of what has been said in elucidation has centered in a general way about the topics of meaning, relations, organization, and unity. Unity has been our most important thesis,— a moral unity as well as a psychological unity.

The interests of the next chapter will be more or less biological, and the term *biological* will be used in a sense which includes mental phenomena that ordinarily would not be included under this category. Some attempt will be made to summarize those major tendencies, capacities, and traits which help to make possible the growth, development, and organization of that which for convenience will be called the moral self, or, more simply, one's moral character.

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CHAPTER II

THE SELF AS BIOLOGICALLY CONDITIONED: PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL TENDENCIES

The primacy of action

There is much truth in the statement that action is primary, feeling is secondary, and intellect is tertiary. Such an ordering of human behavior is, of course, not always true to fact. After all corrections and emendations have been made, it still remains true that normal intellectual functioning should not only end in some form of action but must begin in action. Real everyday experience would seem to be sufficient to establish such a thesis. Perhaps some concrete facts will make the matter clear. Ordinary book knowledge can never be considered real knowledge. Such information is scarcely ever organized so far as the reader is concerned. The products of synthesis are never as important as the processes of synthesis. Products of synthesis are usually little more than gleaned or passively assimilated facts, but the processes of synthesis always imply some sort of sustained activity. Sustained mental activity always implies an apperceptive activity; it means mental expansion, a new and ever-enlarging determination. Soft-cushioned chairs and well-padded classroom procedure are never conducive to self-enlargement. It is a sound pedagogical principle that that which is to function dynamically must first be organized dynamically. For thought to be organized dynamically one's whole being must be literally alive with attentive action. Ears, eyes, attention, a scintillating intellect, a purposeful and well-unified self must all partake of the process. Anyone who has had extensive experience in constructive debating is well aware of the principle set forth in this paragraph. Thinking on one's feet is real thinking and is far in advance of the soft

pedagogy that is now so deeply rooted in most of our educational institutions. Students seem to be losing the art of constructive thought.

Distinction between processes and products of synthesis

If all this holds true of ordinary intellectual behavior (and surely no honest student will seek to gainsay what has been said), such a principle will be doubly applicable in the development of a dynamic self, a moral personality. If we make a distinction between the processes and the products of synthesis in the presentation of scientific facts, we must not hesitate to infer that it is of equal importance to distinguish clearly between the means by which the self becomes endowed with virtue and the possession of a virtue. In the realm of everyday experience it is better to know how to arrive at a certain truth than merely to receive the same truth from someone else. Products and processes in the educative process are not to be confused. Of course, we must not neglect the fact that mere itemized knowledge may be of considerable value, and that virtue which is a matter of routine is of no small importance; nevertheless we should guard against the tendency to let the better become an enemy of the best. In this day and age we are prone to buy in the cheapest moral markets, — to purchase our ethical qualities rather than to make them. The most costly goods in the moral market cannot be purchased or sold, though without such wares mankind would readily perish. There are no moral gifts. Intellectual and moral gullibility is concretely evidenced in the ordinary classroom procedure. How prone are the students of the normative sciences to glean as many undigested theories as possible in the allotted time! How prone is the teacher to sanction such a procedure! The pedagogical sins of the college notebook will probably never be fully revealed. Is it any wonder that moral philosophers have theorized concerning the efficacy of formal moral instruction? The real question, Can morals be taught? has never been satisfactorily answered. The answer to this grave moral issue may be haltingly set forth as follows: Ethics may be taught, moral virtues may be incul-

cated, only when the student and the teacher both come to distinguish and to put into practice the moral differences involved between the conscious processes of synthesis and its more or less unconscious products. We shall now return to the thesis with which this chapter set out, namely, to the consideration of the psychobiological tendencies of the self.

Intelligence an outgrowth of action

To make clear one of the main psychobiological principles of this chapter we may quote from Stout: "The growth of our intellectual nature consists in the growing definiteness and determinateness of our active nature." [1] Tendencies to action are innately stamped in the human organism. Action is a biological fact par excellence. Moralists, philosophers, and educators of all ages have recognized more or less clearly the significance of action for intellectual and moral development. Functionalism was characteristic of the Greek. Socrates and Aristotle are typical exemplars of moralists who endeavored to build upon the principle of activity. That true intellectual functioning inevitably issues into a moral functioning has become almost proverbial since the days of Socrates. If this Socratic maxim be taken to imply knowledge and virtue based upon first-hand human experience in its social setting, we shall be forced to grant it a goodly degree of truth. Why should true intelligence and true morals be divorced? It is one of the main theses of this book that the highest human values, from their very nature, have a tendency to cling together, to organize, and to become one. Great ideas and great ideals are pals. This thesis does not imply that ordinary knowledge and virtue are one. Ethical theory is not ethical practice. Ideas about morality are not moral ideas. To talk about goodness is one thing; to be good is quite another thing. All this may be fully granted without prejudice to the organic relation of true knowledge to true virtue. We may agree with the Greeks when they say that wisdom is the mother of all the virtues.

[1] G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology, Vol. II, p. 238. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

Though Aristotle does not uphold the thesis that knowledge and morals are one, nevertheless he advocates functionalism when he bids us to expand into a moral nature by practicing moral habits. "We learn to do by doing." This doing is that with which we are primarily endowed. It is necessarily the forerunner, and the prime mover, of our intellectual and moral integrity. Plato is also something of an activist. Does he not tell us that it is the function of the eye to see? His doctrine of "ideas" is made to bear fruit in the experience of man. Later in this work we shall essay a brief statement concerning the doctrine of Platonic love.

Since we are tracing the moral self to its biological beginnings in human activity, it will be well to say a few words relative to some modern applications in the field of education and morals. Froebel's educational system is based on action, — a form of action called play. Many modern educators have made play the rightful foundation of their educational philosophy. Though Froebel made play essential to his educational scheme, he did not interpret play in the light of modern biology. Froebel, being a philosopher, did not hesitate to make play, as manifested in the child, a form of cosmic energy. Perhaps this will help us to understand why education should aim to moralize the universe. As it is not our purpose to write a treatise on educational psychology, but to establish firmly some of the more important foundations of the moral self, enough has been said to make it clear that action is natural and necessary to the success of any moral scheme. In the proper place the pedagogy of moral activity will receive due consideration.

Morals related to definiteness of action

Let us now return to that statement previously quoted, which says that the growth of our intellectual nature consists in the growing definiteness and determinateness of our active nature. Also we may add that the growth of our moral nature is dependent upon the same sources. If it is true that growing consistency in thought depends upon the growing consistency in action, it is equally true that consistency in morals is dependent upon con-

sistency in action. This seems to be a truism in practice as well as in theory. That which is analytically true cannot be empirically false. At this stage in our discussion we must not fail to note that natural tendencies to action are always accompanied by natural interests. Interest is a prime factor in moral pedagogy. It is natural for native interests to develop into moral interests. Those who claim that it is easier to be moral than immoral are not mistaken. Rousseau's tirade against formal society in its tendency to destroy original human nature is not far from the truth. Formal society does destroy our original human nature so far as certain human qualities are concerned. This is not an endeavor to uphold that which is wholly objectionable in the writings of Rousseau.

Three stages in development of moral activity:

We shall now consider a few psychobiological actions and tendencies, with their accompanying interests, from three points of view: (1) the unconscious development of interests and tendencies to action; (2) the conscious and purposeful development of interests and tendencies; (3) the abnormal development of interests and tendencies. These three points will be treated in the following paragraphs. The reader or student will please bear in mind that each paragraph and chapter in this book has for its chief objective, directly or indirectly, some phase of the ever-developing moral self.

1. Unconscious development of interest and action tendencies

Anyone interested in the growth and expansion of the normal personality has probably observed three more or less clearly defined stages of development: an unconsciously passive, a consciously active, and, finally, the highest of all, the strictly creative. Here we are only concerned with the first, the unconsciously passive, with its interests and tendencies to action. In mental growth it seems to be axiomatic that one mental process seems to attract to itself a like mental process. That like attracts like seems to require no proof. Of course, this is in accordance with the doctrine of apperception. A certain affective state of mind will soon come to call up or become associated with a similar state of mind. This is no less true of the higher ideational

processes. Emotional and ideational congruity represents a well-established tendency toward mental unity. He who is successful enough to implant a budding ideal within the relatively passive though plastic consciousness of the child may confidently expect such an ideal to develop into the fullness of a moral stature. When early moral ideals are unconsciously implanted, moral integrity will not disappoint us. Too much conscious goodness is not fitting to the rapidly enlarging moral self. Persistent consciousness of one's goodness represents a divided goodness, a weakened virtue, — a virtue that is readily dissipated in the interests of self rather than in the interests of others. Real virtue is objective in its functioning. Early habits are best simply because they are unconsciously formed. Early language habits, good or bad, can never be entirely erased. Such habits simply have no mental hooks by which they may be removed. Faith that is lost continues to govern, continues to guide us to our destiny. If such a principle holds true of our ordinary active but fragmentary mental life in terms of emotions, ideas, and habits, whether physical, mental, or even moral, how much more important it is that our organized moral nature, the moral self, receive the stamp of unconscious integrity.

Without any attempt to set forth specific action tendencies, with their accompanying interests, the last paragraph aimed to interpret the significance of the unconscious inculcation of habits, and so far very little has been implied concerning the dependableness of one's properly organized moral nature. Lecturers, popular writers, and even moral philosophers are often prone to question the continuity of one's morals. Character is thoroughly reliable and dependable. The well-organized character cannot go astray. Deception is not an attribute of the unified self. No one expects the moral man to give way to vice; neither are the immoral expected to show consistent virtue. There are no tricks in our moral make-up. We never become good in a day; rather it is a task that is accomplished and measured by the expansive fullness of life. Of course, there is much

deception in the field of morals, but there is no true moral deception. We have no more right to question the laws of the mind than we have to question the laws of nature. To drop from virtue into vice is a misnomer. Even though this is essentially true, virtuous acts consciously performed are measurably less virtuous than the same acts unconsciously performed. Vice conforms to the laws of mental succession. In the following paragraph we shall briefly outline the conscious or purposeful growth of certain biological tendencies, with their accompanying interests.

2. The conscious and purposeful development of interests and tendencies

Purposeful seeking after truth, or the conscious endeavor to better oneself, or the attainment of some aim or purpose has a natural biological basis no less than the unpurposeful strivings of early childhood. Derived interests and conscious purposes are but the overflow of our past primary interests and relatively unconscious purposes. Many opposite tendencies are at work in the mechanism of the mind. Everywhere we see the natural and unconscious strivings of the child gradually develop into the idealized scheming of the adolescent, and the vivid daydreams of the adolescent soon melt away into nothingness. In the growing mind such triple processes constantly replace one another. Call it natural, biological, or psychological; it does not matter; such is mental behavior. The one important thing is that the molder of the moral self clearly perceive such a procedure and take due advantage of its opportunities. As night follows day, and reaping follows sowing, when one functions well it makes easier and more fruitful the functioning of the other. Likewise, the wide-awake purposes of the youth bear fruit the more easily when preceded by successful childhood. The success of the latter depends upon the success of the former. The unhappy child never develops into happy adolescence, and without normal adolescence an ideal adulthood becomes impossible. These are not new truths, but they are truths that demand our utmost obedience. There is always a reason for our intellectual barrenness; no less is there a real cause of moral perversity.

The last two topics have dealt respectively with human

behavior that is relatively spontaneous and not primarily purposeful, and with human strivings that are consciously directed and organized. The play life of the child offers abundant illustrations of the first stage of normal education, whereas our secondary and higher educational institutions should furnish numerous sources for the exercise of our higher purposes. But alas! how often we are doomed to failure and disappointment. The two principles mentioned fall within the reach of everyday mental functioning, and each process is perfectly natural and normal. In the following paragraph it will be our purpose to explain briefly some of the abnormal tendencies of the human self, or, more correctly speaking, some natural tendencies that for one reason or another have become sidetracked and deranged. We must not forget that the laws of disease are just as orderly and definite as the laws of health. The results of mental and moral dissipation are just as inevitable as the results of physical abuse. It is possible to summarize three theses in a nutshell: the aim of education is the proper directing of human tendencies; the lack of education is the failure to develop one's tendencies; and the abnormal self, if we may use the term *self*, results from the misdirecting of human tendencies.

3. The abnormal development of natural tendencies

In our introductory chapter it was stated that nothing sets to work with greater secrecy than the growth and development of personality. At present we are concerned with the emergence of an abnormal personality on the basis of misdirected natural tendencies. The prime sources of mental abnormality lie close to one's very being. If it is true that virtue and vice are closely related (and the two often become inextricably joined), it is equally true that mental abnormality is always watching for a chance to assume control; and the greater the possibilities of the moral self, the graver the danger that such possibilities and capacities will become deranged. There is scarcely an aspect of our psychic experience that is not subject to mental derangement. Abnormal feelings and abnormal ideas cling to perverted natural tendencies in a manner that is similar to our ordinary

mental processes. The emotions and feelings which seem to lie closest to our active life, and therefore most intimately connected with our original mental endowment, seem to be the prime movers in the deterioration of the self. When the feelings and emotions are no longer proportional to their natural causes, mental and moral integrity is no longer possible. An ordinary increase in our active life is likely to be correlated with a corresponding increase in our affective experiences. This, however, holds true only of the normal mind. Usually the derangement of one's higher intellectual processes is closely related to the feelings, so that when one suffers the other suffers. Is it not true that the ideas and notions of the emotionalist are always in harmony with his emotions? The will suffers derangement no less than do feelings and ideas. It has often been said that disease of personality is a disease of the will.

Perhaps enough has been said at present to make clear the principle that the oncoming of the abnormal, or deranged, self inevitably results from the misdirecting of the psychobiological capacities and activities. Much more will be ventured relative to mental abnormality when we come to consider the various phases of psychic synthesis. It might be well to note in passing that decadence of the laws of moral sensitiveness takes precedence over mere intellectual sensitiveness. This statement must not be taken to imply instability in one's moral self, that is, if proper mental synthesis has been attained. When mental disease falls upon us, however, it is a well-known law of mental degeneration that the latest evolved mental faculty will be the first to disappear. In accordance with such a law the highest stretches of mental and moral unity are canceled. Another psychobiological aspect of the mind will attract our attention in the next few paragraphs, namely, the tendency of the mind to maintain or to attain some definite status.

Similar mental states succeed one another

Whether or not it is true that history repeats itself, it is an established fact that mental states, qualitatively speaking, do repeat themselves. This of course does not mean the return of

identical states of mind. Ideas as such do not return. It simply means that an agreeable state of consciousness seems to be the immediate aim. This must not be taken as an attempt to uphold psychological hedonism or any other ethical theory. No one would deny that happiness tends to succeed happiness; and certainly some such principle inevitably, consciously or unconsciously, determines mental sequence. Surely it is an index of disease when an idea or feeling has no tendency to be followed by closely related ideas and feelings. Sudden and uncalled-for changes are sinister phenomena. This is a statement of a simple principle that the moralist may well take advantage of. The concrete application is that right motives, wholesome ideas, and expanding ideals, once firmly implanted within the unfolding self, will at least repeat themselves, and, with proper encouragement, both from without and from within, will in due season develop into a dynamic personality. When teacher and pupil both come to entertain such purposes in life, then and only then will the normal self attain its rightful heritage. Such ideas and ideals are not utopian; they are simply prerequisites in the science of man-making.

Three forms of mental sequence: 1. Emotional 2. Habitual 3. Logical

A further attempt will now be made to substantiate the thesis mentioned in the previous paragraph, namely, the tendency of the mind to maintain its present status or to seek an agreeable form of consciousness. Under this heading there are three avenues of approach: (1) tendencies in the direction of feeling, or emotional sequence, — emotional consistency; (2) habits, or habitual sequence; (3) sequence of ideas, or logical and philosophical consistency. The student must bear in mind that no attempt is made to lay down infallible laws, — laws to which one's feelings or actions or ideas must inevitably conform. As stated before, they are at best only behavior tendencies; they tell us what to expect in the field of feeling, action, and ideation. At this stage of the science of the mind little more may be expected. A science of the mind can scarcely be said to exist. Emotional consistency will first be considered.

1. Emotional consistency

An emotionalist revels in his emotions. It is as natural for one of emotional disposition to take delight in the expression of his emotions as it is for the intellectualist to hug his cherished ideas. Great thinkers worship their theories as the mother worships her child. In a sense it is a misuse of words to speak of emotional consistency. Everyone knows that an emotionalist is the least consistent of all human types. Then why should the expression *emotional consistency* be resorted to? The term will be used in the sense that an individual well endowed with such a disposition is ill at ease until some occasion arises that will satisfy his affective longing. An emotion is also a selecting and a rejecting agency. No idea or theory may be entertained that is not in harmony with the emotional setting. This is the real meaning that one is tempted to read into the phrase *emotional consistency*. The emotionalist is always in earnest, though it may be a blind earnestness.

Moral ideas must incubate

The writer of this book is not expressly concerned with the origin of the emotions, the laws of the emotions, or even the delights that may come to one who is favorably endowed with so soothing a gift. The question that is uppermost for our consideration is, What is the significance of a mellowed affective nature for the enlarging moral self? The main theme of this discussion must not be neglected. If it is true that the ideas, beliefs, and ideals that are to secure a mental footing at all must be congruent with our emotions, then the integrity of the moral nature is advanced and made sure to the very degree that the budding mind has been properly motivated. Early motivation is a theme that no practical moralist can afford to overlook. Moral ideals may have small beginnings and pass through long stages of incubation. Nothing worth while in the category of morals develops overnight. The writer has had considerable experience in observing the oscillatory but slowly developing ideals of adolescents. How often we observe the pseudopodia-like and shifting ideals of the gelatinous freshman gradually develop, through a space of four years, into substantial senior

selfhood. That seniors do not always attain moral selfhood is one of the disappointing phases of one's teaching experience.

Virtue demands abiding interests

A corollary of the principle mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be apropos at this time. To entertain a motive early in life means a lifelong interest. Morally and educationally speaking, lifelong interests are almost the only ones with which we are vitally concerned. It is true that passing interests have their place in the life of everyone, but interests that come and go with the tide cannot organize character. Character is built of more enduring stuff. Every great life centers around some abiding interest. No great system of philosophy that has ever been formulated finds its motive power elsewhere. Aristotle somewhere says in effect that no one is truly moral until he takes an interest in being moral. This is not the place to enlarge upon the well-known doctrine of interest. This topic will receive attention later.

Perhaps enough has been said to make clear the idea of emotional consistency, — how feelings and emotional attitudes, developed early in life, determine corresponding motives, moral or otherwise, and how such motives become poles around which moral concepts are born, grow, and develop. Little need be said to make clear the next topic for discussion, namely, the meaning and moral significance of habits, or what we have seen fit to call habitual sequence. Of course, the sequence of motives and feeling discussed in the preceding paragraphs implies emotional habits, and it is only for the sake of clearness that habit is discussed as a separate topic.

2. Sequence of moral habits

No attempt will be made to set forth the pedagogy of habit formation or even to say much about the significance of habit. The laws of habit formation so well stated by James and others will receive no attention. This does not imply a lack of interest in such formulations; it simply means that that which is done best cannot be done better. It remains for me to state that if it is true, as was stated earlier in this chapter, that the various mental processes tend to maintain their present status, and if

such a procedure is in harmony with the striving after mental agreeableness, then habit, or habitual sequence, is the means by which the self maintains its present status with its resulting agreeableness. The practical application of the principle just stated may be made concrete. Moral habits follow one another in regular succession. This is what moral selfhood means. There is no moral self without moral unity, any more than there is a real self at all without some sort of unity; and at this point the belief may be essayed that the early Stoics were not altogether mistaken when they freely dogmatized about the virtues being one and only one. Yet President Hyde may be right when he gives expression to the idea that no woman was ever consistently a Stoic. Feeling, of course, is partial to moral unity in the sense that while it rejects one it is bound to select another. How often justice is defeated by altruism and the love of humanity, though the love of humanity seeks after justice.

From what has been said it is not to be inferred that unity and order and consistency are the only true issues of the self. Divergency and consistency, however, may reside in the same personality. Perhaps a few examples of great thinkers possessing varying degrees of originality and consistency will be enlightening.

Values of the divergent mind

Emerson would have us believe that consistency has no place in the life of the great man. Whether or not this is true, it cannot be doubted that the great man is often inconsistent. Since the time of James, psychologists have been well acquainted with the so-called serial and divergent minds. The serial mind is the one that works in grooves, — that nonprogressive type of spirit that is characterized by sameness in its mental output, — the ordinary, the everyday type of self; it may be the strictly moral and reliable self. Such selves compose the common lot of mankind. They are the ones who give firmness and foundation to our various institutions, and without such our great and soul-disturbing thinkers would plunge the world into anarchy and despair. On the other hand we have the picture of the divergent type of mind, the genius it may be, the type of self that ordinarily

knows no logic but its own. Such personalities are slowly ferreting out the laws of the world, and even the laws of the mind itself; but these minds do not seem to be amenable to the laws of their own formulation. Both types of thinkers are in demand and seem to be necessary for the betterment of the world. What would the thinking world do without a Kant or a Spencer, — the one to formulate the law of the categorical imperative, that which is to be obeyed, the source of our inner dignity; the other to formulate the principles of absolute ethics, that which is to point out the relations of man to man? Both Kant and Spencer are usually classed as great systematizers and formulators of the laws of the world and of self, that is, as consistent thinkers. Both have given to the world renowned ethical standards, — standards that humanity will not soon cease to obey, though types of moral guidance that are not consistent with one another. One reveres not so much the abstract systems in themselves as the purpose that motivated and actuated such schemes for the grandeur of the moral self. Moralists should be judged by what they sincerely purposed and aimed to accomplish, as much as by what they really have accomplished.

Two other moralists may be mentioned. Here we find less consistency of thought, less profundity, but keenness and versatility, — highly divergent types of mind. When one mentions Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, both moralists with a pessimistic trend, contradiction, error, and inconsistency fill the mental horizon. But who can doubt the moral purpose of such thinkers? To be sure, we are free to doubt and must doubt many of their conclusions relative to man and his world. The realm of Nietzsche's superman beyond the reach of "good and evil" may not elicit our sympathy; neither will the natural compassion, or pity, which Schopenhauer makes the highest moral category, appeal to all; nevertheless such thoughts are the honest expressions of fertile brains and have attracted the attention of many moralists. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were students of the moral self, always bent on understanding its origin and

nature. We can point out no better examples of the inevitable influence of disposition, motive, and prejudice, early inculcated and later working themselves out into a mature philosophy of life.

3. The logic of the moral self

Having considered some of the typical aspects of emotional and habitual sequence, or what may be called emotional and habitual consistency, it now remains for us to interpret a third and last form of consistency, namely, logical consistency.

As it has not been difficult to show that feelings and habits are prone to repeat themselves, so it is not hard to show that thought tends to maintain itself. There is always a tendency for thought to develop a thoughtful disposition. People come to be characterized as thoughtful in the very same way as they come to be known as emotional, or subject to the influence of habits, good or bad. All this will but serve to make a little clearer the thesis so far explained in this chapter. Though the immediate topic before us is logical consistency, it must be fully admitted that bare logic and thought have less to do with the developing and sustaining of moral character than either feeling or habit. Perhaps the situation may be summarized by saying that feeling motivates and individualizes character, whereas habit only blindly maintains character. To say the least, logic and thought give form to character. Abstract reasoning has more to do with the forms of the more purely intellectual self than it has with the content of one's moral nature. Perhaps a brief analogy will help the reader to understand the present problem. One of the tasks of the astronomer is to explain the origin of the movement of the heavenly bodies. He is not called upon to explain how the movement is perpetuated. It is simply self-perpetuating. In like manner the moralist need concern himself only with the origin of moral motivation. A dynamic moral self once fully set in motion needs no further explanation. A character that is well established needs no external corroboration. The subject of moral sanction will receive further treatment in a future chapter.

Intellectual appreciation of what is right

Perhaps a little more needs to be said relative to thought and character. Some moralists have maintained that to perceive clearly what is right and just is to develop an impulse to do what is right and just. Such a principle seems to have little standing among writers of today, but it is here suggested that one may not fully appreciate what is right without having an inclination to do what is right. Appreciation stands at least halfway between knowing the good and doing good. The whole moral problem is a problem that concerns itself with the origin of moral appreciation. This holds strictly true of any other issue of life. The student who appreciates the value of an education will at once set out to obtain it. He seldom fails. Every teacher knows that his main task lies in getting the student to appreciate the subject under discussion. How often the presentation of great moral themes fails to elicit due appreciation.

Special moral faculties

In evaluating the contributions of thought in support of moral selfhood it must be strictly understood that so far no reference has been made to special moral faculties, Kantian categories, or any other form of a mental process that may not be ordinarily explained. Such possibilities loom up before us, but this discussion must be delayed. Kant supplies us with a special "practical reason" sufficiently divorced from sense solicitations. Others furnish our moral calendar with rational mathematical intuitions and an ethical moral sense. Sidgwick bids us pay attention to his "irrefragable intuition." But to all these we turn a deaf ear at present. Enough has been said to make clear the various proclivities of the mind in the direction of mental inertia. Mental inertia, if left to itself, would control the working of the mind as the inertia in the physical world tends to continue any established course. Mental inertia is both a friend and an enemy of our dynamic moral life. It gives stability to the self. It tells us what to expect. By it moral progress is made possible, although it is an enemy of moral progress. The expression *mental inertia* is not used with the intention of setting forth any special theory of the mind.

Tendency of self to attain an ideal status

We shall next consider a great psychobiological principle, the tendency of the mental processes to attain an ideal status. Such a mental disposition is an acquired disposition. Without such a trait little more than mediocrity would be attained. When this stage has been reached (and ordinarily it never is reached), the moral self advances by leaps and bounds. The possibilities of such a principle will require considerable elucidation. We may examine its many corollaries and implications.

The capitalization of the moral self

In accordance with the method heretofore followed, the subject naturally falls under three heads: namely, feeling, ideation, and volition. Now, instead of living in the present, our personalities stretch to the future in conformity to the solicitation of ideals. Fortunate is the youth who is beckoned on to things of higher worth. As Doctor Horne says so well in his delightful "Philosophy of Education," not only must we obey others and become like others, but also we are morally required to contribute to others.[1] This affords the topic at issue a vital setting. So far little has been said in this chapter that would require one to do more than to imitate others and to become like others. But in contributing to others we are first of all contributing to our own moral self. Such a contribution to others, in whatsoever form it may take, is but the compounded interest on a capitalized moral self. Here no robber enters by night, and the vaults are well guarded by day. "Self-sacrifice, devotion to worthy objects, is always self-propagatory," [2] says Thomas Hill Green. The individual and the world seem to be morally related in this way. Who knows but that Leibnitz is right when he says that this is the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps we should follow Kant in believing that that which ought to be is.

Moral values not subject to competition

From the standpoint of its affective nature the mind's tendency to project an ideal state contributes to its own enlargement in two ways, directly and indirectly. Properly balanced altruism

[1] H. H. Horne, Philosophy of Education, p. 4. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

[2] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 463.

always enhances the moral self, as egoism never fails to contract it, and self-sacrifice seems to be one of the established ways of directly unfolding one's higher feelings. The values and necessities of the physical world are all more or less subject to human competition. Men compete for money and riches, and where one gains the others must lose. Not so in the world of the higher moral values. The honesty, virtue, and integrity of one man do not interfere with the like qualities in any other man. One man's honesty, instead of detracting from the honesty of others, tends to contribute to it. Moral economy, unlike commercial economy, need not reckon with profit and loss.

Art as indirect means of moral enlargement

The immediately preceding paragraph had to do with that search after ideal feelings that directly contribute to the uplifting of the moral self; the indirect means of its enlargement is a more difficult task now before us. And by the indirect means of self-betterment we are to understand the recoil of the products of the higher feelings, such as the fine arts, upon the ethical self. The question may now be asked, What are the sources of the fine arts? The answer to such a question must be traced to one's creative nature. But in consideration of creativeness Huxley sees fit to inform us: "It is given to few to add to the store of knowledge, to strike new springs of thought, or to shape new forms of beauty." [1] To shape new forms of beauty is the prime function of the creative artist, and it is this art in its highest forms that contributes to moral selves. One's instinct of creativeness (if we may be privileged to use the word *instinct*) may take one of many directions. On the one hand, the world of limited perceptual beauty may suggest the ideal of perceptual beauty, and then we have the great painting that sets aglow the souls of men; or it may be that fragmentary voices and forms of nature may release the infinite in the regularly recurring cadences of the poet or the carefully chiseled statue of the sculptor. It may be well to note that in the sphere of mental creativeness, whether it be in the fine arts, in any of its various forms, or

[1] T. H. Huxley, Science and Education, p. 254.

in the more limited expression of somber philosophy, that which is limited and fragmentary and imperfect always tends to suggest that which is unlimited, unified, and perfect. This tendency is the index of artistic creativeness. This is the chief distinction between the products of the artist and the products of the artisan. The true philosopher is as much an artist as the poet, the painter, or the sculptor. The philosopher deals in creative concepts, whereas the painter, the poet, and the sculptor deal in percepts.

The meaning of art

A word as to the meaning and function of art may not be out of place. Art has been defined as the fineness of truth, or that which makes great ideas alluring. If it is true that the perfect in sound, in color, and in form is that which animates the spirit of the artist, it is no less true that the function of art is to ennoble and to inspire. This is the indirect means, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, by which the idealizing self contributes to its own enlargement. Herbert Spencer would have us believe that good art is true, and that the best art is that which touches off the greatest number of perceptive powers of the observer.[1] The moralists and leading educators of today are becoming more and more interested in the improvement of the fine arts for moral and educational purposes. Such a procedure finds sanction in the truth that great ideals and purposes may find their beginning in the refinement of the feelings. This is surely the first function of art.

Sources of æsthetic influences

Still another aspect of our developing subject remains to be discussed. What are the various avenues by which good art impresses its ideal upon the plastic self? The appeal of art is far from being universal. Without the presence of the æsthetic sentiment on the part of the perceiver the most wholesome products of the true artist are in vain. Truth does not impress itself upon all, and the artist is no more successful than the statesman or the philosopher in the inculcation of his ideals. How often are the great thinkers of the world disappointed

[1] Education, p. 70.

when they find the fruits of their intellects unheeded? We need but mention the sad years of a Kant or a Spencer. Not all are so fortunate as a Hume, who could smile upon the world when his books failed to impress his contemporaries. Not all men are optimists; perhaps it is well that they are not. Truth and goodness may be self-perpetuating, but a genius is first required to give them tangible expression. Torture is one sure source of truth. As someone has said, the mind as well as nature must be tortured before it can be forced to give up its secrets. Even much true goodness has no other source. After this slight digression from the main topic of the paragraph I will mention what may be considered the two sources through which art makes its appeal. These are the perceptive and associative attitudes of the observer. These are not at all separate, and it remains true that some minds are more deeply impressed by what appeals to the senses (moral perception), whereas others are more sensitive to subtle associations (moral conception). Moral perception will be discussed first.

Art as the source of moral perception

In the introductory chapter bare mention was made of the introvert and the extrovert. The extrovert, being by nature more or less unreflective, engages himself with the objects of perception. This is the type of personality that is molded by the environment, good or bad. With him, as with Herbert Spencer, life becomes the adjustment of internal relations to external relations. This type of character is not especially at the mercy of his inner associations; neither is he troubled by an oversensitized conscience. His goodness is an objective goodness, and he is obedient to the dictates of his surroundings, though such an environment fails to engage him in reflective thought. This self may enjoy the beauties of nature and may revel in the finished works of art. His function is to appreciate, not to create or portray. Though such a one does not think to make the world better, nevertheless it is to a considerable degree through the immediate influence of art that the world does become better. Moral perception rightfully precedes moral con-

ception. Moral perception and moral conception represent two fairly distinct stages in the development of moral integrity. It is well to perceive the good before endeavoring to think the good. The former gives one moral ideas; the latter, ideas about morality.

Art and association

It is only when art appeals to the intellect that truth and beauty function in their highest capacities. Art teaches best when it associates with the highest feelings and sentiments. These associations and suggested sentiments are the nodal points between art already created and art that is subject to creation. The beautiful and the true create their kind. The true function of art resides most truly in the intellect. Enjoyment may appear on the plane of perception, but real appreciation finds its home only in subtle association. The art of a Milton, a Shakespeare, or a Goethe qualifies the self, — adds to and ennobles the self. The natural desire of the mind to search after ideal feelings is satisfied, but it is no less important that the mind shall search after ideas. This is simply another way by which one projects an ideal status. Do feelings or ideas govern the world? The question has often been asked but remains unanswered. Let us consider the search for ideas, especially in their moral significance. This is the theme ever uppermost in our minds.

Searching for ideas

The term *idea* has been variously employed in the history of thought, but here we shall use the word in a fundamental sense that signifies many varieties of mental and moral experience. Some may well doubt the existence of the search for mental and moral experience as here indicated. It must be admitted that there is not always a conscious endeavor to seek the higher reaches of the intellect, and especially is this the case with the vast majority who are well satisfied to live on the plane of a lower status. Previous paragraphs have made it clear that there is a constant tendency to abide by the agreeableness of mental processes that have become habituated. Plunging into the new often seems like plunging into the unknown, and we often recoil from it. On the other hand, it is to be held in mind that we are

now dealing not with the plain man but with the self that is beginning to see beyond the present, — the here and the now of existence. It may be surmised that we are approaching the realm of philosophy, where not many feet have trod. The philosopher is the one who not only has been given the mental right of way but has taken advantage of its opportunities. How encouraging it is to come in contact with the young mind eager for mental and moral enlightenment!

Thinkers who have searched for a higher moral status

Teachers with long classroom experience well know how contagious are the fertile ideas and enthusiasm of a single student philosopher. The real student is literally shocked when he becomes fully conscious of his opportunities to investigate the intricacies of intellectual and moral phenomena. The well-organized mind is found to be as true a model of art as the organized sounds and colors of nature. The wonders of the mind are no less baffling, and perhaps more so, than the wonders of the physical world. Kant's experience with his moral conscience and the starry heavens above attests the truth of this fact. Every great thinker is gripped by the products of his investigations. To carry out and formulate properly one great thought or principle is the task of a lifetime. Many of the world's greatest moralists, beginning with Socrates, have been engaged in such a lifelong task. Let us pause to mention a few examples. How much less rich would the moral world be today if it were not for the metaphysical "ideas" of Plato, with their tendency to motivate the minds of men in the direction of that which is good, beautiful, and true? No sane-minded student can fail to profit by the moral encouragement of a Plato. Plato's doctrine of ideas is an idea that groups broad sections of human experience. No less could the modern age, with its vice, corruption, crude utilitarianism, and materialism, prosper without the imperative of a Kant, accompanied by his sense of duty, good will, and inner dignity. The saying "back to Kant" should be heeded. Without stopping now to estimate and to evaluate, what should we do without the wise counsels of Mill, Spencer,

Martineau, and Sidgwick? Their qualified utilitarianism and altruism, their irrefragable intuition and graded moral impulses, are a moral and social heritage. These are some of the tendencies of the higher type of a self that would assume an ideal status, and the examples cited are typical moral ideas. This brief account of the past tendencies to search for ideational experiences may be morally enlightening.

Secondary inspiration as source of moral truth

The life of ideation is interesting for many reasons. We are told that art precedes science, and that philosophy, which should follow science, is based on wonder; and one is sometimes inclined to believe that the various institutions are all based on some form of desire and fear. The practical and theoretical sources of thought are inextricably mixed. It is impossible fully to understand the meaning of an idea until something is known concerning its history and origin. Who would assume to appreciate the significance of some of the great moral ideas already mentioned without knowing something about their historic setting? To be able to live the moral themes of Plato, of Kant, and the rest (and the list is long) we must feel as they felt, and appreciate what they appreciated. No one understands a great truth or issue until he feels it. Feeling is not necessarily the source of moral truth or any other kind of truth, but feeling offers conviction. The inaneness and moral emptiness of the average course in ethics is largely due to the fact that the average student cannot, or at least does not, apperceptively assimilate the lives and ideas of the great moralists. The doctrine of secondary inspiration is as important and significant for a student of the moral sciences as it is for the study of literature. Who would pretend to appreciate, nay, even understand, Milton's "Paradise Lost" without an adequate knowledge of the cosmology of the time which he describes? How many fail to understand and to appreciate other great epics for no other reason? He who would at all appreciate the great writers of any age must retire, at least in thought, to the time and place in which they wrote. Students of Shakespeare journey to Stratford

on Avon, thinkers and philosophers search out the graves of the masters of thought, while theologians visit the Holy Land for moral and religious encouragement. These few words are offered with the sole purpose of making a little more fruitful the task of the earnest student in his endeavor not only to understand and to appreciate the theories of the great moralists but even to incorporate the essence of their lives.

Three sources of mental activity

Returning to the main thesis with which we set out, namely, the origin of ideas, and more especially of moral ideas, it was said that, genetically speaking, art preceded science. This gives us a practical philosophy of life, — the first source of a more ideal status. The second source of ideational betterment is thought for the sake of the development of a system of thought. The third source, which may be more or less clearly distinguished from the other two, is thinking for the sake of the pleasure that accompanies mental activity. The following paragraphs will in turn consider these three origins of thought, with their moral bearings and implications. Ethical systems cling to these gateways of thought.

1. Practical thought has established utilitarianism

It seems perfectly natural that thought should first provide for the necessities of life. Thought must make itself possible. Self-preservation is one of the first laws of life. The natural tendencies of thought to satisfy the human desires inevitably developed into what is known as the utilitarian system of ethics. Man thinks because it is useful to think, and according to utilitarianism we are virtuous, good, and wise because it is to our advantage to be. This is not the place to establish the philosophy of ethical utilitarianism, but it may be well to notice in passing that many of our greatest moralists have held to some phase of utilitarianism. In this connection the names of Bentham, the Mills, Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick are ethically conspicuous. I mention these moralists not only because they have formulated great principles of moral thought but because they were themselves consistent moral personalities. This in itself should do much to sanction a system of behavior.

Practical moral consideration

Perhaps a corollary extracted from the utilitarian thesis may be of interest in practical moral instruction. Though many of us would utterly reject a course of action that was consciously carried out for no other than utilitarian purposes on the part of some adult, nevertheless interest and clear-cut usefulness must be considerable factors in the eyes of the developing moral behavior of the child. All this is said even in the face of the fact that moral obedience in the child should be prompt and categorical. There is no discrepancy in the statement that the child should be generally aware of the usefulness of moral behavior, and that obedience should be prompt and not too much subject to thought and rationalization. As was stated in a previous paragraph, moral perception must come before moral conception, moral ideas before moral concepts. He who theorizes on moral themes too early in life may be morally lost later in life. Strict moral obedience is requisite early in life, so that moral theory may be profitable later in life. If one is already good, ethical theory will make him better; but if one is already bad, ethical discussion can hold out but little hope. No one living today would be inclined to report that the laxity of moral fiber is at all due to the absence of moral theorizing on the part of the young, but any thinker would not hesitate to see that our moral flabbiness is largely due to lack of prompt obedience in the home, the place where obedience is due. Forms of thought and action that do not start in the home will probably never start anywhere. We realize this statement to be consistent with the facts, but we do not act upon it, for the reason that we ourselves were not trained in the school of obedience. In this matter it is possible to perceive and to understand without fully appreciating. One does morally only what he appreciates morally.

2. Philosophy as interest in system-building

The second source of ideational betterment, as before mentioned, is thinking for the sake of the development of a system of thought. Here utilitarian considerations drop into the background. It is not to be supposed that practical utilitarian considerations can be fully dispensed with in any system of thought.

The first formulation of any abstract metaphysical theory had its inception in some human interest. All the metaphysical speculations of the Middle Ages were vitalized in the lives of the saints, philosophers, and theologians. Perhaps the only difference between the utilitarian philosophies just discussed and the philosophy now under consideration is a difference in the object of our interest and in the kind of interest felt. The interests that gave rise to the great materialistic and idealistic formulations were largely intellectual, but the interest upon which utilitarianism was founded supplied the more general wants of man and society. It would seem that the philosophical theories of Plato and Spinoza and Kant were actuated by system-building interests. This conclusion does not, of course, militate against their intellectual and moral value. Herbert Spencer would be another good example of a system-builder. Who can believe that his synthetic philosophy of evolution was in its early formulation anything more than the expanding interest of a fruitful idea? His educational, political, ethical, and world-wide utilitarianism was the varied result of his philosophic thinking, and not its cause. We cannot exactly accuse Bentham and John Stuart Mill of abstract system-building; they were strict utilitarians from the very beginning. Is it not true that many great thinkers, early in their career, have denied all concrete application of their philosophy, and then eventually have returned to their theses for the solution of world problems? The practical sometimes takes possession of the theoretical. One might find ready examples in the writings of Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Münsterberg. One concrete example of a shift from the theoretical to the practical will suffice. Some of my readers may recall that Professor Münsterberg, especially in some of his early writings, denied the educational applications of psychology, and then in later volumes succeeded in demonstrating the applications of psychology to the problems of life. Let us now turn from the theoretical consideration of the problem of the origin of systems of thought and see how much great systems have contributed to the moral self.

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The indirect contributions of intellectual systems

Ideas and principles that have become associated with a system of philosophy may be of more practical value for us than the system itself. Not many are vitally interested in Spinoza's conceptions of "substance," but how quickly are one's moral interests stimulated when once he lays bare the interrelations of reason and virtue. Spinoza's ethics are contagious. Are we not willing to admit that the moral self is more powerful than anything that can happen to it? The splendid altruism made manifest in the ethical writings of Herbert Spencer has little or nothing to do with the dead abstraction of the far-famed Unknowable. His essays on intellectual and moral education will forever stand out as great contributions to the developing science of education. Who can forget that "education is the preparation for complete living"? And we are truthfully told that it is chiefly such not only on account of its practical values but also for its moral and religious implications. The true scientist must be truly religious, according to Spencer. We do not need to search further for practical moral ideas that have usually been but corollaries or mere appendages to the great systems of thought. It may be truthfully said that the good things of life are not always those for which we consciously search. To strive consciously for happiness is to fail to attain it. Conscious goodness is a divided goodness; and a conscious badness is not considered very dangerous. Good thinking is not a forced thinking; moral thinking will lead us instead of our leading it. When thought is given a free rein, it will supply and develop its own motives.

The indirect inculcation of morals

The indirect contributions of unified systems of philosophy to ethics suggest a practical principle in the inculcation of morals. Those who endeavor to build up moral fiber in the growing mind well know that the direct presentation of the maxims of goodness is less efficacious than the incidental and more indirect methods. This is especially true of the early stages of moral education, when conscious effort and moral self-striving have not begun to make themselves manifest. We shall later see that conscious

moral striving is absolutely necessary to round out any complete system of moral instruction. It would be the height of unwisdom to assume that the moral child should take an interest in morals as such. Moral interest must become associated with other interests. Bare moral interests can find no true lodging in the early stages of moral growth. So far as the school is concerned, early moral instruction must be closely connected with other subjects. Nearly all subjects of the ordinary school curriculum may be made to serve such a purpose. Encouraged but unconscious honesty in the solving of problems may be an example in point. Here a suggestion on the part of an honest teacher may be of more moral value than a sermon on honesty later in life. It is to be noted that the best of moral sermons in later years (and moral sermons are the best of all sermons) will fall on deaf ears unless they call to mind some moral suggestion dropped on half-deaf ears by parent or teacher early in childhood. It is an established principle of psychology that an unconscious indirect suggestion is more penetrating and lasting than a suggestion that is fully conscious and direct. There is much evidence to show that early moral instruction is largely a matter of applied psychology. Herbert Spencer says: "The true education is practicable only to the true philosopher."

On a former page three sources of mental activity were mentioned. The first was the practical, or utilitarian; the second was the engagement in thought for the sake of system-building; and the third was thought for the pleasure of mental activity. In the following paragraph this third source of thought will be explained. Interest, whether it be natural or acquired, underlies all these mental activities.

3. Dynamic philosophy of life

Much has been said, in the field of ethics and allied subjects, in regard to happiness and the aims of life, and whether happiness results from some attainment or whether it is rather the result of striving to attain. This striving to attain, rather than the attainment, is the principle with which we are now concerned. Many thinkers have held that the striving of mankind finds its

first source in the essence of a striving dynamic reality. This is the dynamic conception of the world. For concrete examples of this philosophy it would be easy to point to the energism of Aristotle, the sublimated "will to live" of Schopenhauer, the "eternal push" of Bergson, and many others. As heretofore explained, our interests reside in the ethical side of these philosophies rather than in the systematic formulations.

Intellectual and moral functioning as sources of happiness

An early illustration of a dynamic conception of the world working itself out into an ethical system would be the "Ethics" of Aristotle. Here is a true ethical functionalism; and happiness being, as Aristotle tells us, the aim of life, is more the result of a striving (especially an intellectual striving in the form of speculation) than the attainment of the fruits of striving. Surely no writer among the ancients has formulated a more enduring law of human behavior. It is largely applicable to every walk of life. Students who do not become fully engrossed in the mental processes suddenly lose interest in education. Unless the search for education is delightful in itself, thinking soon dries up at its source. Herbert Spencer somewhere tells us that happiness on the part of the pupil is the only true test of a wise educational method. The fact that moderate intellectual functioning is always a source of satisfaction is an educational principle that no moralist should overlook. This ends our immediate discussion of the tendency of the self to attain a moral ideal status. Those who have carefully followed the preceding paragraphs will recall that an attempt was made to trace first feeling or emotional striving, and lastly the three forms of ideation, namely, utilitarian, system-building, and functional. It might reasonably be expected that at this point a brief treatment of volitional striving would be introduced. This topic, which is vital, will be explained in a future chapter, under the heading of psychological determination, or, more accurately speaking, self-determination. All through this chapter it has been either specifically stated or indirectly inferred that the mind always tends in the direction of a state of agreeableness.

This will be explained in so far as it has a bearing on moral selfhood. Our ever-present theme is moral selfhood.

Sources of mental superiority

One single topic yet remains to be dealt with before we take up the higher forms of mental agreeableness just mentioned. The question may well be asked, How do we account for the high intellectual and moral attainment of some minds, and the decided mediocrity of the vast majority? Psychologically speaking, the answer is not hard to find. When the tendency of the mind to attain an ideal status overbalances the tendency to maintain the present status, then, of course, superiority takes the place of inferiority. Thinkers interested in biology and heredity would be inclined to find an adequate answer in differences in inherited capacities. Inheritance is undoubtedly a very important factor in determining the trend of one's interests, but it is the opinion of the writer of this book that environment and will are much greater factors in determining the direction of mental accomplishments. High intellectual endowment does not ordinarily attain great development unless permanent and unified interests are developed early in life, and it seems to be the consensus of opinion that such permanent interests are very rare even among the so-called talented. On the other hand, let an average individual with normal perceptive powers and capacities glean some motive or ideal early in life; also let him develop a healthy degree of the consciousness of self, but not necessarily self-consciousness; and, what is more, let him believe in himself, and be moderately encouraged in his undertakings, — and as a result the self becomes truly creative, and there is scarcely a height which it may not justly attain. The possibilities here enumerated are not largely determined by heredity, but all may be the result of the functioning of a proper environment and a well-motivated will. This is no place to talk about the freedom of the will. Freedom, like every other worth-while attribute of the self, is born, grows, develops, and matures. Any normal individual may develop all the moral freedom that he really needs. All the futile discussions of the last thousand years

would have quickly come to an end if men had been able and honestly inclined to take a peep at the moral self as it really is. It is on the nature of this "is" that the present discussion is trying to throw some light.

Sense of moral necessity a requisite in the minds of men

How often we are forced to recognize the plain truth that we do not readily come to understand a mechanism until there has developed some real need for understanding it. It has often been said that necessity is the mother of invention. Some tasks are considered impossible until dire necessity teaches us otherwise. Our day and age afford many good examples of this principle. People will continue to believe that war is inevitable until it becomes possible to prove that it is not inevitable. Since the World War many forces have developed which have driven man to a better understanding of himself and society. When man really understands man and men, then wars will surely cease. Man cannot understand man and men until he understands himself. The same principle holds true in every walk of life. The average student does not take seriously the tasks set before him, and he persistently refuses to be disillusioned until the demands of his life force upon him his irreparable mistake. Perhaps the soul will continue to dwell in its own darkness; but one thing will remain true, — that human betterment will long be delayed unless the sense of moral necessity is better developed in the minds of men. We shall now return to the topic of mental agreeableness.

Harmony and unity as sources of agreeableness

If the thesis that man consciously or unconsciously searches after agreeableness is a valid one, it is also true that such agreeableness has its origin in some kind of unity or harmony. The harmony or fittingness of a situation is always accompanied by mental satisfaction. Some of the ancient thinkers considered the orbits of the heavenly bodies as perfect circles, for the very reason that the picture of perfection, whether concrete or merely imaginary, affords a sense of delight. Concrete illustrations of the satisfaction resulting from such a unity abound on every hand. Do we not find great thinkers, scientists, and phi-

losophers searching the world for facts in harmony with their theories? It is this very process that makes the fact of continuous mental achievement so fascinating. Mere blind facts suddenly become vitalized when they are subsumed under some broad principle. This is how we account for the prodigious memories of great thinkers. Details that are subsumed under an all-embracing hypothesis or law do not need to be consciously remembered. It is also in accordance with this principle that memory becomes truly artistic and not merely an unwinding of facts. As a matter of fact all true education is to be similarly explained. It is only when the mind becomes thoroughly engrossed with the organization of the fact that the mentality jumps ahead by leaps and bounds. Good working examples of the idea here mentioned are occasionally found in the classroom. Progress is slow until some principle or law is hit upon. When interest becomes abiding, progress will look after itself. In a sense the teacher tends to eliminate himself, for the very reason that good instruction tends to make instruction no longer necessary. Enough has been said to make clear the general aim of this paragraph.

Biological applications of principle stated

Coming into closer relations with our subject, an endeavor will now be made to apply the principle of mental harmony to the field of ethics. Spencer makes extensive biological applications. One of his main theses is that function is a correlative of structure. When function is in harmony with structure, then happiness is assured; and happiness itself is the result of moderate functioning. Such statements are in harmony with present-day psychology. The furtherance of functioning processes normally causes pleasure; the hinderance of these processes normally causes displeasure. Spencer strikes the nail on the head when he suggests that the first aim of the moralist is to formulate the laws of life, which are then to be followed irrespective of consequences. Such a suggestion is a moral maxim, a psychological principle, and a biological law, all in one. Let us explain the meaning of such a formulation. Every act is potentially a moral

act. In a sense it is as unlawful to disobey the laws of the self as it is to disobey the laws of the state. One is more likely to suffer as the result of disobedience to the laws of his own nature than he is to suffer from civic disobedience. In the former case punishment is sure, and in the latter case it is only probable. If it is true that the moderate functioning of the laws of our being affords pleasure and happiness, it would be the height of folly to search directly after such pleasure or happiness. It is a fact based on experience that he who consciously searches for happiness fails to find it. True happiness, as we shall later have occasion to note, must be the result of an expanding self. This is what psychology teaches concerning the search for happiness. The laws that determine physical and mental growth are biological laws, and it is the formulation of these laws that Spencer makes the first duty of the moralist.

Early moral motives attract their like later in life

The more specific and intimate applications of the principle of unity and harmony to morals may now be stated. The principle is doubly fitting because it is a natural tendency of a like mental process to attract a process similar in kind, and because every real thought, from its very nature, furthers mental unity. This is sufficient to show that thinking must in itself be interesting. If such conclusions are once accepted as true to fact (and there seems to be no reason to believe the contrary), then it follows that the surest way to make possible an abiding and constantly growing moral self is to establish the proper motives and ideals early in life. This is not a new theme; it is not even the utterance of a new moral fact; but it is a psychobiological foundation of the truth of such a long-established fact. This statement throws some light on the rather unbelievable conclusion that that which is to serve as a source of power in human life must be organized with our thoughts and feelings from early childhood. Healthy moral conversions, like healthy religious conversions, must root themselves in early life.

Unity in art and character

Perhaps it will be of some interest to the reader if another form of unity is mentioned at this point. If *unity* is the great

word in science, in philosophy, in ethics, and in the world at large, it is interesting to note the relations of similarity between the science of ethics and the essence of art. Professor George H. Palmer has made it perfectly clear to us, in his little book on "The Field of Ethics," how the unity of a consistent moral character is in unison with a noble work of art. The essence of art is unity and wholeness, and character is no less a matter of integrity.

Unity and harmony and mental wholeness were fundamental principles in the lives of the early Greeks. It was thought that the good, the beautiful, the true, and the useful were somehow connected, and it remains true that they really are. According to the thesis just explained, the highest values of life tend to unify and to organize. Bosanquet sees fit to suggest: "It is certain that all the great values are cognate with each other, and any of them can be reënforced and vitalized from any other as a point of departure." [1]

[1] B. Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 235. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

CHAPTER III

THE SELF AS BIOLOGICALLY CONDITIONED: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Outline of chapter

He who is interested in man, his mind, his education, and his institutions will not fail to note the growing significance of biological interpretation. Since Darwin biology has gradually gained headway as a ready means of solving many mysteries. Man is no longer the product of a special creation, and his mind, we are told, is but the result of his capacities and tendencies to action, his education the servant of his interests, and his institutions the results of his desires and fears. Formal theology, innate ideas, special moral faculties, formal discipline, and a permanent self, all seem to be losing significance and rapidly becoming a matter of history. It is not the purpose of this chapter to evaluate such trends. If biology is sufficient to account for man and his interests, it is to be expected that his moral nature will be similarly explained. The present chapter will attempt to summarize some biological facts that are more or less fundamental in determining the direction of the development of the moral self. The contents of this chapter will differ from the preceding one more in degree than in kind. Man's biological equipment will be the central theme. Such a thesis may be conveniently treated as follows: (1) the capacities that nature has impressed upon man, and the significance of their variations in the interests of man; (2) tendencies that make possible man's active life; (3) tendencies in the direction of habituation.

Reasons for noting individual differences

The first of these three, the gradually evolving interests of man in determining the subtle variations in his inherited capacities, and the growing applications of such variations, will be

considered at some length. There seem to be four reasons for noting individual differences. These are noted (1) for educational purposes; (2) for occupational purposes; (3) for the betterment of humanity; (4) for political and legislative purposes. Here as elsewhere man comes to take an interest in things only on the complaint of necessity. Outside of his natural interests and desires "he touches the world only when it touches him." This seems to be utilitarianism pure and simple. Interests are undoubtedly the governing factor in intellectual and moral life. Concepts grow up about interests. A great system of philosophy is little more than the development of an interest that received its inception early in life. Many of the greatest educational philosophers, from Herbart to John Dewey, make interest their central theme. Herbart's "many-sided interests" and Dewey's "inarticulate interests" are good examples in point.

Effort necessary to develop capacity

Before taking up the application of individual variation for human betterment it might be well to mention one good example in which dire necessity has forced us to become conscious of, to determine the extent of, and to make concrete application of individual differences. No one would fail to mention the impetus that the World War gave to psychological tests, and ever since then tests for all sorts of purposes have been skillfully devised. It may be true that a nation, like an individual, will never do as much as it really can do unless it is called upon to do more than it really can do. The real capacities of the human mind have not often been put to the test in a perfectly normal way. The low degree of efficiency in many professions is due to the fact that dormant possibilities have never been put to the test. Strife, struggle, and competition seem to be necessary in order to bring out the best that is in us. Historians and writers on social philosophy usually tell us that rivalry and combat are as necessary for the development and maintenance of national, as they are for individual, integrity. Whether or not this is true, it would seem that peaceable souls, like peaceable

tribes of primitive man, have made little advance in the arts of life. The individual moral self is not truly described as a peaceable and passive moral self.

Action as source of belief

Other analogies in the life of an individual and in the life of a people or nation readily come to mind. The efficient individual, like the efficient nation, is active. Man believes in his own moral integrity only when it has been thoroughly tested. One believes in the freedom of the will only when he has put forth effort in the attainment of such freedom. Action is the source of belief and of faith. These are all half-conscious maxims that we cannot help but entertain when they are once called to our notice, but they are truths that are seldom acted upon. Truths and beliefs that we casually grow up with, whether they be social, or moral, or religious, are of little value aside from enabling us to adjust ourselves to an imperious environment; but truths and beliefs that we struggle for are vital. To believe in oneself is not the source of egoism or false pride. Egoism, selfishness, and false pride are more likely to have their origin in the disbelief in self. Such undesirable traits are often the indirect means of glossing over inefficiencies. Likewise, the nation that fully respects and believes in itself will not attempt to dominate other peoples and the world. Such domination, whenever it exists, has its origin in a nation's growing weaknesses. Weak individuals, like weak nations, employ weak methods to accomplish their purposes. One does not need to travel far to observe that officiousness is unconsciously based on a sense of weakness.

Belief and mental creativeness

Further illustration of the idea that belief and action are closely related may be found in the mental behavior of the earnest student. The growing mind is a believing mind in the sense that it is constantly opening up new avenues of thought. Each new idea leads beyond itself. The mind must be believing so long as it is acting. He who has not sufficient faith in the mind to arrive at the truth for which he seeks has not enough moral stamina to utter decrees concerning the ultimate values of life. Real believing is real creating. The artist who vividly

believes in the reality of an ideal will find little difficulty in making such an ideal real. It is this intimate relation between belief and the unfolding mental processes which enables one to believe in mental creativeness.

Belief as mental attitude

Belief as explained in the preceding paragraph has no special application to what one believes or disbelieves, because disbelief may be an example of mental creativeness. Believing is a mental attitude. It is the attitude that assumes the efficacy of thought. It is optimistic in the outlook of man and the world.

Individual variation and education

We shall now consider some of the variations in man's inherited capacities, and the determination of such variations in the interests of education. It is interesting to note that even those who do not contribute to the belief that man came to his present endowment through chance variations and natural selection make application of such chance variations today for educational purposes. The imbecile, the moron, the normal, and the supernormal are no longer herded together in a single classroom and subjected to the same mental pabulum. The many psychological tests in use today are chiefly employed in tabulating the natural endowment of the four classes mentioned. Many reasons have contributed to this new educational procedure, all more or less based on necessity. The inability of all degrees of intelligence to profit by the same content and method of instruction is perhaps the primary reason. Not only is it impossible for minds of different mental caliber to assimilate the same subject matter, but dissimilarly endowed minds must be trained to follow specific occupations. There is also the social application of the so-called mental diagnosis. The imbecile and the moron are coming to be considered prime contributors to social and moral delinquency. It is one of the duties of teachers of small children to forestall such tendencies toward delinquency by labeling all cases of mental inferiority. As before noted, the practice of mental measurements in connection with the school has been enhanced by the mental testing of soldiers during the war.

Figures on paper in the form of the "I. Q." are supposed to determine the extent of one's intellectual and moral possibilities.

Tests do not determine moral purpose

This book is not primarily concerned with the practical problems of ordinary schoolroom procedure. Our interests border more on the theoretical than the strictly practical. That which is theoretically practical may be more truly practical than that which is concretely practical. That which is morally worth doing is worth thinking about. This is the true function of moral philosophy. Refusal to deal with moral theory is not the true road to moral progress. The carefully devised mental test will undoubtedly give a fair index of intelligence in terms of thought and facility of mental action. Perhaps the feelings, dispositions, and dominant temperament may be more or less clearly determined, but mental "sticktoitiveness" and continuity of moral purpose are not so readily subject to tabulation. Moral purposes may be put down on paper, but the continuity of the motives behind such purposes cannot be so easily determined. Ephemeral purposes are of little value in the structure of the moral self. Discipline, whether it be intellectual or more purely moral, can never rise above its source; and its source can be nothing else than the continuity of a moral purpose. He who is without a fundamental life purpose cannot be considered strictly moral. The student that graduates from college without becoming absorbed in some vital interest that continually expands the self will do nothing to make the world better. Much of the criticism directed against the school and college is well founded.

Perhaps enough has been said in regard to the intermediate school in its attempt to determine individual variation in mental capacity, and the possibilities of making use of such individual differences in the schoolroom; also the inability of any test yet devised fittingly to predict the possibilities of moral judgment on the part of the one tested. It may be easy to test conscience, but it is a different thing to determine moral judgment. Moral judgment is the highest moral category.

Tests determine fitness for occupation

In addition to the various forms of tests that are used to determine native capacities and educational attainment, other schemes are being devised to determine the fitness of individuals to follow some specific occupation. A few words concerning the moral significance of such a procedure may be of interest. Man functions most efficiently when he embarks upon that vocation for which he is best fitted. Much physical and mental and even moral distress may be traced directly to the lives of individuals who are bound hand and foot to occupations for which they have no liking. Vocational and trade tests are doing something to relieve the situation. Vocational guidance is coming to be a science. The expert mechanic is not ordinarily endowed with the qualities that would enable him to become a successful classroom instructor, nor is the mind of an engineer ever to be converted into that of a philosopher; and it is not often that a teacher of English can become a successful teacher of literature. Minds that are capable of considerable attainment do not differ so much from the standpoint of quantity as they do from that of quality. Though there is a tendency for qualities to cling together, many professions require distinct qualities that do not reside in any one personality. All this evidently holds true even though we may quote approvingly from Thorndike:

> Having a large measure of one good quality increases the probability that one will have more than the average of any other good quailty. He who can learn better than the average through the eyes, tends to learn better than the average through the ears also; he who can attend to one thing better than all other men, will be able to attend to many things at once or in rapid succession better than most of them. Artistic ability, as in music, painting, or literary creation, goes with scientific ability and matter-of-fact wisdom. The best abstract thinker will be above the average in concrete thought also. The rapid workers are the most accurate. Intellectual ability and moral worth hang together.[1]

As heretofore, we are interested in scientific tests and vocational guidance in its bearing on character. The contented,

[1] Edward L. Thorndike, Individuality, p. 26.

happy man is more likely to be a moral man. Not many are able to follow an uncongenial occupation for any great length of time and continue to maintain their moral integrity. Sidgwick says: "No authority can permanently impose on men regulations flagrantly infelicific." [1] Human beings inevitably strive for that which their nature demands.

Occupation should develop capacities

There is another aspect of man's occupation that has a direct bearing on his moral success. Man not only needs a vocation for which he is by nature well fitted and by education well trained, but also an occupation that will develop his capacities and unfold his personality. Tasks that are uninteresting and tasks that are not diversified enough to stimulate one's perceptive possibilities will do little to develop the intellectual side of the self. The moral self has a tendency to weaken in the presence of persistent monotony. Many trades and professions are sources of physical, intellectual, and moral callousness. Physical callousness is often conducive to moral callousness. Writers on moral delinquency tell us that the loss of moral sensitiveness is often accompanied by the loss of physical sensitiveness.

Occupation and sustaining purpose

The most serious moral indictment against many trades and business enterprises still remains to be mentioned. The status of many occupations is especially nonconducive to moral development from the very fact that the average large business does not project in the mind of the worker the possibility of the accomplishment of any purpose or ideal. There is no sustained purpose that grows, develops, and finally issues in fruition. When no project is advanced, no virtue is attained. The worker, no less than the school-teacher, likes to feel himself expand mentally and morally. It would be as impossible to expect a well-rounded, virtuous life to mature in connection with a monotonous occupation that does not entice all one's capacities and interests as it would be to expect a mature ear of corn to spring from a stunted stalk.

Theories of progress

So far we have briefly considered two of the four applications

[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 462. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

of individual variation to innate capacity, — the educational and the occupational. The determination of the variation of individual endowment for the enhancement of humanity will occupy our attention for a little time. Many theories of human progress have been formulated. Some thinkers seek to occasion progress by improving the individual, whereas others would set out to ameliorate social conditions. Both have the same end in view. At this time no attempt will be made to evaluate the long list of social philosophies listed in the humanitarian calendar. Perhaps the most noted of these so-called sciences of history are the economic or materialistic, the ideological, and the biological. Many others may be mentioned. It is not at all possible to draw any sharp line of demarcation between the three mentioned. By the phrase "theory of social progress," or "science or philosophy of history," is meant that force or principle that underlies the ordering of human betterment, whether such an ordering be man-made or cosmic or both.

The ideo-biological interpretation

In an earlier paragraph of this chapter some mention was made of the application of mental tests to immediate school purposes. Here it will be well to explain the concrete application of such tests to broader and mediate purposes. While the first aim of such tests is educational so far as they determine the capacity of the individual, the purpose is broadly humanitarian so far as the supposed results are concerned. The process simply involves the first steps in the working out of an experimental philosophy of human betterment. The principle in its intention is biological-ideological. It is biological in the sense that high mental attainment depends upon inherited capacity; it is ideological in the sense that ideas govern the ordering of progress.

Tests determine endowment

Perhaps it will be well to note the educational philosophy that backs up and sponsors such an educational scheme. According to some thinkers it is the duty of the state to search out her most promising intellects and to give to such intellects, when discovered, the privilege of having their capacities developed to the highest possible degree. The implication is that the few great

minds will do more for the betterment of humanity than an infinite number of the poorly endowed. Such a philosophy would not do less for the inferior, but it would do more for the superior. In some quarters today psychological tests are employed to find those with superior endowments.

Great-man theory of progress

The thesis being explained is essentially the great-man theory of human progress. Such a theory is an old one and has had many disciples. The theory is old in its implications but is new in its man-made applications. Man takes it upon himself to find out who the great man is, and then sets him to work in the interests of all. History seems to establish the verity of the significance of the great man in the releasing of great ideas and ideals. William McDougall is perhaps one of our best modern representatives of such a philosophy of history. Why may we not liken the experimental investigations of those who are especially fitted to advance the interests of human progress to the influence of scientific experiments in furthering man's knowledge of the applied forces of nature? It is yet too early to tell. Some thinkers, like Spencer, would seem to oppose, theoretically at least, man's attempt to interfere with the cosmic processes. He tells us that evolution is not a man-made institution, and that man may formulate the laws of social behavior, but that when the great man consciously endeavors to push ahead the evolutionary order of progress, he will be doomed to failure. McDougall, on the other hand, would make man's endeavor to improve himself by first improving the group or state in which he lives the flower of all psychological effort.

It might be of significance to follow the custom of adding a few moral corollaries of the thesis under discussion. It is quite customary for philosophic schemes to begin or end in ethics. Plato seems to begin with a metaphysical ethics and to end in a practical ethics. Kant endeavors to make religion a footnote to his chapters on ethics rather than the reverse. Spencer would make his whole philosophic endeavors fundamental to the interests of his "Data of Ethics." While it is true that many

writers would make that which *is* the foundation of that which ought to be (namely, the field of ethics), some, like Sorley, would make that which ought to be foundational for that which is. Whether philosophers believe in the innate goodness of a world, as do the extreme idealists, or whether they believe that their philosophy will inevitably culminate in virtue, as did the disciples of Socrates, or whether they believe the world to be innately bad, as did Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, they all agree in believing that goodness is man's choicest possession.

Many writers and teachers hold that whereas man's intellectual and social and æsthetic attainments are determined by his inherited capacities, his moral inclinations are much more the result of his environment and specific education. If conscience is taken as the index of one's moral make-up, environment and early association are largely the determining factors. If, on the other hand, moral judgment is taken as the standard to determine what is right or wrong, then the inherited capacity has greater possibilities for moral behavior. All such speculations as we are now engaged in take it for granted, of course, that man is not endowed with any special moral sense, power of intuition, or any other innate mechanism of moral determination. These moral theories are intensely interesting and valuable in the field of moral speculation, but they have nothing to do with biological considerations. They are of more interest to the theologian, and had an especially good standing prior to the days of Darwin and the great biological scientists. Perhaps these older speculations have been of great service even in modern times in moderating the rather extreme views of those who would carry too far the thesis of naturalism and science.

Racial variation

The fourth and last topic for consideration in connection with the general topic of individual variation in mental and moral capacity will now be explained. Here we are more concerned with racial variation than with individual differences. The assumption that there are racial differences that are quite as conspicuous as individual differences is beginning to bear fruit in

the form of natural legislation. So far in this chapter we have explained the application of individual differences for educational, occupational, and humanitarian purposes. Here the interest may be in any one or all of the purposes mentioned, but in its first intent it is primarily national, or in the interest of some one nation, and therefore only incidentally educational, occupational, or humanitarian. The idea that the races differ in innate capacities is not at all novel in the history of social thought. Although the idea that such differences exist is not new, it is only recently that great nations have begun to legislate in the interests of national integrity. Here as elsewhere dire necessity is forcing anthropologists, as well as statesmen and those who are vitally interested in the welfare of man, to investigate the possibility of mental and moral differences among the races of men. It is probably true that the old economic doctrine of protection was to a degree either consciously or unconsciously based on the idea of differences in racial capacity. Today the recognition of racial differences is made concrete in the national exclusion of certain peoples, as the Japanese from the United States.

The Lockian doctrine no longer tenable

It is true, not all are convinced that there are vital differences in racial capacity. Though many thinkers seem to recognize such differences, not all seem to be concerned with the application of such differences in the functioning of educational, social, and political institutions. Many have followed in the footsteps of John Locke in maintaining that the mind of man is originally a blank tablet, and consequently all individuals are equally endowed. Until quite recently such a thesis has received undue recognition in the field of education. As a result education and environment were of course emphasized, and heredity as we know it today was scarcely known. Surely there was little endeavor to take into account individual differences. Today not less emphasis is placed upon education (and this is as it should be), but more stress is based not only on individual differences, as before noted, but also on racial differences, the topic that now

directly concerns us. John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant seemed to assume the burden of Locke's thesis in announcing that man is little more than what education makes of him. Such a belief, of course, is quite as extravagant as that of the pansophists of the seventeenth century, who claimed that man might attain all knowledge. The expansion of modern science has readily put an end to the dreams of a Milton or a Bacon in reference to universal knowledge. Though it is one of the main theses of this book that, in the science of man-making, education and will are not all, nevertheless it seems undeniably true that normal man has no moral right to point to his supposed lack of inherited capacity as the reason for his failure in life. The workman is prone to blame his tools for his botchy workmanship, and the student may excuse on the ground of lack of time his failure to prepare his daily lesson; but when it comes to investigating the real cause of failure, it is usually found that the workman has simply failed to develop his possibilities in terms of manual skill, and that the student, instead of forming a systematic habit of study, has squandered his time.

Crime not primarily based on heredity

It is quite the order of the present day to relegate delinquency and crime to heredity and not to education in terms of will and a conscious motive. If heredity is the dominant factor in the production of delinquency and crime, then it must of necessity follow that we are rapidly becoming a degenerate people, because no one can doubt the fact that crime is advancing by leaps and bounds. He who places crime at the door of heredity must deny efficacy to the morally developed will. It is undoubtedly true that much crime is rightfully attributed to moral degeneracy, but such moral degeneracy is often and perhaps usually self-inflicted. The imbecile and the moron are not by nature criminals, even if it is true that they are criminals in the making. The moron and the imbecile become criminals as the result of bad environmental influences. Many become criminals who are far above the moron in intellectual capacity. The criminal may appreciate the distinction between right and wrong without

choosing the right and rejecting the wrong; but the choosing of the wrong instead of the right must be attributed not to heredity but to moral self-dissipation. The criminal is scarcely aware of his developing criminality. It is perhaps true that no one is consciously dishonest for the first time. Conscious honesty, like conscious dishonesty, must pass through stages of incubation. It would seem that consciousness serves as a middle term both in the development of goodness and in the development of badness. If it is true that both goodness and badness have their inception in mental processes that are relatively unconscious, it is equally true that goodness and badness soon develop into relative unconsciousness. When goodness becomes relatively unconscious, we have reached the acme of the best; but when badness becomes unconscious, the cause of humanity may well be at stake. Palmer says: "Those who suffer most acutely from sin are those of the finest moral organization." [1] Also: "A convenient test of the height which the character of any man or nation has attained is found by noticing how disintegrating vice is." [2]

In treating the subject of variation a little more may be added in regard to the sources of variation. In his monograph entitled "Individuality" Thorndike mentions three causes of individual differences: namely, sex, race, and immediate ancestry. It is not our purpose to summarize and to appraise his conclusions concerning individuality in its relations to any of the three factors. Perhaps it will be well to state that the consensus of opinion is that there is no radical difference between the intellectual and moral capacities of men and women. There are differences, but such differences are not of much moment for education and morals. Perhaps woman is more highly endowed with the parental instinct and man is more inclined to fight. Both sexes are well supplied with those capacities that would make possible a much higher moral development than they now have. Woman's higher ethical standards are to be accounted for not on the assumption that she has more moral capacity in terms of neuron

[1] George H. Palmer, The Field of Ethics, p. 59. [2] Ibid. p. 62.

patterns, but on the ground that the influence brought to bear upon her in the home is of a finer quality than the influence that impinges upon man.

Races differ more in intellect than in morals

The question of racial differences in its relation to the question of moral differences is of considerable interest to the student of the moral sciences. Races probably differ more in intellectual capacity than they do in moral integrity. The fact that races differ less in moral integrity than in the range of intellect must not be taken to imply that there is more uniformity in the manifestation of race morals. Racial morality is subject to wide variation. Two distinct races may possess equal degrees of moral integrity, but such integrity will manifest itself in a myriad of forms. Moral behavior is quite as diversified as custom or habit. The moral customs of many tribes of darkest Africa may be quite as lofty as the moral customs of many civilized peoples. Though such customs are often equal in integrity, they may be very dissimilar in expression. If we take humanity as a whole, it is probably true that man differs much more in intellect than in morals. All men are similarly endowed with fundamental tendencies which inevitably give rise to certain motives. Ordinarily it is true that similarities of tendencies give rise to similarities of motives, and similarities of motives will normally result in unity of character. In a future chapter we shall have much to say concerning the significance of motivation in the organization of character. Motivation is more a matter of psychology than of biology. Biology gives us the sources of motivation, but psychology organizes it into moral fiber.

Forms of human activity

We have endeavored to make clear the variations in capacity that nature has impressed upon man, and the significance of such variation in the fields of education, business, humanity, and the affairs of nations. Our next and second topic to be treated in this chapter will be the tendencies that make possible man's active life. In reference to the sources of man's active life physiologists and psychologists have devised lists of various lengths in summarizing the forms of human behavior. Breese, in his

"Psychology," completes the list of bodily reactions as follows: purely physiological reactions, uncoördinated random reactions, native reflexes, instincts, acquired reflexes, habits, ideomotor reactions, and volitional reactions. At the present time our interest is primarily with the so-called instincts as sources of human activity. Our treatment of the perplexing topic will be limited to a few general remarks. The present-day literature relative to instinct is voluminous, and in many respects it is quite as unsatisfactory as it is voluminous. No two writers entertain similar views on this much-discussed subject. Light may be gained from some of the more interesting of the modern writers of wide experience and study who have seen fit to present their diversified views. No one interested in finding a core of truth concerning instinct would fail to mention McDougall, Shand, Trotter, Rivers, Tansley, John Dewey, Woodworth, and Thorndike; among older psychologists the name of William James is preëminent. No one volume on the subject under discussion would be adequate to summarize and to evaluate the truth and error that these interesting writers have consciously or unconsciously set forth. Students interested in the subject of instincts should not fail to become acquainted with the writings of these great masters.

Controversies concerning instincts

As the aim of the present volume is not primarily psychological but largely ethical, there is no good reason why the present writer should engage in the controversies that are rife within the camps of the instinct and noninstinct psychologists. Whether or not instincts really exist depends upon what is implied by the term *instinct*. There are quite as many views concerning the meaning of instinct as there are writers on the subject. Such discussions are the same in character as those that were prevalent concerning the existence or nonexistence of innate ideas, moral faculties, infallible conscience, and the like. In a sense they all exist, and in a true sense they have no existence at all. John Locke says that some do for the sake of conscience what others keep from doing. Many psychological quarrels are based

on mutual misunderstanding. A classification is not ultimate, but exists only for some specified purpose.

Various interpretations of instincts

Instincts have passed through or are passing through many stages of interpretation. Modern psychologists no longer attribute to instinct the active agency with which the Divine has endowed the animal kingdom. When instincts are applied to man as well as to animals, it probably matters little whether the interpretation is psychological, biological, or even, as with many modern psychologists, purely physiological. William McDougall appears to be the best exponent of the so-called psychophysical interpretation of instinct. This is the view with which the present writer is most in sympathy. It aims to be the true source, either direct or indirect, of all man's tendencies to action, and it is with these innate tendencies to action that the writer of ethics is most deeply concerned. Such a conception of instincts gives one a sure foundation upon which to build the intellectual, emotional, and active life. Intellect, feeling, and action are genuinely real and must have some sure foundation. Modern reflex or physiological theories of instinct, from Spencer to Watson, have a different story to tell concerning the origin of mind, of its feelings, and of its tendencies to action. Spencer defines instinct as compound reflex action. This, of course, is a physiological explanation. The upholders of such an interpretation today are usually termed behaviorists. Mind seems to have no existence as such, and all is to be explained in terms of stimulus and response, conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, etc. This is materialism carried over into the realm of psychology. Of course, such an explanation is in harmony with naturalism and empiricism, with determinism and the elimination of supernaturalism. Ethics must stand on its own merits.

It is not our purpose to theorize concerning the very existence or explanation of tendencies which assume the name of instinct. It is sufficient to know that certain tendencies really exist, and it matters not whether they are physiological, psychological, or biological. No one denies the truth that one's intellectual and

moral processes do develop in accordance with certain tendencies, and it probably matters very little, as to the real nature of such tendencies, whether they are purely instinctive, in accordance with the general meaning of the term, or purely reflex, elicited by a varied environment. Psychology resents the encroachment of physiology, and religion is not at all satisfied to allow ethics to stand on its own feet. Whether all the sciences, including the ethical, can be reduced to one ultimate category, or whether the physical, the biological, and the ethical are all equally ultimate, no sane mind can yet decide. From the very nature of the human mind the biologist will never fail to argue in the interest of his science, the physicist will endeavor to reduce all to mechanism, the man of ethics will depend upon the genuineness of his inner motives, and the man of religion will continue to believe in the continuity of human values; and it is well that they should.

Instinct as a cosmic force

If it is fairly certain that tendencies well known as instincts are really *sui generis*, and are not reduced to other categories, as seems to be true in spite of the flood of doubt and criticism that have been directed against them, other problems quite as momentous still remain to be solved. With regard to the primary source or sources of such propelling tendencies, are the instincts to be traced to some world force, vital force, cosmic force, will to power, will to live, or what not? In this connection many great names loom up before us, the names of Schopenhauer, Paulsen, Nietzsche, and Jung being especially worthy of mention. It is very true that not all thinkers who postulate a cosmic force, — creative, evolutionary, or otherwise, — make use of such a power in the interest of instinct. All will recognize that Arthur Schopenhauer's "will to live" is cosmic in its very inception, — the true source of man's misery and anguish, so we are told. In man's desire there is perpetual pain, and in his fullness there is unmitigated apathy. Nietzsche's "will to power" would cause man to trample upon the multitudes of the lowly. It is this world power that would establish the glory of the superman.

In the ethics of Friedrich Paulsen we find a world-striving making itself manifest in the instincts and in the will of man. But it is in the writings of Jung that we find a typical example of a world force, emphasizing itself as "libido" in the instincts of man. It is only the more philosophical of our psychologists and moralists that resort to cosmic agencies to account for the behavior of man, instinctive or otherwise. Even the ancient Stoics, who endeavored to reduce man's rationality to a cosmic reason, entertained a rather sane view that made instinct preliminary to reason. This seems to be in harmony with an important trend in modern psychology. More than one great moralist in the modern era has hearkened to the rationalism and the good common sense of the early Stoics.

Man identifies himself with world forces

Whether or not it is true that man may account for his striving, natural or acquired, by some propelling world force, it nevertheless remains true that he takes great delight in identifying himself, physically, morally, and spiritually, with some source of power. Man likes to align himself with the powerful, the good, and the true. This is but another example of the persistent search for unity and harmony, the true source of mental and moral satisfaction fully explained in the first two chapters of this book. Who can doubt the satisfaction experienced by the materialist in identifying his very being with the mechanism of nature? This may be the source of his seeming optimism. If the materialist derives great pleasure from considering himself one with a lower order of reality, of course the theologian and the idealist would rightly derive no less satisfaction in their feeling of oneness with the Divine. Apropos of what has just been said I may profitably quote from MacDougall in regard to human culture and the system of ideal values. He says:

> Man seeks for himself a spiritual order, an intellectual order, and a social order. The first of these is a sense of unity with the world of being as a general ground of action. The second is a sense of unity with one's self, — an inner consistency in the system of judgment which individual life expresses. The third is a sense of unity with

one's fellows in an organized life. The three factors have a logical relation and development. The first felt need of man is to bring himself into harmony with the world-order. He worships before he thinks for himself or acts for himself. Religion, in human history, precedes both science and statehood.[1]

The attractiveness of ideals

If there is little doubt that man's joy is enhanced by becoming one with the spiritual, the intellectual, and the social order, there can be no hesitation in attributing to him a desire to become associated with everyday ideals, purposes, and attractive personalities. This is a fundamental principle in the development of the moral self, and is both psychological and biological. The tendency of man to become one with that which he likes is psychological in its very nature, whereas adjustment, whether it be physical, mental, or social, is a fundamental thesis of biology. This is not the place to consider the various means by which one becomes adjusted to his environment, whether good or bad. A detailed discussion of sympathy, imitation, and suggestion will be found in the chapter on the psychological determination of the self. Our chief interest here is in tracing the theoretical sources of instinct, and incidentally in mentioning man's inclination to bring himself into oneness with that which is the source of power or the object of worship. Man needs to worship and to admire. George H. Palmer tells us that when admiration ceases, deterioration begins.

Classification of instincts

After having enlarged upon the cosmic conception of the primary sources of instinctive tendencies (and it must be remembered that most modern psychologists who emphasize instinct to any considerable degree are not at all concerned with the cosmic aspect) it will next be necessary to say a few words in regard to the number, classification, and persistency of instinctive tendencies. Here again modern psychologists are at variance in their opinions. Some who believe in the genuineness of instinct fail to make any classification at all. At least they have no cut-and-dried lists to offer, and for this the reader may be duly

[1] The General Problems of Psychology, p. 136.

thankful. In this connection the name of John Dewey may be mentioned. Of course, such writers may use the common terms normally applied to the instincts, such as *anger* and *fear*, the *sexual* and the *parental*, without implying any logical separateness. This is somewhat similar to James's conception that there are as many specific emotions as there are possible ways of acting. Those who are interested in tracing the source of instinct back to some cosmic principle of activity are less apt to engage in minute classification. The principle of unity seems to dominate the mental tendency to diversify. If I am not mistaken, Carl Jung would supply us a typical illustration in his doctrine of the libido. The libido is a cosmic force making itself known in the instinctive impulses of man. The older psychologists, and especially those who were inclined to apply psychology to education, were prone to present long tabulated lists of instinctive tendencies. William McDougall, who is probably one of the most ardent of instinct psychologists, gives us a fair list of about a dozen. In his "Outline of Psychology" McDougall mentions the following principal instincts: the parental or protective instinct, the instinct of combat, the instinct of curiosity, the food-seeking instinct, the instinct of repulsion, the instinct of escape, the gregarious instinct, the instincts of self-assertion and submission, the mating instinct, the acquisitive instinct, the constructive instinct, and the instinct of appeal. These few instincts, we are told, are the true sources, either direct or indirect, of man's diversified behavior. Not only are they the true sources of his behavior, but they make possible the organization of his intellect, and lay well the foundation of his social achievements. The author of this notable list of instincts is especially interested in their social applications, which, taken in conjunction with his doctrine of intellectual aristocracy, are sufficient to cause the betterment of mankind.[1] W. H. R. Rivers, another psychologist of considerable note and originality, emphasizes the so-called

[1] William McDougall, in "Group Mind" and in "Ethics and Some Modern World Problems."

danger instincts in their several gradations.[1] For Rivers the danger instincts are quite as important in helping to understand man's behavior (especially human behavior in its abnormal manifestations) as is the sexual instinct in the writings of Freud. The genius of Tansley has enabled him to group McDougall's list of instincts around certain fundamental interests which he terms the ego complex, the herd complex, and the sex complex,[2] whereas Trotter, in his delightful little book called "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," has endeavored to explain much of human behavior in the light of the so-called herd instinct. Little has been said in behalf of those who have criticized the ordinary conceptions of instincts, and some have rejected their very existence, but sufficient information has been presented to show that instinct still plays a dominant rôle in the thinking of most psychologists.

Necessity partly explains belief in instincts

Again, it is interesting to note how necessity enters in to determine what man is to believe concerning the constitution of his mind and the source of his behavior. Pedagogues and modern writers on ethics and morals are almost as one in emphasizing the true existence and vital importance of instinctive tendencies in the development of mind and in the inculcation of morals. Of course, the older intuitionalists and rationalists paid very little attention to man's active disposition, for the very reason that they had other means of explaining the source of the good. The intuitionalist could not afford to belittle himself by appealing to his lower instincts. That which is in any way connected with man's physical nature has been considered inferior in comparison with one's supposed rational faculties. Even today the physical body does not rank as high as the mind; it is still considered a tenement of clay. One does not need to be a profound student of human nature to observe that the body is, as Huxley would have us believe, the ready servant of the will. The physical features readily respond to what is dominant in the mind, and the

[1] Instinct and the Unconscious.
[2] The New Psychology.

face is always a perfect map of the human soul. Coming back to our discussion of instincts, it may fairly be claimed that the criticism directed against instinct today is not the fruit of theological bias but is largely due to physiological investigation. Writers who seem to have no vestige of bias for either the physical or the spiritual orders imply that in the realm of human accomplishment it would be well to distinguish between the roots and fruits of the moral self. The implication is that although the roots of the self may be traced to one's physical constitution, including the instincts, the fruits of the instincts are, ideally considered, nothing less than the highest expansion of the moral self. The moral self may be lowly in its beginnings, but the possibilities of its attainment have as yet been scarcely realized. History and science and biography have revealed to us that the normal childhood of the saint has not been especially endowed with saintly gifts and qualities. Intellectual, moral, and spiritual precocity has never been conducive to the highest flower of the moral self.

Reflex action not a true basis of motives

Outside of the truth or falsity of the existence of instincts in the ordinary sense of the term there are good reasons why educators, moralists, sociologists, and most modern schools of abnormal psychology should still cling to the significance of real instincts. In the fields of education and morals the instincts seem to provide the necessary background for intellectual and moral motivation. This does not imply that instincts are motives in themselves; it means that motives arise from such tendencies. It is rather difficult to see how merely the conjunction of stimulus and response can account for motives; and yet motives surely exist. There are many things new to earth and sky; but if ethical motives can have their inception in a mere reflex, then surely it is high time for psychologists and moralists to cease their speculations. It is in the field of abnormal psychology that instinct plays a conspicuous rôle. The suppression and repression of natural tendencies seem to be the primary causes of mental abnormalities. The writer is not unaware of the fact that a few psychologists would

endeavor to account for abnormalities of various sorts on the basis of conditioned reflexes. Freud and Jung and Adler may be wrong in their essential theses, but this would not be sufficient to negate the integrity of instincts. The downfall of psychological hedonism (the idea that pleasure is the source of all action) did not interfere with the idea that happiness is the moral aim of life. The fact that present-day moralists have lost faith in the innate existence of a conscience, a power of moral intention, and the like does not make a developed conscience any the less necessary. There is more reason for the existence of an individualized conscience today than ever before in the history of the world. The average student does not cease to be good, nor does he yield to despair, when the truth begins to dawn upon him that he is no less the product of evolution than the lower animals. Instead he is encouraged when he once realizes that man's mind and morals have progressed, and that the time has not passed when he and all men may become the true masters of their own fate. This is no mere dream of the ultra-idealist who would level the good with the bad.

Happiness and conscience have an instinctive basis

But if a man is to be happy, he is not to have happiness for the mere asking. Many have asked, but many have been refused this priceless and much-sought treasure. He who consciously searches for happiness never finds it. But he whose motives have been properly grounded on a well-organized instinctive basis seldom fails to attain happiness. True happiness is self-perpetuating, but pleasure is not. And the history of a developed conscience is not unlike the history of an abiding happiness. As active happiness is never the result of associated pleasures, neither is conscience the mere product of early associated experiences, no matter how well ordered such early experiences might have been. Conscience in this progressive sense (that is, in the sense in which we are using the term) must have a dynamic, active basis. Earlier in this work it was maintained that true discipline, whether intellectual or moral, can only result from purposeful striving, and it is equally true that a progressive con-

science can only result from an instinctive and purposeful striving. The conscience that is really worth while is more than habit and feeling, the left-over products of early adolescence. Conscience as here explained may properly be identified with moral judgment.

Instinct not transitory

We do not need to discuss the transitoriness of instincts in the light of certain psychological revelations. James seemed to entertain the notion that most instincts were transitory. Most modern writers who emphasize the significance of instincts at all are fairly consistent in their belief that instincts are not transitory. This seems to be the opinion of most writers in the field of abnormal psychology. It might be expected that those who entertain the view that complexes result from suppressed desires and tendencies would believe in the continuity of instincts. If instincts are real at all, their gradual disappearance in the life of the individual would seem to argue a discrepancy in the economy of human nature. One's own individual experience is perhaps the best means of determining whether or not his instincts are transitory or ephemeral. The cool observation of one's own thoughts, feelings, and experiences seems to be a fairly sure test of truth or falsity. Ordinarily such a procedure will be a sufficient guide to what is morally right, and moralists are prone to tell us that almost the only proof we have concerning the freedom of the will is the fact that it seems to be free. Aristotle makes the good man the only true test of the good.

Processes reënforce one another

Though the question of the transitoriness of instincts still remains to be solved, there is another factor in regard to the functioning of instincts yet to be considered. It is to be presumed that every real instinct has a real function. If we are believers in the doctrine of evolution, we must affirm that all native tendencies perform some work in the economy of biological organisms. The functioning of any one natural capacity or tendency makes possible the more efficient functioning of other capacities and tendencies. This is a very helpful principle in pedagogy; modern writers since the early publications of G. Stanley Hall

have made considerable use of it. Hall's suggestion to the effect that we must not cut off the tadpole's tail is full of significance. We are told that nothing succeeds like success. The sense of achievement, the conscious expansion of one's capacities in some definite way or other, facilitates the growing possibilities of the moral self. To tell the exact truth under the stress of social custom makes it easier to tell the truth on similar occasions. Numerous examples of the principle set forth in this paragraph will come to mind. Some writers on education and allied subjects seem to hold that it is possible for each normal child, if his instincts and budding capacities are only properly gratified and developed, to attain the proportions of a genius. Though such a belief is probably the result of unbounded enthusiasm as to the possibilities of education, nevertheless the considerable degree of truth which the statement contains is due to the fact that the successive functionings of the child's powers naturally reënforce one another.

Unity of the physical, the mental, and the moral

Some further examples of the successive functioning of one's capacities may well be mentioned. In this connection we take it for granted that happiness and satisfaction are valid tests of normal behavior. Anyone may observe how successful physical functioning reënforces and facilitates intellectual processes. This does not imply that the pugilist is an intellectual expert; on the contrary, he is more likely to be a moral pervert; but it does indicate an organic connection between the physical and the normally intellectual, and the same organic connection generally exists between the intellectual and the moral. Not only is there a real tendency for moral qualities in terms of virtues to cling together, but also, though to a lesser degree, the physical, the intellectual, and the moral tend to cohere. Not only does the physical facilitate the intellectual, and the intellectual in turn the moral, but, what is of equal significance, intellectual satisfaction is a higher form of satisfaction than the physical, and surely no one would hesitate to affirm the superior quality of a moral act in comparison with the intellectual. Still another

example of the progressive functioning of one's expanding mental processes may be mentioned. Moralists have often set forth three standards of moral judgment: namely, obedience to law, happiness, and perfection. These three standards represent three progressive stages of human satisfaction. Who could doubt that obedience to law, whether it be natural, man-made, or divine, reënforces human happiness, and that true happiness, in turn, is a sufficient guaranty of perfection? These higher forms of intellectual and moral progression which stand at the apex of human attainment are but the natural products of those reënforcing processes that should be normally operative in the budding capacities of the child. Enough has been said to make explicit the fundamental biological principle that the functioning of the lower order of capacities, including the instincts, makes more efficient the functioning of the higher orders.

For lack of space we shall not try to enlarge upon many of the biological principles and their corollaries. Nothing will be said at this time concerning the specificity of instincts and the significance of such for education and morals. William McDougall makes brief mention of the specificity of instincts in his "Outline of Psychology."[1] Also, as to the lengthened period of human infancy in its relation to moral pedagogy we shall have nothing to say at present. This is a fruitful topic in the interests of moral education. Readers who are especially interested in this topic from the educational point of view will find a good brief statement in "The Philosophy of Education," by H. H. Horne. Another significant topic which will need to forgo discussion is the one interestingly discussed by Woodworth in his little book called "Dynamic Psychology." Concerning the main aim of his book Woodworth says in his own words: "The great aim of the book is, that is to say, to attempt to show that any mechanism (except perhaps some of the most rudimentary that give the simpler reflexes), once it is aroused, is capable of furnishing its own drive and also of lending drive to other connected

[1] Outline of Psychology, pp. 113–114.

mechanisms." [1] The essence of the book seems to be that man's various capacities serve as sources of human behavior in no less a fashion than do the instincts as formulated by McDougall.

The progression of instincts

Closely connected, on the one hand, with the functioning of the higher order of capacities with the lower order of capacities and, on the other hand, with the specificity or nonspecificity of instincts is the principle that the normal development of any capacity or tendency is progressive. We shall mention a few examples of such progressiveness as applied to instincts and capacities. Such progressiveness seems to be applicable not only to the stimulus that unlocks the instinct or instincts but also to the resultant. The nature of the stimuli that occasion anger will be a good case in point. It is possible for a multitude of conditions to produce anger in the normal, healthy child. In course of time, if the developmental processes are permitted to have their natural course of encouragement, the physical stimuli which readily provoke anger in the early years of childhood gradually lose their causal significance, and anger, if it is ever in evidence at all, is more likely to be roused by some intellectual issue. In due course of time moral issues may take the place of the more purely intellectual sources. This is not too much to expect in the ideal unfolding of the moral self. The real working of this form of progressiveness is no uncommon occurrence. Moralists are quite unanimous in their opinion that anger, when properly directed, is of considerable significance from the ethical point of view. The boy who is not inclined to protect his just rights will probably be less inclined to stand as a firm citizen if the integrity of his school or state or nation is ever at stake. The progressive functioning of anger is quite as noticeable as the stimuli that produce it. The healthy schoolboy protects himself with those first-hand instruments which Mother Nature has provided him, his bare fists. In due course of time, if he is sufficiently fortunate to attain a degree of intellectual stature and become a senior in a college or university, he proceeds to protect his ideals and opinions, not by

[1] R. S. Woodworth, Dynamic Psychology, p. 67.

physical instruments of warfare but by the pen or the living voice. So it is in line with the natural ordering and development of the instinctive proclivities that the boy should fight, that the student should argue, and that the moralist should exemplify and persuade. This progressiveness, both in the nature of the stimuli that evoke the instinct and in the progressiveness of the resulting behavior, is characteristic of many of the other instincts. Its application to the various phases of the sexual and parental instincts is obvious to all. John Dewey makes mention of three stages in the development of curiosity: the physical, the intellectual, and the social.[1] We may take the term *social* as being closely related to the moral. Social consciousness is not necessarily moral consciousness, but the former usually gives rise to the latter. It is sometimes said that conscience is social consciousness.

Three keys to inherited capacity:
1. Instinct
2. Utility
3. Philosophy

Without further details referring to the sublimation of instinctive tendencies, and the forms of stimuli that should normally release them, it will be proper to say a few words in regard to the progressive unfolding of inherited capacities. Progressive ordering or continuous unfolding seems to be the means par excellence by which one's endowment is most fully realized. Instinct, utility, and philosophy seem to be the only means by which the most obscure inherited endowment may be revealed. Though instinct and natural interest in a specific direction are primary, they are not the only means by which one's intellectual and moral possibilities may be tapped. A student may display little natural interest in mathematics, but when the usefulness of mathematical calculation is clearly discerned, then it is not an uncommon thing for an average student to become considerably proficient in this study. But it is not until he becomes gripped by the fascination of philosophical speculation that the indifferent and drowsy student pricks up his intellect and advances by leaps and bounds. Such a progressive unfolding of hidden capacities is not limited to the development of mathematical interest only, but in

[1] How we Think, pp. 31–32.

the very nature of the case it seems to be universal in its application. The gradual unfolding of one's interest in ethics or the theory of moral behavior is another case in point. Bain, I believe, somewhere says that the child first obeys his parents because he is required to do so; then obedience is forthcoming on account of the child's tendency to please his parents; and finally obedience follows simply as a matter of conscience. But the mere development of conscience in the ordinary sense of the term is not sufficient to develop an abiding interest in moral theory. It is not often that an interest is developed in the "good," no matter how thorough and pedagogical one's early moral training may have been; also it is exceptional that mere utility is sufficient to stir the student's interest in becoming better acquainted with the moral self; and as a rule it is not until his interests have attained philosophical proportions that the nature of the "good" becomes the object of moral speculation. No moralist can fairly expect rich gains, either practically or theoretically, from the pursuit of his science, until this stage of ethical enlightenment is reached. In the last few paragraphs considerable emphasis has been placed upon the progressive unfolding of capacities as the result of the proper development of interests and capacities that naturally preceded them in point of time, and also the developmental relations of the physical, the intellectual, and the moral, and finally the so-called sublimation of the instincts. The concept most suitable for explaining such a procedure would be the onward and forward tendency of the synthetic moral self. In the following paragraph we shall take a brief glance at the phenomena made manifest in the retardation of the self.

Regression of the instincts and emotions

Students of the mental and moral sciences are well aware of the fact that while there is order, progress, and advancement in the normal growing mind, there is disorder, hesitation, and even retrogression in the case of grave mental disturbance. There is a reversal in the order of the stimuli that set free instinctive activity. Higher forms of stimuli, as the intellectual, moral, and spiritual, give way to the physical. And not only may there be a

reversal of the stimuli that occasion instinctive expression, but, what is more, it is not at all uncommon for spiritual or moral functioning to be replaced by that which is lower. In the disturbed moral self the good and the bad are not far apart, and this is especially so in the unstable mind that has reached a high degree of attainment. A well-developed case of hero worship will occasionally display to some degree all the phenomena mentioned in this paragraph. In an extreme case of hero worship the emotions, and in a general way the affective nature, become stranded and fail to develop in the proper direction. Not only do the feelings fail to develop, but there is often a retrogression to earlier stages of affective experience. Under such conditions the more purely intellectual processes may advance to higher stages of perfection, but, as the feelings are generally in control of the thought processes, only those ideas that are in harmony with the prevailing emotion have any chance of functioning. If thought and feeling are closely related in all normal human experiences, they surely become indelibly joined in cases of affective disturbance. Too intense and persistent feeling of any kind disturbs the equilibrium of the self. This is especially true of the early stages of adolescence, when feeling and emotion are more likely to be persistent and intense. Danger to the self does not come from the fact that the object of love or worship is unwholesome or impure, but, on the contrary, the harm that may result from the close attachment of an adolescent girl to her teacher or spiritual advisor may be directly proportional to the true spirituality of the individual loved or worshiped. This is not an argument against true and healthy friendship, but it is a warning against the lurking dangers that often follow in the wake of misplaced love and worship such as very often occurs when the emotions are most plastic.

An emotional set

Adolescence is the age of changing ideals, but when an ideal with its accompanying feeling becomes too firmly established in adolescent consciousness, an emotional complex is the only logical result. As the inevitable result all other minor feelings and

interests tend to gravitate in the direction of the major feeling or complex. This sufficiently accounts for the so-called emotional set that often characterizes the intellect of many persons of considerable literary attainment. In the more serious disturbances of the self there is a more conspicuous reversion not only to some previous state through which the individual has passed but to some condition that seems to be more or less atavistic.

Tendencies increase or decrease in range

So far we have been trying to follow the forward and backward movement of instincts, capacities, and tendencies. Under healthful conditions the movement is forward, carrying one's intellectual and moral integrity always to higher planes of perfection, but under certain circumstances involving emotional stresses and strains the movement is backward toward some lower level of immaturity. Not only may capacities and other forms of natural equipment be directed forward and backward, in accordance with impinging circumstances, whether subjective or objective, but also their range of function and influence may be either materially increased or materially decreased, whether unconsciously or in accordance with the clearest light of modern pedagogy. Attendant circumstances may broaden or decrease the range of almost any instinct. The possibilities of curiosity would be a good example in the field of education. The encouraged child may well develop a many-sided curiosity, but the child whose interests are either neglected or thwarted fails to develop broad visions of life. In the common everyday experiences of life fear is perhaps most subject to expansion and contraction. This is a common subject for pedagogical treatment. Fear can be made the source of that which is good, — discipline, virtue, religion; on the other hand, it may become the foundation for the dreadful, — cowardice, phobias, insanity. Professor James, in his "Principles of Psychology," has made it plain to us how early circumstances may either increase or decrease the normal functioning of the sexual instinct, while McDougall, in his "Outline of Psychology," [1] makes the parental instinct "Nature's

[1] William McDougall, Outline of Psychology, p. 130.

brightest and most beautiful invention." If it is possible for conditions good or bad to increase or decrease the range of capacities and tendencies toward behavior, it is equally possible for experience to change the direction of these same capacities, either for the betterment or for the detriment of the individual.

The reversal of interests

The statement has often been made that opposites are the closest associations in consciousness. While this statement is not generally true, there are specific instances in which one's feelings, ideas, and ideals do take an opposite course. A qualified unity is always characteristic of the well-organized mind, and a disordered heterogeneity is no less an index of the disordered self. At this stage of our discussion it will be well to show that even in the normal functioning of the mind there is always a tendency for any fundamental and vital interest that makes itself manifest in the form of a feeling, an idea, or an ideal to develop the possibility of its true opposite. The actuality of love makes necessary the possibility of anger, and surely there would not be much true joy in this world without some true sorrow and disappointment. But at the present time we are especially interested in the reversal of certain instinctive tendencies and interests in connection with the higher moral nature.

The delicacy of moral motives

It is not at all uncommon for the natural unfolding interests of early adolescence to develop into their opposites. Such clear-cut reversals in the life of certain interests seem to have no assignable cause; but when one comes to investigate the nature and intricacy of the mental mechanism working in conjunction with the interplay of delicate motives, on the one hand, and with cruel experience, on the other hand, it is not hard to account for such unexpected phenomena as the reversal of life's natural interests, either in whole or in part. The early stages of any motive are weak and unstable, and the higher the possibilities of moral motivation the greater the possibilities of its misdirection and perversion. John Stuart Mill somewhere says that virtue is a delicate plant in the life of the human soul. This seems to be very true in the budding tendencies and motives that give rise

to virtues, but surely not to the well-established virtues indicative of selfhood. Perhaps a few concrete examples of the theme under discussion will make the matter clear.

The development of antisocial tendencies

The natural social tendencies of the adolescent may be converted into an antisocial disposition to such a degree that it may interfere with his success in life. Sociality is coming to be considered more or less clearly a true index of sanity. So much so that the term *sociality* or its equivalent is beginning to be adopted by the legal profession as indicative of moral responsibility. Undue and misdirected criticism of the child's growing social interests may be sufficient to convert such interests into their opposites. It is a well-known fact that moral and criminal delinquents are lacking in social purposes to such a degree that they are not amenable to social sanctions. Closely connected with such a reversal of one's natural proclivities is the development of the sense of inferiority on the part of the sensitive child. Misdirected criticism by someone in authority may be sufficient to destroy all possibilities of future happiness, no matter what the individual's material success in life may happen to be. More common, but in many respects less consequential in the moral and social success of the individual, is the reversal of the pupil's aptitudes for certain subjects. This, however, seems to be quite as applicable to the college freshman as it is to the early stages of school life. How often the early presentation of subjects like history, or language, or mathematics converts what may be considered a normal interest and capacity for such subjects into a real and lasting dislike. Pupils with considerable ability may revel in one or more subjects and thoroughly despise another. Such a change of interests into real aversions can usually be traced to lack of tact on the part of the teacher in making painful and disagreeable, by lack of foresight and pedagogical procedure, that which under normal processes of functioning would be pleasurable. The failure of the average pupil to maintain an interest in the ordinary subjects is not often due to the lack of capacity on the part of the pupil. Capacities, like the virtues,

seem to hang together. We may mention two primary reasons why a pupil may lose his natural interest in a subject. The first, which is briefly explained in this paragraph, is the substitution of an aversion for a desire, and the interchange of the corresponding motives. The second reason for such a loss of interest is that a superficial acquaintance with a subject tends to develop a dislike for that subject. Almost any individual can point to concrete instances within the borders of his own life. The reason why normal desire is not replaced by simple indifference rather than by real aversion, like an aversion for some disliked subject, is probably to be explained on the principle of mental opposition, or opposed mental tendencies. When desire for some particular subject ceases to function, its opposite in terms of an incipient aversion assumes control. The intensity of the developed opposition between desire and aversion for some object of human experience is often more or less proportional to the intensity of the original desire or aversion. Are not the quarrels of lovers of much greater intensity than the quarrels that may develop under the conditions of superficial acquaintance? We are now ready to make concrete application of our principle to the moral and spiritual. It is rather hard to touch our physical and intellectual interests without having some influence, either positive or negative, upon the moral and spiritual life.

Moral motivation and character

Just as the sociologist and the practical social worker concern themselves with those conditions that convert social into antisocial tendencies, and the earnest pedagogue strives to maintain the developing interests of his pupils, so the moralist engages himself with the maintenance of moral interests. Moral impulses, even the strictly altruistic, may as readily be changed into their opposites as the social and pedagogical impulses already mentioned. How often our faith in the integrity of a particular person's morals is broken by his infraction of some virtue. This occasionally happens even in the presence of normal heredity and what seems to be favorable environmental influences. It is true that such a departure from virtue may

never be adequately accounted for, but if an accurate analysis of the delinquent's motives could be had, it would be found that there had been a substitution of immoral for moral motives. In the introductory chapter of this book it was stated that, morally speaking, nothing ever happens to the moral self, implying that moral growth and deterioration are the result of the interplay of motives. The substitution of motives is essential to an alteration of character. Certain motives may be unconsciously sapping our moral integrity or they may be consciously gaining for us a moral capital. A word concerning the reversal of motives along more purely religious lines will be in order.

Reversal of religious motives

The reversal of spiritual motives and interests is probably of more consequence than the reversal of either the intellectual or even the moral. A child reared in a rather inconsistent formal religious atmosphere is more likely to suffer a reversal of his earlier religious motives. Such changes in a person's highest evolved qualities are the more disastrous for the individual and for society from the very fact that one's religious interests are by their nature suffused with emotion. It is common knowledge that the sudden change of the emotional life may have more direful results than the mere change of ideas. Any sudden change of feeling is harmful to the integrity of the human mind, and a sudden change in religious emotions is likely to be followed by more disastrous consequences, not only because they are suffused with feeling but because of the more exalted nature of the spiritual order. At this point it may be well to note that beyond the age of adolescence there are few marked and sudden changes in religious interests. In the case of a sudden decline of religious belief the first cause may well be attributed to some form of mental deterioration. A sound, sane, and relatively matured religious belief is never suddenly lost. The practical sociologist or those interested in the field of social ethics have occasion to be disturbed by the seeming reversal of religious interests. The course of events in recent times is of significance to social ethics not because of the injury that the honest scientist may do (for science,

at the very most, can do no more, and cares to do no more, than to reduce the range of religious authority), but because of the fact that those who drop away from early formal religious beliefs are among the most insidious enemies of society and religion. The scientist as such is never an enemy of religion; but the man who has lost his faith may enlist his interests against the institutions of religion. This is not at all an uncommon procedure in the everyday affairs of human life. Is not the man who has lost his position disposed to harbor ill feeling toward those who are considered responsible for his loss?

After having in a very sketchy way offered a few concrete examples and several theoretical explanations of the tendencies of behavior, such as the reducing, extending, and reversal of certain sources of interest until recently called instincts, it might be expected that a fuller account of the possibilities of the organization of one's interests and capacities would be in order. The organization of the tendencies of action and inherited capacities will receive treatment in the chapter more especially devoted to psychological determinations. Those who have been successful in following the outline of the present chapter will recall that the three main theses for discussion were, first, the capacities that nature has impressed upon us, and the various interests for which such varying capacities are made to function; secondly, the topic just discussed, or the tendencies that seem to make possible man's active life; and, thirdly, tendencies in the direction of habituation, which will now be briefly outlined.

Habit characteristic of nerve tissue

Valid reasons may be offered why tendencies in the direction of habituation will not accurately describe the phenomena which the present writer wishes to set forth. Perhaps it can truly be said that there are no tendencies in the direction of habituation. However that may be, the real meaning to be implied is that all nervous tissue is subject to habituation. This is the primary sense in which I use the expression "tendency in the direction of habituation." It is not the intention to enlarge upon the value of habit, but the significant fact to be noted is that the possibility

of habit has a natural or biological basis. It is in behalf of factors primarily biological that this chapter is written. No statement in this paragraph is meant to imply that habit is the all-important phenomenon, or the idea which reduces all the so-called mental processes to chained reflexes. But, after all these warnings have been given, there are several senses in which many things significant for the self may have a biological-habitual basis.

Definition of habit

Everyone is born with some capacity to form habits in one way or another. Some have nervous systems that are plastic in many directions, whereas others are born with nervous systems that are amenable to habituation of only the lowest order. The wise moralist no less than the educator must take this fact into account. Habit, in the ordinary sense of the term, means that when the nervous system is caused to function in some definite way (whether such a function is primarily due to a simple reflex, an instinct, a simple motive, or a carefully thought-out purpose), there is always a tendency, other things being equal, for the act to be more easily repeated. This, of course, is very common knowledge, but it is no less significant for all that. A good share of the real success and worth in life is due to the simple ability to do many things easily and well. If there is a higher value in life, it may probably be attributed to the feeling that we are advancing on the long road to mental and moral achievement. Self-competition, or the competing with every developed stage of mental enlargement, is the higher form of competition, — a competition that improves the self and does not injure any other person.

Recent interpretation of habit

There is today a tendency to use the term *habit* in quite another way from that in which it was used in the preceding paragraph. It is said that the most important thing about habit is not due to the blind repetition of it, but that an action prompted by a habit in the real sense of the term may take place only once in a lifetime. Habit in this sense would seem to imply some sort of physical, mental, or moral disposition that would

cause one to act, not blindly, but favorably or unfavorably in some life situation. Thus a person may be said to choose wisely or unwisely some life purpose as the result of habit. There seems to be no good reason why habit should not be explained in this way. Habit thus designated would simply imply an active wide-awake intelligence. Old-fashioned habits will continue to be with us, but habits that reënforce one another, and habits that are not blind but accompanied by consciousness, are habits of a higher order. John Dewey, in his "Human Nature and Conduct," goes on to say that "habits in the weak character alternate with one another, but habits in the strong character reënforce one another." [1] In the following chapter it will be our purpose to discuss some details relative to what may be called the psychological determination of the self.

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[1] Human Nature and Conduct, p. 38.

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CHAPTER IV

THE SELF AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY DETERMINED: THE FORMS OF ORGANIZATION AND SYNTHESIS

Forms of self-organization

No scientist would endeavor to understand the history of a plant, an animal, a man, or society without some accurate information, first, in regard to the forces, purposes, or desires by which each is either mechanically or purposefully actuated; secondly, in regard to the elements or parts of which each is made or constituted; and, finally, in regard to those forms or organizing forces and principles in accordance with which each has attained its present status. Now, that which holds true of the plant, the animal, the human being, and the social world is equally applicable to the moral self, which is our chief object of investigation. The two preceding chapters were primarily concerned with those actuating causes, biological and psychological, which seem to account for the possibilities of self-behavior in terms of interests, tendencies, and inherited capacities. The first aim of the present chapter is to formulate and to apply those principles of mental organization and synthesis which seem to be necessary and real in the development of character. We shall mention five such principles of organization: (1) the mechanical organization of the self; (2) the logical organization of the self; (3) the organic organization of the self; (4) the purposeful organization of the self; (5) the self-conscious organization of the self. These five theses in themselves are probably not sufficient to account for all the attributes of selfhood. In the first chapter of this book feeling and organic sensations were mentioned as one source of self-unity. It is probable that organic sensation serves only as a relatively permanent background. Neither is it to be supposed that any one of the five forms of

organization outlined is possible without the influence of one or more of the others. The type of the resultant self, however, will depend largely upon the dominant principle that is occasioning its unity. Moral selves may be mechanical, logical, organic, purposeful, and self-conscious, and a well-rounded character may have a fair degree of all five attributes. The mechanical and organic types of self may rightfully be considered more primitive and elementary than the logical, the purposeful, or the self-conscious. We shall first consider the mechanical, as that falls most clearly under what may be called the law of association.

1. The mechanized character

We are not concerned as to whether the ordinary laws of association are to be interpreted as mechanical laws of association, nor do we especially care whether such laws are in themselves sufficient to explain all forms of mental phenomena (though it is the writer's belief that they do not, as we shall have occasion to see later); we are simply interested, at the present time, in analyzing that type of character which automatically and mechanically reflects the environment, whether it be physical, intellectual, moral, or even spiritual. The materialistic-spiritualistic type of personality is not uncommon. So far as form is concerned, it is easy for the materialist to imitate the spiritualist. This is, of course, only another way of emphasizing the existence of moral and spiritual hypocrisy, which is always so evident among us. If we are to use the term *self* as implying the embodiment of some form of unity, it is seriously to be doubted whether it is advisable to speak of a mechanical form of mental organization at all. If there could be a form of character that simply retained and recalled the events of the world as they were experienced, it would certainly not be entitled to be the holder of a moral self. The objective world of diversified events may be one grand example of unity, but that is not enough, in itself, to occasion unity such as we attribute to the developed self. The forms of unity that are impressed upon us by the regularly occurring events are important but do not explain

what may be called a selected unity. The objective world impresses upon the self an objective form of unity in terms of valuable habits, whereas it is the true function of the developed moral self to impress upon the objective world forms of unity that are selective and purposeful. The mind mechanically organized may incorporate the former, but it could hardly be said to account for the latter.

Conscience as highest product of determined self

When we go out into the world in search of concrete examples of persons whose characters seem to be about as mechanical as the laws of nature, we do not have to go far. We need only investigate our own moral nature to discover sufficient examples of motives of human character which, though not popularly considered the mere resultant of association, nevertheless, on final analysis, turn out to be little more than such. Whenever we sit down in a "cool hour," as Butler would have us do, and analyze dispassionately the reasons why we do this in preference to that, we are quite likely to find that our choice of action was determined by custom or social habit. We behave in a certain way because society behaves in a similar way. It may truthfully be asserted that, until the age of later adolescence at least, a high degree of moral integrity will not automatically maintain itself until it is perpetually corroborated by one's fellows, and it is not at all common for moral selfhood, even in its highest attainment, to withstand the repeated attacks of social disapproval. Though social approval is the highest source of moral authority outside the moral self itself, nevertheless the main thesis of this book maintains that social approval, even in its highest forms, can *never* be the real source of a moral motive. When so-called social approval in terms of approbation and disapprobation stamps itself upon the growing self, however, it has grown to be the custom for society to symbolize the resultant moral criterion as a conscience. Conscience at its very best is nine tenths social consciousness and one tenth rationalized honesty. This is not intended as a criticism of conscience; it is simply an endeavor to lay bare its inner mechanism. The world is not yet sufficiently far advanced to

get along without an old-fashioned conscience. Concerning the origin, nature, and neglected opportunities of the "morality of common sense" Henry Sidgwick has this to say:

> We are much less concerned with correcting and improving than we are with realizing and enforcing it. The Utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper of rebellion against the established morality as something purely external and conventional, into which the reflective mind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that the established rules are not intrinsically reasonable. He must, of course, also repudiate as superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or Divine Code which Intuitional moralists inculcate. Still, he will naturally contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth, shewing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit: he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced; a mechanism which no "politicians or philosophers" could create, yet without which the harder and coarser machinery of Positive Law could not be permanently maintained, and the life of man would become — as Hobbes forcibly expresses it — "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[1]

The moral world could little afford to lose the sense of integrity and honesty that seems to be so deeply ingrained throughout all the writings of this famed moral master. When the mechanically determined self, even at its very best, functioning in terms of conscience, fails to lift character above the surroundings in which it is enmeshed, it is high time for the moralist to search for higher sources of moral authority.

The diversified influences of environment

Before turning to those higher sources of moral authority and self-organization it will be well to say a little more in regard to environmental influence. Much is being said today in behalf of environmental influence in the development and inculcation of

[1] The Methods of Ethics, pp. 473–474. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

intellectual, social, and moral personality. Stimulus and response, working on the basis of a reflex mechanism, are fast assuming proportions in present-day psychology. The stimulus is supplied by the environment, the all-sufficient factor, — sufficient, we are told, to account for all the interests of man, — sufficient to account for any degree of attainment of the moral self. Character thus becomes a long-drawn-out, a synthetic, reflex mechanism. It may not be strictly correct to identify such reflex mechanism with associationism, but the two are closely enough related to be treated under one heading, the mechanical organization of the mind, character, or self. We are not here concerned with upholding or rejecting such a thesis; we are simply interested in determining the influence of the environment under various circumstances. It is true that the environment that brings out the saintly qualities in one will summon the devil in another. Subtle influences in the surroundings of one adolescent that will inevitably lead to temptation and resulting degradation will just as truly strengthen the moral fiber in another youth with a different constitution. The simple, humdrum life under which a youth with a certain temperament may be reared is often insufficient to awaken his interests or to stimulate his capacities, whereas the same environment, impinging upon the senses of another youth with equal capacities but with a differently sensitized nervous system, may elicit interests and ability that border on genius.

Evil results of scattered attention

Though one's interests are ordinarily proportional to the complexity of the environment in which one lives, it does not necessarily follow that an overstimulating environment is best for intellectual and moral interests. Earlier in this work it was stated that an ever-changing environment was not conducive to the inculcation of morals, and the ability to do original thinking may be best subserved by moderate and peaceful surroundings. A few concrete examples will make the matter plain. How often the average well-meaning parent makes the mistake of thinking that his child must be provided with many toys of various kinds

and descriptions. The harm comes to the child not so much from the sense of extravagance, or even the tendency on his part to become dissatisfied when not in the presence of a multitude of toys, but from the more sinister fact that the child's attention becomes hopelessly divided. It is mentally and morally disastrous for the child's attention to flit from one thing to another in rapid succession. The powers of attention must begin to organize early in life. The writer of this chapter has much good reason to believe that the mental flightiness of many students upon entering college can be traced directly to such influences as have just been described. The kind of attention that is objectively sustained is of very little intellectual and moral value. Attention, to be of any appreciable value, must be sustained long enough to permit of mental reënforcement. Unsustained attention may do more to unbalance than to integrate character. Where attention lingers, there is growth.

Dangers from complex demands of schools and colleges

We may well consider another field in which an unfavorable environment has a deleterious effect on the moral self. Here the evil result is due not so much to influences which make impossible the systematic ordering of the child mind in its early stages as to those all-compelling interests that disturb the moral equilibrium of the adolescent. A multitude of stimuli, favorable and unfavorable, inevitably impinge upon the already overstimulated nervous system of the boys and girls in our public schools. In addition to the fact that these conditions are disastrous in their first moral effects (those observable to the naked eye), there are ulterior consequences, — the evil effects of scattered attention. The conditions that we are now trying to explain are also characteristic of student life in the universities and colleges. Those distracting influences, incident upon a too complex environment, which the child may by chance escape during early childhood, will in all likelihood pounce upon him during his public-school career; and if through providence he succeeds in getting through the public schools mentally and morally unscathed, and is successful enough to enter college, here for the

third time his mental equilibrium will be endangered. He may be successfully guided through the strain and stress of a host of intellectual and social demands, but many are not so successful.

Bad effects of emotion and fatigue

Mental instability is one of the inevitable results of our modern high-pressure mode of living. Modern society is full of insidious stimuli that set in vibration the unstable nerves of its victims. Only the strongest nerves can continue to maintain their integrity when subjected to many simultaneous interests of a divergent nature. Too many opposing interests cause the mind to give way. Conflict of interests soon leads to fear, phobias, complexes, and incipient insanity, so common in modern civilization. Mental dissipation, unlike physical dissipation, is not immediately discernible in its effects. It is a notorious fact that the disastrous consequences which follow long-drawn-out emotional excitement often seem to be inversely proportional to the time that elapses between the time of dissipation and the mental collapse. Not many are aware of the harm done until it is too late. No mind can long withstand emotional strain and stress, especially when accompanied by fatigue.

The environment of mediation

We may now turn to more pleasant fields of contemplation and speculation. Many thinkers maintain that the thought processes are at the mercy of the perceptual world. Whether or not this is an accurate statement of the fact, nevertheless it remains true that an agreeable environment is conducive to quality and quantity of thought. Writers and thinkers betake themselves to some favorite spot with the intention of eliciting thought and feeling in harmony with the problem at hand. Poets must reside in the environment of poets if they are to compose and to create in a manner worthy of their name. Somber philosophy is not often produced within the reaches of the gay lights of society; even the social philosopher must withdraw for a time from the strivings of humanity if he is to predict with any degree of certainty what politics and the institutions of man may bring forth. Much of the world's best literature has been produced in the quiet of seclusion. The environment which calls out the

great thoughts of the thinker and the ideals of the artist is not always the environment discernible to the eye or to the ear; it may be the environment real to the imagination, picturing itself in thought and portraying its colors on canvas and expressing to the soul of the ear sounds yet unsung.

The unconscious sources of thought

Other phases of an environment conducive to thought may be of some interest to the reader. One does not need to be consciously aware of the favorableness of his environment in order that the surroundings may facilitate thought. The conscious and tangible beauty of a certain landscape may really interfere with the creativeness of thought, whereas a landscape less consciously discerned may disengage thought of a much higher order. A principle of some significance may be formulated. The environment most suitable for the provocation of thought is the one that unconsciously unlocks the identities in the thinker's past and present associations. We cannot force the thought processes any more than we can force the growth of the moral self. Thought will assume and carry its own burdens if the thinkers will but supply the requisite conditions. The agriculturist in the sandy desert needs only to construct his trenches, and through them the water will gravitate to every place that needs it. Likewise, the thinker who would give expression to originality and mental productiveness must plan well those mental furrows that will unconsciously become the means of furnishing sustenance to constructive thoughts, sane feelings, and wise sentiments. Teachers who have long become accustomed to certain classroom surroundings in the form of definitely arranged desks, pictures, and books find it difficult to think when such articles have been removed or rearranged. A person reared in a home where some form of interest or recreation has been dominant during the early years will find throughout all adult life that the intellectual processes will be quickened and reënforced when in the presence of such a source of stimulation. Perhaps enough has been said to show the significance of the environment in producing mental states of a certain quality and order. It is easier to

be social when in the presence of people who are socially active. Could we but register the thoughts and sentiments of people during their attendance at church, there would be no need of pessimism concerning the world's religious convictions. Is it not easier to be good in the presence of the good? But the possibility of being good when in the presence of the good is only the first stage or requisite in the development of the moral self. We shall now turn from those conditions of mental and moral development that are primarily mechanical to those that are, to a degree at least, logical, thoughtful, and meaningful.

2. The logical organization of the mind: rationalism

Whenever we betake ourselves to the task of tracing out what man has thought concerning the nature, workings, and meaning of the world, and especially the nature of that highest evolved product, man himself, his mind and his conscience, we find parallel lines of thought, — two answers, the empirical and the rational. In perplexity man returns perennially to experience or to reason for the true solution of his problems. One needs only to turn to the history of thought to see how man has tried to solve, and often has solved to his complete satisfaction, the problems mentioned. In the first division of this chapter an attempt was made to solve man's moral interests in terms of material experience, in conformity with the mechanical laws of association, stimulated by an objective environment; in this division the world of empirical experience will not be consciously neglected, but the meaning of this experience will be emphasized. When reason is used to give meaning to experience, we have the doctrine called rationalism. Perhaps we may justly offer an introduction to our subject on the logical organization of the self by first presenting a few choice thinkers who have had much to do with determining what is the true source of the morally good. In this list we shall barely have time to mention the names of Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics as conspicuous among the ancients, and the great names of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and others among modern rationalists. Kant conscientiously endeavored to reduce the range of reason.

Socratic knowledge and virtue

On the one hand, these philosophers, moralists, and thinkers vary considerably in respect to the source or sources of moral concepts, inspiration, and reason, and, on the other hand, they differ more or less as to the method of application of such categories. Not one seems to be satisfied with the facts of particular empirical experience, but all emphasize the universal and the rational. A few concrete examples will make these abstract principles clear. Socrates, one of the founders of the science of ethics, seeks to establish his moral concepts on the basis of the community of human experience. Not in an isolated human experience but in living experiences common to many men Socrates finds sufficient material for the establishment of concepts. Such concepts as those of justice, the beautiful, and the true are similarly formed. These related concepts are not to be found in the realm of philosophy or in any sphere other than the interests of man and society. Not many moralists today would seriously question the concrete sources, man and society, from which Socrates draws heavily for his ideas of what are now known as the Socratic concepts. It is true that many in the past, but fewer in the present, have looked beyond man and society for the true source of that which inspires and urges man to be good. Perhaps it is the neglect of this far-away source of goodness that is bringing the world into trouble and despair. Many are inclined to think so. It is not, however, until Socrates proceeds to make concrete application of his concepts that trouble and dissent seem to arise. Socrates failed to save Athenian society, though the many-sidedness of his personality was such that he became the source from which many schools of ethics have sprung.

The Cynic and the Cyrenaic, the Stoic and the Epicurean, and the Platonic, each finds some logical connection with the personality or the ethics of Socrates. His conception that "knowledge is virtue" is both a strong and a weak point in his ethical philosophy. It is strong in the fact that the right kind of knowledge does lead to virtue and a righteous life. It is none the less weak,

since conceptualized knowledge has no necessary tendency to work itself out into moral life. No other ethical creed embodies so much truth and so much error.

Socrates and Plato compared

We make a considerable advance beyond the concepts of Socrates when we reach the "ideas" of Plato. Plato also has his notion as to the origin of moral concepts, likewise his special mode of application. Socrates, it will be recalled, questions the man in the street in order to arrive at the ideas universal in their application, but Plato seems to resort to his so-called dialectic, and communes with his own soul, in order to arrive at the first sources of goodness and of truth, the "ideas." Both Socrates and his great pupil Plato believe in making knowledge the primary source of virtue. The knowledge of Socrates is man-made and experientially-born, whereas the knowledge of Plato is eternal, delivered only on the earnest request of the philosopher. To Socrates all may drink of the fountain of knowledge and be good, but to Plato only a specially devised technique will permit the ablest in thought to arrive at the true sources of truth.

Plato's social scheme

Plato, with the ingenuity of a real artist, devised, in his famous "Republic," a unique educational and social scheme whereby knowledge originally in the hands of the thinker may infiltrate and become of moral advantage to all. Thus the philosopher, the soldier, and the artisan, respectively endowed with the virtues of wisdom, of courage, and of temperance, are to make possible justice in man and in the State by their faithfulness to duty. Socrates, on the other hand, offered no social scheme to mediate his ideas and his social usefulness, but in person peacefully (though in the eyes of many others ill-naturedly) sauntered up and down the streets of Athens, convincing some of their ignorance, but directly encouraging all to be just, good, and true. Thus two of the three great moralists of antiquity resolved to inculcate the virtues, the one on the basis of moral precept, the other on the basis of moral concept.

Significance of Platonic ideals

A few statements may be detailed in exemplification of the relation of the "ideas" to the virtuous life as outlined in the

writings of Plato. The "ideas" in the poetic fancy of Plato are, as we may believe, only the established standards of the empirical forms of existence. Yet these archetypes (for instance, the "good" and the "just") are by many present-day thinkers considered the products of a fertile Platonic imagination. However that may be, the thing of moral significance to those who are deeply engaged in discovering the nature and source of the good is the fact that man, in his moments of highest moral endeavor and creativeness, is capable of entertaining ideals of such real worth. It may be surmised that the divine types, to which Plato so happily gave expression, are merely good examples of the principle formulated in a previous chapter in regard to the tendency of the mind of the higher type to search for and to entertain a higher ideal or status. The foregoing statements have made clear the distinction between the organization of the moral self that is chiefly sponsored by the stimuli of a diversified and mechanical environment and the more idealistic, rationalistic, and inspirational scheme of Socrates, and more especially that of Plato. For Plato ideals are made to mold the environment, but for the mechanist the mind and its ideals are molded by the environment. In the following paragraph we shall briefly note the contributions of the Stoics to the logic of morals.

Stoic contribution to morals

Socrates, in searching for his universalized moral concepts, looked to the experience of everyday man; Plato, in order to seek out the "ideas," bade only the philosopher to look within; whereas the Stoic turned his attention to the world which was endowed with the essence of reason. Man, who is by nature an integral part of the world, is universally endowed with the spirit of reason. Hence his possibilities of becoming virtuous are proportional to his ability to partake of the world reason. The logic of their social scheme is at once in evidence. The State is an institution worthy of the interests of man, for the reason that the whole (the State) is more complete than the parts (the individuals). This view of the world and its essence, and especially of man's relation to the world, would naturally dispose

those entertaining such a belief to a rationalistic philosophy of life. Stoicism and rationalism have much in common.

The Stoics and civil law

The Stoics have interestingly identified the reason innately resident in nature with the mechanical laws of nature, and so it has come about that the reason which they assume to be the essence of the world, and the laws of nature, including man's rational faculties, have come to have a close alliance. Man is free to the degree that he puts himself in harmony with the universal reason, or the inevitable laws of nature. The contribution of the Stoics to the world of ethics lies not alone in the fact that they made reason and virtue the aim of life, but from the further fact that they laid so well the foundations for the establishment of civil law. If all men would partake of the world reason, there would be clearly set forth for the first time a way by which various peoples might attain some possibilities of justice and fellowship. The conceptions of justice and universality resident in modern civil law may be traced back to the early philosophical notions first entertained by the ancient Stoics. These early conceptions, we are told, were real factors in preparing a way for the amelioration of man and humanity that was conducive to the establishment of the principles of Christianity, with their further accent on unity, universality, and fellowship.

Various phases of early Stoic philosophy crop out in all ages. The Puritan, with his rigid insistence on unqualified virtue, is truly reminiscent of the early Stoic sages. Immanuel Kant in his insistence on virtue and duty was as much of a Stoic as the famous ones of old. Stoicism, like Pragmatism, may be conveniently employed to prefix many a philosophy. Thomas Hobbes uses the Stoic prescription, the laws of nature, to establish securely the rights of the selfish individual and the rights of society. The more practical phase of the Stoic philosophy is common to the natural temperament of many men. It is this aspect of the Stoic that is most commonly identified with what many would call the philosophy of common sense. It is not the philosophy that bows to the inevitable aches and pains and

worries to which mankind is so prone. It would waste little time in passive sympathy and sentimentality. It is a philosophy that is ever leading onward and upward — a philosophy of life that is ever on its way.

It will not be well to belabor the patience of the reader with further historic examples of the logical or rationalistic sources of moral concepts and their various applications, such as those mentioned in connection with Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics. The great modern rationalists, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, were primarily philosophers, and only incidentally, for the most part, concerned with morals. Their contribution to morals will be neglected for the present, although the ethics of Spinoza is a fine example of rationalistic insight into the nature of the moral self. The moral schemes of Cudworth, Clarke, Price, and others, who emphasized man's rational integrity, will be passed by in silence. Many interpretations have been read into the terms *logical* and *rational*, but we shall now use these terms in the sense of that which conforms to the understanding and the meaningful. When the plain man has occasion to use the word *logical* or *rational*, he ordinarily has in mind that which accords with common sense, that to which the sane mind might be expected to give expression.

Teacher as demonstrator of meanings

Teachers with considerable classroom experience are well aware of the sharp line of demarcation in the educative process between rote memory and understanding. That which is simply impressed upon the mind is not learned at all, and it is only when facts become organized with one's interests and purposes that they are an integral part of the self. The association of ideas is not to be identified with associated thought. *Meaning* and *understanding* are the great words in the learning processes. When meaning and understanding have been attained, the ordinary laws of association seem to be of little significance. Teachers no longer need to harp on the pedagogical importance of recency, primacy, vividness, repetition, emotional congruity, and the rest. Outside of unity, meaning seems to reflect the

highest function of the self. Whether it be supplying an active background of meanings in the early kindergarten experiences of the child, or whether it be the evolving of conceptualized meanings in the mind of the graduate student of celestial mechanics, the chief rôle of the teacher is always the same; he is the active demonstrator of meanings. Not only must the teacher be a perpetual unfolder of meanings, but likewise he must be a living embodiment of the truth of his teachings. To be more than barely successful the teacher of physical and mental athletics must be sound in body and sane in mind, the teacher of dietetics must be a living example of the value of the well-balanced diet, and it would be well for the teacher of ethics to embody the moral truths which he endeavors to portray and to inculcate. A further exemplification of meaning may be of interest to the practical moralist.

Significance of moral sentiments

Teachers, parents, and even instructors in ethics are often chagrined by the fact that those over whom they have the exercise of moral guidance seem to take little interest in the precepts, maxims, and principles seemingly fundamental in the development of the moral self. A concrete solution of this real moral problem is not hard to discover. The ideas and feelings of the youth are made up of his experiences. Moral maxims are of little interest to him for the very reason that corresponding sentiments have not been established in his moral experience. Moral sentiments must grow before they can be expected to function. It is for this very reason that the average youth takes very little interest in the oververbalized and oft-repeated moral maxims so dear to parent and teacher, and often has as little concern for the moral possibilities of the expected future. The development of a moral interest does not differ much from the inculcation of any other acquired interest. Perhaps no interest can be said to be abiding and relatively permanent until it has become a sentiment. A moral sentiment is any moral idea around which feeling has become organized. Truth, honor, justice, etc., with their accompanying feelings and interests, are

real moral sentiments. The establishment of moral sentiments is the real dividing line between the unmoral and the moral experiences of the youth. Moral sentiments are the first stabilizing forces in the history of each individual self.

Egoism and altruism in human nature

Closely connected with the acquired attributes of the self is the question of the naturalness of egoism and altruism. Some of the older writers (we may mention Hobbes as an example) claim that man is by nature selfish, others (as Rousseau) attribute to him a natural goodness, whereas among more modern thinkers there are those (Dewey, for instance) who would make him unconsciously egoistic and altruistic but able to become, in turn, consciously one or the other. The last point of view seems to be most in accord with human beings as we know them. At this stage in the analysis of moral character we are especially concerned with its acquisitions. It is well to be born with the capacities for human excellencies, but it is better through stress and effort to acquire them. We appreciate and enjoy and most truly cause to function only that which we ourselves have brought to fruition. Aristotle was, we believe, the first to draw the line clearly and distinctly between the intellectual and the moral excellencies, — the one we may inherit; the other we may possibly acquire. Some light may be gleaned for the theme at hand by hearkening to the wise words of Herbert Spencer. With confidence and enthusiasm he expresses the view that one's lower nature functions at the expense of the higher only when the higher has been denied its proper and natural expression. Altruism and benevolence normally take precedence over egoism and the coarser traits. Even Henry Sidgwick, who is ever so careful not to utter one word out of harmony with fact, somewhere mentions the egoist's natural sense of ignobility; and it is this same thinker who has given to the ethical world his famous doctrine of rational benevolence. In accordance with this theory of rational benevolence he who postulates the general thesis that happiness is the true aim of life is rationally bound to entertain the happiness of others.

Rational benevolence an acquired sentiment

The doctrine of rational benevolence is not to be identified with the Socratic principle, which has already been amply explained. Neither is it to be supposed that the author of this famous moral thesis would ally himself with the Socratic teachings. Whatever truth attaches to such a formulation (and it is to this thesis that Sidgwick applies the high-sounding phrase of irrefragable intuition) is to be found in the agreeable and kindly feelings that organize themselves about such an idea. Rational benevolence, when we come to analyze it, turns out to be an acquired moral sentiment. It is purely psychological in origin and requires no other mental processes than would be required for the development of any other moral sentiment. To consider it an intuition in the ordinary meaning of the word *intuition* would be ethically superfluous. Similarly we are to explain the degree of truth to be found in the now rather discredited saying that to perceive clearly what is right is to have some inclination to do what is right. The inclination to do what is right because we clearly perceive what is right is true to the very degree that pleasant feelings become suffused with such an idea. Emotions and feelings tend to reënforce, to vivify, and to animate the ideas to which they become conjoined.

Words as carriers of emotion

The true function of a word is to serve as a sign or symbol of some object of reference. But very often words do not serve this purpose, especially when they become freighted with feeling and sentiment. Thus words, instead of making possible the integrity of thought, really swamp thought in a slough of emotionalism. Is it possible for the seasoned veteran to think sanely on such a subject as patriotism or to relate with true perspective the events of some battle in which he may have taken an active part? We are not at all surprised that the pious Spinoza was intoxicated with his notion of an all-embracing God. Was not Kant carried away with emotion when he contemplated the starry heavens and the moral law? Here is one place in the life of the great thinker where warm emotion assumed the place of rigid duty. In his book "Human Nature and Conduct" John

Dewey says: "The separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy."[1] It is often assumed (and there is much evidence in support of such a belief) that long contemplation on abstract themes has a tendency to dissipate one's natural emotions and to substitute for them a rather cold intellectualism. Kindly benevolence, we are told, becomes converted into rigid puritanism, and the spontaneous performance of duty is subsumed in the interest of categorical imperatives. The accusations thus heaped upon the abstract thinker are many and cutting. The world's best literature has its origin in the emotions and higher sentiments, and only the more abstract ethical treatises, philosophical systems, and mathematical calculations, it is inferred, can be attributed to the cold intellect.

Abstract principles become emotionalized

On the contrary, we may assert, the most abstract books on philosophy are quite as truly the offspring of emotionalized intelligence as the great masterpieces of literature. The "Critique of Pure Reason" as penned by Kant was probably actuated by as intense a feeling for truth as were the vivid descriptions so strikingly portrayed in Milton's "Paradise Lost." From what has been said in relation to intelligence proper and the affections it must be admitted that long and intense intellectual application does crowd out the spontaneous natural feelings, but to no less a degree (and this is the important thing to bear in mind) do abstract principles and theories organize about themselves as true sentiments acquired feelings and emotions. Abstract intellectual endeavor simply substitutes acquired feeling for natural, spontaneous feelings. The emotional life of an abstract ethical theorist does not differ appreciably in quantity and quality of emotional experience from that of the best modern novelists. The one difference lies in the form and mode of expression.

3. Organic organization of the self

After this rather long-drawn-out discussion concerning the logical and meaningful organization of moral character we shall now briefly address ourselves to what I have seen fit to call the organic organization of the self. This is the third form of mental

[1] Human Nature and Conduct, p. 258.

organization mentioned in the early part of this chapter. This form of moral synthesis is naturally prior in point of time to the logical and more meaningful forms of synthesis mentioned in the last few paragraphs. The forms of synthesis to be outlined in the few following paragraphs are at work in the background of one's personality irrespective of the higher reasoning and understanding processes. The moral self is taking shape whether or not we are striving to attain any ultimate or worth-while goal. This phase of moral development has received scant attention until recent years, and it is only since the advent of the writings of Stout, McDougall, and Shand that we have become acquainted with the mechanism of this important side of character building. It is on account of the natural organizing tendencies of the mind that the early years of life are so important. For a multitude of reasons the moralist and the pedagogue must understand the workings and applications of these tendencies.

Sentiments organize character

It is a sound pedagogical principle, and also it is in harmony with the dictates of the practical moralist, to instill into the child's mind a wide range of social interests rather than merely to impress upon him the importance of a few formal virtues. No matter how pure in their intent and purpose, moral interests, if overemphasized too early, will prejudice the moral self. Until the age of early adolescence a many-sided interest, even though it is not well organized, is better than a paucity of virtues overdeveloped and pigeonholed. Such a principle, of course, has a bearing on early specialization. A dominant early interest will have an inclination to prejudice the whole mind in its favor. Open-mindedness is the great desideratum. It has been implied that we have as many selves as we have major interests. In consideration of the point at hand we can do no better than to quote from the illuminating pages of Shand: "Every sentiment tends to acquire the virtues and vices that are required by its system."[1] Such a statement as this needs no

[1] A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character, p. 110. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

exemplification. An instinct or a sentiment tends to give the self a definite "set," whether it be moral or otherwise. Any well-established interest or sentiment has set up many lines of least resistance leading in the direction of itself. We quote further from Shand: "Every sentiment tends to form a type of character of its own." [1]

Forms of responsibility

After having set forth the theory of organic synthesis, and especially the stage of synthesis most significant in the life of the child and youth before conscious purposes and motives have reached their full maturity, we shall now, on the basis of such a principle, explain the origin of various forms of responsibility that continue throughout life. It is a common experience to come in contact with adults who seem to have attained no adequate sense of responsibility for the tasks of life. Teachers are often aware of the lack of intellectual responsibility on the part of their pupils. Anyone who is at all well acquainted with the practical aspects of sociology, and with the economic and labor problems that are always before the world, is fully convinced that much of the poverty and economic squalor are directly traceable to the lack of the sense of economic responsibility in the average laborer.

It is not only in the field of formal education and industry that the beginnings of many of the world problems are to be found. There are multitudes who possess no sense of social responsibility, who are actuated by no moral urge to ameliorate the conditions under which mankind strives and suffers. Along with the absence of any sense of social interest is the lack of moral interest. Moral responsibility is normally the flower of all other forms of responsibility. The moral sense is not an abstract moral entity, a something that is detached from all other interests; it is organic with other tendencies and proclivities, educational, economic, social, and religious. Those adults who have neglected or who have been denied the advantages of early in-

[1] A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character, p. 123. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

tellectual discipline, who were not required during the early years of life to perform definitely set tasks, and whose early social tendencies have been neglected, have difficulty in finding adequate room for what may be called conscience, social consciousness, or simply the sense of moral responsibility. It will be worth while to enter into some detail in explanation of the possible sources of early forms of responsibility.

Intellectual responsibility

It is in accordance with the principle of organic synthesis that that which is to function as a real force in human life must have been at least latent in our thoughts and feelings from quite early years. It has been the writer's privilege to follow the educational career of a few pupils from the kindergarten to the graduate school, and it may be worth noting that in no case has an adequate sense of intellectual responsibility which failed to develop in the early grades appeared in the high school or college. There seems to be no definite relation between the ability to profit by intellectual tasks and the development of an intellectual discipline that will motivate the regular performance of such a task. All this seems to imply the significance of early training. Dewey says that unless the child is required to do some real thinking early in his school career, he will depend upon others to do his thinking all through life.

Economic responsibility

Although it is unfortunate if a youth fails to develop intellectual interests in this day of science and literature, it is of much greater moment if he fails to have ingrained in him the fundamentals of some trade or occupation, and the desire to succeed along some chosen line. The child who is not required, during the early years of life, to perform definite, set tasks over long periods of time, even though such tasks be mechanical in nature, will probably never develop a genuine sense of economic responsibility. Such a conclusion as this is more than mere theory; it is an established, concrete fact. Those who succeed in the economic and business world have the essentials of success ingrained in their physical and moral fiber from early life. Thrift, economy, sense of values, — economic, intellectual, so-

cial, and moral, — all have the same origin. These qualities are organic in their origin and nature. They are not the result of purposes pursued late in life; they are the result of long discipline and interests developed early in life.

Sources of human sympathy

Two other moral attributes not altogether unrelated to those already mentioned in the preceding paragraphs are sympathy and conscientiousness. We may not be able to discover the roots of sympathy, but one thing seems certain, — its field of cultivation is not to be entirely attributed to the child's contact with human beings. No experience that the normal child may have is of greater value in the development of sympathetic qualities than that the child should assume responsibility for the proper care of animals and pets. This is only another good example of the organic nature of many virtues that must be early cultivated. It is a way in which the individual unconsciously grows in virtues that are organic in the interests of some set task. Long-continued attachments resulting from the care of domesticated animals is important not only because it develops an interest in animal life but because of the moral qualities that are incidentally engendered. Some may be inclined to the opinion that any endeavor to develop moral qualities in any experience outside of the purely human is a matter of sentimentalism; but this is not true. The mental and moral qualities which the child or youth may truly acquire through the proper feeding and care of animals may be of more lasting value than anything the best kindergarten or Sunday school can afford.

Conscientiousness

Another moral quality of no less significance than human sympathy is conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is merely a name that includes many human attributes. Conscientiousness is the resultant of early tasks well and faithfully performed. The interest which the child may develop in the cultivation and care of plants is as conducive to conscientiousness as the thorough performance of assigned intellectual and moral duties as such. Virtues incidentally developed in the performance of some set duty or task are always more vital than those culled from the

classroom or church. The virtues which we later acquire in church and society are likely to be prompted only by surface motives, and such motives cannot be expected to compete with motives developed early in life.

Criticism of nonpersonal sources of virtue

A source of criticism directed against the inculcation of virtue otherwise than through the well-established agency of personal contact in school, in church, and in the home is the belief that qualities resulting from mere association with inanimate and impersonal objects can never develop real human sympathy. This is the nature of the criticism urged against the natural system of punishment advocated by Rousseau and Herbert Spencer. The punishment inflicted by nature as the result of the disobedience of her laws develops the sense of causation, but the sense of causal sequence lacks the personal touch of parental or human sympathy. Impersonal nature, we are told, no matter how certain is the infliction of her penalties, can never develop personal and sympathetic qualities. The repeated association of disobedience and pain may well develop prudence and insight, but prudence and insight are not the true sources of human kindness and altruism. Prudence and virtue are generically different. He who repeatedly disobeys the laws of health and brings on pain and sickness may eventually learn through experience that sickness and dissipation are inevitably joined, but there is nothing in such an experience to engender human obedience and kindness. Obedience to laws of nature is not obedience to laws of humanity.

The specificity of virtue

The degree of truth lodged in such a criticism is evident. Mental and moral qualities are more or less specific. We seem to have consciences and not one conscience. Our sympathy may go out to animals and dumb beasts, and our interest for humanity may be below par. He who takes an active interest in the amelioration of humanity may be cold and unsympathetic toward specific individuals. Love that is broad in its scope is normally thin in its quality. All this seems to be in harmony with the organic nature of the self. Sentiments tend to acquire the

virtues and vices demanded by their system. Love demands the possibility of hatred, if not its actuality. Shand says: "Stern men are more often just than loving-hearted women." [1] All this tends to lay bare the relativity of the virtues and the various mental processes. The most highly and consistently organized moral self is composed of lesser groups of selves and interests, — interests whose very existence seems to demand opposite feelings and mental processes, as love and hate, like and dislike, etc. This interrelation of feelings, sentiments, and virtues seems to explain why opposites are often the closest associations in consciousness. Under normal mental conditions such opposites are so well organized that their very existence is overlooked. If all this holds true (and a careful analysis of the working of the mind seems to lead us to no other conclusion), the Christian doctrine of love for all men may be impossible to put into practice if we are consistently to love those who conform to the good.

A higher source of synthesis needed

This relativity of virtues and sentiments does not seriously interfere with the unity of the moral self. Real and functional unity may be occasioned as much by the opposition of qualities as by their harmony. Even from the practical point of view the character that meets no serious opposition cannot, from its very nature, be organically strong. Unity comes from overcoming resistance and opposition, provided of course that such resistance and opposition are not too persistent and powerful. Another good reason for the relativity and specificity of virtues in their everyday functioning is the fact that interests develop the mind in various ways. To be honest with a friend and equally dishonest with an enemy simply shows the particularity of such a virtue. As we shall have occasion to see when we come to consider the purposeful organization of the self, it takes something more than the consistent development of a many-sided interest, something more than many specific virtues, to

[1] A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character, p. 109. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

attain the real unity of character that we are striving to set forth in this work, —the kind of unity that enables one to pass beyond the relative contradictions and oppositions made more or less necessary by what may be called the relatively passive organic organization of interests and sentiments.

The doctrine of formal discipline

A theme of considerable interest and especially related to the present topic under discussion is the well-known doctrine of formal discipline, of formal training, as it is sometimes called. Educators have long argued over the possibilities of formal discipline, some maintaining the efficacy of Latin and mathematics in training the mind in fineness of discrimination and logical analysis respectively. It was thought that such acquired abilities would function equally well on all occasions. As a result of a more thorough insight into the nature of the related mental processes the doctrine of formal discipline has been considerably modified. No one subject, even under the most ideal methods of instruction, will discipline the mind thoroughly in any one phase of its possibilities, such as accuracy. Mathematics may discipline the mind in accuracy, as Plato long ago proclaimed, but accuracy does not seem to characterize the functioning of the mental processes on all occasions where it is needed. One may attain a high degree of accuracy along some one line of mental endeavor, and blunder quite hopelessly along some other line when accuracy may be confidently expected. What seems to hold true of this one acquired quality undoubtedly holds true of many other qualities. So far in this chapter little has been said that will assist one in overcoming the relative specificity of any acquired quality or virtue, but the remainder of the chapter will be largely devoted to the task of showing how such a limitation may be overcome. We are primarily concerned with the application of this famous doctrine to the field of practical morals. If honesty can be made universal in its application, it is the moralist's bounden duty to ascertain the facts in such an ethical prescription. If this can be done, there must be some method or condition of mental organization that would

tend to make possible and actual the general functioning of any quality or virtue; if it is found to be impossible, then there is no higher degree of self unity. But it has been one of the main purposes of this book to explain the possibilities of such a higher unity, a higher form of moral synthesis.

4. Purposeful organization of self

Three of the five main topics of the present chapter have been discussed in considerable detail. The successive topics analyzed were the mechanical organization of the self, the logical organization of the self, and the organic organization of the self. The next topic for discussion and exemplification will be the purposeful organization of the moral self. There is perhaps no sharp distinction between the early stages of moral synthesis which we have called the organic, and the type of moral thesis which is called purposeful. The organic stages of mental development are relatively passive on the part of the individual, that is, so far as a directing consciousness is concerned, whereas the purposeful is more persistently directed to some final and perceived goal. Instincts, interests, and tendencies are the prime movers in organic synthesis, but consciously controlled purposes are the directing agencies in the teleological. The normal gratification of the earlier organic interests is absolutely necessary for the fullness of expression of the higher conscious purposes. The best indication that one's higher self will be realized is the fact that the lower interests and capacities are being gratified. The chief aim of this fourth stage of moral development is not so much the inculcation of new moral interests, but rather the deepening, the intensifying, and more especially the widening of moral functioning on the part of any well-established virtue. Formal discipline has given us acquired moral qualities — limited in their scope of functioning. It is the aim of consciously directed purposes so to organize the self as to make real the universal application of the higher moral qualities. Justice, for instance, should not only function in the interest of the individual, but should progressively unfold and increase in ever-widening circles to the home, the school, the city, the State, and eventually

to an all-embracing humanity. Moral character as it ordinarily exists does not function in so large a field. The self has not reached its rightful heritage until this ideal has been attained.

Ordinary experience fails to widen human sympathy

Mechanical associations cannot enlarge one's moral horizon, for the reason that they are limited in range to tangible experience, whereas reason and logic will not appreciably broaden one's interests in others except on the basis of an understanding of the mental qualities of others. The fact that mankind has become one vast and closely integrated neighborhood has not in itself been enough to make concrete the principles of neighborliness. While, on the one hand, the so-called organic processes make possible and real the development of human interests (sentiments in the interests of self and sentiments in the interests of others), on the other hand such sentiments and interests are, from their very nature and constitution, limited. For instance, peoples who have been considered very patriotic have not been known for their expressed love for humanity, and individuals who entertain a kindly feeling for all mankind are usually not the ones who engage actively in patriotic celebrations. Students who participate in school sports, athletics, and debating, those who develop intense sentiments for their home school, often become prejudiced and evil-intentioned toward competing schools.

Possibilities of higher worth

There is considerable reason for believing that the human mind as we ordinarily perceive it in its everyday functioning is ideally organized. It may be maintained with a considerable degree of earnestness that if it were not for the individual, social, and international animosities there would be no true source of progress, moral or otherwise. Herbert Spencer has been severely criticized for suggesting an ideal state of society in which the rights of the individual should harmonize with the rights of society. Perhaps those who advocate war and eternal strife are in the right. Yet the World War does not seem to have made the world much better mentally, morally, or spiritually. Many well-known writers (James, for instance, and William McDougall)

rightfully emphasize the true significance of strife and competition and even the instinct of pugnacity, in the interests of education, morals, and national progress. Although competition and a degree of strife seem to be necessary for the advancement of many and perhaps all interests, there are possibilities of higher moral purposes that seem to be real and more worth while; and it is with the search for such higher possibilities that we are now primarily concerned. Is the true answer to be found in the precepts of religion? So far Christianity has failed to attain the cherished ideal of the universal brotherhood of man. Politics have been unsuccessful in stemming the tide of human malice and hatred. The various theories of social progress have all had their chance to make the world better.

Although the arts and sciences have advanced beyond the most cherished dreams of the utopians, the quality of human life has not been noticeably improved. The various devices and plans so much in evidence today — League of Nations, World Court, peace tribunals, disarmament conferences, and the like — are not likely to be abundantly successful. External agencies, whether they be religious, political, or even educational, are of little value unless they reach the true source of man's inmost motives. Man has often theorized and has entertained lofty notions as to the ultimate aim of life, — obedience to law, happiness, and human perfection; but such schemes, although they are truly noble to contemplate, — logical constructs, — have done little to make any man better. He who searches for happiness has never been able to find it. Obedience to law, whether it be natural, civil, or divine, is a prerequisite of happiness, but it is no sure source of happiness. Is it not axiomatic that the enemies of one's virtues are often more deadly than the enemies of one's vices? The fact that the virtuous life is not uniformly accompanied by human happiness is a perpetual commentary on the discrepancy that exists between man's two highest forms of experience. The true answer to the problem, of which we have long been in search, is to be found in the properly

motivated and actuated moral self. This is not a self furnished and actuated by the power of heaven, ready to do the bidding of man, but a self which is the true resultant of higher human purposes. Let us investigate the higher sources and issues of this self. The self ever beckons us on.

The four attributes of a life purpose

The purpose which makes possible the ideally integrated and unified character of which we are in search must have the following attributes or qualities: First, such a purpose must be lasting and not subject to frequent or radical change. Secondly, this purpose must be one whose realization will make possible and necessary the development of all one's ready capacities. Thirdly, the fulfillment of a major purpose will cause to be subordinated all minor interests and purposes. Fourthly, the attainment of such an end will occasion the functioning, in its service, of all the cardinal and Christian virtues. Such a scheme, if consistently carried out, will make possible and real all the essential aims of life for which great moralists and theorists have so long striven. Without any direct attempt to make one's life purpose the obedience to law, the search for happiness, or even the perfection of the self, these aims will be incidentally realized on the occasion of the successful achieving of the fundamental life purpose.

The continuity of purpose

No one need be at a loss for concrete illustrations of young men of considerable promise who are failing to attain success for no other good reason than that they lack the ability to persist in some well-chosen life task. These people fail financially and morally not because they are lacking in mental capacity but solely because they lack moral integrity. Those who persistently search for rainbows are ordinarily deprived of such moral qualities as only the long pursuit of a high purpose can instill. Moral character, and especially moral growth during the stages of adolescence, may be likened to a moving equilibrium; all goes well so long as there is movement and progress in a forward direction, but there is a tendency to topple when motion and progress cease. The boy on a bicycle cannot maintain his balance when not in motion. A forward movement is a requisite for

physical equilibrium. Persistency in some well-established life purpose seems to be essential for continuity of moral growth. After embarking on a worth-while purpose, time seems to be a necessary element. The child is unmoral until the age of early adolescence, and the youth is unstably moral until the beginning of ideal adulthood; and it is only when some ideal has been entertained and actively cherished for half a lifetime that the adult may have the feeling of a secure moral selfhood. Firmness of character is always measured in terms of the persistence and quality of purpose. Idleness soon dissolves moral fiber.

Life purpose and the development of capacities

We have now to discuss the second requisite of a moral purpose, namely, the unfolding of the natural capacities and possibilities. It is impossible for a person with a scanty intellectual endowment to become dynamically good. Mere kindness (and we may thank the world for what kindness it has to offer) is not sufficient to eradicate vice and to improve the conditions under which man lives. The moralist that counts is the moralist of conviction, the moralist willing to fight. One's occupation or profession, whatever it may be (provided, of course, it be a worthy one), must be such as will cause interests to develop. A man has ill chosen his calling when the furtherance of his duties does not broaden and expand the intellect, refine the feelings, and properly motivate the will. The growth of character means nothing more than the doing of this very thing to the highest possible degree. Thinking is vitalized and becomes a source of true satisfaction when it functions in the interests of some conscious purpose, and the feelings that result from the sense of progressive achievement are lasting and not readily dissipated. The will is properly actuated only by the formulating, the entertaining, and the carrying out of motives. A life purpose which would provide and minister only to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual needs of life is not an adequate one. The making of a livelihood is not to be overlooked. That purpose or occupation which fails to provide one with the physical necessi-

ties of life is not a worthy calling. Long ago Aristotle gave the matter due consideration. The teacher and the preacher would be much more successful in the imparting of intellectual and spiritual truths if they were adequately provided with the material necessities of life.

The subordination of interests

Closely connected with the development of all one's capacities and interests is the subordination of all minor interests and purposes to the one set task of life. This task or aim may be the formulation of a system of philosophy, the long years of continuous study necessary for preparation for the teaching profession, the years of thought, meditation, and experience required to become a wide-awake preacher, a conscientious doctor, an honest lawyer, a successful farmer, or a wise statesman; all are life tasks of no mean order. He who wisely and conscientiously and with a high purpose in mind embarks upon any one of the vocations mentioned, or numerous others not mentioned, will find sufficient opportunity to fill with achievement the matured life of threescore years and ten, to develop in a harmonious fashion all his capacities, and to cultivate the cardinal virtues. The chief requirement is that the minor interests be subordinated to the major interests. Subordination of interests such as we are here trying to explain is a prime requisite for the organization of the moral self. Subordination means the selecting and rejecting, the valuation and evaluation, of motives and purposes. The mind is not naturally and intuitively endowed with a graded series of moral preferences, as is the unique scheme interestingly formulated by James Martineau in his "Types of Ethical Theory." A kind heaven does not seem to have provided such a graded series for the glory of man. Natural man will not always choose the good when in the presence of the good and the bad. On the contrary, the chief moral value to be derived from the process of subordinating lesser to greater interests is the establishment, in the mind of the one so choosing, of a graded series of values. Such values are of real worth. The student who moderately subordinates all other interests to the attainment of an ed-

ucation cannot fail to profit thereby. It is a truism that unless the student does subordinate minor interests to major interests the obtaining of a diploma has not been worth while. It is necessary for moral growth that representation control presentation. Does not Herbert Spencer speak wisely when, commenting upon the significance of his formulated activities of life, he says: "Greatest stress where value is greatest, less stress where value is less, and least stress where value is least." [1]

Purpose and the virtuous life

The fourth and last essential attribute of a successful purpose is the virtuous life implied in its fulfillment. Virtues do not merely happen; they pass through long stages of growth. They are constituent elements in a successful career. Virtues discussed in the schoolroom, virtues read about in books, and those specifically tabulated in moral and religious catechisms, including those which seem to stand out in the lives of the medieval saints, are real to us only in name; they scarcely ever become ingrained in our moral tissue. The degree of truth dormant in the old Socratic doctrine of knowledge and virtue has its source in the functioning of our present thesis. Perhaps we have now set forth all that is necessary to make clear the possibilities and results of the form of mental organization and synthesis which we have seen fit to call the purposeful and the teleological. Whenever we have occasion (and such opportunities are not rare) to observe lives morally shallow, — lives that to all outward appearance have had the best chance and opportunity for success and achievement, — we find upon investigation either that such failures are to be attributed to a purpose or purposes not worthy of the name or that there has been no set purpose at all in life. The life lived in accordance with the scheme presented in this chapter should be one easily adjusted to the dictates of law, — a life happy with the fullness of achievement, and one that has attained selfhood and relative perfection. The next and last step in the development of the subject matter of this chapter will be the self-conscious organization of the self.

[1] Education, p. 17.

5. The self-conscious organization of the self

Self-consciousness, the kind of self-consciousness which is a handmaiden to mental and moral synthesis, is not that kind of mental process that interferes with skill and efficiency of any kind, not even the kind of analytical skill enabling one to dissect complex mental constituents, but the honest and sincere recognition of one's self as a responsible and free moral agent. Such a stage of moral efficiency is not always attained even by those who rightfully pride themselves on being true exemplars of moral integrity. Any well-chosen life purpose, especially when this purpose has reached a marked degree of achievement, is likely to develop a moderate quantum of self-consciousness such as we have described. It is hard for the successful teacher, minister, social leader, or statesman (provided, of course, that he has been truly efficient and worthy) not to develop a due measure of self-assurance. Self-consciousness does not imply selfishness, but is a necessary attribute making possible continued success; it reënforces one's purpose and highest endeavors. It may be well to sketch, in a very hasty way, a few of the factors in the normal unfolding self which make possible a ripe self-consciousness.

The influence of bodily sensations

Some of the elements in human experience which make possible the logical attributes of the self, such as unity, continuity, identity, are the very elements occasioning self-consciousness. The extremes of such experience would be consciousness of bodily sensations, on the one hand, and a well-formulated purpose, on the other hand, — the starting point and the goal of selfhood, as it were. Ordinary bodily sensations of the child or youth naturally have some tendency to direct his attention to what is going on within. In some extreme instances such sensations may become the source of morbidness. Too early and unnatural turning of the mind within is never indicative of mental health. It is normal for the child or youth to be interested in the things of the objective world and not to be mentally disturbed about the intricacies within it. The growing sensations of the budding adolescent inevitably entice consciousness and attention

to their organic sources, and occasionally with untoward consequences. The self-consciousness developed at adolescence will be either favorable or unfavorable to mental and moral interests. At this stage of life it is not a matter of indifference. Bodily self-consciousness comes before the purely mental, and the mental before the moral and the spiritual. Here as elsewhere the highest qualities are the last to appear.

Possession and consciousness of self

Another phase of child experience, but as a matter of fact a tendency and interest manifest throughout life, is what is sometimes called the instinct of possession. The child soon learns to put into operation the instinct of possession. To say "this is mine" is a stage in the development of self-consciousness. In a previous paragraph we have mentioned the moral value to be derived from encouraging the child to care for plants and animals. Here we are interested in such possessions as being the source of the consciousness of self. Such interests on the part of the child may lead to vice as well as to virtue. We are encouraged at the thought of the possibilities revealed by the average child when his interests show themselves in the collecting and possessing of specimens of various sorts, — botanical, biological, geological, etc., — for we are aware that the interest of the adult in such fields of science can have its only true source in the early interests of the child; but, on the other hand, we are morally gladdened to see how the interest in the possession of such physical objects is converted into an interest in the possession of a moral self. It is natural for one form of possession to be converted into the other. Spencer was not defending an untruth when he upheld the moral and religious qualities resulting from the sincere pursuit of the natural and biological sciences. It is, as he says, not the honest pursuit of science that leads to irreligion, but the prejudiced neglect of science.

Social sources of self-consciousness

The child's attention does not become consciously directed to himself, even to his physical self, until he reaches the first years of adolescence, and then it is largely because of social approval

or disapproval that consciousness turns within for the sheer purpose of noting defects and virtues. Here the adolescent is forced to pay attention to his qualities, good or bad, just as if he were standing in the presence of a mirror. Conscience, as we have before noted, is largely a matter of social consciousness. Here we are not especially concerned in tracing the moral effects of social approval or disapproval. This will be duly emphasized in the chapter devoted to the social aspects of the moral self; it will be sufficient here to mention that if the adolescent is too sensitive to social disapproval, he may become antisocial and morose, and turn against all social influences in the future. Such phenomena are not infrequent in the experience of social workers. On the other hand, if the youth or even the adult is too solicitous of social approval, there may be a tendency to avoid that which calls forth disapproval in the eyes of friends and associates, not on account of a sensitive conscience which avoids the bad, but on account of a conscience that expresses hypocrisy. Thus, the consciousness resulting from the disapproval and approval of one's associates may have its bad features as well as its good features. When conscience is sensitive and ambition is keen, the disappointment resulting from the consciousness of real defects may develop what is known in the province of abnormal psychology as the inferiority complex, with the resulting compensations and mechanisms. Superiority complexes may likewise be formed. These are all the darker sides of social influence impinging upon a plastic nervous system. The normal consequences of a youth coming in contact with man and his institutions present quite a different picture. The normal result of social influences is to direct consciousness to the self, — physical, mental, moral, and spiritual, — not for the purpose of evolving complexes and not in the interest of avoiding social disapproval or a too ardent endeavor to appear well in the eyes of others. In the proper place we shall have occasion to show how self-consciousness, — a self-consciousness realized through the avenue of social influences, — may even make possible and real a form of moral con-

sciousness that rises higher than true social sources. Ethics today cannot well dispense with the solution of such a moral paradox. The moral self which is an organized and acquired self does not become truly creative until it can rise above its social progenitor, the social environment.

In this chapter we have tried to show the essential sources of mental organization, or self-organization, the sources of a unified moral character. We have passed briefly in review the mechanical, the logical, the rational (or the meaningful), the organic, the teleological, and finally that highest stage of organization designated the self-conscious.

CHAPTER V

THE SELF AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY DETERMINED: FEELING, COGNITION, AND WILL

Feeling, knowing, and willing

The last chapter was primarily concerned with the forms of mental organization and synthesis. It is one thing to assemble the parts of which an edifice is to be constructed; it is quite another thing to determine the form or forms of architecture to be used. The chapter just completed distinguished five fairly well-defined types of mental architecture. The present chapter, while of course it must assume one or all of the forms of synthesis to be constantly at work, will nevertheless be primarily interested in explaining the significance of some of the more important phases of the three traditional forms of mental functioning, namely, feeling, cognition, and will. The present writer has chosen to use those old forms of mental function, not because he considers them separate processes, not because he is especially interested in the systems of psychology of Plato, Wolff, and Kant, or in their theories of the soul, rational or otherwise, but because any average intellect can understand what such terms are commonly understood to mean. People do experience feeling, and they do seem to know and to exercise cognition, and occasionally they do choose to do this and to avoid that. No meanings are to be read into such terms that the psychological dictionary would not gladly sanction, and for our present purpose it will not be necessary to resort to the glands of internal secretion, conditional reflexes, or even the linguistic forms of thought for enlightenment. (1) The wise directing of feeling, (2) the selecting of the right objects to perceive, to conceive, and to think about, (3) the controlling of desires and the choosing of values, — these are the processes out of which a full-grown

moral self will inevitably emerge. It is the first aim of this chapter to enlarge upon these primary moral agencies.

Feeling, motivation, sentiment

The three topics outlined will be considered in their respective order. The affective, or feeling, processes will be discussed under the headings of feeling, motivation, and sentiment. The reader will please bear in mind this order of treatment. The significance of feeling in the development of the moral self will now be discussed.

Feeling as a moral agency

In connection with the topic before us we can do no better than to quote from the observations of Stout. He says: "The ideas and combination of ideas which arise in the mind under the influence of vehement passion, are all such as in some manner harmonize with the dominant tendency. They explain it, justify it, or gratify it." [1] If these words of Stout are at all true to the realities of life (and surely one's own experience would seem to be sufficient to remove all doubt concerning the tendency of intense feeling to incorporate ideas and other mental processes in harmony with itself), then it would seem that one of the first duties of the practical moralist would be to supply the growing mind with the proper feelings. It is often said that the world is governed by feelings rather than by ideas. Ideas may be said to rule the world only because ideas soon become suffused with feeling, and then they are no longer true ideas, but ideals and sentiments, the storehouses of future values. There are two interesting and equally important phases of the dynamic relation of intense feeling to other mental states; in the first place, not only does feeling attract those states in harmony with it, but, in the second place, the states so attracted are inevitably believed to be true to the facts of life. Mere explanation to the contrary is of little value when one is truly seized in the grip of an intense feeling. When we are in a pessimistic frame of mind, many of the ordinary events of life become colored with pessimism. Is it any wonder that a per-

[1] G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology, Vol. II, p. 104. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

manently pessimistic temperament is capable of producing a pessimistic philosophy? Normal feelings and normal sensations are prime requisites, for the reason that they organize other mental states of like caliber. The child who has experienced intense fright early in life may never fully recover, because the impression made upon the nervous system may be sufficient to interpret many of life's experiences in terms of fear rather than in terms of their true cause. Scars on the nervous system never fail to function. When night falls, how prone are the timid to explain every event in terms of burglars and other agencies of destruction! Sufficient reason can never be summoned to dispel such fears. Yet many a man who is mentally strong hardly knows the meaning of fear, even in the presence of dangerous agencies. Caution is not to be identified with ordinary fear. Rational fear is a good index of civilization.

Persistent feeling narrows thought

The most conspicuous instances of the relation of intense feeling or emotion to the ideas that tend to arise in the mind are to be found in extreme emotionalism. No amount of argument will dethrone the reasoning of the emotionalist; but when his feelings have died down, and his notions and ideas, once tenaciously entertained, are found to have no basis in fact, he vehemently denies the possibility of ever having held such views. James somewhere says that to conceive in a passion is to affirm. If I have an enemy, and if much emotion has become associated with my personal object of animosity, and if there is the least chance of his having done me some injury, I will inevitably suspect him. Likewise, by those endowed with intense emotion all people with whom they become acquainted are classified as close friends or bitter enemies. The good mother never suspects her boy of doing wrong; she always believes to be true what she wants to be true. Perhaps it is well that faith should have such an impregnable foundation. The average parent, and seemingly with no suspicion of prejudice or malice, will sympathize with the story of the child to the disadvantage of the accused teacher. Perhaps we may easily explain the one-sidedness of many

philosophies and theories. Error, we are told, is likely to lurk in wholes. The holders of prejudiced philosophies are usually honest people. They may be governed by the purest motives. Often they are considered saints. Hume believes that reason is at the mercy of passion, Hobbes is sure that man is by nature selfish, and Comte would put all at the mercy of the social sympathies. These thinkers were great philosophers and moralists, and were no more subject to prejudice than the thinkers of today. Their views are no more extreme, and perhaps less so, than the present-day theories of Freud, who would make man's whole sphere of activity, normal as well as abnormal, revolve about the sexual instinct.

We do not need to search farther in order to understand why an interest or motive implanted early in one's career will gather to itself sufficient feeling to explain all the experiences of life. Feelings are amœboid in their functioning; they select what is pleasant and reject what is unpleasant.

Feeling partial to interests

In enumerating those states of mind that are most influential in determining the content of consciousness we must not fail to note the significance of motive. Motives are not to be identified with mere feeling, though without feeling there would probably be no real motives. It is doubtful if reason or any other state of mind than feeling can give rise to a motive. Feeling in itself, however, is no respecter of moral integrity. Every feeling that may gain a hearing in consciousness is always partial to its own interests. If noble feelings are entertained, then the mental processes enjoined are similarly noble; but when the feelings are base, the ideas clustering about them will be equally unworthy. If such a dynamic relation exists between feeling and the ideas and other mental states called in to reënforce them, then it seems as though the task of the moralist would not be a difficult one. It must be admitted to our possible satisfaction that the task of the moralist would not be unsurmountable if he were always inclined, and if it were always possible, to put into practice what is known concerning the composition of the moral self. We know how to be good. We know how to elicit

good from others, and it lies within the province of our own intellects to arrange the feelings and ideas of the child so as to make it impossible for him not to be good.

Motive more than feeling

A motive in itself is no more a respecter of moral interests than are the instincts or feelings. Motives may be either good or bad. A feeling or an instinct cannot be considered a motive until the intellect has superimposed an end, an aim, or a reason for some form of behavior. Curiosity and wonder are not real motives leading one onward in the search for truth. They are forces making possible the search for truth, but the actual motive for intellectual enlightenment is an added factor, a reason. Also, in the field of moral behavior we find a clear distinction between feeling that leads us to a virtuous life, and motives that impel us to strive for moral attainment. Many people lead an upright, virtuous life largely because they are endowed with a kindly disposition or temperament, or even for some other reason, and not because they are actuated by a conscious motive to lead an upright life. A really dynamic and constructive character can be founded only on motives that are fully conscious and definite. There is a wide marginal difference between the man who is good simply because being good fits in with his disposition and the man who is good because he has determined to be. The former may be a good citizen, but he is never actuated to make the world better, whereas the latter is the choice soul who is interested in the uplift of man.

Purpose and motive

In the last chapter something was said about the relation of purpose to the organization of the moral self. Also, purpose was claimed to be one of the chief sources of mental unity. Purposes are closely connected with motives, but they are not to be identified with them. A man's purpose may be to live an upright life, but his motive for having such a purpose is quite another matter. It is well to have a high purpose; it is better when such a purpose is put into action; but it is best when this purpose has been morally motivated. If one believes purpose to be the highest intellectual category, it would be difficult not to

give to a properly motivated purpose priority in the realm of morals, — evidence of a higher synthesis.

Fundamental moral problems

Moralists have long considered the true object of moral judgment. Is a man to be judged good or bad by his motives to action or is he to be morally judged by the results of his action? Kant would make motives the only source of right and wrong. The strict utilitarian would emphasize, not the motive in the mind of the doer, but the resultant action. John Stuart Mill would be a typical exponent of this view. John Dewey would emphasize both the motive and the result in the determination of moral judgment. The determination of the proper object of moral judgment is one of the most difficult problems that moralists have to solve. But closely connected with this question is the problem of the true aim or purpose of life. As we have before inquired, is it obedience to law, or is it happiness, or human perfection? Then again, are motives, or the results of action, or both, to be judged good or bad in terms of their relation to obedience to law, to happiness, or to human perfection? In the present chapter no attempt will be made to solve these moral problems. But motives and purposes are closely related to all moral interests.

Perfect and imperfect obligations

The philosophy of motives goes far beyond one's interests in practical moral education and beyond the theoretical discussions of the great philosophers of the past and present. Motivation is a subject of equal significance in the field of civil and criminal law. The motives underlying the duties of "perfect obligation" are usually more cautiously determined than the motives underlying the duties of "imperfect obligation"; and by the duties of "imperfect obligation" we are to understand the virtues implied under the influence of the moral relation. Love of neighbor, kindness, altruism, and benevolence are to be considered duties of this sort. The law does not force us to be kind, neither does it command us in definite terms to be benevolent and altruistic. Love, kindness, altruism, and benevolence may be to a degree native to each normal individual, but this is not sufficient to make them duties of perfect obligation. The

virtues implied by Sidgwick,[1] such as wisdom (or insight into the good), benevolence (or the doing of good), and justice (or the distributing of the good), which are said to be incapable of excess, even these are not to be classed as virtues of perfect obligation; but in consideration of the duties of perfect obligation the law expressly states that we shall be protected in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We not only demand these rights for ourselves, but the law requires such rights to be meted out to others. It has been said that the laws of nature point out that which is, ethics points out that which ought to be, whereas the state points out that which must be.

Ethics and law

According to the early Stoics obedience to the laws of nature was the true source of a virtuous life. It was the life of wisdom. Ethics is not especially concerned with that which is, but is largely normative in character. Man ought to be wise, he ought to be benevolent, and he ought to be just. Law has little to say about what should be. Its chief aim is to maintain the established order. Law has to do with the real, whereas ethics is concerned with the ideal. Law has little to do with the molding of the moral self, for its chief purpose is the maintenance of order and not the inculcation of motives; whereas ethics, although its chief intention is not the maintenance of an established order, eventually becomes the only true source of order through the indirect influence of its motives.

Moral resolution and action

While feeling and motives are the first requirements in making possible the growth of moral character, they do little more than pave the way or anticipate moral possibilities. People may entertain moral feelings and be really actuated by the highest motives and purposes without having substantial worth. Moral feeling, in order to become of moral worth, must be funded and organized. Moral motives and purposes must function. High resolutions in themselves will not produce noble character. Purposes and motives not carried into action inevitably lead to

[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 393. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

emotionalism and sentimentalism. *Sentimentalism* is not a term used to imply the existence of healthy sentiments; on the contrary, the word *sentimentalism* denotes what may appropriately be called moral or emotional infantilism, high moral motives and resolves one day, with a total disregard for what is worth while the next day. In the inculcation of morals, no less than in the field of the ordinary thought processes, motives, thoughts, and action must be continuous and unified. Every time a high moral resolve fails to eventuate in action, not only is an opportunity lost, but the moral possibilities have been actually weakened. Moral sentimentalism seems to be directly proportional to the number of moral resolutions. The truly moral man makes but one moral resolve. Any true moral resolution will last the span of a lifetime. The signing of pledges, the too frequent engagement in moral and spiritual resolutions, are not good indices of moral worth. The youth with sterling qualities makes no conspicuous moral resolve; he is simply actuated by a motive to do what is right. Every time one succeeds in doing what is right in the face of opposition he succeeds in tapping new storehouses of moral energy.

Not only may moral sentimentalism result from too frequent formulation of high purposes, even with the best intentions of carrying them into execution, but such sentimentalism, with its accompanying emotionalism, may also result from a form of early moral experience which was too much devoted to pure spirituality. Spirituality is naturally the resultant of a healthy moral growth occasioned by a healthy environment; but when a sensitive child or youth is surrounded by conditions and maxims of pure spirituality, the result is often far from the ideals of the spirit.

Dangers of pure spirituality

The youth who has been too carefully sheltered from the evils of this world cannot develop into moral selfhood. The moral and spiritual life of the youth may be too strictly moral and spiritual. When pure spirituality becomes too closely associated with the youth's conception of sex, marriage, and the

home, etc., the realities of the normal life are often sufficient to develop an unwholesome emotionalism. Love, sex, and marriage are not exemplifications of pure spiritual existence, and when ideals founded on them are held up to the unsuspecting and gullible youth, emotionalism, disappointment, and mental contradictions are the inevitable result. Opposites are closely associated in consciousness, and when one does not find the fulfillment of his cherished ideals, he not infrequently becomes a living example of the unideal. Two naturally antagonistic sets of motives, the ideal and the real, cannot well reside in a consistent moral consciousness. This is not an argument against the ideal in favor of the real; it simply means that the ideal must be grounded on the basis of the real.

In an earlier chapter of this book the statement was ventured that the real enemies of religion are not the true philosophers and scientists, but those who, early in life, were too deeply ingrained with pure spirituality and the formalities of religion, — the nonessentials of religion. These people, in consequence of their violent mental reactions, become foes of all established religion. A corollary from the principle just stated may be of some real moral significance.

A tyrannical conscience

In accordance with the main theses outlined in this work it is to be noted that an individualized conscience is given due consideration, although conscience is admitted to be not the highest moral experience. Conscience functions well in the mind where feeling, intellect, and will are in true relation to each other, — where no process is strictly at the mercy of any other. This, however, is not at all the case in a person whose mind has been early ingrained with the ideals of pure spirituality. Conscience still continues to function, but it functions tyrannically. Perhaps a few words will be necessary to make matters clear. When conscience seems to be little in evidence, there is of course little tendency to choose the right and to reject the wrong. When a person has no conscience in the general meaning of the term, we say he is without character and has no developed sense of moral

values. There is no agency keeping him from doing wrong, and when wrong has been committed there is no remorse. But, on the other hand, in the person whose sense of pure spirituality has been overdeveloped, and whose conscience has been oversensitized, — in a person whose feelings and actions are subject to sudden reversals, — conscience will go to almost any length in glossing over and rationalizing wrongdoing. In the province of abnormal psychology such phenomena are called rationalizations, or false reasoning. This is what we mean when we say that conscience functions, but functions tyrannically. Of course, not all forms of false reasoning are to be based on an oversensitized conscience. The criminal will ordinarily put forward "good reasons" for all his deeds.

This kind of conscience is not to be confused with real hypocrisy. The kind of hypocrisy that is caused by being too sensitive to social disapproval is not the same as the abnormally spiritualized conscience just described. We find numerous examples of good people who easily excuse their untoward actions. These people seem to be surprised and often make manifest an indignant reaction when we fail to understand the ease with which they explain away their behavior. These wrongdoers are not wholly to blame. Their early teachers are largely at fault. Why do young men and women of college rank, — youths who were reared in homes of almost pure spirituality, — students whose homes were those of moral culture, — why are they so prone to make light of their failure to prepare daily lessons? The strictly moral student never fails to prepare his daily tasks. Conscience must be made of firmer stuff.

Sentiment as affective experience

So far in this chapter we have been exemplifying various phases of affective experience, but most of our discussions have centered about feelings and motives, both in their normal and in their more or less abnormal functioning, as in sentimentalism and an overspiritualized conscience. Our next topic for discussion will be normal sentiments. Sentiments are rightfully considered the highest manifestation of affective life.

The functions of sentiments

Normal sentiments subserve at least three functions as constituents of the moral self: First, sentiments make possible the integrity of the moral self by the funding of moral values. Secondly, when normally established they become real storehouses of moral dynamics. Thirdly, sentiments become unifying and organizing agencies. Many meanings have been read into the term *sentiment*, but we shall take the word *sentiment* to imply that mental experience which is the resultant of the organization of feeling and some idea or object. Modern psychologists and moralists, such as Stout, McDougall, Shand, and Tansley, have furnished us with interesting discussions of the meaning and functioning of sentiments. The next topic will explain how sentiments, from their very nature, make possible the funding of moral values.

It has been explained before how attention makes possible the growing spots in consciousness. Such attention does not need to be consciously directed; it may imply only the unconscious absorption in some object of interest. It is natural for interest to become funded. A happy childhood is funded and is carried over into adulthood. Likewise, an early life of misery and unhappiness is retained and brought forward to oppress us in later life. One is simply reaping what he himself has sown or what others have sown.

Sentiments and funded values

It is in this manner that moral sentiments become funding agencies. He who normally develops a life of moral virtues, whose interests become attached to justice, integrity, honor, and the rest, will not fail to have a reserve fund of such interests for time of need. These funded interests are the real storehouses of moral energy about which we have already spoken. No one ever glows as the result of the performance of duty unless there lies hidden in the deep recesses of the self those storehouses of moral energy. We do not need to go beyond the avenues of human experience to find a ready explanation of the phenomena of the "oversoul" about which Emerson speaks. Not only do the moral virtues in terms of sentiments lay up storehouses of

energy that may be tapped on appropriate occasions, but all well-established sentiments seem to be able to function similarly. A moral person will have a good reserve of moral energy upon which he may without question rely to bear him out in some moral issue. He who has developed scientific and social sentiments is also able to make headway along such lines, owing to his intellectual and social reserves. This is not only true in theory but is actually verified in practice. The strictly religious person is more energetic than one not at all religious. This statement is not always true of the religious emotionalist, because this type of person is energetic only during his emotional excitement, and his emotional kindliness is soon dissipated; but healthy religious sentiments may be just as steadying as any of the moral sentiments.

Moral energy limited

The amount of reserve energy from which one may draw is not inexhaustible but is directly proportional to the normal maturity of the sentiment itself. Scientific sentiments developing from early youth, as in the case of Darwin, and reënforced from year to year with new facts and conclusions, seem in time to be sufficient to actuate any scientific endeavor. This reserve energy assumes an important rôle in making possible real mental creativeness. Only when the mind is properly organized is it possible for one sentiment appreciably to reënforce another. The degree of actual reënforcement between the intellectual, the moral, the social, the religious, and other higher sentiments depends upon mental organization. *Organization* seems to be the one great word that spells mental efficiency.

We have now made clear how sentiments make possible the conservation of moral values, such values being proportional to the stage of affective maturity; but in establishing this thesis we have incidentally touched upon the second function of moral sentiments, namely, the sentiment as being the storehouse of moral dynamics. These centers of moral interests are real conative agencies. The moral self is but another name for the organization of these interests.

Sentiments dynamic

Moral conation means moral desire, a striving for moral attainment. The degree of moral desire depends upon the maturity and genuineness of the parent sentiment. Moral interest and moral desire are two sides of the same mental experience. The purity of desires based on sentiments may be measured by noting the distress occasioned by the interference of such desires. The person interested in scientific investigation, or the student who has developed an abiding interest in some problem, is ill at ease when his thought processes become sidetracked. Solution of the problem at hand becomes his avocation no less than his vocation. The same phenomena hold true of all the higher and well-established sentiments. There is no higher source of mental satisfaction than the gradual unfolding and maturing of some problem or purpose, and likewise there is no source of dissatisfaction more keen and tormenting than interference with the continuity of one's thought processes. The anger and mental perturbation resulting from the nonfulfillment of intense conation based on sentiment may be as violent as that resulting from the conflict of instinct.

Sources of satisfaction

There are two sources of mental satisfaction or mental dissatisfaction attendant upon the realization or nonrealization of the conative tendencies just described. In addition to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction analyzed in the last paragraph, — that due to the problem or purpose in itself, — there is another source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, due to the consciousness that one is realizing or failing to realize both the fulfillment of a purpose, or the solution of a problem, and the free expansion of his own self. It is a real source of happiness, and it is also of some moral significance, to be able to realize that our moral self is being appreciably enlarged as we toil through the day.

A virtuous life is first made possible by the fulfillment of an objective aim, and if we are to feel, to think, and to will, it is absolutely necessary to lead a life of action. True and creative development takes place only when we begin to watch the growth and expansion of the self.

Stages of moral conation

There are at least four stages in the development of mental dynamics or moral conation. The moral element is of course practically nonexistent in the first, or earliest, stage, but reaches its fulfillment in the fourth, or highest. Any act or conation possesses the possibility of moral integrity. The four stages of mental conation are as follows: first, the instinctive and spontaneous stage; secondly, the conscious interest in the attainment of some object or the accomplishment of an ordinary task of life; thirdly, the development of one or more specific virtues, or even the desire to live a virtuous life; fourthly, the desire and satisfaction that supervene upon the unfolding and expansion of the moral self. We shall briefly consider each of the four stages mentioned.

Instincts and moral conation

If spontaneous and instinctive behavior makes possible an intellectual life, it makes equally possible the realization of moral fruition. Action is the great desideratum of childhood. It may not be easy to explain why the child is normally active. Our present interest only requires us to take cognizance of such action as an early stage in the organization of character. The tendency of the child to explain all in terms of action is dynamic evidence of its significance. The moral life not founded upon the bed rock of action is never sound and secure. It is to be admitted that one may take on pseudo-virtues, but such virtues are never ingrained in one's very being. They often give way later in life under the influence of some strain or stress. Morals, to be efficient and dependable, must stand on their own merits. Religion is a goodly assistant to moral character, but religion in itself cannot establish moral integrity. Moral action is early made possible by action that is unmoral.

There is today an appreciable tendency to make religion vital by basing it upon the principle of moral dynamics which we have explained. Creeds and dogmas are quietly disappearing, and real religious values are being organized and funded on the basis of action, — social religion. Religious values, no less than the moral and the intellectual, must be funded. Man cannot

appreciate God until he appreciates man, and man cannot appreciate man unless his early social interests are duly taken advantage of. The individual is socialized only on the basis of social action. In this sense religion and morals are copartners in the building of the higher self. They have the same aim.

Conation: performance of tasks

We shall now consider the second stage in the development of moral dynamics or moral conation. This is a higher type of conation because it represents the conscious performance of some task or duty, — the planning of a day's work, the successful turning of the furrows, the impressive deliverance of a lecture, the inculcation of the elements of a virtue in the plastic mind of the youth, — not with the express intention of cultivating our own virtuous life or personality, but with the consciousness that we are bringing to fruition a task worthy of achievement. It is the awareness of the task well done that counts in the organization of moral character. This conscious performance of a set task is of moral value because we are relatively unconscious of the development of our own virtues; consciousness is directed without and not within. Likewise, the teacher who would teach well must not at the same time psychologize too freely. He must watch the growth and unfolding of the child's desires, but must not be too solicitous concerning his own mental or moral enlargement. There is a time to psychologize and there is a time to teach; both are equally important and necessary, but when the two processes are combined it is apt to be to the disadvantage of both.

Theory and practice incompatible

We may find a ready corollary of the principle just touched upon. The successful theorist or investigator is ordinarily not a successful teacher, and, on the other hand, the born teacher (and good teachers are usually born) is not likely to add greatly to the direct advance of science. The real teacher indirectly advances the kingdom of science, not by adding to the storehouse of attainable knowledge but by building intellectual and moral selves who in their turn may advance science. It is one thing to be able to unveil and to formulate the mysteries of the

world about us, but it is quite another thing properly to adjust those mysteries to the apperceiving desires of the growing mind. Great moral theorists may not be successful teachers. The Greeks furnished the world with great moral theorists and philosophers, but it required a Roman civilization to institute law and practical efficiency.

Conscious moral conation

The third stage in the growth of moral conation is made conspicuous by the shifting of consciousness, to a considerable degree at least, from the performance of duties and tasks to the inculcation of a virtuous life itself. Perhaps there is no such thing as the development of a general moral life, but a general moral disposition as such is the resultant of the organization of specific virtues. We have already learned that the well-disciplined mind is the mind that has been subjected to many sources of discipline. Both intellectual and moral discipline are largely specific in their manifestations until their objects become idealized. When one makes morality his ideal, all the specific virtues may develop equally fast, but the rapidity of development depends upon the richness of the individual's experience. Moral ideals are not made real through the mere process of idealization; they must first be perceptualized and actualized. A man may set up an ideal of wealth, but pecuniary desires in themselves are not sufficient for the attainment of riches. When this third stage of character formation is reached, interest in the ordinary affairs of the world is minimized, but he is fortunate who is able to maintain a balanced interest between a moral ideal and the realities of life.

Both these interests are subject to accentuation. When objective interests become too engrossing, we are characterized as materialists; but overdeveloped attention to spiritual ideals at the expense of the real world is no less disastrous to mental and moral health. If any of the great philosophies of life are bad, they are bad because of their one-sidedness. Materialism and idealism, dualism and agnosticism, are all examples of extreme views of man and his world. It is possible to be too virtuous. To live a life incorporating all the virtues of the moral

calendar would be simply impossible. The holders of pure but extreme moral views are usually not appreciated even by those who uphold the standards of morals. A puritan is often not solicitous of the society of puritans.

The highest desires of the self

The fourth and highest stage of moral dynamics, or moral conation, is reached when one directs his attention, not so much to the immediate attainment of some moral quality as such, but to the enlargement of the self. The feeling or sense of self-enlargement now becomes the chief aim of life. When this stage of self-culture is reached (if it ever is reached), all the other necessary attributes of a fully organized moral experience have already been accounted for. The degree of self-satisfaction that we are describing is never the mere result of social encouragement in terms of social approval or disapproval. No society has ever attained this standard; so far in the history of human culture it has been the achievement of a few select souls. The experience of a few select individuals ought to be sufficient proof that man is not entirely at the mercy of his environment. There are higher values ahead for him if he will only avail himself of his just and due opportunities.

We have now passed in review the four stages of moral desire or moral conation, namely, the instinctive, the objective, the conscious search for virtuous experience, and, finally, the desire for immediate self-enlargement. We have also briefly explained two of the three functions subserved by normal sentiments, namely, sentiments make possible the integrity of the moral self by the funding of moral values and sentiments as storehouses of mental dynamics or moral conation. It will now be our purpose to explain the third and last function of normal sentiments, — sentiments as unifying and organizing agencies.

Shand tells us that there are two kinds of forces, one leading in the direction of mental organization and the other leading in the direction of mental disorganization.[1] Sentiment is an

[1] A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character, p. 20. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

organizing force, and emotion is a disorganizing force. Here we are chiefly concerned with sentiments as organizing agencies.

The child is selfless

Outside of mental content, organization is perhaps the most important attribute of the mind or self. The self may be said to have a real functional existence only so far as there is unity or organization. The child, though truly normal, is considered to be almost selfless from the very fact of his lack of mental unity. He is entirely at the mercy of his reflexes, instincts, and spontaneous tendencies. Unity, order, reserve, representation, all are lacking; only possibilities exist. In this respect the adult differs from the child only in degree; there is simply greater organization and control.

Signs of selfhood

The behavior of the normal self, especially the self that has reached a considerable degree of growth, is more or less predictable. The scientist is able to predict the phenomena of nature with a high degree of accuracy. The prediction of mental behavior is also something of an art. This prediction of mental behavior does not deny the possibility of freedom of choice on the part of the individual whose mental processes are being predicted; it simply implies that it is possible to estimate the moral reaction of some specific individual under the influence of definite mental stimuli. The spontaneous, hair-triggered, and unpredictable type of personality is often more attractive and interesting than the one whose reactions are measured and subject to mathematical calculation, but such a mind lacks what may be termed real selfhood. The ability to adjust oneself to a heterogeneous environment is often not indicative of a high degree of selfhood. Scruples sometimes interfere with success and happiness. Overscrupulousness is often just evidence of the fact that the moral self has been spoiled in the making. Fortunate is the individual who is able to combine moral unity and mental flexibility.

The question may now be asked, Is it possible to combine mental unity, the essence of selfhood, with a fair degree of mental spontaneity? Spontaneity and unity are more or less oppo-

site and antagonistic mental processes. Both are invaluable to a balanced moral character. Without affective spontaneity, character is dry, hard, stereotyped, and uninteresting; in the absence of unity, however, order, oneness of purpose, character, and moral dependableness can hardly be said to exist.

Moral unity and spontaneity

Mental spontaneity and moral unity are not impossible of human attainment. Unity and order in themselves inevitably tend to dissipate the natural feelings and emotions, while the natural affective life is inimical to law and order. Though these interacting influences hold true of the ordinary everyday experiences, there is no good reason why unity and feeling should be at war with one another after the individual has developed real life purposes and has cultivated a fair degree of mental introspective ability and self-appreciation. Honest self-observation combined with fundamental and growing life interests is sufficient to make possible and real a high degree of moral unity and selfhood with affective spontaneity.

When we have occasion to observe people who are changeable and fickle in their morals, — people who are prone to adjust their morals and consciences to certain situations, social or otherwise, — we are likely to find upon investigation a dearth of higher motives and purposes. On the other hand, the persistent pursuit of a life purpose, — an end or purpose not capable of attainment, — though it may occasion unity of character, will inevitably bring about hardness and sordidness. People who spend a large part of their lives in trying to perfect perpetual-motion machines never fail to become moral cranks; but he who has been privileged to choose a wise life purpose, and who has from time to time been morally encouraged with the sense of progressive achievement, will combine in one personality moral unity and affective spontaneity, — the moral ideal. An individual may develop as many sentiments as he has interests. The more thoroughly the lesser interests and sentiments are subordinated to the service of a life interest or sentiment, the more ideally organized will be the resulting character.

The intellectual, moral, æsthetic, and religious sentiments are sentiments of the higher order. They may be considered sentiments of the higher order because the higher values of life center around such interests. In these four classes of sentiments the proportional relations of the affective and the more purely intellectual elements may vary considerably. In the æsthetic and religious sentiments the feeling element predominates, whereas in the intellectual and the moral sentiments the cognitive element is usually more conspicuous.

Cognition

This finishes our more general discussion of the affective processes. Under this heading we have been especially interested in the proper direction of feeling, motives, and sentiments. The next topic for consideration and exemplification will be cognition. Here we shall touch briefly upon perception, conception, and ideation in so far as they may contribute to the growth and integrity of the moral self, the main theme of these chapters. The right objects to perceive, to conceive, and to think about will now engage our attention. The reader will please bear in mind this order of discussion.

Neural nexus

In an endeavor to lay bare the possibilities of moral perception we fully realize that there is no sharp line of demarcation between feeling and perception. Perception is valuable as a moral agency only to the degree that favorable feeling accompanies the object perceived. In addition to the feeling element in perception, however, the object perceived, good or bad, always serves as a possible nexus around which future feelings and associations cling. Every real perception is valuable as a possible moral agency largely on account of the neural nexus established.

Unintentioned evils

It is the early percept that makes possible moral character. The child or youth may take no tangible interest in the object or situation perceived; he may even dislike and turn away from such objects in disgust; he may be admonished that such objects or modes of action are bad; but the very fact that these objects are perceived will often be sufficient appreciably to mold thought and feeling throughout all the future. The prevalent

notion which would encourage the child or youth to go out into society for the express purpose of perceiving its evils is a false clue in the inculcation of morals. The recalling in imagination of any image implanted upon the plastic nervous system before the age of early adolescence cannot help engaging thought during one's whole future life. Whenever parent or even Sunday-school teacher impresses upon the child mind the evil of some perceived act, this teacher or parent is thereby impressing upon the mind a lesson not conducive to morals. Though such intentions are good, the results are inevitably bad. The early exposure to what is evil in percept, even though there is no participation in action, is often sufficient to bias character in its favor. The only true maxim would be never to permit the child to look upon the bad; the mere percept may be more powerful in the establishment of associations in its favor than any number of moral maxims to the contrary. Even the sowing of a light crop of wild oats is never conducive to a moral character. The thoughts and mental associations of the reformed gambler can never be strictly pure. He who early in life perceived one unwholesome word or action can never expect to be quite free of its influence. The child mind early impressed with the awfulness of disobedience to formal church doctrines can never attain a normal mental equilibrium. Early experiences are prone to warp the mind. We do not need to look far for innumerable examples of the principles here set forth. It is only necessary to repair to any so-called normal home where *don'ts* are too much in evidence, and where moral maxims are formally written upon the walls. Just now, as I am penning these lines, the newsboys are shouting: "Read all about the latest murder, extra, only five cents." At this very minute numerous boys and girls in their early adolescence are reading and perceiving the portrayal of the bad. If we are solicitous of more numerous examples of the principle that I am endeavoring to make clear, it is only necessary to visit the most popular moving-picture performance, where the child may perceive and feast the eye

upon the suggestive. But when, under the ostensible sanction of realism, the endeavor is made by the theater or moving picture to inculcate moral lessons by the presentation of the evils of life, then the true aim of art, which is to make great ideas and ideals alluring, is not fulfilled. Man seems to see through the moral glass darkly.

From what has been said in the preceding paragraph we are to infer the impossibility of moral representation through the avenues of immoral presentations. There is no process known to moral chemistry by which the bad in itself can become the signal for the good. The reader must bear in mind, however, that the perception of the evil is not always the source of evil intentions and evil deeds. So far our discussions have centered about the bad influences of evil perception and suggestion upon the plastic mind of the child before the age of early adolescence, and perhaps in some sensitive individuals much later and even throughout life. Some people are always at the mercy of their environment and associations.

Temptation as a source of moral strength

We must now hasten to state that the mere absence of evil suggestion is not sufficient to develop strength of character. The youth who has been too closely sheltered from the bad will usually not develop the rugged virtues. While the child should be protected from the untoward stimuli that may impinge upon his eyes, ears, and feelings, sheltered virtues are usually little more than the shadows of oncoming vices. Unwholesome suggestion and perception may serve either as an integrating or as a disintegrating force. When moral stamina is not in evidence, an unfavorable environment may be much more potent for the bad than it would be if character had already attained a definite set and purpose. When character has reached its majority, evil influences are no longer evil influences. Temptation is no longer a factor in the experiences of the truly virtuous. Temptation destroys the weak, but it serves to make stronger the strong. Temptations, like institutions for the wicked, do not exist for all, but only for those who are not sound morally. Social envi-

ronment may destroy character early in life, but during youth and adolescence it may become the chief agency for its development, whereas in the morally successful the environment is often a matter of moral indifference. When character and personality become constructive and creative, the moral benefits to be derived therefrom become inversely proportional to the frequency and intensity of the perceived evil. The strong man does not thrive by merely adjusting himself to the good; he grows in strength and courage in combating the bad.

Few rise above environment

The significance of early perception may be fairly evaluated by considering its influence from another point of view. Very rarely does an individual rise above the influence of his early environment. Occasionally one will, through sheer force, rise above the environment in which he was born, but such an exception tends to prove the possibilities of intellectual and moral creativeness rather than the negative influences of the environment. The community in which one lives for the first twelve or more years of life will mold the thought, feeling, and sentiments which will be used as the units of measure almost unchanged throughout life. This is especially true of the average personality. It is not due to the fact that instinct is transitory, as James would have us believe, nor to the rigidity and unchangeableness of intellectual and moral habits. Perhaps the plasticity of the nervous system is not appreciably lessened until maturity is fully reached. There is, however, some good reason why early perception is so vital in controlling thought and feeling. Surely thought and feeling have not advanced far during the first few years of life. We shall, I think, find a ready answer in the fact that every early experience which may be remembered or imaged has served as a neural nexus for ramifying associations. This is the reason why immoral perception is as potent as moral perception. For the same reason the child who is warned against the commitment of some tangible wrong is all the more apt to become disobedient. The suggested idea of doing what is wrong has set up a nexus in the nervous system.

Earlier and later perception

The significance of perception after the age of early adolescence has a different source. It is now a much less important factor in the directing of the thought processes. Perception may now become of importance not because it sets up a new neural nexus but because it may, provided the perception be a worthy one, consciously reënforce some ideal or purpose. Perception early in life may stand upon its own merits and mold its own character, but perception later in life can become only an assistant to ideals and purposes earlier established.

The conclusions drawn so far would seem to imply that the beginning of moral integrity must be securely launched in early perception. Moral perceptualization must come before moral conceptualization. Early in life, unless one sees and hears what is worthy, — even feels or senses what is right, — there is slight chance that the good will be duly appreciated later in life. Moral concepts and ideals do not drop from the sky. Moral ideals are real experiences, — realities whose first beginnings may often be traced to some vivid percept in early life, — the mother's wish, the father's desire, or the teacher's suggestion.

Psychological determiners

After this attempt to lay bare the neural basis of early perception in the development of the moral self, and the far-reaching effects of early perception compared with that which is perceived during the years of relative maturity and adult life, we may now discuss the psychological reasons why our first perceptions are so overpowering in importance. Desire and aversion, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, are prime factors in the life of any normal individual. These primitive forms of human experience are the psychological elements which, more than anything else, determine the significance of early perception. Perhaps a few concrete examples will make our thesis clear. We need only refer to common, everyday experiences.

Sources of aversion and desires

It is of singular significance that our most primitive sense, namely, the sense of touch, may do as much as or even more than any other sensory experience to establish lifelong likes and dislikes. The sense of touch is especially significant during the

early age of adolescence. Here the pleasantness or unpleasantness of touch, the mere shaking of hands, will set up desires or aversions that can never be erased. Friendships may be formed or friendships may be irreparably broken in this casual sort of way. Experiences like these are sometimes sufficient to make or to break a life of social happiness. Our early likes or dislikes may be variously sidetracked. He is a wise man who is able to unravel all the major sources of his desires and aversions, but more fortunate is he whose prejudgments have been favorably guided.

Sources of minor morals

If these possibilities lie dormant in the primitive sense of touch, there are even opportunities for aversion and desire in the derived senses. It is not possible to change the child's desires and aversions without thereby altering for the good or the bad his moral inclinations. Desire and aversion are the advance agents of that which is good or bad. Every informed parent and teacher is well aware of the early perceptual likes and dislikes in the world of color and sound. How soon the child becomes prejudiced in favor of certain hues and tints, owing, perhaps, more to some unknown association or feeling experience than to any natural neural organization. The early adjustment to specific kinds of physical vibration is also experienced in terms of musical qualities, refined or unrefined. Habits of dress, habits of speech, even the dietary likes and dislikes are early set and are not subject to appreciable change. All such perceptual likes and dislikes, in themselves examples of minor morals, are concretely influential in the establishment of major morals, the substantial virtues.

Perception not sufficient

After this rather long presentation of the moral possibilities of perception of one kind or another the reader is not to infer that perception is sufficient for the establishment of a single full-grown virtue. Perception only sets up tendencies, lines of direction, desires or aversions, that will inevitably lead the unsuspecting self in the interest of vice or virtue. The establishment of one interest or aversion will always lead to the inculcation or

elimination of some other interest or aversion. When one side of the scale goes up, the other must go down. This analogy generally holds true of the intellectual and moral processes. For this very reason early specialization is fraught with intellectual and moral dangers. No one can become more prejudiced than the narrow specialist, — the one who looks with contempt upon all fields of investigation save his own. Science, whose unfettered investigation offers the freest and best avenues to mental freedom, will, when limited in scope and range, do more to shackle the expansion of the soul than the rankest ignorance.

Moral concepts

In the next few paragraphs we shall turn our attention in the direction of conception. We do this with the full consciousness that there is no sharp line of demarcation between perception and conception, but for our purposes a valuable distinction may be made. While particular percepts initiate and make possible the direction of moral behavior, concepts integrate, enlarge, and organize moral behavior. We are not here affirming that generalized or conceptualized moral behavior is simply the result of the summing up of particular moral experiences, but we do imply that concrete experiences are the prime materials out of which character grows. This belief does not commit one to any special psychological cult.

Moral percepts and concepts

It is noteworthy that one may be able to say that some particular form of behavior is right in itself without being able to generalize freely in matters concerning morals; on the other hand, it is often possible to decide what is generally wholesome and moral without being able to determine the status of a specific act. Concrete examples will readily come to mind. Thus there is a real distinction between moral percepts and moral concepts. Moral conceptualization comes later than moral perceptualization. To make abstract principles concrete: if we ask a well-intentioned adolescent about the moral status of some particular habit or act (for instance, whether the student is morally bound to come to class lectures on time), there may be some hesitancy in deciding upon an answer, though the intentions are good. If

we take occasion to put the same question to some seasoned teacher, the answer, whatever it may be, will be forthcoming. This brings out the distinction between moral perception and moral conception.

Tests of character

Two factors determine the moral integrity of any normal individual: first, his ability to generalize in regard to particular moral or immoral situations (namely, his facility in pigeonholing a certain act); secondly, his willingness and sense of oughtness, — the presence of sentiments issuing in action. To know, to appreciate, and to do are the real tests of character. We shall now briefly consider the two chief sources of moral concepts.

Two sources of moral concepts

Concrete experiences and reflective thought are the chief sources of moral concepts, and both are fully requisite in the molding of the moral self. When we reduce these two forms of experience to pedagogical terminology, the resulting mental products are known as psychological and logical concepts. Psychological concepts are the concepts that are perceptual, incidental, and nonreflective in origin, — notions that casually shape themselves, — the early and nonscientific moral standards. These concepts may have all the evidence of moral earnestness, but they usually lack unity and consistency. The moral concepts entertained by the plain man are largely of his sort, — concepts of an unreflective nature. Logical concepts are the logically and scientifically organized mental products. While passive and casual experiences are the prime sources of the concepts first mentioned, thought, reflection, and intellectual and moral evaluation are necessary for those higher moral notions called logical concepts. Logical concepts may be considered both the cause and the result of moral judgment. Our relatively finished notions of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice may be cited as examples of logical concepts.

Moral generalization

Intellectual grasp, conceptualization, power to generalize, are usually considered signs of mental ability. Ease, range, and profundity of suggestion are mentioned by John Dewey [1] as

[1] How we Think, pp. 34–37.

essential attributes of the higher thought processes. One can but marvel at the power of generalization attained by Darwin and Spencer. Moral generalization in terms of moral concepts is no less an envied achievement. More dangers lurk in moral generalization, however, than in intellectual generalization as such. Generalization in mathematics, in logic, and perhaps in science holds for all time and for all people, but generalization in the field of ethics does not hold true either practically or theoretically. That which is strictly moral for one age is not necessarily moral for a succeeding age. This may be said to be concretely true, though some moralists (Sidgwick, for example) tenaciously hold to the existence of irrefragable intuitions.

Dangers of generalization

The dangers resident in intellectual and moral generalization are of the practical sort. The scientist trained to formulate broad generalizations about man and the world will be more efficient in determining the attributes of man than in understanding particular men. The individual is lost in the general. It is often hard for the renowned biologist to understand the particular motive of some one individual, though he may write a treatise on man as a biological organism. The same phenomena apply in the realm of practical ethics. It is a comparatively easy matter for the moralist to formulate the laws of ethical behavior, but he is not always facile in diagnosing the motives which prompted the behavior of an isolated individual.

Reformed pedagogy

We may readily discern good examples of those who, through wide experience, have developed generalized notions of man and his behavior. It is not difficult for the well-meaning parent to comprehend the behavior of his child; in some extreme cases this labeled perverseness has been sufficient to cause great thinkers to conclude that the child is by nature bad. The child is probably neither good nor bad by nature, and our tendency to brand him as one or the other is the result of false generalization. The whole field of intellectual and moral pedagogy is in the clutches of the evil results of generalization. The teacher almost invariably reads his motives and ideas into the minds of those

who come to him for instruction. Enlightened intelligence will never be sufficient to eliminate the tendency of the normal adult mind to judge in terms of its own experiences rather than the experiences of the one being taught. We not only suffer on account of our own education, but we unconsciously make others suffer. The latest and best works on education and pedagogy are full of wise suggestions emphasizing the significance of understanding the motives and mental content of each specific child.

Religions; science; philosophy

To trace the history of apperception, or, in other words, to trace the historic tendencies of the human mind to interpret the world in terms of its own feelings, percepts, and thoughts, would be sufficient to lay bare the history and origin of religion, philosophy, and science. What are religion, philosophy, and science, that is, so far as our experiences of such disciplines are concerned, but our generalized and objectified notions of feelings and experiences? The world has impinged upon us, and we are returning to her in a refined form our choicest thoughts, feelings, and sentiments.

Pedagogical qualification

If people, even educators and moralists, are largely at the mercy of their thought processes, and if overgeneralization of specific experiences militates against our ability to appreciate the exceptional or that which does not conform to our own views, is there any way by which such a mental handicap can be overcome? Though the answer to this all-important problem is clear enough so far as a theoretical solution is concerned, only those who are fortunate enough to have a certain mental trait can hope to be helped by the solution. In addition to a well-developed personality and a richness of intellectual content there is no one quality or attribute of the teacher or practical moralist as important as his ability to recall vividly his own early and adolescent experiences. The teacher who appreciates his own youthful intellectual and moral struggles, and who in addition is willing to make capital of such recollection in the classroom, has the one qualification that will do more than

any other to mediate between his own mind and the mind of the young. The teacher is a true mediator.

Relation of teacher to pupil

Most great investigators and thinkers are not able to accomplish this pedagogical feat. Either they are unable to recall in vivid terms the real difficulties early encountered in the educative processes or they remain indifferent and fail to appreciate the blind groping of their pupils. The child enjoys being in the presence of other children, the adolescent is desirous of youth of his own age, and the adult is no less gratified at being in the company of adults, all because the members of each group can readily understand and appreciate one another. There should be a subtle nexus rather than an intellectual hiatus between teacher and pupil. This is not the only attribute of the living teacher, but it would be safe to predict that if this one qualification could be fully realized and appreciated there would be many more intensive intellectual journeys; and, as one great thinker has said, intellectual journeys are the most pleasurable of all journeys.

The relation between teacher and pupil may be characterized, intellectually and morally speaking, as being more or less rhythmic. There is a natural divergence and convergence of processes. This is probably more or less providential in the relation of human selves. The intellectual and moral content of the developing mind of the adult comes to be more or less separated from that of the child; but is it not true that the mind of the adult teacher, as it approaches the fullness of maturity, comes more and more to appreciate the interest and thought of the child and youth? The next few paragraphs will briefly touch upon the relations of ideation to the moral self.

Ideation

As there is no way of making a clear distinction between perception and conception, neither is there a sharp line to be drawn between conception and ideation. These three forms of cognition are more or less continuous. Any complete and constructive mental procedure requires perception, conception, and ideation. We may be permitted to use the expression *ideation* to imply

thoughtfulness, open-mindedness, and mental sensitiveness to suggestion, not suggestion coming from an objective social environment, but suggestion coming from within, from our own past experiences. Perhaps the meaning that we wish to read into the term *ideation* may be best expressed by using the statement before quoted, "the power of representation over presentation." No better index of moral advancement can be found than the persistent ability to replace impulse by thoughtfulness. The old statement to the effect that he who hesitates is lost is not appreciably true for moral behavior and moral culture. Intellectual hesitation is often the source of strength.

Two kinds of ideation

There are at least two phases or aspects of intellectual and moral representation (or we may choose a simpler expression, namely, *ideation*): first, the impulsive or suggested act is brought face to face with some well-established moral concept; secondly, the impulsive or suggested act is not necessarily brought into relation with a definite moral law or concept, but it is estimated in the balance of all our past experiences. The reader will please bear in mind the two uses of the term *ideation*. The first use of the term implies a rather well-organized moral self, a self largely automatic in its functioning; the second use denotes a more or less constructive moral attitude, — character in the making.

Concepts control impulses

Impulses and feelings are undoubtedly the prime sources of all the values of life. Every feeling is of marked significance in ethical behavior. When we tell the truth or are virtuous simply because cold intellect requires it, virtue has already lost some of its reward. Though impulse and feeling give value to life and a glow to virtue in itself, there are many times when feeling and impulse must be curbed; ideas, impulses, and feelings must be brought before some appropriate moral concept, — justice, integrity, law, principle, or what not. This is representation, — ideation in the first meaning of the term, — and the best classic example in the history of ethical thought would be Kant's categorical imperative, which says: "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature." When some

impulse suddenly and all unawares prompts us to an act of injustice, and our well-established sense of justice says No, this is a simple and direct example of ideation, or moral representation. Any number of similar incidents will come to the notice of the experienced self. Perhaps conscience may function in a similar fashion.

One of the chief aims of moral education is to ingrain the mind with established moral concepts; but it is not sufficient that these concepts simply have residence in the self; they must be led to function. It may be possible for the mind to have a goodly storehouse of ethical principles with little power of representation as we have seen fit to use the term. Mental pathology is insistent in affirming that it is possible for the intellect to know what is right and what is wrong without the presence of the proper feeling or motive to prompt in choosing the right and rejecting the wrong. If this is true of the diseased mind, it must be, to a degree, true of the normal mind, as abnormal mental functioning is simply accentuated normal behavior in feeling, in thought, and in action.

Concepts in the making

A few words will be necessary to make clear our second use or meaning of the term *ideation*. Here we are describing a mental attitude, — a disposition gradually leading to the organization of moral concepts. Justice, honor, integrity, and the other virtues are not yet well "set," but are gelatinous and still in the making. Here the impulses and ideas and tendencies to action are not guided by established principles unconsciously coming from within, but consciousness is watching the dictates of social approval and disapproval.

The moral will

We have clearly set forth the value of cognition in terms of perception, conception, and ideation. We have consciously chosen certain aspects of these three processes to suit our special purpose, namely, to show how the moral self is constructed. When right objects have been perceived, conceived, and thought about, we have lived up to the possibilities of cognition as a moral agency, and this was the second aim of the present chapter.

The third and last problem of this chapter remains to be considered, namely, the control of desires and the choosing of moral values. Perhaps we may truthfully say that the task immediately before us is to determine the origin and functioning of the moral will. The origin, nature, and functioning of the moral will represents the height of all ethical speculation. Our treatment of the subject will be purely psychological. Scarcely a moralist in modern and recent times has neglected to take issue with the problems connected with some phase of the will. At the present time we are not especially interested in the theories and speculations centering about determinism and indeterminism. In the present chapter we are not to be concerned with the various arguments that tend to uphold or to deny the existence of metaphysical freedom. These interesting topics will be at least briefly treated when we come to the more speculative and philosophical sources of the moral self. Perhaps Kant was right when he affirmed the good will to be the only thing in the world that was good without qualification.

Method of approach

Perhaps we may best fulfill the task before us by first considering the origin and functioning of the moral will, and then we shall be prepared later to speak intelligently in reference to its nature and meaning. We cannot fully understand an object until we know something about its origin, its history, and its functioning. He who would understand man must first become acquainted with his origin and history, his behavior, the laws of his existence, how he feels, thinks, and wills; then perhaps we may know something about his nature; then and only then may we with confidence venture to improve his very being. This brief analysis gives us a method of approach.

Strength of will

In endeavoring to clarify our conception of the origin, function, and nature of the will we are not referring to any mental process apart from feeling, motivation, sentiment, perception, conception, ideation, or any other form of mental behavior already enlarged upon in this chapter. A similar statement was also made in analyzing the nature of the self. The self is just

another name used to denote organized mental experiences. We may make our meaning clear by saying that the will is nothing more than the functioning of the self. There are at least two reasons why we should understand the nature and mechanism of the will. First, we should understand the will in order to improve the will of others, and, secondly, an understanding of the will is necessary for self-improvement. Self-education, whatsoever form it may take, is an index to the self-improved will. He who, through sheer force, or, as it is ordinarily expressed, through strength of character, rises above the level of the environment in which he was born and reared, does so as the result of will power. Strength or force of will does not, of course, imply a moralized will, or a good will, as Kant would say. To act in accordance with duty may require as much will power as to act from the sense of duty. The two acts may well differ in moral quality. The will as such is a dynamic resultant; the moral will, the will in which we are especially interested, is a capitalized and ideally motivated self.

A funding process

The development of the will, then, becomes a funding process. Even though the well-organized will is capable of lifting itself above the level of its environment, this does not imply the existence of a power not attributable to concrete and easily definable sources. The mind is both a cause and an effect. In a very true sense it cannot be one without being the other. There can be no such thing as a functionless will.

Will, the actuating self

It would not be difficult to show that in one sense the will is the resultant of various antecedent mental processes. Where feeling, desire, ambition, and various trends of instinctive behavior are relatively absent in early and adolescent life, there is little opportunity to develop a powerful will. These are the raw materials out of which the will grows and develops. The presence of these constitutive elements is not sufficient to provide for a full-grown will, but where they are absent there is little hope that any other psychic process will take their place. When desires and ambitions are unfulfilled, the possibilities of the will

are to that degree curtailed. When desires, ambitions, capacities, conation, and other dynamic tendencies are allowed to make themselves manifest in the world of tangible experience, and when they are moderately and wisely controlled, the dynamic resultant is an active will, the actuating self.

The triple functioning of will

The discussion so far has made intelligible the actuating sources of the will, but as yet little or nothing has been hinted in regard to its functioning. What are the functions of the moral will? The first function of the healthy will is the proper regulation of those desires, strivings, impulses, etc. which originally are its true sources. A second and higher functioning of the will is its power to select the values of life, — the values conformable to the best interests of the moral self. The third and last attainable function of the will is the conscious striving for self-improvement. Here, of course, the highest functioning of the self and the will combine into one. These three purposes of the will are never completely realized; one may succeed in being a fair master of the first, only moderately interested in the second, and hardly conscious of the possibilities of the third. Whether or not one is to attain a fair degree of success along the lines mentioned depends more upon education and environment than upon inherited capacities. Then again, the development of the will and the functioning of the will are not, from the point of time, two separate processes.

Primary function of will

The first function of the will does not consist in the repression of desires and impulses; neither is it wise to allow the impulsive life free rein; but the primary function of the will is the proper guidance of the affective and conative tendencies. It is only when the moral self has attained considerable growth and organization that it is possible to make the body and impulses the ready servant of the will. So long as the feeling and active nature is under the control of pleasure and pain, social approval or disapproval, the true will is not really functioning. The true will functions in terms of a funded dynamic disposition, — a capitalized moral reserve. As long as one is at the mercy of

feelings and passions, desires too ardent to be controlled, and the coarser of the unsocialized instincts, the will has not as yet subserved its first function. Perhaps there can be no better test of the attainment of its first purpose than the subduing of active temptation. When the self has reached the first rung of its upward achievement, the dangers of temptation are forever silenced.

The second stage of human perfection is not well launched until the age of middle or later adolescence. The shifting of youthful ideals is hardly sufficient in itself to give rise to a dependable will, and it is only when such ideals and values become stabilized that the will really enters upon its higher mission, the selection and rejection — the evaluation — of ideals and purposes. Adolescence is the age when the moral self presents its greatest possibilities, when the human soul exposes its greatest surface to the world.

It is only when the self becomes conscious of its limitless opportunities that the will enters upon its highest function and mission, the conscious search for realization, — not simply the realization of one or more objective interests, not even the conscious endeavor to incorporate the objective world, but the endeavor of the self to embrace and to enlarge itself. This is the highest stage of self-realization. It represents the highest function of the will, the highest embodiment of one's affective, cognitive, and active life.

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CHAPTER VI

THE SELF AS SOCIALLY REALIZED: SOCIALIZING THE SELF

Human beings, in so far as they are free to do so, always endeavor to bring about an agreeable state of mind or consciousness. This has been and will continue to be one of the persistent themes of this book. In an earlier chapter it was argued that a normal individual either attempts to maintain an already established state of existence, which ordinarily is one of agreeableness, or strives for an ideal state of existence which would make possible a more agreeable state of consciousness; and it was further maintained that the tendency of the individual to strive for a higher source of mental satisfaction, ideal, or status, at the expense of some present or past state of satisfaction, is an index of that individual's intellectual and moral capacity. Intellectual and moral advancement is a matter of pressing forward. It has also been assumed, and in some cases concretely exemplified, that this source of agreeableness is usually to be found in some form of synthesis, unity, or harmony. Unity is always a source of satisfaction, — the unity which is the result of the subordination of many interests to the attainment of a life purpose or life interest, — the unfolding of a far-off ideal.

Personality and love

Heretofore in these pages we have been primarily concerned with that form of unity which has taken into account the interests of the individual, the various forms of mental organization mentioned in Chapter IV, all those forms of synthesis making possible the real self, and personality. But in addition to this form of unity there is a higher type of unity, — a synthesis which tends to harmonize the interests of the individual

with the interests of society. Apropos of the subject at hand Hobhouse, in his book "The Rational Good,"[1] says:

> The building up of isolated impulses into the Self or Person, and the union of separate individuals into a social bond may be regarded as the two great movements of synthesis, which between them bridge the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and the complete harmony of activity and feeling.

Hobhouse calls these two sources of unity the principle of personality and the principle of love. This form of social unity now under consideration is not to be identified with that phase of Herbert Spencer's social and ethical philosophy which would reconcile the rights of the individual with the rights of society. The form of social and individual relation which is to prevail is not one of absolute tranquillity (like Spencer's) but one of organic usefulness.

The individual and society

The proper relation of one person to other persons, or, more specifically stated, the relation of an individual to organized society, has always been a difficult and vital problem for both the practical and the theoretical moralist. The issue today seems to be as far from a satisfactory solution as it was at the beginning of social thought. The first difficulty connected with this moral problem is whether man's first interest or duty should be directed to himself or to others. This uncertainty has given rise, throughout the ages, to individual and social philosophies. According to individualism each man's interest lies primarily in administering to his own self or personality, and thereby paving the way for that which will be best for society as a whole. Those who hold the opposite philosophy maintain that man should first labor in the interest of the world, for by so doing he will bring to pass that which will be best for each individual. The second question connected with the primacy of individualism and social interests is, What are the directing forces working in the interest of the individual and in the interest of the social whole? We are concerned here not with those forces that have

[1] L. T. Hobhouse, The Rational Good, p. 151.

their origin in social institutions of one kind or another, as the religious, the political, or the social, but with those innate forces or impulses which are known as the egoistic or altruistic or benevolent.

Sources of moral guidance

Then again, if it should be definitely decided that man is by nature egoistic or altruistic, would such a conclusion be sufficient to make egoism or altruism the fundamental guiding principle in the development of the moral self? If it should be conclusively proved that man is egoistic, would egoism become the true source of moral behavior? Or are we to draw the conclusion that some form of law or social authority is the rightful source of moral character? It is not our purpose at this time to offer an attempted solution to the several problems related respectively to the individual and to society; our purpose in mentioning these difficulties has been to show why most ethical discussions, past and present, have centered about individual and social relationships. Spencer makes the relation of the individual to society the crux of the moral problem, and in no unclear tone of voice Sidgwick declares[1] that the relation of rational egoism to rational benevolence is the profoundest problem of ethics. In the following paragraph will be found the two primary interests, or problems, of the present chapter.

Outline of chapter

Having mentioned briefly the problematic setting of the subject matter of the present chapter, we shall now proceed to present in broad outline the two chief sources of individual and social harmony or unity, — the origins of a higher synthesis. They are as follows: (1) sources of social interest and social participation; (2) reasons for willing the social good.

Social participation

We may conveniently consider the sources of social participation, — not social participation in the sense of an endeavor to improve or to be of service to the social order, — but social participation in the sense of being drawn into social contacts. There are at least two general sources of social participation, the direct

[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 387, note. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

and the indirect. We may also speak of social participation as being natural and acquired. These forms of social contact, whether they are instinctive in origin or whether they are intellectual, moral, or spiritual, are actuated by self-interest. Scarcely an instinct can be found (if we may be permitted to use the word *instinct*) which does not require, sometime in its functioning, the presence or assistance of human beings, — human beings organized in some capacity. Instincts make possible the very existence of society in terms of social institutions, and then man, instinctively as well as purposely, is drawn into contact with these established institutions of one kind or another to fulfill the requirements of some need. For instance, the instinct of curiosity makes possible the institutions of science and education, and in turn wonder and curiosity are the forces leading one to enroll in the schools of learning. The primary aim of education is not the immediate improvement of society or the social order, but the betterment of self. The betterment of the individual through education is more conducive to the lasting improvement of society than is the specific improvement of society for the benefit of individuals composing society. Individual integrity is active and largely self-sustaining, whereas social integrity is largely passive. Man thinks of himself before he thinks of society, and at its very best society is only man's convenient and ready tool. It is through society, or the social order, that man gratifies his interests and instincts, and only the exceptional see fit to counsel its improvement. Man may enter actively into the favor and enjoyment of society without the least inclination on his part to improve its structure. Ordinarily the dictates of the social order develop a functioning conscience and pave the way for the oncoming of moral judgment; but when one becomes too desirous of social approval and fearful of social disapproval, then conscience fails in its real purpose, and moral judgment plays the rôle of hypocrisy.

Man a social being

Whatever may be the various forces that entice man into the presence of his fellows, the most conspicuous of all is the ancient

truism that man is by nature a social or political animal. The saying has received two interpretations: the first is to the effect that man is by nature instinctively social, and the second is that man finds it to his advantage to be social. Both these modern versions are true; man would not be innately social if it were not to his advantage to be so. It is hard to find in the mental make-up of man any general quality not working in the interest of his moral integrity; nor do we often find the human constitution and the social order directly at variance. That which is of real interest to man as an individual is usually to the advantage of society, of which he is justly a member. It is to the interest of man to develop all his ready capacities, but the fully developed capacities make him the best citizen. Institutionalism, a modern type of social and political philosophy, would develop man's capacities and enlarge his individual and social usefulness by making him an organic part of the social order. According to this scheme man does not first prepare himself for some task in life; education would not be a preparation for complete living, as Spencer would say; but education *is* life, as Dewey critically comments. Thus education and life become two sides of the same process, that is, service in the growth and development of social institutions. In conformity with this conception of the relation of the individual to the functioning of social institutions we may quote approvingly from Dewey's twofold classification of the virtues.[1] He says:

> A virtue may be defined, accordingly, either as the settled intelligent identification of an agent's capacity with some aspect of the reasonable or common happiness; or as a social custom or tendency organized into a personal habit of valuation.

Thus virtue in this double sense would mean, for instance, that truthfulness may be considered as functioning in the service of society or as an established disposition of the individual. Institutionalism would give this virtuous disposition an institutional origin.

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 403.

Reasons for social participation

Whenever we say that man is a social or political being, we imply that there is something in his nature that makes social participation attractive, or that groups of human beings in some way or other serve as attractive stimuli. Modern writers on sociology and kindred subjects employ various expressions to account for man's interest in being with others of his kind. Whether the so-called "consciousness of kind" is an instinct, or whether it has some other source than instinct, as modern writers are trying to make out, we are not here greatly concerned. We are simply interested in the fact that man is in some way led to become associated with human beings who are similar to him. Trotter, in his interesting book entitled "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," uses the expression "herd instinct" to account for man's attraction to the group. According to Trotter the herd instinct does much more than merely to give man an interest in the group; in accordance with it his mental life, even his beliefs, are largely molded. Still others, like McDougall, employ the gregarious instinct to account for man's well-known gregariousness. The plain man simply uses the expression "social interest" when he has reason to explain man's tendency to congregate with others of his kind.

Indirect sources

In addition to those instincts or forces that bring man irresistibly into the presence of others there are many more or less indirect sources of group participation. Many of the instincts that are not primarily social in their first manifestations lead men to the altar of society. We may mention only a few. The sexual instinct is undeniably a factor in making men social participants. This instinct not only leads men to partake of group life but is the source of the establishment of one form of group life, the family. Pugnacity is an indirect source of group participation; man combines with one group for the express purpose of defeating another group. Tendencies in the direction of self-assertion and industrial coöperation also bring men into social relationships. In most of these forms and sources of social and group participation man is primarily interested in his own

welfare and only incidentally, if at all, interested in the group for the benefit of the group. In addition to those interests that are primarily instinctive (as are, for the most part, tendencies having as their reward military victory or pecuniary gain) there are, on the part of individuals, other sources of group or social participation of a higher nature.

Sources of strength and weakness

It is not at all uncommon for man to become associated with, to become a part of, or to participate in the activities of some group or organization for intellectual, moral, or spiritual betterment. Those who desire to avail themselves of the privileges of an education enroll in some school, college, or university, or perhaps become active members of a select scientific organization. Scholarship societies are expressly organized for those who have attained high ratings in academic circles. Man likes to identify himself with things of real worth. Fraternities, now so commonly connected with college and university life, are, as an ideal at least, founded upon the principle of good fellowship. If it is a sign of weakness to have the desire to identify oneself with (or, when it comes within one's power, to exercise) undue control or authority over man and nature, it is no less an index of intellectual and moral worth to have the desire to become one with an organization or principle that stands for the higher values of life. Weak men desire power and authority to compensate for their weakness.

Social aspect of religion

If it is true that man consciously associates himself with his fellows in order to gratify his desire for social and intellectual fellowship, then it is for this same reason that he becomes a member of a moral or religious organization. A large share of man's religious consciousness is social consciousness. Without the element of social fellowship the religious consciousness would wane. A growing and conscious recognition of this important fact is probably one of the reasons why religion is rightfully shifting its interests from forms, creeds, and dogmas to social and spiritual fellowship. If religion is to function in the interest of man, it must function in the direction of its true source.

Widening sociality

There are other and more subtle reasons why man should become interested in social life or social organizations of one kind or another. It is of considerable significance whether man is attracted to some form of social organization by subtle instinct or a developing moral conscience, or whether he is induced to become an active member of society as the result of utilitarian calculation; in any event an expanding social interest is necessary to develop his moral capacities. Man's interest may extend all the way from an interest in himself to an interest in an all-embracing humanity. Mind grows in the direction in which it is exercised. Though man must become interested in himself before he can become interested in others, only through the widening circle of social interests will the moral self continue to unfold and to enlarge. Man's major interest must always be socially directed. There is no one phase of social endeavor sufficient in itself to call out all man's social and moral possibilities unless it is an abiding interest in humanity. Perhaps a little more explanation will be necessary to make my meaning clear. Man naturally takes an interest in the objective world. His mind is also socially constituted. Three factors are requisite for the fullest possible mental and moral development. When any or all of these factors are partially or wholly absent, mental and moral growth will be cut short. The three factors, in their natural order, are as follows: objectivity, sociality, and an abiding unity. It is not at all possible for man to become vitally interested in an all-embracing humanity, and then in time to become interested in lesser social groups, and finally interested in the self. The development of man's social interests is in close analogy to the nature of his mental organization. Unity is the only true index of man's intellectual advancement, and unity in widening circles of social organization is the only real sign of man's social advancement. To make the principle concrete, the child is first normally interested in himself. Then, as the capacities unfold, the adolescent comes to realize his higher privileges in the establishment of the family; this represents the first real

advancement in moral and social unity, — the unity primarily actuated by the principle of love. The second stage of moral and social unity is entered into when man as a member of the family becomes actively interested in some wider social group, — the city, the school, the state; again, the citizen who is a member of a family, a school, or a state may enter into a wider social unity, the nation or even humanity. This process, which is more than imaginary, makes concrete the necessary requisites for a complete life experience: objectivity, sociality, and unity.

Sufficient explanation has been offered to make clear the chief reasons why man should become interested in widening circles of social activity. Though an active interest in the welfare of humanity at large is a social ideal, all that has been said or implied so far has been primarily for the benefit of the individual and only incidentally for the benefit of society. Man's interest in the bettering of the social order has not yet been touched upon. Before approaching this important topic it will be well to say a few words concerning the reasons why it is possible for man to gain larger and larger circles of social interest.

Why Christianity fails

Man has long been aware of his duty to mankind at large. Various means have been employed to accomplish humanitarian results. Christianity commands the brotherhood of man, and its practical precepts are largely in the interests of such an attainment. However universal these precepts in the so-called Christian nations may be, it must be frankly admitted that Christianity has largely failed in its endeavor to inculcate the principles of the universal brotherhood of man. Moral and Christian teachers cannot with success command man to love or even to respect his brethren. Man is neither moral nor Christian because he is commanded to be; neither will he love his neighbor or entertain a kindly feeling toward humanity in conformity to any known moral or religious command. The precepts of the Christian teacher are noble in their intention, but they have often failed to ennoble, not because such precepts and ideals are incapable of concrete realization, but because the

methods and pedagogy employed have lacked psychological insight. The successful inculcation of moral, social, and religious ideals is just as much dependent upon sane principles of pedagogy as are the more purely intellectual principles. Man will never come to respect humanity until he respects himself. He who normally respects himself may easily be led to respect others.

We shall now turn our attention from the various sources of social interests and social participation to a closely related topic, namely, the reasons for willing the social good or social happiness. This will be the second main topic in this chapter. The last paragraph, which pertained to Christian ideals and methods, discussed the individual's own interests as well as the individual's interest in the welfare of others, which is now our main theme for consideration. Otherwise stated, religion is both individual and social in its purposes. Perhaps it would be true to say that religion is social — purposely social — in so far as it is real and refined. Man philosophizes alone, but men worship together.

Altruistic sources of social good

Perhaps no sharp line can be drawn between the individual entering society for the sake of gratifying his own interests, and the one entering it for the purpose of being of service to humanity. It may be that men are so ideally constituted that the giver and the receiver are mutually benefited. Spencer, in his chapter on "Absolute and Relative Ethics,"[1] makes clear his meaning of an absolutely right act, an act benefiting both parties concerned. He mentions the natural relation between parent and child as embodying the conditions necessary for an absolutely right act, — an act that is mutually beneficial. He also says: "The artist of genius — poet, painter, or musician — is one who obtains the means of living by acts that are directly pleasureable to him, while they yield, immediately or remotely, pleasures to others."[2] Perhaps the most acceptable of all reasons why man should actively will the good and happiness of others is altruism,

[1] Herbert Spencer, Principles of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 261. [2] Ibid. p. 263.

or benevolence, — not an altruism based upon an enlightened self-interest, but an altruism that is strictly real. Many ethical theorists have recognized the existence of such a motive working in the interest of others. The "good will" so highly lauded by Kant is a good example of a rationalized altruistic will. This will is said to be good without qualification. Bishop Butler, in addition to self-love and a native conscience, recognized in man the existence of a quality which he called benevolence. More recent writers (and perhaps we may mention Dewey as an example) seem to attribute to the child unconscious or more or less passive tendencies which may be considered the background of both egoism and altruism. This is a sane and wholesome way of viewing the self. The child acts as if he were genuinely egoistic and altruistic, but he is not consciously so. According to Dewey:

> The true doctrine says, the self is constituted and developed through instincts and interests which are directed upon their own objects with no conscious regard necessarily for anything except those objects themselves. The false doctrine implies that the self exists by itself apart from these objective ends, and that they are merely means for securing it a certain profit or pleasure.[1]

Sources of altruism

What may be the true source or sources of altruism or benevolence does not especially concern us in this chapter, but we may confidently suppose altruism to have an evolutionary origin so far as the human race is concerned. The tendencies, largely instinctive, whatever they may be, out of which conscious altruism develops, are inherited by each normal individual. It has been and is as necessary for man to be interested in the welfare of others as it is to have an interest in his own welfare. Altruism is sometimes identified with the so-called social instinct, or gregariousness, but it is well known that man may be actively interested in the pleasures which society and various group organizations afford without any attempt to improve such groups. Real altruism is not to be identified with mere

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 378.

social interest. It would not be impossible for those who have mingled freely with many classes of people to point out concrete cases of individuals who have their social natures fully developed but lack to a marked degree the element of altruism. Being too sensitive to specific social requirements may be a source of vice rather than of virtue. Anyone keenly observant of social behavior will recognize the fact that social veracity has not advanced at equal pace with those forms of integrity which we call intellectual, industrial, or even, perhaps, political.

Veracity and necessity

We are again driven to a principle which we have before mentioned to explain man's behavior. Necessity, that is, social necessity in this case, is again invoked to explain the nature and degree of human integrity. To make our meaning clear, man has learned to express his candid opinion in regard to his researches in the realm of science and religion. He generally expresses his conclusions freely, and this is largely because the social order approves of a high standard of intellectual or scientific veracity. Man may present and uphold scientific truths when to uphold political and social truths would be the height of folly. The moral self of the average man will conform to the dictates of the immediate social order. When man is fortunate enough to be able, through his own efforts, to rise above the consensus of public opinion, then and only then will it be possible for veracity to be one and not many. Even the most virtuous life, a life endowed with a high sense of integrity and mellowed with the purest altruism, will generally fail to be equally truthful on all occasions. Business corporations and industrial institutions generally demand a fairly high degree of moral integrity. Perhaps it would be truer to say that society as it is at present constituted requires man to be veracious in his business dealings. This rather high level of business honesty cannot be said to have a strictly moral origin, if we mean by moral origin a sense of honesty springing from moral motives. Honesty is more or less of a necessity in all forms of coöperative and business dealings. This is what is meant by saying that veracity is determined by

necessity. Man in the field of industry often acts in accordance with duty and not from duty.

The standards of political veracity are lower than the standards of industrial veracity. Truth-telling in the interest of politics is less dependable than in business relations. Man's political sense is not morally equivalent to his sense of moral obligation. Society does not require or expect as much moral integrity from the former as from the latter, and the niceties of social etiquette are satisfied with the least semblance of veracity. Society requires man to be clever rather than to be truthful. Thus, man may be an active participant of the social order, — the intellectual, the industrial, the political, and the more formally social, —with a moral sense subject to wide variations. His altruistic tendencies and his sliding sense of moral values may peacefully rest in logic-tight compartments.

After this little excursion into the intricacy of man's moral sense as determined by social necessity we shall now return to our main thesis, the sources of man's active interest in the social welfare. It will be necessary to consider a little more in detail the origin of altruism.

Reason versus altruism

In a previous paragraph of this chapter religious pedagogy was criticized for having failed to inculcate, through precept and maxim, some of the more essential ideals, — practical idealism, altruism, and the brotherhood of man. Some writers on moral and religious themes make altruism not dependent on any instinct but inherent in the nature of the religious consciousness itself, altruism being the essence of religion and not simply the resultant of instinct and of pedagogical instruction. We may mention one such writer. Benjamin Kidd, in his "Social Evolution," seems to make religion the only true source of social progress, and altruism is the one essential factor. This altruism does not spring from a mere instinct. Religion for Kidd is the great evolutionary force making possible human betterment, though this altruistic religious force is itself the resultant of natural selection. Kidd makes the interests of the individual

necessarily antagonistic to the best interests of the social order. Reason is always in the interest of the individual, he tells us, and consequently reason becomes a socially disintegrating force, whereas altruism, the essence of religion, which in itself is ultra-rational, is the one great integrating force. The author of "Social Evolution" would make a rational religion a scientific impossibility. In Kidd's own words: "The interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable."[1] The greatest problem of a progressive society, we are told, is how to retain the beneficial results of both the altruistic and the rationalistic forces. In the history of the race, when the intellectual and rational forces have dominated the altruistic force, natural selection has eliminated the disturbing element. This seems to be about the only way Kidd has of accounting for the development of the altruistic religious consciousness. In analogy with physiology, altruism is likened to anabolism, and reason is identified with katabolism. This author seriously endeavors to make plain that all the good things that social evolution has brought about have been the result of altruism and not of individual reason. Later in this chapter we shall have occasion to compare Kidd's antirationalistic views with other views that emphasize the significance of rationalism.

Contrasting views

It will be of interest to contrast Kidd's view of the relation of the individual to society with that of Spencer. We have seen Spencer depicting an ideal society, in which the rights of the individual may rightly harmonize with the rights of society. Spencer does not seem to imply the belief that any such complete harmony will ever be attained, though there is nothing contradictory in such a conception; it is simply an ideal to be striven for. Kidd, on the other hand, sees no hope of ever reconciling the interests of the individual with the interests of society. These two thinkers also hold irreconcilable views of altruism.

[1] Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution, p. 84.

Both see the significance and value of altruism in the amelioration of the social order. For Kidd, altruism is pure and simple, the essence of religion; but for Spencer, altruism, which is essentially transfigured egoism, though not consciously such, has its origin in anticipated pleasures.

We are not especially interested in contrasting individual and social philosophies, but it is a matter of great concern if it is true that human reason is always directed to the interest of the self. According to this view reason would tend to dry up the springs of altruism rather than to sanction and to encourage them. Any force, rational or otherwise, that may be suspected of encouraging altruistic desiccation must always be looked upon with disfavor. In a future paragraph we shall have some cause to see why reason, if not a true source of altruism, is at least an agent actively serving its interests. Though Spencer may be mistaken in assigning an egoistic basis to the most exalted altruism, he is not at all in error in attributing real significance and value to it. When our interests and powers unfold naturally, he tells us, we seek the gratification of our higher altruistic self and not the lower egoistic tendencies. When one consciously seeks to gratify his lower selfish interests, it is because the higher self has not had a chance to unfold. If this is a true description of the functioning of the normal self, we should be inclined to overlook any attempt to base altruism on a refined egoism. An altruism that functions is the only one worth while.

Double source of satisfaction

Whatever may be the real source of altruism, — whether it is pure and unadulterated or whether it has a purely egoistic basis, — the higher moral values must receive their sanction therein. Unless something akin to altruism is innate in the growing self, it would be rather hard to account for a real moral motive. It is difficult to understand how an external sanction can produce a moral motive. Those who have put morals on the basis of sympathy and pity are not altogether mistaken. Though it is perhaps true that sympathy must not be identified with

altruism, nevertheless sympathy is the chief assistant of altruism. Without sympathy altruism would be rather empty and lifeless. Altruism, however, is a doubly powerful agent working in the interests of the moral self simply because it affords a double source of satisfaction. The consciousness of a social duty performed is reënforced by the consciousness of the resulting happiness of others. In the following paragraph we shall consider one more source of altruism.

Altruism and parental instinct

Our search for the sources of altruism will not be at all complete unless we trace its possible connection with the parental instinct. William McDougall finds no difficulty in tracing altruism to this instinct. He endeavors to distinguish altruism from sympathy, sympathy being ephemeral and passive, whereas altruism from its very nature urges in the direction of service. From the tender feeling or emotion which accompanies the parental instinct springs generosity, gratitude, love, pity, true benevolence, and altruistic conduct. McDougall makes much of the anger evoked when the tender emotion is in any way interfered with. He says: ". . . for the anger evoked in this way is the germ of all moral indignation, and on moral indignation justice and the greater part of public law are in the main founded."[1]

Practical idealism

It is of greater significance to the moralist to be able to trace the moral and social effects of the working of altruism than to be able to locate and describe its possible source or sources. As it is sometimes said, one must distinguish between the roots and the fruits. Civilization has no doubt been rapidly advancing for many decades. Man has almost every convenience at his command. Space has been practically eliminated. Intellectual and moral attainments are free to all who have the desire for them. Little more than effort and persistence are requisite to obtain an education. The whole civilized world has suddenly become one huge neighborhood. Social service is now the order of the day. Some writers (McDougall, for instance) have even suggested that nations might compete with one another to see

[1] William McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 75.

which could be of most service to the weaker peoples of the world; and this form of competition, it is further suggested, might take the place of wars. This is certainly an anticipation of practical idealism on a large scale, but from the very fact that war continues there is unmistakable evidence that the task of altruism is uncompleted. The missionary spirit has permeated large portions of the heathen world, but it would seem as though the honest labors of the missionary had been more quantitative than qualitative in their effect of salvaging humanity.

Missionary influence limited

The missionary may never do more than begin the task of socializing and spiritualizing humanity. There is only one truly continuous source of moral regeneration, and that is the individual himself. The teacher, the preacher, or the missionary must stop when he comes to the boundaries of the self. A moral purpose on the part of the individual is the only true source of human betterment. The individual must have the desire to direct himself, — self-direction. Self-direction, we are told, in order to be successful, demands an ideal, a purpose, and a decision. Moral and religious teachers may urge and beg for goodness, but they are powerless to exact it. The individual contributes what he chooses. The conclusion, then, is that altruism, whatever form it may take, may do much and is doing much to eliminate suffering in various parts of the world; the missionary abroad and the missionary at home are both laboring unselfishly in the interest of erring humanity; but altruism on the part of one individual can do but little to make another morally happy. It can make happiness possible but hardly actual. We are not mistaken when we say that moral happiness, which seems to be the truest source of happiness, must come from within; but this satisfaction which comes from within may well have its source in the consciousness of a service well performed.

Even though the spirit of altruism is pure and simple (and no one can do much to guarantee happiness in others, no matter how eager he may be to bring joy to those who suffer), nevertheless it must not be forgotten that altruism in all its manifesta-

tions is a very genuine source of moral satisfaction. In addition to and beyond the satisfaction and joy issuing from the expansion of the moral self, the altruist finds his highest contentment in ministering to others.

The results arrived at in the preceding paragraph are similar to the conclusions which imply that what happens to us does not appreciably affect us (that is, does not affect us in the sense of changing our inner motives and dispositions or even occasioning any radical change in our attitude toward life), but that a plan or purpose persistently and systematically carried out, either in our own individual interest or in the service of others, may not only alter our inmost motives but may also work radical changes in our philosophy of life. Social service is always directly of advantage to those engaged in it and at best only indirectly of advantage to those to whom it is directed. Moreover, kindly intentioned acts never fail to enlarge the moral self of the one performing the act, whereas the recipient of the act may be only momentarily benefited, even if there is any resultant moral gain at all.

Altruism as self-sacrifice

It may rightly be of some ethical moment to say a few words about a form of altruism which by its very nature is of a higher moral quality than what is usually understood by altruism in the form of social service. Those who are only occasionally, or even those who are regularly, employed in the service of others may not be exercising any appreciable degree of self-sacrifice. George H. Palmer, in his delightful and wholesome little book called "The Nature of Goodness" (p. 58), makes self-sacrifice one of the conditions of personality; the other three conditions of personality are self-consciousness, self-direction, and self-development. Self-sacrifice is considered a higher form of altruism or social service than is common, not because the resulting benefits to society are greater but chiefly because the moral values accruing to the individual who has performed the sacrificial act are appreciably greater. Palmer says: "The man of culture starts with a sense of defect which he seeks to supple-

ment; the sacrificer, with a sense of fullness which he seeks to empty." [1] It is more noble to give than to receive.

Purposes of self-sacrifice

If self-sacrifice is properly made a necessary constituent in the development of personality, there will be good reasons for investigating the true sources of this moral value. Is self-sacrifice based on the assumption that there is no real conflict between individual and social interests? Is there any real moral value in giving to others what I myself possess, or doing for others what I might do for myself? Is there any real moral worth in the mere act of sacrifice? Is it a moral act for me to give up opportunities for the mere sake of making similar opportunities possible for others? Perhaps the real value of sacrifice is to be found in the discipline accruing to the sacrificer. It would be possible to admit that the spirit of sacrifice is the highest expression of altruism, being kindly in its intention and wholly disinterested in its functioning, and still to hold that its chief moral value is not in the fact of its being of service to others but in the further fact that its chief value is to be found not even in the act of giving and doing but in the mental state occasioned and made possible by giving or doing. Of course, the practical and moral value which society as a whole receives from an act of sacrificial social service is often (as it should be) much greater than any intensity of moral value that might accrue to the individual who has gladly sacrificed an interest of his own. For instance, a public benefactor may reap great and deserved moral rewards as the result of his sacrifice or social service, but this would not be proportional to the general social benefits; and yet no other one person save the benefactor himself will reap so rich a moral reward as he.

The chief aim of the giver or doer, of course, is not to reap the benefit himself, though the benefit is morally inevitable, but to make possible the moral personality of others. When altruism and self-sacrifice fail to accomplish this, they have failed in their rational purpose.

[1] George H. Palmer, The Nature of Goodness, p. 174.

Duty to self

A corollary of the thesis set forth in the preceding paragraph may be mentioned. All admit that it is nobler to give than to receive. The real nobility of any act or service must be eventually determined by the results. Giving is more noble than receiving, not simply because it makes possible the happiness of others, but because it ennobles the giver. If giving did not make the giver happy by enlarging his moral self, giving would probably not be considered of greater moral value than receiving. People who are rationally inclined do not continue to sacrifice their immediate interests unless there is some reward, immediate or remote. For some the consciousness of duty performed or services rendered is sufficient. There are possibilities and values which we should be loath to sacrifice even in the interests of those most dear to us. Should an individual with marked intellectual and moral capacities sacrifice the development of these possibilities in order to render service to others? It may seriously be doubted if there is ever a condition so exacting as morally to require any individual with the promise of exceptional ability to sacrifice the development of his personality. It would be hard to compensate for a lost personality. The highest values of life must not be sacrificed to lesser values. It is one's moral and religious duty to develop his personality to the highest possible degree. When this is not possible for each normal individual, then there is something wrong with the social order. Whether or not it is ever possible or even desirable for one to do more than his moral duty may be difficult to determine; nevertheless it is always our bounden duty to develop the moral self.

After this attempt to trace the first origin of altruism, and to evaluate its highest manifestations in terms of social service and self-sacrifice, it may be of no little importance to speak briefly in regard to the dangers of altruism when irrationally sanctioned. A virtuous life is not far separated from a life of vice.

When it comes to the higher educational values and the development of moral integrity, no one can do for us what we have

the privilege of doing for ourselves. We must do our own thinking. A virtuous life cannot be imposed upon us. We may be born in the midst of loving care and altruistic surroundings, but this is not sufficient to guarantee moral success. Real education is largely self-education, and character that is the resultant of even ideal surroundings may be little more than an absorbed or passive goodness. Unmeasured altruism not only may encourage a negative, passive existence but may encourage a life of vice.

Dangers in altruism

Altruism in the form of social service is a sure source of happiness, inasmuch as the doing for others is a source of happiness in itself, and there is the further possibility that others have a better chance for self-realization. Making possible the happiness of others, however, does not necessarily result in the happiness of others. Good intentions are not sufficient to guarantee a life of virtue even in the person whose motives are the purest. Parental affection that finds its purest expression in the love and care of the child, when unduly meted out, not only fails to accomplish its first purpose but may even result in failure and distress for both parent and child. Parents often spoil their children in their honest endeavors to make them normal and happy. Ignorance, as usual, is the chief sin. Parents should love their children; there is no gainsaying the fact that the child who is not the recipient of the tender emotion cannot expect to be happy in adulthood; but while all this holds true, the dangers of unremitting service and unrestrained love on the part of the parent for the child are easily seen. No one loves the feminine man. It is man's moral purpose to become strong and noble. On the other hand, it is no less evident that the child should respect and honor his parents. This much at least is the parents' just due. It is not the child's bounden duty to worship his parents. Hero worship is never a true source of moral strength; neither can it be made the safe foundation for normal manhood and womanhood. When carried to excess, as it will be unless promptly checked, it inevitably leads to unstable emotionalism and other mental

disturbances. Hero worship or any other condition of intense and prolonged adoration is to the developing personality what overspecialization and early specialization are to the educative process. Early specialization is not possible without warping of the mind. More and graver dangers lurk in the warping of the emotions than in the narrowing of the intellect.

Moral effort

The social evils resulting from thoughtless benevolence are usually in evidence. The true object of social service is not the happiness and satisfaction of those engaged in social service (even though the happiness is unalloyed), nor the immediate happiness of those ministered to, but the endeavor to help others to help themselves. When philanthropists and public benefactors fail to accomplish this end, they have failed in all save the immediate satisfaction of their own consciences. If ignorance is usually the chief sin, intelligence and understanding are also the chief virtues. Social service, to be efficient, must work from within and not from without. Unless those who are served are remotivated and enlarged in their ideals, philanthropy becomes not a science but a form of public emotionalism. No one enlarges until he has the desire to enlarge. Effort soon becomes the ready servant of persistent desire. Palmer makes effort the only quality deserving of praise and indicative of moral worth. Intellectual superiority may well be the result of inherited gifts, but moral purpose and honesty can hardly fail to be results of moral effort.

Religious purposes

What is true of social service in the form of public or individual philanthropy is true of that phase of service which is primarily spiritual in purpose. Missionaries long ago found out the futility of merely converting the heathen. Kindness and goodly intentions are not sufficient in the realms of the spirit. In the category of religious experience, as in the more common field of intellectual and moral experience, sentiment and not mere feeling becomes the true foundation upon which the moral and the spiritual are to rest. Religion becomes of value to the heathen only when it takes the form of noble sentiments. To intellec-

tualize religion is not to destroy it, though its essence is not primarily an offspring of the intellect. Intellect never destroys pure religion; it only refines it, organizes it, and puts it to wise and fundamental purposes.

Reason and social welfare

So far in the present chapter two reasons have been presented to explain why man wills social good or social happiness. These two reasons were the religious and the altruistic. Some endeavor was made to trace the origin of altruism, either as the essence of religion, as in the view of Benjamin Kidd, or as having an instinctive origin conformable to the view of William McDougall. Other writers of considerable note have found other possible reasons why man should recognize the desires and really serve the interests of others. Reason may be considered a third source of man's concern for the happiness and welfare of others. This use of the term *reason* is not to be confused with reason in the sense of enlightened self-interest or enlightened egoism, as was advocated by Bain and others.

Reason as source of desire

It is one thing to realize that others are as deserving of happiness as ourselves; it is another thing to have the desire to make others happy; and it is still another thing to institute and carry out a plan to bring about the happiness of others. One may continue to hold that instinct and impulse are the real dynamic sources of belief and action of all kinds, and that reason can only estimate, evaluate, and coördinate such impulses and actions, and still maintain that reason may truly enable a man to see, to desire, and to work for the happiness of others outside and beyond any altruistic and religious motives as such. Reason may be quite largely at the mercy of the stronger passions, as Hume was inclined to believe, and perhaps Comte was not far from the truth when he asserted reason to be at the service of the social sympathies. We may still continue to believe in these half-truths and yet be convinced that reason may be employed to establish a logical basis for the welfare of others, and also to experience an active desire for the happiness of others.

Ideas are emotionalized

When one endeavors to make reason or logic the foundation for altruistic acts, it is not to be inferred that reason in itself can be a true motive in any sense of the term. Reason, however, may result in a motive or desire, and desire may eventuate in a corresponding social act. If feelings become organized to form sentiments around objects and ideas, they may also become organized around the idea or concept of social equality. Surely if reason or logical analysis is sufficient to enable one to see that the rights of one person are just as sacred as the rights of any other, then it is inevitably true that one cannot continue to entertain this idea of social equality without its becoming emotionalized and consequently a dynamic motive power.

Justice as social motive

Any abstract idea or concept may become interesting and develop into a sentiment. Abstract philosophical principles become dynamic mental forces. Ontological conceptions may at first be dry and largely meaningless, but if we continue to think about them, they soon become mental dynamos. The idealist takes delight in contemplating the perfection of the universe, and the materialist cherishes equally the concept of materialism; cosmic sentiments are as real to the philosopher as are the sentiments of friendship in the experiences of the plain man or the ethical sentiments to the man of integrity; surely the rationalized concepts of justice and equality may also become socially motivated. The present writer maintains this to be a fact of human experience. Wherever intellect dwells for a considerable length of time, there motives begin to take root. Perhaps a statement from Palmer will make the principle plain. Palmer is considering the moral values of ethical discussions. He says: "One cannot contemplate long such exalted themes without receiving an impulse, and being lifted into a region where doing wrong becomes a little strange."[1]

A life of extended mental activity may be a real source of emotional desiccation; that is, too great attention to abstract ideas may, through neglect of the natural emotions, cause these

[1] George H. Palmer, Nature of Goodness, p. 9.

very emotions to decrease in intensity. Nevertheless continued attention to an idea, no matter how abstract the idea is in the beginning, will soon cause such an idea to take on acquired active tendencies.

Rational benevolence

Perhaps the most interesting and notable attempt to establish a rational basis for the welfare and happiness of others is Sidgwick's doctrine of rational benevolence. He employs this doctrine as a rational basis for the utilitarian system. A quotation will make the matter clear:

> When, however, the Egoist puts forward, implicitly or explicitly, the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is Good, not only for him but from the point of view of the Universe, as (e.g.) by saying that "nature designed him to seek his own happiness," — it then becomes relevant to point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person.[1]

We are also told that rational benevolence may be considered one of the few intuitions which stand the test of rigorous criticism. This is the "irrefragable intuition" standing as the first principle of utilitarianism. Thus this principle is made to harmonize egoism and altruism. Not only is rational benevolence a self-evident intuition, but justice and prudence are similarly considered. Sidgwick says: "I regard the apprehension, with more or less distinctness, of these abstract truths, as the permanent basis of the common conviction that the fundamental precepts of morality are essentially reasonable." [2]

It will readily be seen that the theory of rational benevolence supplies only the logical basis for the happiness of all. The logical basis of social happiness is not in itself sufficient to motivate a desire to make possible the happiness of others. This, as we have explained in a previous paragraph, is a matter of growth and organization, — a sentiment making social motivation possible and actual, and not a mere matter of cold logic. The

[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 420–421. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company. [2] Ibid. p. 383.

theory of rational benevolence as explained by Sidgwick is not to be identified in its present form with the old Socratic doctrine which says that knowledge is virtue, although we affirm that logically represented moral truths, in being apperceptively assimilated, have a growing tendency to become actuated.

Enlightened self-interest

Even concerning enlightened self-interest Sidgwick has this to say:

> And it seems scarcely extravagant to say that, amid all the profuse waste of the means of happiness which men commit, there is no imprudence more flagrant than that of selfishness in the ordinary sense of the term, — that excessive concentration of attention on the individual's own happiness which renders it impossible for him to feel any strong interest in the pleasure and pains of others. The perpetual prominence of the self that hence results tends to deprive all enjoyments of their keenness and zest, and to produce rapid satiety and ennui; the selfish man misses the sense of elevation and enlargement given by wide interests; he misses the more secure and serene satisfaction that attends continually on activities directed toward ends more stable in prospect than an individual's happiness can be; he misses the peculiar rich sweetness, depending upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy which is always found in services rendered to those whom we love and who are grateful. He is made to feel in a thousand various ways, according to the degree of refinement which his nature has attained, the discord between the rhythms of his own life and of that larger life of which his own is but an insignificant fraction.[1]

If the evils of selfishness and the values of altruism set forth in the preceding paragraph are at all true to actual life, and if the dictates of religion and the impelling forces of altruism and benevolence, or even the logic of cold reason, are in themselves, as is often the case, not sufficient to cause man to be active in the interest of others, it would still be worth while for him to become actively engaged in increasing the sum of human happiness even on the basis of calculated selfishness. This might be cited as an example in which the end justifies the means, — a means which,

[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 500. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

if it is not virtually ignoble, is at least not noble. Perhaps it would be possible to detect the "sense of the ignobility of Egoism" without being wholly ignoble.

The encysted self

Actual observation of human relationships will readily furnish evidence of the fact that one cannot long continue to direct attention to himself without a gradual falling off in actual happiness. The continued growth of the self is of course a prime aim of life, but when attention is too often turned selfward there is a real contraction of personality. The overobserved and overfondled self becomes encircled and encysted, as the biologists would say. Whatever occasions unity and order in the self works in the interest of happiness, but this happiness is never complete until it becomes integral in its functioning with the interests of society.

Mill's proof

Our reasons for upholding or willing the social good or happiness would not be at all complete without Mill's proof for utilitarianism. He says:

> The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, the happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.[1]

Little needs to be said concerning Mill's so-called proof of utilitarianism. Surely, if each and every man desires his own happiness, a good reason has been presented why everyone should desire the happiness of others, but no logical reason

[1] J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 52–53.

can be detected in Mill's empirical proof which makes such a desire an irrefutable fact. Man does not desire the happiness of others simply because he knows that all others individually desire it for themselves. Of course, the desired is not necessarily the desirable. Although Mill has failed to furnish us an infallible proof for utilitarianism, nevertheless it is a principle that has worked. Opponents of utilitarianism have even admitted the practical if not the logical efficacy of the doctrine as upheld by its greatest exponents, Bentham and Mill. The happiness doctrine has been a real agency by which happiness has been made more universal. In this respect the guardians of virtue have been no more successful than the guardians of happiness.

Altruism and the self-regarding sentiment

A most interesting account of the process by which an individual may be led to take a semialtruistic interest in others is to be found in McDougall's account of the extension of the so-called self-regarding sentiment to widening social groups. The self-regarding sentiment, we are told, is the resultant of the normal organization and socialization of the positive and negative self feelings. When this sentiment, after it is properly moralized through the influences of fear and active sympathy, becomes extended to the family, the school, the state, etc., there is made manifest in the interest of these groups a semialtruistic feeling. This form of altruism, as one may readily see, does not differ essentially from enlightened selfishness. This fact, however, does not militate against its importance. In McDougall's own words we read:

> The parental sentiment, we said, is apt to be not only a tender sentiment of love for the child, but to be complicated by an extension of the self-regarding sentiment to him and to all that pertains to him, owing to the parent's intellectual identification of the child with himself.[1]

This means that if a man has a proper respect and regard for himself, he will have a proper respect and regard for his family. Also we read:

[1] William McDougall, Social Psychology, pp. 211–212.

But the child is by no means the only object to which the self-regarding sentiment may be, and very commonly is, extended, especially in men in whom the sympathetic tendency and the gregarious instinct are strong.

This form of altruism may be intense enough in its manifestations to make genuine self-sacrifice work in the interest of the groups to which the sentiment has been extended. In the service of moral equipment the author says:

> These quasi-altruistic extensions of the egoistic sentiment constitute a very important part of the moral equipment of the individual; for they lead to the subjection of immediate personal ends in the service of social coöperation undertaken to secure the collected ends that individual action is powerless to achieve. They enrich our emotional life and raise our emotions and conduct to an over-individual plane.[1]

Patriotism

In a later work McDougall makes further extensions of the self-regarding sentiments to what is called the national self-consciousness or national sentiment. He says:

> This national sentiment, which, if we use the word in its widest sense, may be called patriotism, is, like all other group sentiments, developed by way of extension of the self-regarding sentiment of the individual to the group, and may be further complicated and strengthened by the inclusion of other tendencies.[2]

The implication is that patriotism is in its very essence the extension of the individual's self-regarding sentiment which has its choicest beginning in the family, the first agency in the ideal development of the self-regarding sentiment, and the true beginning of that mental process which should eventuate in true patriotism, or national self-consciousness, or even in an all-embracing interest in the welfare of humanity.

Résumé of social schemes

We may now turn our attention from those schemes which may be considered more or less individualistic in their inception, — schemes that have been worked out by the insight and

[1] William McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 214.
[2] William McDougall, The Group Mind, p. 225.

genius of social philosophers, including the empirical proofs of Mill, the rational benevolence of Sidgwick, the altruism which is the purely religious product as emphasized by Benjamin Kidd, or the altruism which, according to McDougall, results from the tender emotion of the parental instinct, or even the last-mentioned scheme for the expansion of the sentiment of self-respect.

We do not need, however, to depend upon the theoretical schemes devised by social philosophers whose formulations are principally found in treatises on ethics and the social sciences, and whose contents are largely esoteric so far as the general public is concerned. If the almost unlimited number of schemes and plans more or less clearly before the public today for the benefit of society at large are to be appreciably successful in the amelioration of social conditions, it is probable that they must function on the foundation of the social philosophies already mentioned and summarized in the previous paragraph. No plan for social amelioration can well dispense with altruism, whatever may be its source or sources. Perhaps wisdom is the true mother of all the individual and social virtues. McDougall makes the enrichment of the national self-consciousness the great factor in furthering the progress of mankind.

Knowledge and social service

Outside and beyond mere logic and reason as such, and beyond the fact that normal persons desire and should desire happiness, there is no greater source of acquired interest in others than the mere knowledge of others. So long as man is unconscious of his own ignorance he has no interest in striving to attain knowledge. The sense of ignorance is the true beginning of self-education. Knowledge, in whatever direction it may lead, is always a source of interest. To be thoroughly acquainted with man is to be more or less in sympathy with him. Various religious organizations find it to their advantage to become acquainted with the nature and practices of heathen and semicivilized peoples through the medium of mission-study classes. Knowledge seems to intensify the missionary zeal for service. G. Stanley Hall says: "To know

the savage is to love him." He who has the patience to analyze carefully the motives of his enemy has gone a long way toward substituting the emotion of amity for the emotion of enmity. Apropos of the subject before us Cooley says: "One who entertains the thought and feeling of others can hardly refuse them justice; he has made them a part of himself." [1]

Neighbors without neighborliness

Men who are not neighbors may continue to live happily, though they are ignorant of one another's ideas and motives. The same may hold true of nations so long as there is no intercourse between them, industrial or otherwise. All this, however, is changed just as soon as they begin to come into contact with each other. To give a concrete illustration of this principle: The present civilized world has suddenly become one vast neighborhood without the establishment of the fundamental principles of neighborliness. The genius of man has succeeded in annihilating distance but has failed to actuate the principles of brotherly love. Nations as well as individuals have found themselves in close communication with one another. War and strife have become almost inevitable for the very reason that there is little understanding of one another's motives and ideals. Strife and animosity existing between individuals and between nations does not mean that worthy ideas and ideals are altogether lacking on either side, but that such motives and ideals are not mutually appreciated and understood. We do not appreciate what we do not understand, and we cannot appreciate the people whose ideas are wholly foreign to our own.

Appreciation and attainment

Understanding is always a source of appreciation. Of course, we may appreciate what we do not enjoy, and likewise we may enjoy without appreciation. It is possible to appreciate a musical selection without enjoying it, or we may take more or less pleasure in a kind of poetry that we cannot appreciate. We may appreciate an abstract system of philosophy. Ability to appreciate is an index of attainment along any line of intellectual, moral, or spiritual endeavor.

[1] C. H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 366.

If appreciation is largely a matter of understanding and intelligence, it is likewise true that appreciation is a kind of sympathy, — not, of course, sympathy in the ordinary sense of the term, but sympathy in the sense of an appreciative understanding, an intellectual interest. This may be said to be the highest type of sympathy; it is the kind of sympathy that is most subject to the molding influence of formal education. This special form of sympathy, as is the case with the lower aspects of sympathy, has its possible vices as well as its actual virtues. When overemphasized it may become an example of intellectual sordidness, — overintellectuality, — but its value or virtue when properly applied to an understanding of men becomes the first true source of the love of humanity.

Community of interests

This principle seems to be universal in its application. Wherever there is mutual understanding the possibilities of friendship are increased. This is true not only where individuals and peoples understand each other but also where individuals have common interests. Why does a scientist delight to be in the presence of a group of scientists? People having the same objective interests are more or less sympathetic with one another. There is something in common, and this something is a real source of sympathy and abiding friendship. People of the same age are usually more sympathetic for the very reason that they are more apt to entertain similar ideas and motives. No one can appreciate and sympathize with the ideals of the adolescent quite as well as an adolescent with similar ideals. This is the age for the development of lasting friendships, because sympathy for others of the same age is most manifest. Ideals search out their like.

Unity seems to be the most universal condition requisite for human existence. All the sciences point in the direction of unity. Coöperation is made possible by unity. Every constructive thought process leads in the direction of mental unity. The moral and virtuous character, as Palmer says, is the whole character and is not fragmentary. Happiness is not possible

without unity, — mental unity as well as individual and social unity. One of the main theses of the present chapter is that community of understanding is one of the conditions requisite for making possible a universal interest in social or human welfare.

The sympathetic teacher

Perhaps we may be privileged to make a brief excursion into the field of pedagogy. No attribute of the teacher is to be more highly praised than that of sympathy, — not the kind of sympathy that makes the life of the pupil a life of ease, or gives rise to soft pedagogy, but the kind that is based on understanding. The truly sympathetic teacher is the teacher who appreciates the intellectual, moral, and spiritual struggle of the pupil. The teacher is in sympathetic *rapport* with the pupil in so far as he vividly recalls his own mental struggles. This is sympathy par excellence. The sympathetic teacher is sympathetic not merely because he is in close touch with the living problems of the pupil and has a sympathetic appreciation of his struggles and difficulties; he is also sympathetic in the sense of being an intellectual companion. It is the climax of satisfaction on the part of the sympathetic teacher to impart to the pupil that which the teacher has already attained. As naturally as water seeks its level the live teacher's reservoir of knowledge tends to flow into the recipient minds of his pupils. As giving to the poor and the worthy is a real source of satisfaction in the life of the benevolent, so the sharing of ideals and ideas between teacher and pupil is the acme of tutorial satisfaction, and becomes a real source of intellectual benevolence.

The principle of mental unity or harmony, understanding or community of intelligence, which we have made serious use of in endeavoring to establish a stable and enduring basis for an interest in the welfare of others, has also been employed to explain other social phenomena. Our purpose has been to show that understanding not only gives one an interest in the welfare of others, near or remote, but, what is more, takes active steps toward improving the welfare and happiness of others. Interest and kindly intentions are not enough to bring about the

amelioration of the human lot. In this respect mutuality and reciprocity of understanding should serve as the advance guard of a more humanistic and worthy civilization.

Belief and human nature

An interesting example of the general thesis which is here maintained is to be found in the writings of William James. Here Professor James is endeavoring to make clear the idea that no philosophy or theory will be universally acceptable which does not provide for those ultimate values most congenial to our natural emotional tendencies. Pessimism, fatalism, materialism, etc. cannot be universally believed, simply because they do not provide for those values — God, freedom, and immortality — in which man is prone to believe. James says:

> If we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great periods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we shall find, I think, simply this: that each and all of them have said to the human being, "The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers which you possess." [1]

Great leaders have been successful because they have appealed to that which is common to all. We find ready examples of this principle in the functioning of public opinion. At the right psychological moment a person of marked ability, whether he be educator, politician, or theologian, by registering his appeal in harmony with public sentiment may be able to direct and control the beliefs and policies of a nation. A law not sanctioned by public sentiment is seldom enforced. It may be truly said that the Christian religion has been successful so far as it has consistently made its appeal to that which is common to the experiences of all, — love, — which has its possibilities rooted in human nature, irrespective of creeds and dogmas; but, on the other hand, we may as truly affirm that the growing failures of Christianity are due to the fact that it has made and is continuing to make its appeal to beliefs and dogmas which find no common biological background in the experiences of man.

[1] William James, Psychology, Advanced Course, Vol. II, p. 314.

This criticism is not directed against the essential theses of the Christian religion as upheld by its founder, but it is directed against those who stubbornly persist in upholding forms of belief not essential to the vitality of Christian living. Theologians, ministers, religious teachers, and others whose business it is to uphold the authority of creeds and doctrines have no moral right to demand beliefs and practices not consistent with modern intelligence. Religion, to be truly successful, must satisfy the intellect as well as the will and the feelings.

We may now return to the subject with which this chapter is chiefly concerned. Little more needs to be said, however, in regard to man's interest in social welfare. All forces tending to uphold the principles of democracy are of course tendencies directed in the interest of social welfare. Various existing social organizations today — religious, political, moral, as well as an equal number of social and political philosophies — are working in the interests of man. For instance, the Red Cross is a humanitarian institution functioning in the interest of human welfare. The efficacy of this national crusade against unnecessary human suffering is not based primarily on man's natural sense of pity or sympathy, but is more the result of the self-conscious realization that all men are brothers. This is perhaps another example of that kind of sympathy which results from picturing in imagination man's right to life and the pursuit of happiness. A little honest self-consciousness, a little sympathetic reflection, would be sufficient to clear man's soul of gross selfishness; and he who possesses a sufficient degree of honesty to think consecutively on justice, integrity, honor, duty, and the rest cannot help becoming more just, more truthful, and even more actively altruistic.

Virtue and moral analysis

In the whole catalogue of human morals not a single virtue may be found refusing to lend itself to the interest of honest reflection. Reflection may not be the taproot of the individual and social virtues, but surely no other form of mental experience is so influential in promoting their growth. Mental dishonesty,

the enemy of all virtues, flees in haste when brought into the presence of honest moral analysis.

Those who have given more than a passing attention to such world schemes as the League of Nations are well aware that the growing interest in the welfare of peoples lies at their very foundation. All plans and schemes for the prevention of major human conflicts such as industrial disturbances and wars have their inception in a growing sense of humanity. It is only when human nature has failed to realize its best opportunities that man engages in the "war of all against all."

Indirect humanization

Although conceived in the interest of humanity, it is evident enough to all who meditate concerning world problems that the League of Nations, world courts, Hague tribunals, peace conferences, and similarly constituted humanitarian agencies can never, as such, eliminate man's tendency to resort to war. Not until man seeks more earnestly a higher standard of moral integrity will wars cease to be waged. Nationally established agencies like those just mentioned are valuable in molding public conscience in the interest of their intended purposes. In a true sense the mind of a nation, as well as the mind of an individual, grows in the direction in which it is exercised. It is not enough that national conflicts should cease; it is not enough that man should simply live his life in accordance with peaceful relations; if the world is to be "safe for democracy," man must desire, and take pleasure in living, a life of virtue.

Perhaps never before in the history of the world have so many and various humanizing forces been at work to bring about the betterment of mankind. Justice, equality before the law, equal opportunity, universal education, altruistic forces applying their remedies in a score of directions, cosmopolitanism, ultrademocracy, universal ethics, and an unlimited number of similar agencies are all supposedly working in the interests of an all-embracing humanity.

Evils of ultra-democracy

It is interesting to note that this tendency in the direction of ultrademocracy and equal privileges to all — this extension of

the scope and range of democracy to include all mankind, where racial lines are no longer to be drawn, where one man's vote is as good as another, where education is a leveling process rather than a differentiating process — is, in the view of some influential writers, not the true source of human betterment but rather the inevitable beginning of race deterioration. Instead of functioning in the interests of altruism such practices would result in racial deterioration. Concerning the results of universal ethics — ultrademocracy (the unlimited mixing and reproduction of peoples with inferior intellectual and moral capacities) — McDougall has this to say:

> The prevalence of this state of affairs throughout a brief period would suffice to destroy all the institutions, undermine all the traditions, and degrade all the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic standards of our civilization.[1]

[1] Ethics and Some Modern World Problems, pp. 146–147.

CHAPTER VII

THE SELF AS SOCIALLY REALIZED: SOCIAL FORCES AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Purpose of present chapter

The present chapter is only a continuation of the subject matter of the last chapter. Two fundamental topics were discussed in the last chapter: first, the reasons for considering man a social being; secondly, the reasons for his constructive participations in various social organizations — the sources of his interest in social betterment. In the present chapter our interest will center about two important matters of much interest to the moral self. In this chapter, as in all the rest, the development of the moral personality, or self, will be the foremost consideration. Here the social forces which mold the moral self will be emphasized. The first part of the chapter will have to do with the social-psychological forces, or the so-called forms of mental interaction; the second part of the chapter will analyze in considerable detail the various contributions of the chief social institutions to the moral self. Under the heading of the social-psychological forces we shall suggest briefly the moral contributions of sympathy, imitation, and suggestion.

No attempt will be made to give an exhaustive account of these three psychic agencies. For instance, just enough will be said to show how sympathy, when properly directed and developed, may contribute to the interest of a virtuous life. Of no less significance for our analysis will be the possible vices developing out of sympathetic behavior. From the very fact that sympathy, imitation, and suggestion are fundamental in human behavior and are the chief agencies by which society in its various manifestations impresses its forms of feeling, action, and thought upon individuals, it is to be expected that these

forms of interaction are as likely to be carriers of vice as of virtue. In this respect we are not mistaken. Although the world could ill dispense with sympathy as it ordinarily manifests itself, nevertheless there is no other form of mental experience so destructive to mental integrity as to be oversensitive to the sufferings of others. The oversympathetic, instead of being society's best friend, may be its worst enemy.

Kinds of sympathy

For clearness of exposition we may conveniently discuss the subject of sympathy from four points of view. Perhaps it will not be departing too far from ordinary usage to mention four kinds of sympathy, namely, primitive sympathy, natural sympathy, active sympathy, and intellectual, or creative, sympathy. It is to be readily understood that there is no sharp line of cleavage between any two of the kinds mentioned. We shall first analyze primitive sympathy by pointing out its possible contributions to the moral self in terms of virtues and vices.

Primitive sympathy

We may adopt the expression *primitive sympathy* not only because it is a term in common use but because it seems to be most universal in its functioning, both in man and in animals. Primitive sympathy, which is a form of imitation, is that tendency on the part of any normal member of a gregarious species to act in conformity with its group. Primitive sympathy, of course, may include the induction of feeling, such as anger and fear, as well as forms of action or behavior. In this chapter we are not especially interested in any scientific explanation of so-called primitive sympathy; we are simply interested in its functioning. It may be well, however, to note that this kind of sympathy is especially conspicuous in gregarious creatures.

Primitive, or passive, sympathy seems to be quite as extensive in scope as the instincts themselves. This means that one may react, though unconsciously, in conformity with any instinctive behavior, this also being more or less true of all the more intense emotions and feelings. This species of sympathetic activity is rightfully considered passive from its very nature. Actions and feelings induced from without rather than initiated

from within are of necessity short-lived. This is a principle of considerable significance to the practical moralist. He who would practice the art of virtue in mere conformity with a like practice in others cannot be judged substantially virtuous. A virtuous life not properly motivated and actuated is likely to be ephemeral. Although crime waves may have a real existence and may be in a sense attributed to the forces of sympathetic imitation, the most heinous crimes are those that are self-initiated and premeditated. But mere conformity to an act, a feeling, a virtue, or a vice, no matter how passive each may be in its inception, will in time be sufficient to establish a motive. Before taking up the subject of motivation in its relation to primitive sympathy it will be well to offer a few concrete examples of primitive sympathy.

Primitive sympathy on instinctive plane

Passing over numerous examples of passive, or primitive, sympathy in the animal world, we may mention a few typical cases in human behavior. It is no uncommon occurrence that when one child in a group of children begins to weep, all the children of the same age have a tendency to weep. It is almost impossible for a normal person to hear angry words directed to another without himself becoming angry. We express the same truth when we say that feeling and action are contagious. Perhaps many phenomena connected with mob behavior may be similarly explained. The purpose of sympathetic reaction seems to be to bring about unity of action and feeling. This is the reason why this form of behavior is so conspicuous in gregarious creatures.

Necessity of primitive sympathy

It is only when we come in contact with imitative reaction to group behavior and feeling on the planes of belief and ideation that the phenomena which we are describing become of significance in the development of intellectual and moral personality. It has been necessary in historic development that each individual conform to group behavior, and harmony of action has been accompanied by oneness of group feeling and sentiment. All this has been necessary and still remains more or less imperative if a great degree of social coöperation and harmony are

to be realized. Also one is not unmindful of the fact that the group should to a moderate degree continue to determine what we are to believe and to do. A stage may be reached, however, in which primitive imitation becomes inimical to intellectual and moral progress. This stage has long since been reached.

If there is more or less of a tendency for individuals to accept unconsciously, and to entertain and carry out, the feelings and actions of others, and especially if such actions and feelings are perceived in connection with group behavior, there is every reason to believe that such phenomena are somehow connected with the gregarious instinct. The gregarious instinct is the instrument by which individuals of a species find satisfaction in each other's presence; and if individuals find the presence of others the source of real satisfaction, and if group life is necessary for coöperation in various enterprises and necessary for mutual protection in times of danger, some means must have been devised to make possible group harmony and unity. This is the function of primitive sympathy which we have been describing.

Vices and virtues

In connection with the tendencies of individuals to copy from group life it may be of some interest to analyze the actual sources of vice and virtue resulting from social sensitiveness. To be oversensitive to the dictates of the group to which we may belong, or to be too prone to hearken to public opinion, is a real evil; it is not only an evil in the sense of being a source of hypocrisy, as well as a highway to nervous disorders, but, what is more, sensitiveness to public opinion, when carried too far, inevitably steals away our personality. If these rather unpleasant features have their origin in being oversensitive to social sanctions, it is no less true that a normal degree of sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval is a condition par excellence for the inculcation of the social virtues.

Herd suggestion and morality

No modern writer has given us a clearer insight into the relations of the individual mind to the group mind than has Trotter. He says:

Reason cannot enforce belief against herd suggestion, and, finally, . . . totally false opinions may appear to the holder of them to possess all the characters of rationally verifiable truth, and may be justified by secondary processes of rationalization which it may be impossible directly to combat by argument.[1]

Trotter goes on to say:

The only medium in which man's mind can function satisfactorily is the herd, which therefore is not only the source of his opinions, his credulities, his disbeliefs, and his weaknesses, but of his altruism, his charity, his enthusiasms, and his power.[2]

Trotter would have us believe that man is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence. Herd suggestion is the source of truths of primary certitude, truths that we really feel and appreciate, whereas reason can only be the source of truths of secondary rank, truths that we do not actually feel. In conformity with this general point of view we find Tansley saying: "The whole system of morality and the moral law are the direct outcome of herd organization, and the felt obligation to obey the moral law is a direct expression of the herd instinct."[3]

Moral possibilities

Perhaps it will be possible to summarize these various statements from recognized authorities in regard to the all-powerful influence of the so-called gregarious instinct, herd suggestion, or public sentiment, resulting in a form of behavior or feeling which may be called primitive sympathy, by saying that one may become abnormally sensitive to the dictates of public opinion. In the hands of the unscrupulous one may come to play the rôle of the hypocrite, whereas under wholesome social influence one will be normally guided toward truth, well-established belief, and a moral career, though at the same time constantly subject to the various degrees of veracity which the numerous social levels provide. This means that any normally sensitive person living under varying degrees of herd suggestion may become abnormally sensitive to social suggestion, a hypocrite, or an exponent

[1] Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 39.
[2] Ibid. p. 42. [3] The New Psychology, p. 223.

of truth and moral integrity, and at the same time entertain as many degrees of veracity as the social calendar may provide.

Natural sympathy

After tracing some of the more conspicuous influences of group behavior upon the beliefs and mental integrity of the individual in terms of the so-called primitive sympathy, which is essentially a form of imitation or suggestion in disguise, we may briefly discuss what is ordinarily called natural sympathy. By natural sympathy is understood what psychologists ordinarily understand when they employ the word *sympathy* — the induction of a feeling. No one needs to misunderstand the meaning of natural sympathy. It is not our purpose to account for the existence of sympathy, whether we say that it is instinctive, as some of the older psychologists (James and Baldwin, for instance) stoutly maintained, or whether, with McDougall, we deny that it has the status of a real instinct.

Our one and only aim is to trace the significance of natural sympathy in the development of the moral self. This is the one theme which we do not wish to lose sight of. Many of the older philosophers and psychologists have seen fit to make capital out of sympathy. It is also true that psychologists and thinkers of the past have included in the category of sympathy mental qualities which today would be classed as altruistic and not as sympathetic. Students of the social sciences are well aware of the large place occupied by sympathy in explaining moral concepts. Adam Smith, in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," gives sympathy a large place in the founding of moral character. Hume seems to be not unmindful of sympathy. Spencer makes sympathy a moral deterrent from crime, and for Schopenhauer compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct. Concerning it he says: "And this compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, is an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions, conceptions, religions, myths, training, and education."[1] Compassion is inborn.

[1] The Basis of Morality, p. 177. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

Natural sympathy is undoubtedly a constituent element in social amelioration. Although sympathy is purely egoistic in its origin, this lowly origin is not sufficient to deny its worth as a humanitarian agency. No one would think of denying significance to self-respect, though the self-regarding attitude is a sentiment in the interest of the self. The man who fails to respect himself will probably be unable to respect others.

Respect for self and others

Sympathy in the ordinary sense of the term, like other good qualities of human nature, is subject to its vices and abnormalities. It may easily become perverted into sentimentalism and emotionalism. Sensitive people who indulge too freely in a kind of literature that elicits feeling and emotion readily become sentimentalists. Novels, love stories, sex themes, records of crime and excitement, are all select themes upon which the emotionalists are wont to feast the feelings. How prone are the young women of our schools and colleges to avail themselves of the opportunity to attend lectures for "women only"! Sound and accurate information, when it is psychologically needed, harms no one, but information elicited in the service of emotion and forgotten with the cooling of emotion disintegrates character. Feeling and emotion not in the service of fundamental purposes is never constructive. Passive sympathy is a sign of mental decay. But, on the other hand, sympathy, even though it be rightly separated from altruism, is one of the greatest contributors to the upbuilding of the individual moral self, and an important agency in the soothing of the ills of others.

Sympathy and sentimentality

A third kind of sympathy indicated in the early part of the present chapter needs but a word of exemplification. It is more truly an aspect of ordinary sympathy than any special variety. Active sympathy is the conscious sharing of feelings and emotions. Active sympathy may be truly constructive of good when solicited for the purpose of sharing our happiness with others, but it may become equally destructive of the welfare of others when solicited for the purpose of sharing our pains and distresses. It may be a sign of nobility in the artist when he bids

Active sympathy: virtues and vices

us share with him the beauties of his art, but it suddenly detracts from the glories of his greatness when we are required to sympathize with his misfortunes. We may justly enjoy the saintliness of the saint without being able to appreciate the demands of sainthood. Active sympathy demands for its fullness of expression an ever-present series of centrifugal and centripetal forces, happiness and sorrow, pleasure and pain, the giving and taking of that which is best and worst in human nature. Such, for instance, is the nature of the trafficking of the human feelings, the example par excellence of the reciprocity of human emotions. If it were at all possible to find terms suitable to express the perversions of active sympathy, perhaps no words would be more fitting than *vanity* and *self-ingratiation*. Vanity is not a necessary correlative of active sympathy, but seems to be the inevitable quality of those who, while they are greatly pleased to share their satisfaction, are also no less solicitous of sympathy from others. The givers and buyers of sympathy are prone to ingratiate themselves; this is the conscious endeavor to prejudice others in their favor. It is only when active sympathy becomes unbalanced that it longs to shine by its own light.

The teacher and active sympathy

Not only may virtue be its own reward, but active sympathy also may become its own reward. It is not in the field of the plastic arts, but in the field of a higher art, that active sympathy becomes its own reward. The teacher is not a solicitor of sympathy, but he is a true giver of sympathy. Active sympathy is the most highly prized quality of the live teacher. The true teacher is the true artist. His happiness resides only in its possibilities of being shared and it takes the form of intellectual companionship. His thoughts, his ideals, his intellectual and moral discoveries become true sources of happiness only on the basis of mutual appreciation between pupil and self. The mutual sharing of mind is the highest form of satisfaction. If a phrase could be formulated that would most accurately define the noblest active sympathy of the teacher-artist, perhaps none

better could be found than "the process that leads to actualization of intellectual and moral appreciation."

Only a few words need be said in behalf of a fourth kind of sympathy, namely, intellectual, or creative, sympathy. This kind of sympathy was sufficiently enlarged upon in the last chapter in our endeavor to summarize the various sources of social amelioration. We said that intelligence, or understanding, is a true and fruitful source of social unity and harmony — a kind of acquired sympathy, a source of neighborliness.

Intellectual sympathy

In using the term *sympathy* as the emotional reaction to understanding and intelligence, whether it be the sympathetic appreciation of peoples, based on an insight into their manners, customs, and dominant ways of thinking, or whether it be an emotional appreciation of some scientific subject matter, a poem, an ethical theory, or a system of philosophy, it must be strictly understood that in all such cases we are using the term *sympathy* in the sense of intellectual appreciation, which, however, when applied to peoples, may function on a higher plane of social service than any expression of natural sympathy. It may be considered a wrong use of language to say that a clear understanding of a scientific law or an adequate insight into an ethical theory may develop a sympathetic attitude for such a law or theory. If it is no misuse of language to say that we admire a noble and worthy character, a piece of art, a beautiful landscape, or even the architecture of the universe, surely we may be permitted to develop a sympathetic attitude toward any object of human investigation. We lend our effort to maintain the integrity of that in the animal and human species for which we feel sympathy; likewise we should be permitted to express sympathy for, and to endeavor to uphold and to keep intact, any object or fact or theory, whether it be the freedom of the will, the law of evolution, or a scientific demonstration of the future life. This is not sympathy in the ordinary sense of the term, but it is a kind of sympathy that is as significant

in the experience and mental economy of the scholar and the scientist as is the mellowing sympathy of the social worker.

Vices of intellectual sympathy

One thing more should be said in concluding our discussion of intellectual sympathy. This, like the other forms of sympathy, has its vices and its virtues. If we may be permitted to use the term *vice* in connection with a derived feeling based on mental acquisition, perhaps no better expression could be found than *overintellectuality* or even *intellectual sordidness*. One becomes all "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Intellectual sordidness takes the place of natural insight. Acquired feeling which has been termed sympathy takes the place of natural emotion. This kind of knowledge can hardly fulfill the Socratic requirement for virtue, and the resulting feeling may lack the essence of spontaneity and freshness. Perhaps Schopenhauer was not altogether mistaken when he claimed that compassion is born in us, not subject to change, not amenable to education. But the virtues and values accompanying acquired appreciation far surpass the possibilities of its vices. Its values linger, and we are continually beckoned on to higher orders of appreciation. The thoughts of the scientist are among his loved ones; for them he entertains and cherishes the fondest hopes.

Love of humanity

Our ability to appreciate is not lessened when entering the field of social relationships. Knowledge and insight into the ways and thoughts of strange peoples, as we have before noted, is the shortest and surest avenue to an everlasting sympathy and real appreciation. If we are to search for the choicest virtue that is concerned with the world as a whole, functioning on a plane proportioned to the extent of the social order and to one's insight into this order and into the nature of the peoples living in it, such a virtue can be none other, in essence at least, than the love of humanity. This love of humanity is not a form of love or sympathy whose extent is inversely proportional to its intensity, but a form of feeling or appreciation for mankind that is directly proportional in intensity and extent to the width and intensity of our knowledge and insight into the kinds and races of men.

Aim of discussion

After having considered the contributions of sympathy to the moral self in terms of virtues and vices, we shall now turn to the second social psychological force, namely, imitation. Much of what was discussed under sympathy might apply equally well to imitation. If ordinary sympathy is an induction of feeling, imitation is an induction of action. Both are means of attaining harmony and coöperation between individuals. As in analyzing sympathy our aim was to point out the contributions of sympathy to moral character, so now our chief purpose will be to point out the values of imitation to character and the moral self.

The subject of imitation has been interestingly treated by Baldwin, Tarde, McDougall, and many others. Baldwin, in "Mental Development in the Child and the Race," has given a good account of how the individual becomes adjusted to the requirements of society, imitation being an important factor in the process. Tarde, in "The Laws of Imitation," has given the world a more elaborate and perhaps a more brilliant account of imitation, emphasizing the significance of imitation in the social and political spheres. McDougall, in his book "Social Psychology," chap. xv, has given brief accounts of "Imitation as a Conservative Agency" and "Imitation as an Agency of Progress." Under the heading "Imitation as a Conservative Agency," McDougall says: "It is a general law of Imitation that modes of doing persist more obstinately than modes of thinking and feeling."[1] This statement is meant to imply that many practices of an earlier civilization continue to persist when the reasons for these practices have long since faded. Our present-day initiation ceremonies may be mentioned as cases in point.

Questions considered

It would indeed be difficult to make any valid comparison of the moral values of imitation with the moral values of sympathy, that is, a comparison of the respective contributions of these two forms of mental interaction to moral character. Many possibilities would need to be taken into account. It would be necessary to consider the fact that forms of action continue beyond the

[1] Social Psychology, pp. 338–339.

ideas and feelings initiating action. It would be equally necessary to make note of the priority of action to feeling; also as to whether feeling or action lies closer to the moral self. Which is more conducive to the establishment of moral judgment, the continuity of moral feeling or the continuity of moral action? Is man normally so constituted as to be more sensitive to human actions manifest in his immediate environment than to perceived feelings, or is the reverse true?

It will be of some moral value to compare the respective contributions of sympathy and imitation to the development of moral conceptions, although the complexities of the factors involved may be such as to preclude any definite answer as to which is of greater moral service.

Futility of imitative forms

We are told that imitation is not only an agency of progress but also a conservative agency. We see this in the tendency of actions to outlive the ideas and purposes initiating action, not only in connection with many practices in formal society but also in the more specific religious formalism. Many religious forms and creeds functioning verbally or otherwise are of the kind of action that has essentially outlived the pulsating ideas and feelings for which religious actions were initiated. Living meanings have been converted into symbols almost devoid of content. Meanings may continue to exist in the minds of the most devout, but in the minds of the great majority only the bare practices live on. Here we are chiefly interested in showing that these bare practices, which are really continued through imitation, are of very little value in the inculcation of morals. Men are not appreciably good on account of their formal practices; they are constructively moral on account of the early inculcation of moral ideals and purposes and the gradually rationalized ideal to live a life in accordance with the good. This must not be construed as an argument derogatory to the practical theses of religion; it is simply a bit of evidence to show that without the presence of true religious motives the continued practice of religious forms is not sufficient to mold character.

Even at its very best the imitation of worthy practices is no more than a moral scaffolding by means of which real, purposeful motives may get in their work. A person may well obey all the formal standards of the social, political, and religious orders and still be essentially evil at heart. Our conclusion so far would seem to be that the mere fact that the imitation of forms of action continues longer than the ideas and feelings originally initiating such forms does not necessarily mean that the imitation of action is a greater factor than sympathy in the inculcation of moral character.

Priority of action or of feeling

Some interest may attach to the problem as to the priority of action or of feeling. It would probably be worse than useless to attempt to determine the priority of action or of feeling. Whatever may be the origin of feeling, and whatever may be the true origin of action, the fact seems to remain that wherever we find action we find feeling. The one seems to follow the other just as inevitably as effect follows cause. Both are certainly important in the processes of initiating character, but neither in itself is sufficient to sustain or to develop a high degree of moral integrity.

Moral determination

So long as character remains on the feeling and action plane of maturity there is only immaturity. A good deed not seasoned with feeling is rather thin and lifeless, and the best of motives not issuing in worthy acts do not speak well for the motives. Feeling and action are necessary, but as long as the moral self is constituted of only feeling and action it will perpetually demand corroboration and will always be in grave danger of falling. Sinister forces will always be at work. All this means that community of action and feeling, imitation and sympathy, though moralizing forces, are not sufficient to round out character. Only moral determination can lift one above the medium of his social environment and put character beyond the reach of sinister influences. Only the morally determined character can stand alone. We do not need to make further comparison of sympathetic feeling and imitative behavior in ethical development. It is perhaps worthy of note that the moralist no less

than the artist must first sympathize with that which is worthy of imitation in order to make imitation of constructive value. Imitation makes possible the stage of moral creativeness, but mere imitation of others, no matter how worthy the example imitated, is not a creative moral act. It is well to imitate the ideals of some worthy character, but, exemplary as the practice may be, it is not an example of moral creativeness. The social order today needs moral creativeness.

Interest and imitation

Only a few more words need be said in regard to imitation contributing to moral welfare. It is not our province to put imitation on an instinctive basis or even to refuse to make imitation an instinct. Modern writers, however, like Dewey and McDougall, deny the existence of an instinct of imitation. With this controversy we are not concerned. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we recognize interest as the true source of imitation. The normal child or youth will readily imitate that in which he is vitally interested. The young artist imitates that form of art for which he has a liking. The adolescent adopts the ideals of those he idealizes. The first forms of mental creativeness are usually little more than the sublimated results of unconscious imitation. It is quite impossible to draw any sharp line between imitation and originality. The breadth and greatness of any noted character, in so far as such a character has copied from others, is seldom the result of the incorporated ideals of any one individual; but, on the contrary, when he copies too persistently the ideals of any one person, such ideals, even though they are above reproach, will from the very nature of their restricted source militate against the range of his own moral personality.

Sources of personality

When one copies, even though consciously, some supposed ideal, one copies not merely the isolated ideal, but the whole mental or moral set, the essence of personality. A well-diversified and unified personality must ordinarily have two sources: on the one hand there must be a wide range of ideal personalities from which the apperceptive and growing self may freely im-

bibe, and, on the other hand, if these various ideals are to achieve unity and oneness of expression, unity must be attained not on the basis of any known feature of imitation but solely on the foundations of mental creativeness or moral determination.

The examples given are sufficient to cause the reader to realize the significance of the forms or phases of sympathy and imitation in the making of the moral self or, more simply, moral character. We shall be able to mention only briefly the third of the social-psychological agencies or forms of mental interaction, namely, suggestion.

Suggestion

In recent times much has been written in an endeavor to explain the phenomena of suggestion. A large number of those who have written extensively on the subject have dealt with it especially in its application to the field of abnormal psychology and mental therapeutics. We are not at present interested in this particular phase of the subject. Our main purpose is to show how suggestion may aid materially in the growth of moral character. It is very important that we know the value of suggestion and the special conditions under which it may be of most service in the determination of moral character. If the power of suggestion can be made a real instrument in the hands of the moral pedagogue, surely the laws of suggestion are of importance.

Enemies of suggestion

It is of considerable significance to the moral pedagogue to know that some people are more subject to the power of suggestion than others, and that sensitiveness to its influence is more or less relative to the mental conditions of the one to be influenced. He who has control of his mental powers is less at the mercy of suggestion than he who is the victim of mental weakness. Mental organization and unity are likewise enemies of its power. Mental integrity is an armor against which anything so subtle as suggestion can exert little force. In the normal mind, fully charged with its mental and moral responsibilities, actuating motives are seldom born unconsciously. The intellectual and moral reserves with which the well-disciplined mind is endowed — those funded meanings and values which represent

the successive issues of the self — will, either consciously or unconsciously, deny admission to all ideas and motives not in harmony with themselves.

Suggestion and mental inertia

If mental awareness and unity are among the enemies of the power of suggestion, ignorance is one of its normal allies. The child is especially credulous from lack of mental content, and the unlettered adult is a victim of credulity for no other reason, whereas the mentally deficient is a victim of the environment and suggestion not primarily because of ignorance or lack of experience but chiefly on account of mental and moral inertia. It will be well to enlarge upon some of the statements made in this paragraph. The human mind is prone to believe all that is not contradicted. This accounts for the credulity of the child and of the ignorant. For no other reason does the one obsessed believe in his obsession. Ideas and feelings become fixed in consciousness and must be accepted. Ideas firmly held in consciousness soon assume the rôle of reality.

Realism and the good

Since we are especially interested in the relation of suggestion to the normal self, we shall point out some of those conditions in which suggestion may play an important part in moral growth. To be subject to suggestion on account of ignorance or some mental defect may prove more harmful than beneficial. Waves of crime are usually more common than waves of virtue. The first tendencies in the direction of crime and wrongdoing are often traced to unconscious suggestion or to some sinister motive. Seldom can realism in art be employed to teach a moral lesson. The evil unconsciously suggested will assume priority and dominance over the moral lessons consciously presented. The moral motives soon fade, whereas the evil suggested grows strong. It is only after one has attained a considerable degree of virtue that evil can be employed to suggest the good. When the moral stamina of the youth is sufficiently developed so that he is not to be tempted by the presence of the bad, then only can the moral self, no longer subject to the solicitations of the bad, be improved by the contemplation of evil. No institution of

modern times has done more harm to good morals than the theater and the moving-picture show in their endeavor to present a moral theme or to inculcate a cardinal virtue in at least an unmoral setting.

Associative suggestion

Returning to our more immediate theme of normal suggestibility, it will be interesting to note that suggestion has more or less of a tendency to follow the direction of some instinct or active mental state. Here, of course, we are using suggestion in the sense of ordinary association. A person interested in some philosophy or theory has no difficulty in discovering facts that are sufficient to establish its validity. The first stage in the successful establishment of any principle, theory, or virtue is the development of an ardent interest in its service. Kant was thoroughly convinced that the "good will" was unqualifiedly good. Spencer could not be argued out of the belief that he had given us the formula in accordance with which the world, including man and his institutions, integrates and differentiates.

Sources of suggestion

It is interesting to note how some modern writers make capital out of the gregarious, or the so-called herd, instinct by making it the chief vehicle of suggestion. In the hands of Trotter herd instinct becomes all-powerful. He would have us believe as follows:

> Reason cannot enforce belief against herd suggestion, and, finally, . . . totally false opinions may appear to the holder of them to possess all the characters of rationally verifiable truth, and may be justified by secondary processes of rationalization which it may be impossible directly to combat by argument.[1]

Thomas Hill Green undoubtedly had a similar idea in mind when he was led to say: "No individual can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him."[2] Conscience is, no doubt, social consciousness. But whether conscience is largely the result of the social or herd instinct as such, or the social sanctions in terms of social approval or disapproval,

[1] Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 39.
[2] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 351.

or even the combined results of many other human traits and qualities with an instinctive basis, it may be difficult to determine. McDougall makes good use of admiration in finding a suitable basis for the phenomena of suggestion. Admiration is said to be compounded of wonder and negative self-feeling. McDougall goes on to say:

> The impulse of wonder, then, keeps his attention directed upon the admired person; the impulse of negative self-feeling throws him into the submissive, receptive, suggestible attitude towards the object of his admiration. Hence the child accepts by suggestion the moral propositions of the persons admired, he imitates their actions and sympathetically shares their moral emotions; and so his developing abstract sentiments are moulded in accordance with those of the admired persons.[1]

Moral initiative

The significance of suggestion for character does not differ essentially from imitation. Suggestion contributes less of value to character than does imitation. Neither imitation nor suggestion can be considered constructive moral agencies in the sense of being directly constructive. One may imitate either consciously or unconsciously an act or ideal of some esteemed character, but this alone does not morally expand the self. To be sure, it adds another moral act or ideal to those already existing, and this is a good in itself, but a true moral expansion requires a new and higher motive — a new moral experience. The acquisition of a new fact is not sufficient to constitute added intelligence. Real thinking requires the perception of a new unity. The expansion of the intellectual self is analogous to the expansion of the moral self. In either case the new order is initiated from within and not from without. This, however, must not be taken to imply that the intellectual order is equivalent to the moral order.

Motive versus environment

Sufficient proof of the thesis maintained in the previous paragraph may be gleaned from everyday experience. Although it is an undoubted fact that people born and reared in an environ-

[1] Social Psychology, p. 229.

ment in which the models for imitation and suggestion are the best are apt to entertain higher ideals than those not so favorably circumstanced, nevertheless there are many exceptions. Not only do those who fail to develop characters consistent with their environment and the influences under which they are reared prove the principle under consideration, but those who, in spite of untoward environmental conditions, succeed through "sheer force of will" may be pointed out as conspicuous examples of the same principle. On the one hand, then, it is not an uncommon experience to come in contact with persons living under favorable surroundings but lacking moral motivation, who have failed to attain moral worth, and, on the other hand, we see striking examples of those who, although they have been denied the privileges of a wholesome environment, nevertheless have by effective motivation succeeded in reaching moral distinction.

Our analysis of sympathy, imitation, and suggestion is now finished. The constructive part of the discussion has centered about three main issues. First, it was our endeavor to show that sympathy, imitation, and suggestion are the three chief agencies by which the individual comes to take on the mental experiences of those living about him — their feelings, actions, and forms of thought. Secondly, these forms of mental interaction, as they are sometimes called, are the primary means by which, under normal conditions, virtues are made possible, whereas under unfavorable circumstances they are the three sources of vice. Thirdly, any one or all of the forms of interaction combined are never in themselves sufficient to lift the individual, morally speaking, above his environment. Sympathy, imitation, and suggestion never enlarge the moral self except in an additive, quantitative sort of way. They are never constructively creative.

The remainder of the present chapter will be devoted to the contributions of the more important social institutions to moral character. Those phases of human behavior that seem to have most to do with molding character will be emphasized. Sym-

pathy, imitation, and suggestion will always be held in mind, but other molding agencies will contribute their share. The question of valuation and evaluation will be uppermost in mind. It will be a question of greatest emphasis where moral value is greatest.

Social institutions

The chief social institutions and the order of treatment are as follows: (1) domestic institutions (the family); (2) educational institutions (the school); (3) industrial institutions (industry); (4) religious institutions (the church); (5) political institutions (the state).

The family

No one can assume the burden of outlining the possible contributions of the modern family to the upbuilding of the moral self without sensing the many difficulties involved in the undertaking. The subject is a perennial one for the practical moralist. The family is rightly recognized as the first and most important of all institutions in the molding of character. At the same time, it must be candidly admitted that it is the most neglected of all institutions except by those theorists who would moralize on its importance.

Reasons for moral failure

Two reasons may be given to explain why the modern family is contributing but a minimum of its possibilities to the actualities of moral growth. Perhaps the first and principal offender in this respect is simple ignorance. This does not mean the ignorance on the part of the innocent child, but ignorance on the part of the parent and others who should be awakened to the moral possibilities of the home. The second offender is the moral indifference of the parents themselves. The average parent is never brought to realize the significance of early morals. Health and morals are closely related. The disobedient child usually pays for his disobedience in ill health, and ill health is a contributor to poor morals. All the institutions that man has established or perhaps is capable of establishing will do little to better mankind unless the parent can be made to see more clearly what can be accomplished for the moral health of the child in the home. With enlightenment there must go a developed interest in

morals. Parents, not being aware of their foremost duty, do not take a sufficiently keen interest in the morals of their children.

Difficulties

It is extremely difficult to foresee how these two major defects in the home are to be remedied. Surely education in the ordinary sense of the term has found its way into the home, but in the face of this the moral influence of the home has undoubtedly lessened. This apparent decrease in the moral fiber in the home may be considered inversely proportional to the growth in intelligence. This would seem to imply that this increased intelligence is either not of the kind that counts in the inculcation of morals or that learning has had a tendency to replace other forces of considerable moral significance. It may be surmised that the increasing knowledge is not of a kind calculated appreciably to increase one's understanding of the moral mechanism. Ordinary book knowledge will contribute little to the desired end.

Disintegrating forces

And as to the fact that increased learning is driving out other moral forces there can be no doubt. The parents responsible for the integrity of the home are almost wholly to blame. Of course, there are many reasons why parents are unable to cope with this alarming situation. Economic conditions, the downfall of formal religious beliefs, and the multitudes of distracting social interests and diversions are some of the forces working against the unity of the home. The child's main interests are no longer to be found in the home. The increasing knowledge, whatever be its source,— whether gained through the ordinary educational agencies or gleaned through the practical experiences of life, — is not of a kind to combat demoralizing influences. Only the most ideal home can expect to compete with the moving-picture show and the high-powered limousine. A search for pleasure that is accompanied by a feverish excitement is a great enemy of sound morals. The home cannot expect to be morally attractive to the average youth unless it becomes a greater source of interest than any the social world has to offer. In the world today there are not many agencies that cause one to follow the line of greatest resistance. Whether or not it is

theoretically possible to follow the line of greatest resistance, there is very little moral training in responsibility that would not require action along that line. In whatever way psychologists and moralists explain the sense of moral effort, effort will forever remain essential to moral training.

Moral indifference

The second offender in the deterioration of the modern home is moral indifference. Moral indifference is less amenable to change than is ignorance. The difference between ignorance and intelligence is largely quantitative, but there is a qualitative difference between simple ignorance and moral indifference. Moral indifference is not primarily a matter of ignorance or intelligence. It is possible to eliminate ignorance without dispelling moral indifference, but it is scarcely possible to dispel indifference without, in some degree at least, releasing intelligence. Huxley says truth comes out of error much more easily than out of confusion; similarly, it is easier for morals to spring from ignorance than from indifference. Teachers with long years of teaching experience are well aware how much easier it is to deal with the stupid and ignorant who desire to learn than with those intellectually indifferent.

Moral anticipation

We have seen fit to mention ignorance and indifference as the two chief forces working against the ideals of the home. Perhaps it would be truer to say that ignorance and indifference are the chief obstacles standing in the way of moral betterment. It will now be our purpose to set forth five conditions, or factors, any one of which, when allowed to function during the first dozen years of home life, will largely determine one's future morals. Some of these factors may well be the result of ignorance and indifference on the part of the parents, or they may be the express results of carefully planned educational theory. We may designate them as (1) reasons why caution is necessary in the early development of intellectual, moral, and spiritual habits; (2) the pedagogical significance of the conscious directing of the child's intellectual, moral, and spiritual tendencies; (3) conditions resulting in the unconscious formation of bad habits;

(4) conditions resulting from the early inculcation of formal beliefs; (5) conditions resulting from the undirected or misdirected emotional life. We shall consider these topics in the order named.

Early habits bias the mind

It may be surmised that the first condition mentioned in our list can hardly be true to life as it is actually lived. It would not be possible for the child to spend the first dozen years of his life without forming habits of one kind or another. Although habits would inevitably be formed, the essence of the principle could still be put to the test. Rousseau, it is recalled, urged against the formation of habits early in life. The chief function of the child during the early years of life is to grow to become a good physical animal. We may well recognize the great degree of truth in this conception of early childhood experiences — a conception interestingly advocated by Locke, Rousseau, and Herbert Spencer. An early good habit is always to be preferred to an early bad habit, but a good habit is not necessarily better than no habit at all. It is possible for the early inculcation of intellectual, moral, and spiritual ideas or ideals to be of greater detriment to the growing moral self than the failure to develop such ideas or ideals at all.

Requirement of moral growth

Perhaps a little explanation is needed to make clear these apparently erroneous statements. Early feelings, sentiments, ideas, and habits, no matter how ennobling they may be in themselves, are bound to prejudice the mind. A mind morally prejudiced in favor of the good is perhaps better than a mind curtailed in the breadth of its interests and thoughts, but there is no valid reason why the mind not bent in favor of the good should lean in the direction of the bad. Religious ideals early inculcated will never militate against the development of the moral self, but early formal religious practices which have become associated with some denominational organization can hardly fail to work evil influences. Wholesome political and social ideals well organized into character through the medium of parental influence must have beneficial results. Mere political and social theories may

prove to be highly detrimental. Ideals are less apt to prejudice the mind than habits. Ideals have less tendency to attach themselves to particular theories and organizations, but personalities, theories, and institutions are foci around which prejudices cling. Habits and prejudices unconsciously ingrained are more detrimental than when consciously formed. No reason can be given why a goodly storehouse of habits, sentiments, and beliefs should ever be detrimental to intellectual and moral growth except the fact that they impede and bias the moral self. Does not the narrow specialist pay dearly for his specialty? Health, growing ideals, and open-mindedness are the requisites of the first dozen years of life. These are the first requirements of moral growth.

After sounding a note of warning in the previous paragraph as to why caution is necessary even in the formation of habits ordinarily considered good, we shall now briefly analyze our second topic, the pedagogical significance of early habit formation in the home. We shall consciously neglect the negative aspects of habits and direct our attention to the constructive results. The reader must realize that we are dealing with the first dozen years of child life in the home.

Wholesome naturalness

If there has been a real deterioration in the integrity of the family in recent times, the major cause of this deterioration may be traced directly to the failure on the part of the parent to impress on the minds of his children a few basal habits. These habits have no necessary relation to the school, church, politics, or even formal society. They are habits and ways of feeling and thinking such as must find their first source within and closely connected with the home. Mere book learning is not of much moment during the first twelve years of life. Perhaps no intellectual or moral defect can be traced to absence of early learning. A many-sided interest is important during these vital years, but the absence of intellectual interests does not foretell future moral defects. Morals are important during the early years, provided they function unconsciously. A too vivid moral consciousness

on the part of the child spells intellectual disaster. There should be little formal religion during the early years. Wholesome naturalness is the best religion for the child.

1. Interest in the home

There are fundamental interests and habits, however, which cannot be left to chance. Three of these seem to be more important than all the others. No one concerned with the moral issues of childhood can afford to overlook the child's interest in the home. A well-developed interest or sentiment for the home will not fail to offer moral sustenance to other interests and sentiments that normally find their beginning in the home. Outside the home circle there is usually only one practical source of moral interest or sentiment. Close friendships may be formed outside the home. Close friendships, although natural and wholesome when carefully directed, are nevertheless subject to subtle and demoralizing influences. Compensating attachments are never as valuable as natural attachments. A mother's love for an adopted child is never as close as her love for her own child. An abiding interest in the home is the only moral unit of measure. All other interests — friendships, church, school, etc. — are at best only supplementary.

2. Obedience

If there is a moral quality exacted in the home that may rightfully be deemed primary and fundamental, it is the attitude of obedience. Without this old-fashioned requisite there seems to be little possibility of old-time virtue. Prompt obedience is largely lacking in the average American home today. An obedience that implies a censorious, nagging, or dictatorial attitude on the part of the parent is not true obedience. Obedience is not only a prime requisite for good citizenship; it is an unfailing source of physical and mental health. Obedience is not simply prompt compliance with domestic and civil authority; it is the source of adjustment to the laws of human nature.

3. Sense of responsibility

A third positive quality which was analyzed in considerable detail in a former chapter is the sense of responsibility. There are quite as many forms of responsibility as there are ways of classifying human activity. Responsibility begins in the home.

It would seem that moral character is little more than the essence of various kinds of responsibility — economic, social, and intellectual. The student without a sense of intellectual responsibility neglects his lessons. Lack of sympathy is a fair index of the absence of social responsibility. Shiftlessness stands for failure to develop economic responsibility. Space does not permit us to enlarge upon the significance of the sense of responsibility. Political, economic, and religious issues compete, but the higher virtues do not compete with one another. An abiding interest in the home will not prejudice the mind against other moral interests, but a well-established sentiment for one worthy political party will militate against any sentiment in favor of an opposed political party.

Undesirable habits

Perhaps little or no explanation is needed for the third possibility of home life, the conditions resulting in the unconscious or even conscious formation of bad habits. Here, instead of a growing sentiment for the home, a sentiment that will be permanent, the child seeks interest elsewhere — at the moving-picture show or perhaps with questionable companions. Wherever interest in the home is absent, there disobedience and lawlessness will be found. With these negative conditions will be found no positive program of life, and this implies no sense of personal responsibility. Without a daily program there can be very little ordering of thought, feeling, and action. The child is not to act, appreciate, and think because he happens to be in the mood to act, to feel, and to think, but these processes should be organic in a definite program.

The reversal of beliefs

A fourth subject for critical comment pertains to a practice usually of much less moral significance than any of the three already discussed. Here we are concerned with the presentation of fairy stories, beliefs, and creeds for the most part not purporting to be in accord with scientific fact. The purpose of this teaching is either to symbolize truth or to supply the growing mind with interests suitable to a certain period of development. Formal religious creeds and doctrines may be taught as repre-

sentations of symbols of spiritual truth, and are often of a kind that an inquiring intellect must sooner or later reject. Our conclusion would seem to be that no impression should be made upon the growing mind as a fact that is known not to be a fact. It is surmised that no interest can ever compensate for an unsubstantial fact. Especially is this true where feelings, hopes, fears, and ultimate values have become indelibly associated with early belief. As before stated, the enemies of religion are not the thinkers and the scientists but those who are not strong enough to reconstruct their early religious beliefs.

Change in belief dangerous

The unity of the mind at any stage of its development depends upon its past experiences. One's projected purposes, ideals, and beliefs are the chief sources of this unity. Any sudden change in beliefs, ideals, or purposes must inevitably result in some mental disturbance. No one can lose his early religious beliefs with impunity. The loss of a close friend has been known to derange the mind. Even great nations have suffered disaster as the result of change in political and religious beliefs. Our conclusion is that beliefs and sentiments organized early in life cannot be given up or abandoned late in life without disastrous consequences of one kind or another. Only those beliefs should be impressed upon the child mind that can stand the assault of a searching intellect. Sympathy, altruism, service, good will, can withstand the inroads of the keenest intellect, but it is not so with many formal creeds and practices.

Only a few words need be said to make clear the evil consequences that result from misdirecting the child's affective life. This is the fifth and last topic for discussion which comes within the purview of early home life. Disturbances of the emotional life are of moment to mental and moral health. The self recovers much more readily from a false idea than from a false feeling or emotion. Ideas pervert the mind only to the degree that they are organized with feeling.

Evils of excitement

Although fear and anger, if experienced too often early in life, will exact heavy penalties later in life, the effect of these intense

experiences upon the self are usually not so lasting as the cumulative effect of an early life of mental and social excitement. This unstable mental state may well take any form. It may result from too intense application to studies. Not infrequently it is consequent upon too many or unwholesome social stimuli. Young people living under unfavorable home conditions often develop an incurable sex tension. Continued excitement of any kind is especially dangerous for the very reason that its evil effects are not noted by parent or teacher until much harm has been done.

A mind subjected to too many stimuli or to one stimulus of long duration soon loses its elasticity and, being unable to direct its processes from within, soon comes to demand a host of extraneous stimuli. Unfortunate is the child reared in the home where there are too many stimuli of an unhealthful sort — where excitement is the rule and not the exception. Although intellectual and moral growth demands a variety of interesting stimuli, a constant search or demand for exciting interests is inimical to moral stability. Children reared under the influence of ever-changing stimuli are never interested in quietly developing their own personalities but are constantly searching for the novel, the changing, and the exciting. A too-varied environment militates against moral growth and stability of purpose no less than it interferes with the continuity of thought.

Early home trends

If the home is the place where intellectual and moral ideals have their inception, the home is likewise the place for the beginning of various forms of mental abnormality. No adult ever completely outlives his early childhood experiences. Of course, wholesome home associations perpetuate themselves no less than the untoward circumstances. That which does not begin in the home is not apt to begin elsewhere. Here we have in mind intellectual and moral trends.

Mental disturbances

Grave forms of emotional disturbances that unexpectedly make themselves manifest in late adolescence, or even perhaps not until adulthood, can often be traced to home conditions. A

great variety of affective disturbances which sometimes take the common name *hysteria* can in many cases be thus accounted for. Unprovoked anger, which seems so conspicuous in this malady, can nearly always be traced to unpleasantness in the home life. This is no less true of a closely allied phase of mental disturbance which takes the name *neurasthenia*. The varieties of fear accompanying this ailment often seem to have a definite origin in the home where fear and anxiety have held undisputed sway. A third kind of mental alienation often more severe than the two already mentioned is also causally related to early influences that are especially moral and formally religious. Too much moral and religious brooding is a real actuating agency for what is sometimes known as *psychasthenia*.

These various mental and affective disturbances, no less than a well-organized moral personality, are the inevitable results of long stages of growth and incubation. Mental experiences organized in one fashion will result in a strong influential personality, but similar experiences differently organized or perhaps not organized at all will result in sure but unpredictable consequences.

Summary

We have now analyzed in some detail five aspects or possibilities, good or bad, of home influences, namely, the evil effects of even wholesome habits or beliefs too early inculcated, the good effects of intellectual and moral habits, the evil effects of bad habits, the results of discarding early beliefs, especially of a religious sort, and lastly the results of mental excitement and emotional influences. The home influences discussed have been applied almost wholly to the individual, but a little may be said concerning the influence of the home, through the medium of the individual, upon other social institutions. When the home suffers, all institutions suffer. A happy home makes possible a glad people.

Extension of self-respect

One of the most interesting and at the same time one of the most enlightening accounts of the influences of the home upon the moralization of the individual within it is that given by

William McDougall in his "The Group Mind." The main purpose of the author is to show how the child under ideal home conditions and later through widening social influences develops a wholesome self-regarding sentiment; and it is largely through the extension of this sentiment to the family, and then successively to more inclusive institutions, as the city, the state, and perhaps even the nation, that the influence of the home is morally and socially realized. That is, the individual who has developed a sentiment of respect will come to identify his home, his city, his state, or his nation with his own interest. He will honor the state or the nation as a part of himself. McDougall says:

> Hence the development of a family sentiment, or of one for some other small easily conceived group, is essential for the development in the child of those modes of mental action which are involved in all group feeling and action. For this reason the family is the surest, perhaps essential, foundation of national life; and national self-consciousness is strongest where family life is strongest.[1]

Without further details in regard to the direct or indirect influences of the home upon the individual and eventually upon all social organizations, we shall conclude the present chapter with a summary of the main contributions of the school, industry, the church, and the state to moral character.

Purpose of school

The home is not primarily an educational institution, and the school is not, in its first purpose, an institution for the inculcation of morals. Still it can be truthfully said that all institutions are for the moralization of man. The first purpose of the school is to develop and organize interest, to broaden the sympathies, to develop and control the feelings and emotions, and to teach the child to understand, to appreciate, and to will the best in his own interest and in that of others.

Indirect sources of morals

First, the school is indirectly an institution for the instilling of moral sentiment in so far as it succeeds in causing the individual to realize all his capacities. The broad-minded man sees the necessity of moral character. This is an important step in

[1] The Group Mind, pp. 225–226.

the development of the moral self. The self-educated man is the man who has realized the necessity of an education. Likewise, the man who sees the necessity of moral culture will rise through his own efforts above the level of his social environment. Secondly, the school (and here we have the public schools in mind) is an indirect source of morals, inasmuch as every subject of the well-planned curriculum offers an opportunity for the instilling of a moral lesson. History and literature are especially rich in moral opportunities. Thirdly, the school, especially the college and the university, offers opportunities for the inculcation of morals in so far as ethical theory may be said to contribute to moral character. Theoretical ethics cannot establish ethical foundations, but moral speculation can refine and intensify one's morals.

The school must be recognized as a moral agency not merely from the standpoint of intellectual content or moral theory, but even more on account of the socialized atmosphere. Not many growing minds can long hold out against the social impact of the school spirit. The most recalcitrant will ordinarily bow to the approval or disapproval of his mates. Almost without exception educators, moralists, psychologists, and sociologists recognize the influence of social approval and disapproval in the molding of character.

Vocation and ethics

The school may well serve as an indirect moral agency in still another capacity. One of the chief aims of education is to put the individual in that position in life for which he is best fitted. Thus the school should not only find and develop capacity, but it should also cause capacity to function for the advantage both of the individual and of society. When this is said, it is implied that the school, in placing the individual in the position for which he is best fitted, has performed a real moral service. An agreeable vocation is conducive to morals. The continued performance of irksome tasks will produce not only physical callousness but even intellectual and moral callousness. Drudgery is not conducive to good ethics.

Character and industry

The present-day industrial institutions do not contribute their full quota, either directly or indirectly, to moral health. The Federal government is functioning in a constructive way in encouraging and partially supporting various trades schools. Although the aim is not directly a moral one, the results are at least wholesome and beneficial. No one can become truly moral without engaging in some constructive occupation or profession over a long period of time. Wise educators of all ages have sanctioned the learning of a trade. The growing mind does not passively absorb the virtues of justice, honor, integrity, and the rest, but the moralization of the self is the result of doing just deeds, acting honorably, and living consistently. The normal production, exchange, and distribution of commodities can become, under a wise industrial régime, true sources of virtue. It is probably not altogether an untruth to say that he who does not work must steal. Poverty is often the result of not working, and waves of crime are often closely related to industrial depression. Idleness always weakens morals. The criminal is usually an idler.

Possibilities of mechanical forces

If present-day industrial institutions are not primarily stimulators of morals, nevertheless many opportunities are afforded for intellectual initiative on the part of those with mechanical insight. The genius revels in the intricacies of the mechanical powers. It is here that his insight discerns new unities, new applications of the forces and powers of nature, new inventions conducive to man's interests or destructive of his institutions, intellectual, social, and moral. Science as science has no moral sense; it is left to man's moral sensibilities to elect those forces in the favor of the good and to reject those in the service of the bad.

Industry and moral values

Herbert Spencer long ago announced that that nation which produced the greatest number of people who are the best physically, morally, and intellectually would be the dominant nation. Even to this day no sane thinker has seen fit to gainsay this wise counsel. The first purpose of all constructive institutions today

is to bring this ideal into realization. Modern industrial institutions make possible the physical support of increasing numbers of individuals, but it can hardly be said that the trades and occupations (and now we have in mind the large industries) are making possible the highest moral or even intellectual values.

The deadly conflict between capital and labor is sure evidence of the lack of moral insight and appreciation on the part of two great forces in civilized society. The seemingly impersonal functioning of large corporations which have "no soul" is concrete evidence leading to the same conclusion. The failure of courts, legislative bodies, and public opinion to entertain sympathetic sentiments in favor of improving the conditions under which large multitudes labor points in the same direction, namely, a moral indifference.

Occupations should moralize

A major charge often directed against large industries is that the division of labor and the specialization made necessary are inimical to personal interests and consequently conducive to intellectual and moral callousness. Hemmed-in activities of any sort, and especially industrial activities carried on for a period of years, will make impossible the expansion of intellectual and moral interests in so far as such actions in themselves are concerned. One's occupation, trade, or profession should become a true source of intellectual and moral realization. The home and the school can at most only be expected to initiate and to motivate intellectual and moral interests, and it should be the purpose of one's profession to develop what the home and school have begun.

Religion and morals

Much has been written to make clear the interrelation of religion and morals. Writers have endeavored to show that without religion there can be no true morals. Many modern writers are inclined to believe that while religion is highly conducive to morals, it is not absolutely indispensable to the establishment of the cardinal virtues. It is one thing to make religion and the church necessarily foundational in the establishment of moral character; it is quite another thing to see how religious insti-

tutions can be ready servants in the inculcation of morals. Although religion and morals represent two logically distinct phases of human experience, nevertheless the two normally function in the growth of personality. For convenience of exposition it will be well to consider the possible contributions of religion to morals from four points of view: first, religion as a constituent factor in the economy of human nature; secondly, religion as manifesting itself in terms of admiration, awe, and reverence; thirdly, religion as based on a belief in God, immortality, and future rewards and punishments; fourthly, religion as a force fostering a spirit of benevolence and good will. We shall consider these in order.

1. The naturalness of religion

If religion can be shown to be a constituent element in the experience of man, then its place in the economy of the moral self is firmly established. Little more would be required to prove its moral worth. No one denies the significance of thought, feeling, and volition in the establishment of character. Every normal person naturally chooses the good in preference to the bad. Everyone believes that, given an equal chance, good will triumph over the bad. All who have attained some degree of the good, the beautiful, and the true are solicitous of the highest values. The thoughtful man believes in the continuity of human values. These several beliefs seem to be ingrained in the constitution of man. If these elements are natural to the mental constitution of normal man, they must one and all pay their just dues to his moral personality. Höffding sees fit to say: "We shall find that the measuring rod of ethical endeavor, and the principle of ethical good, are determined by the principle of continuity."[1] Also from the same author we read: "Religious faith asserts a continuity in the realm of ideals that may go beyond any and every possible experience."[2]

2. Admiration, awe, reverence

In his "Social Psychology" McDougall tells us that admiration, awe, and reverence are the emotions that play a dominant

[1] The Problems of Philosophy, p. 158. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company. [2] Ibid. p. 178.

rôle in one's religious life.[1] We are not here concerned with analyzing the various emotions, feelings, and sentiments that may be assumed to constitute the religious life. It would seem to be in accord with actual experience to accept admiration, awe, and reverence as among the more important of the religious emotions. These emotions being true religious expressions, we may be confident of the rôle that religion plays in building character. No one can fail to grow into the likeness of the object of his admiration. To admire is to pay attention to, and attention determines the direction of mental and moral growth. If admiration in conjunction with attention determines the direction of mental growth, reverence is no less efficacious in determining moral quality. Quality is as important as quantity in things moral. Our conclusion is, then, that religion pays tribute to one's moral nature.

3. God, immortality, retribution

A third possibility of pointing out relations of religion to character and conduct is to be found in the religious experiences in so far as they take the form of a belief in God, immortality, and rewards and punishments. Although religion (and here we have in mind the Christian religion) usually incorporates these theses, it cannot be said that these formal aspects of religious belief are necessarily of chief importance in the attaining of the higher moral values. To be sure, they are at least regulative principles, but they are not usually in themselves the largest contributors to moral motivation. Motives actuated by prospects of rewards and punishments are ordinarily not the highest. A mere belief in God, with all the attributes usually assigned to Him, is not sufficient to establish and maintain the moral urge.

There are other avenues by which normal religious experiences may become active contributors to the moral self. In the following paragraph a few words will be offered to make clear the moral significance of the religious consciousness in so far as it takes the form of altruism, benevolence, and good will.

[1] Social Psychology, pp. 136, 309.

4. Altruism, benevolence, good will

It would be difficult to make any worth-while distinction between the terms *altruism*, *benevolence*, and *good will*. *Good will* is commonly used in a more abstract sense than either *altruism* or *benevolence*. The point to be noted is that perhaps no other terms can be found that are more common to both morals and religion. Neither of the two categories of human experience would be vital without them. Morality of a kind does undoubtedly exist without good will, just as truly as religion exists without this high attribute. In either of the possibilities just mentioned, justice would be unbending, and faith would not be a matter of spiritual repose. We have now completed our sketch of the contribution of religion to morals, or, perhaps it would be possible to say with equal propriety, the just services of morals in the field of religion.

The State

No one sees fit to deny the moral significance of the State. Most great thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle up to the present time, have gloried in the moral possibilities of the State. Of course political institutions, like all other institutions organized for the service of man, have their possible vices as well as their actual virtues. Anarchists plot the downfall of all social organization, and some political theorists, like Tolstoy, deny the actuality and even the possibility of the State. Extreme individualists would reduce the range of the function of political institutions. Herbert Spencer implies that the State has only an ephemeral existence and should, as an ideal, pass away when there is no longer any need of its services. This interesting individualist thinker compares the State with the teacher and the physician; their efficiency tends to eliminate their necessity.

Double function of State

The State may function doubly as a moralizing agency. The first way in which many states should and do function in the interest of morals is through the establishment of public education. A typical example, of course, would be found in the American public-school system. Normal enlightenment is always in the interests of morals. Much is being done today through the instrumentality of our public-school system to further the

interests of humanity. The State aims to do the best for all; no less should be done to make life easier for those who are by heredity and misfortune handicapped in the possibilities of life; but much more is being done, and should be done, to find and to develop innate capacities for the service of the individual and for the benefit of humanity at large. Buckle makes the accumulation and diffusion of the right kind of knowledge the panacea of humanity.

Another way in which political institutions in the service of the State function for the betterment of morals is in the formulation and execution of law. Obedience to the enactments of the State is quite as significant as conformity to the moral precepts in the home. Wholesome adjustment to the one implies an appreciation of the other. Although the fulfillment of a moral motive in itself can never be mere obedience to established law, obedience to law may well point in the direction of better morals. Palmer says: "The aim of the law is the defense of an already established order. Development is the aim of morality."[1] The moral function of law is to make possible those conditions from which ethical motives spring.

Public opinion and conscience

In addition to the various institutions already mentioned it will be of some note to point out the relations of the general social order — that which is usually called public sentiment — to moral realization. The efficacy of public sentiment as a moralizing agency is not to be identified with the mere summary resultant of the specific institutions already analyzed. Similarly, individual conscience is not the exact equivalent of the possible functioning of one's intellectual and moral interests. Public opinion is that objective moral force that sits in judgment over the actions of individuals and societies somewhat as conscience, as a subjective force, presides over their motives and actions. Legalized public opinion is called law, and the individualized conscience functions as moral judgment. Moral judgment will be the chief topic for discussion in the following chapter.

[1] The Field of Ethics, p. 74.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SELF AND MORAL JUDGMENT: MEANING, CONTENT, ORIGIN, AND SANCTION

Man as scientist and moralist

It is now our duty to come into closer and more scientific relations with the subject matter of the moral self. The plain man is primarily interested in the facts of his environment. These facts pertain, on the one hand, to the qualities and actions of the physical world, and, on the other hand, to the actions of man in his relation to the moral and social order. The scientist and the philosopher are both interested in these same facts, but they are interested in them only in so far as they may be subsumed and explained in terms of laws and principles. The moralist is not primarily interested in the facts and laws of the physical world, either as a scientist or even in the rôle of the philosopher; his chief interest lies in the facts and principles of the moral and social order. The moralist as such is called upon to judge the moral order — to be the judge of moral value and worth; it is not the province of the moralist to judge matters of scientific fact. The scientist as such is likewise limited in his functioning; he judges not in terms of value and worth but in terms of the poverty or richness of objective relations. Man as scientist conforms to the exactions of nature; man as moralist bows to the moral interests of man. These statements imply a clear distinction between a scientific judgment and a moral judgment.

Nonmoral and moral worth

The reader is not to conclude that all statements of value and worth are matters of moral judgment. All cases of moral judgment are of moral worth, but many qualities and experiences of value, of one kind or another, are not considered moral in content, and consequently do not come within the purview of moral

judgment. Many if not most of our thoughts and actions, even though valuable and of real service, are to be classed not as moral but rather as unmoral or nonmoral. Perhaps all actions possess the possibilities of moral worth, but such forms of action and conduct and the motives actuating them are not the objects of moral judgment. Examples of such judgments will be made clear later in this chapter.

In earlier chapters some attempt was made to set forth the contributions of biology, psychology, and sociology to human character and conduct. Biology, it was pointed out, provides the dynamics of conduct; psychology, in terms of mental selection and self-determination, makes real the higher degrees of ethical synthesis; and society, manifesting itself in various social and institutional organizations, contributes to the ethical worth of man through the three forms of mental interaction — sympathy, imitation, and suggestion.

Methods to be followed

This chapter has little to offer which has not already been discussed as biological, psychological, and social; yet little has been said to make clear and definite that most interesting and worth-while aspect of ethical discussion, namely, moral judgment, and we shall endeavor to analyze and illustrate this subject from several points of view. These ways of analyzing the ethical situation are not at all isolated points of view; they overlap, whereas at the same time the various angles of the subject matter are emphasized and thrown into relief. It is chiefly for this reason that the present chapter will be treated under the following heads:

Outline of chapter

(1) The meaning of moral judgment; (2) the content of moral judgment; (3) the origin of the content of moral judgment; (4) the sanctions of moral judgment. These four points, in their relation to the central theme of all ethical discussions, will be discussed in the order indicated in this paragraph. Moral judgment seems to be the nucleus of moral values. Our first interest, then, will be to discuss briefly the meaning of moral judgment.

Knowledge and scientific judgment

All knowledge takes the form of judgments — the statement of the relation of one concept to another, or the statement of the relation of one concept to a fact. We say the same thing when we say that all knowledge takes the form of facts and relations. Facts and relations of similarity and dissimilarity seem to exhaust all the possibilities of knowledge. The statement that the mental processes in man are similar to those in animals might be taken as a typical example of the knowledge relation. It points out a relation of likeness or similarity. The statement that animals are living beings without a sense of moral responsibility can be taken as an example of probable fact. That objects fall toward the center of gravity, that the self grows in the direction in which it is persistently exercised, and that man is an animal with social and moral proclivities are not only matters of fact but typical examples of scientific judgment. We may express a like truth when we say that advancing knowledge takes the form of the conceptualization of percepts or the perceptualization of concepts. Science is interested in these facts and relations, not because they are of any necessary value to man but primarily because they are facts. The scientist as such is not concerned with values, ethical, social, or otherwise. His duty is to know. His mere knowing, however, may turn out to be of inestimable value to man, materially, intellectually, socially, and morally.

Other judgments of value

We may also turn to judgments that are of value to man in innumerable ways, though they fall short of moral judgments. Undoubtedly they make ethical judgments possible, but in themselves they lack the essence of things moral. The assertion "He is a genius," implying mental capacity, originality, resourcefulness, insight, and other qualities of a high order, is a judgment representing real value, but it is not worthy to be classed as moral. Suppose we hear the very common remark "She is a wonderful artist," with emphasis on the word *wonderful*, signifying remarkable talent, whether it be in the field of poetry, painting, or music; this assertion likewise falls short of

a judgment designated as moral. We might mention numerous other acts designating social and even religious qualities but still lacking that essence of which we are in search.

Of course, in the examples of judgments of value already mentioned no attempt has been made to distinguish between the agent, his capacity, the act, or even the quality of the act. This analysis will be undertaken when we come to analyze the objects of moral judgment. Here we have no reason to differentiate motives, purposes, and consequences as objects of judgments.

A possible criticism

A criticism could well be made against the statement which implies that the endowment of the genius, the skill of the artist, and the faith of the purely religious are not typical examples of moral judgment. These qualities do not necessarily imply moral worth. It is possible that intellectual capacity should be converted into moral energy. Art should make great ideals alluring, and religion will normally become one of the foundation stones of ethics. All this will be freely admitted without allowing the assertions made concerning the genius, the artist, and the religious enthusiast to stand as typical examples of moral judgment. We shall see later that certain motives or their close allies will, in some stage of the ethical process, be called in to make real a situation of moral worth. Motives are the essential moral agents.

1. Meaning of moral judgment

Any statement or assertion which predicates a moral quality or act is an example of moral judgment. It differs from an ordinary scientific judgment such as was mentioned in previous paragraphs only in its affirmation of a quality or act considered moral. The predicates of these judgments always imply ethical concepts. There are as many classes of moral judgment as there are virtues. In order to exhaust the possibilities of this kind of assertion it would be necessary to enumerate all the possibilities of moral behavior.

Examples of moral judgments

When I say "John is a young man," I make a matter of fact judgment; but when I say "John is a worthy young man with sterling qualities," I make a statement implying worth and

value. Yet there may be some question as to whether or not this statement should be classed as a moral judgment — surely not unless an ethical situation is involved. But when I say that John's behavior was just, or honorable, or courageous, etc., there is a real moral judgment. Justice, honor, and courage are moral concepts. This form of judgment may well be applicable to courts of law, to states and nations, and to all properly constituted agencies. Any organization actuated by motives and purposes, any body that deliberates and judges in the interest of man and society, may give expression to moral judgment. In times of war it is often asserted that the actions of a nation are just or unjust. A just God is said to pronounce judgment on the deeds of man.

Ultimate sources of good deeds

Many reasons might be mentioned why man has been the doer of just deeds. The idea of justice has been an important factor in governing man's thoughts and actions. The reasons for being good and true and just have not always been derived from man-made authority. Man has acted justly and honorably because he has conceived God to be a just god. Also man has not infrequently been just and demanded justice from others not only because he believed in a god whose nature is just but because he believed in a god who willed that man should be just.

We may go a step farther and believe that man has not infrequently been induced to entertain the precepts and to practice the arts of justice and of virtue in some of their many phases from the fact of his having conceived of the world as just and good and rational. No one has reason to doubt the significance of Plato's idea of "the good." Leibnitz considered this the best of all possible worlds. Spinoza seemed to be intoxicated with the love of God. Kant would not have dared to destroy knowledge had he not believed in the rationality of the world. We do not need to mention other reasons — reasons that go beyond the reach of the everyday facts of life — to see why man in the past, if not in the present, has seen fit to become the agency of moral action.

Nations as moral agencies

We have just mentioned ultimate reasons why man has seen fit to be the embodiment of good and just actions — reasons why his actions might be truly characterized as examples of moral judgment. It was also said that any organization actuated by motives and purposes — any body deliberating in the interest of man and of society — is capable of pronouncing this kind of judgment. Nations are sometimes said to possess a national mind; we even read about national pride and a national sentiment; and, what is more, a national self-consciousness is said to exist. In a very good sense this is all in accordance with actual fact. We are not called upon to theorize concerning the nature of the so-called state or national or group mind; we are simply interested in realizing that the most highly organized modern nations do possess what is called a group mind.

National self-consciousness

One of the latest and most interesting attempts to characterize the mental processes of organized groups which take the name of *nations* is McDougall's fascinating book entitled "The Group Mind." In this book we are told that modern nations, as France, the United States, and England, are especially typical examples of highly organized peoples with national sentiment and national self-consciousness. In the future, we are informed, national progress will find its chief support in this national consciousness.

Individual and national sentiment

It is also interesting to note how McDougall not only makes individual self-consciousness an important factor in the development of a proper self-regarding sentiment, but also applies the same principle, in the same way, to the national self-consciousness which helps to make real the moral motives and moral sentiments of highly civilized nations.

If the last few statements are at all in accordance with facts as they actually exist (and the present writer has no good reason to doubt the essence of the thesis), the conclusion would seem to be inevitable that highly organized and morally motivated nations, like highly organized and properly motivated indi-

viduals, are truly capable of being, and are expected to be, the dispensers of moral judgment.

Moral aims

In the last few paragraphs we have been endeavoring to make plain the meaning of the expression *moral judgment*. Moral judgment may be said to issue from persons, divine agencies, and highly organized states and nations. Perhaps it may be said with a considerable degree of truth that the final end or purpose of any individual or institution is the establishment of moral values. Most great educators and moralists seem to sanction this thesis. One needs only to instance the educational philosophy of Pestalozzi, Herbart, Spencer, and Dewey. Many aims of life have been set up; happiness is generally said to be the ultimate end or aim of life; but surely there is no other truer source of happiness than moral character when healthily interpreted. The next topic in this chapter to receive brief notice is the content of moral judgment. This is the second topic in our outline.

2. Content of moral judgment

If it were our purpose to outline the content of intellectual or scientific judgments, it would be necessary to analyze the whole field of science and logic — all that the race has thought. Surely it would include all scientific formulations — the intellectual tradition. Likewise, if we were to set forth the content of æsthetic judgments, it would be necessary to concern ourselves with an analysis of all that the human race has appreciated in the forms of art. But the task immediately before us is neither to summarize scientific prediction nor to analyze the various forms of æsthetic appreciation. It is of great consequence for man to know; it is perhaps of more value for man to create new forms of beauty; but, after all, man is most man when he assumes the rôle of a true moral agent. What are the records of man's achievement in this capacity? The answer to this question can well assume a variety of forms. Biologically or historically speaking, man's present moral stature in terms of motivated self-determination is an index of his progress from the magical incantations of the primitive man.

Social index of moral judgment

Another index of man's desire to will virtuous acts, that is, acts that would deserve the sanction of moral judgment, is to be found in the social or moral status which any civilized community has attained. It is not my intention to identify the moral status of any social community with the degree of civilization which that community may rightly be said to possess. Civilization, if we use this term in the sense of discovery and invention and the practical applications to society, may stand above or below the level reached in moral progress. It is probably true that the average community has advanced much more rapidly in science and invention than it has in the actualization of real worth. Neither happiness nor moral integrity has kept pace with scientific progress. Science has done much to relieve the rougher forms of unhappiness and suffering, but science as it is ordinarily understood and applied will do very little to make man really happy or unmistakably good. Science will do most toward making man virtuous and happy not only when it functions in bringing him ease and convenience but when it is directed in the interests of his motives and conduct. Moral science is the science par excellence. Happiness will follow in the wake of moral science, but there is no good reason why happiness and moral progress should follow science in its applications to objective nature. Science must touch the desires and motives. John Stuart Mill was probably right when he said: "I regard any considerable increase of human happiness through mere changes in outward circumstances, unaccompanied by changes in the states of desires, as hopeless."[1] This statement is in direct accord with the thesis mentioned in the early pages of this book, which holds that that which happens to one does not appreciably alter his character; only that which he resolves to do and to achieve counts in molding conduct.

Educational index of moral judgment

We shall outline a third record of man's ethical achievement. This third record is our formal system of moral education. No one can accurately mark off the boundaries of this species of

[1] Autobiography, p. 404.

instruction; it lurks in nooks and crevices that are hidden from the intuitions of man, and we often fail to find it in the most promising places. Perhaps our formal endeavor to inculcate the virtues is a better index of the content of moral judgment than our actual accomplishment. Perhaps the present failure of moral content to keep pace with scientific advancement is not due to the indifference of teachers but is rather to be attributed to the fact that science, while it is relieving the rougher sources of unhappiness and pain, at the same time is bringing into the world agencies tending to negate the beneficent influence of all positive ethical teachings. This was one of the criticisms directed against the modern home, namely, the demoralizing influences made possible by the advances of science. The youth of today follows the new, the strange, and the exciting rather than the old, the commonplace, and the substantial.

Virtues and moral judgment

The last and fourth sign, or index, of the content of moral judgment is the so-called formal virtues. Here our interests are wholly abstract, while the three already indicated — the historic, the social, and the educational — involved practical interests. We would now measure the content of ethical worth not by noting practical applications and functioning, but by formal records. When the geologist wishes to study the behavior of the earth during past ages, he sets himself the task of studying the strata of the earth today — the present record of past actions. Likewise, if we wish to become acquainted with historic peoples, we may not only do so by studying their art which survives them, but we may also gain an insight into their mental attainment by a careful perusal of recorded language. It is therefore fitting that one should measure the content of moral judgment by noting the chief forms of recorded virtues. This, of course, is the abstract subject matter of a course in ethics. A brief mention of a few of the recorded virtues will suffice.

Three sources of virtues

There are quite as many methods of classifying the virtues as there are people interested in ethical theory. It would be as

difficult to find a method of classifying the virtues that would be acceptable to all as it would be to find a satisfactory tabulation of the feelings and instincts. When we once recognize the formal virtues to be nothing but the resultant of mental functioning and not due to powers and faculties mysteriously sanctioned, it will not be difficult to make use of a scheme that will at least meet the needs of the present writer. Three conditions appear to be sufficient to account for the major virtues. These conditions are as follows: (1) the harmonious unfolding of capacities and mental processes; (2) the directing of these same capacities and processes in the interest of others; (3) the moderate control of capacities and mental processes in the interest of self and of others. These three sets of factors are intended to be more or less sequential. The first set of conditions make possible all the virtues. The virtues actuated by the second group of processes would be nonconstructive if it were not for the capacities to be unfolded. Likewise, the virtues classified under the third heading would be little more than form if it were not, on the one hand, for the content supplied by the capacities under the first heading and, on the other hand, for the feelings and sentiments in the interest of others, the second source of virtues. Some analysis will be necessary to make these principles clear.

a. **Harmonious development**

We shall first see how the harmonious development of capacities becomes the first real source of virtue. It is probably nearer the truth to say that capacities make virtues possible rather than real. Something more than the mere development of capacities will be required to bring virtues to their maturity. The Greek ideal, or virtue, of whole-mindedness was occasioned by the wholesome development of capacities. Whole-mindedness may be considered a virtue because it helps to free so many other qualities. In this way the development of one capacity does not interfere with the like development of others. The overgrowth of one or a few qualities usually tends to crowd out other possibilities. When all interests receive similar

encouragement, one capacity will reënforce another capacity. The benefit is reciprocal. Whole-mindedness is essentially healthy-mindedness, and this implies sanity. If these qualities cannot rightly be considered moral excellencies, they are at least first steps in making virtues possible. The moron has no virtues. Likewise, an insufficiency of interests is likely to be accompanied by a paucity of virtues. Whole-mindedness is only another name for wisdom. Plato makes wisdom the first virtue of the philosopher. Sidgwick makes wisdom the knowing of the good. Dewey has this to say:

> Wisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is the nurse of all the virtues. Our most devoted courage is in the will to know the good and the fair by unflinching attention to the painful and disagreeable. Our severest discipline in self-control is that which checks the exorbitant pretensions of an appetite by insisting upon knowing it in its true proportions. The most exacting justice is that of an intelligence which gives due weight to each desire and demand in deliberation before it is allowed to pass into overt action.[1]

Our first conclusion, then, would seem to be that the development of all the possibilities of which one is capable affords the surest and best foundation for the content of moral judgment. Judgments that are rich in moral worth can never be based on simple interests. The wise man may know the good without doing or distributing the good, but he has greater possibilities for the realization of the good as the result of a well-rounded mental development. We now pass from possibilities to actualities.

b. Capacities directed in the interest of others

Of the three conditions that would seem to be sufficient to account for the major virtues the second will now be briefly explained. Instead of speaking of the directing of one's capacities and mental processes in the interest of others it would be more in accordance with fact to say that these interests and processes which result from a well-rounded development are naturally projected in the service of others. Altruism and be-

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 405.

nevolence are not consciously projected in the interest of others, but from their very nature are of others' seeking. If wholemindedness and wisdom can be considered virtues in the making (and it is the opinion of the present writer that they can), they are such primarily in the service of the self. But true love, altruism, benevolence, good will, and other closely allied feelings are primarily virtues functioning in behalf of others. These qualities which result from the naturalness of development are prized on account of their spontaneity. They come to be considered matters of constructive worth when they are guided by intelligence, but they become objects of moral judgment only when they are the true servants of the will. All this implies that altruism, benevolence, and other similar emotional qualities become the true content of moral judgment only when they are directed by the intellect and determined by the will.

Dangers of altruism

The old saying that love is blind is at least a half-truth. Love becomes most wholesome when it is properly seasoned by the intellect. Intellect will not destroy love; on the contrary, it will do much to reënforce it. Intellect has never been known to interfere with the values of life. Selfishness under the cloak of the intellect may well interfere with man's best interests as well as those of the race. What is true of love is equally true of altruism. Altruism is undoubtedly a virtue certainly deserving of the respect of moral judgment; nevertheless altruism in its purest intention has often been the source of misguided philanthropy. Concerning the evils of unregulated altruism Dewey says: "It tends to render others dependent, and contradicts its own professed aim: the helping of others."[1] The "good will" is another species of virtue of this same order, differing from love, altruism, and benevolence, if at all, in degree and not in kind. The "good will" seems to reflect more of the intellectual and the spiritually refined than the other qualities just mentioned. Love and altruism can hardly be said to exist

[1] Ibid. p. 387.

unless some person is loved or unless someone is the concrete recipient of the altruistic act; but the so-called "good will" seems to exist in the form of an abstract sentiment.

c. Control of experiences for self and others

We shall now glance at the conditions that make possible the third class of virtues. If the first class of virtues require little more than the harmonious development of one's capacities, and if the second class mentioned in the previous paragraph require, in addition to their naturalness and spontaneity, a governing intelligence, it will be seen that the virtues of the third class require, in addition to a directing intelligence, a long training in moral discipline. In other words, there must be a control of certain mental experiences in the interest of self and the interest of others. Two virtues clearly the resultant of control are temperance and courage. Temperance may be said to be the control of pleasures, and courage the control of pain. The virtues of the first and second classes are quite largely born, whereas those now under consideration require persistent attention—first, control from without, and, eventually, self-control, or self-determination. Courage, like temperance, is of many varieties—physical, intellectual, moral, and even spiritual. We are not often temperate in all our interests. Paulsen also makes self-control the fundamental form of the individualistic group of virtues.[1] All of the many other forms of virtuous behavior which we have not mentioned may readily be subsumed under one or another of the three conditions outlined. Justice and veracity are easily explained in terms of discipline and control. Justice is the control of one's actions which go to make possible the rights of others. Veracity is an accurate representation of facts as experienced.

This closes the formal discussion of the content of moral judgment, the second main topic of this chapter. Of the question asked, What are the records of man's willingness to assume the rôle of a moral agency? or, what amounts to the same thing, What are the signs of the content of moral judgment? four

[1] System of Ethics, p. 482.

answers have been ventured. They are the historical, the social, the educational, and, last, the formal virtues.

3. Origin of content of moral judgment

In the account of the analysis of the origin of the content of moral judgment it will be our purpose to outline the sources and agencies that make possible the virtues and qualities discussed in the last few paragraphs. We shall assume the three classes of virtues, namely, the intellectual, the emotional, and those more accurately described as disciplinary, as fairly representative of the content of the moral self. Of course the reader is to understand that these three classes of values comprise the nucleus of the higher self which is the chief object of discussion in this book.

Heredity, environment, and will

In considering the subject immediately before us we shall be partial to the empirical method of accounting for the ethical qualities which make up character. We are not departing from the ordinary procedure in emphasizing heredity, environment, and will. Our analysis at this time will be brief on account of the fairly adequate treatment of the self in Chapters II and III, devoted to the biological foundations of the self. One of the main theses of this book is that heredity as it actually functions in making possible intellectual and moral content is of more importance than environment, and that environment is of more intellectual and moral consequence than will. Another thesis maintained in these pages is to the effect that will should play larger and larger rôles in making possible the richness of moral judgment. As science comes to understand better the mechanism and constituents of the self, this possibility will become more and more an actuality.

Heredity and the virtues

Since the investigations of Galton, Goddard, and a host of modern writers on the results of the intelligence tests conducted during the World War, and the more recent psychological and educational tests, there is no doubt as to the supreme importance of heredity in determining intellectual content. Moral possibilities are also closely related to intellectual possibilities. If we keep in mind our threefold classification of ethical values, we

can readily see how seemingly impossible it is for some persons to entertain and to realize any high or continued purpose, which is but another way of expressing the Greek ideal of whole-mindedness. In these same inferiors, or in other poorly endowed persons, the qualities of love, altruism, benevolence, and "good will" seem to be persistently absent, no matter how enticing the environment and educational methods may happen to be, although the moron may seem to possess a species of kindness and good will. As to courage, temperance, and veracity, poor native endowment is always accompanied by the absence of these virtues, although the pugilist who exhibits great physical courage and bravery in the prize ring is the kind of exception that proves the rule; morons in the form of physical giants do not know the meaning of intellectual and moral courage, to say nothing about practicing them.

Environment and moral judgment: the home

If heredity determines the possibilities of formal judgment, the environment and the will are still necessary to make these possibilities real. Under the heading of environment will be included education, that is, education in the broad sense of the term. The three educational agencies of greatest importance in developing our triple list of virtues are the home, formal schooling, and social organization. For the sake of convenience we shall consider first the so-called feeling virtues, namely, love, altruism, benevolence, and good will. It would seem that the organized institutions of society have little to do with making these moral qualities function in the life of man; likewise, formal schooling is not of prime importance in fashioning these virtues in the self; but one could not overlook the significance of the home in the establishment of the moral qualities. They are either born in the home or they have no significant place in the economy of life.

The school

As formal education is not of prime importance in calling out the higher feelings, so the home is not the most important institution in organizing the intellectual qualities — the intellectual sentiments included in the ideal of whole-mindedness

before mentioned. Our formal institutions of learning are responsible for scientific sentiments and for the unification of intellectual interests. We naturally look to the home for love and good will, but we turn to the school for science and philosophy. There is a just division of labor in the origin of the content of moral judgment.

Social institutions

The third and last list of virtues, including temperance, courage, justice, and others of a disciplinary character, are not to be specifically attributed to any one phase of the environment, whether it be the home, the school, or any other sector of experience; yet it would appear that these forms of discipline are more rightly attributed to the institutions with which the youth comes in contact beyond the home and formal schooling. One's life vocation, civil and political interests, and public opinion are contributing forces in the inculcation of courage, justice, temperance, veracity, and other allied forms of self-control.

When we turn from an analysis of the several virtues and take a brief glance at their historic significance, we see that nations and peoples have emphasized different virtues. In historic times one institution and then another has been considered dominant. Likewise, moralists in modern times have emphasized some specific institution as the chief source of goodness. It will be of interest to note some of the more typical institutions, virtues, and forces which, in one age or another, have been considered most important. In this brief historic survey we are primarily concerned with those peoples who were interested in what we have called the moral self. Interest in the moral self means nothing else than an interest in the moral personality.

The Jews emphasized the home

The Jews made the home the dominant institution, for it was in the home that the child first received his moral and religious instruction. The home was also of considerable importance among the Romans, although their chief interests seemed to be those of a legal nature, organization, and practical efficiency. The Jews emphasized the virtuous life not only because it was practical but because it was the good life. The Romans were

genuinely utilitarian; using modern phraseology to describe their daily life, they could well be called pragmatists. For the Romans, virtue and prudence were not generically different.

The Greek city-state

When we come to Greek civilization, we find a different state of affairs. The piety of the Jews is conspicuously absent, and the practicality of the Romans is not in evidence. The city-state was the dominant institution for the Greeks. It was their interest in this form of political organization that enabled them to set forth conspicuous examples of moral judgment. Socrates became the founder of the science of ethics. Plato set forth in bold form the cardinal virtues wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Aristotle, in his doctrine of the golden mean, did much to emphasize the Greek ideal of whole-mindedness.

The Church and the Middle Ages

It will suffice to mention one more example in which emphasis is laid on the particular institution — an institution in which the moral life is the end to be attained, or at least an essential means to the attainment of some other end. We make special mention of the Middle Ages. Here the Church is the center of interest around which all the other interests of life are organized. Nearly all the philosophies of the Middle Ages — mysticism, monasticism, scholasticism, and chivalry — serve in some way the purposes of the Church. The life of the Middle Ages was one of discipline. Discipline is always essentially an aid to morals, although the discipline practiced throughout the Middle Ages was often inimical to true moral judgment. Poverty, chastity, and obedience, the ideals of monasticism, although formally adopted in the interest of the ethical and religious life, could not well make this life a reality. The extreme denial of the essentials of life can never become the source of healthy virtue. The content of moral judgment is to be based on the organization of interests and not on their denial. The proper encouragement and gratification of an interest always favor the normality of moral growth, but the repression and denial of the same interest must inevitably give rise to an undercurrent of mental if not of moral deterioration.

Moral dominancy lacking today

If one were to search for the dominant institution since the opening of the twentieth century, no little uncertainty would attach to the correctness of the decision. The reader is to bear in mind that we are using the term *success* as an index of moral personality. The success of any institution or agency in fulfilling its mission is no necessary index of the ultimate value and worth of such a mission. The Chinese system of education was eminently successful if we think of success in terms of its aims. The aim of the churchly institution of the Middle Ages was attained if we have in mind the ideal of otherworldliness. Likewise, the historians of the future will look back upon the present age as a real scientific renaissance, far surpassing any other now recorded in history. Yet it would be difficult today to point out an institution or a social agency functioning in the life of modern society as the home functioned in the moral interests of the Jew, or as the city-state acted in the interest of the Greek, or even as the Church operated in the service of the monk or of the people at large during the long Middle Ages. It would not be far from the truth to assert that all the dominant institutions of today are almost on the same level of efficiency or inefficiency when it comes to matters of moral worth. The Church, clearly recognizing the failure in the home, would endeavor to compensate for this failure by combining the religious, the social, and the practical. Likewise, the school, both public and private, would compensate for the failures in the home and the Church alike. The conclusion would seem to be that so long as the home and the Church fail in their respective functions no system of education will ever be able to compensate morally for the two services lost.

Enforcement of home ideals

The conclusion drawn in the previous paragraph is not altogether a matter of speculation, and it is only partly based on concrete observation of the functioning of the three institutions now under consideration; the third and main reason why the school, no matter how good its intentions are, will never be able to compensate for the home is a biological one. In the first place,

the home has a biological basis; the home as an institution would not exist if it had not a necessary service to perform. The home is to the race what conscience is to the individual. Both are the results of long stages of evolution. Concerning the public sense of right and wrong, after which individual conscience is copied, Sidgwick says that it is the product of long stages of growth, being greater than the invention of any moralist, and that man suffers not from the need of its improvement but from a lack of its enforcement. Much the same may be said of the home; it is not a man-made institution, and man suffers not from the need of a better institution but from the failure to enforce its ideals. Bishop Butler says that if conscience had might as it has right, it would govern the world. The school is a man-made institution. At best the school can only extend and enlarge and more completely organize those moral sentiments that have their inception in the home.

Two methods of approach

When we turn from the dominancy of some special institution in the development of moral personality, and consider the methods employed in moral education, we find a variance of opinion. Two methods of approach have been advocated. In order to improve man some reformers would first improve the environment, in the belief that it would be of little value to moralize man without first improving his surroundings. Others would reverse the process by endeavoring immediately to refine man's motives and sentiments, leaving the environment to take care of itself. Each method of procedure, of course, is partial and one-sided. Moral corroboration seems to be continuously necessary during the early stages of its development. It is not always possible to improve one's morals without improving the environment under which one lives. In earlier chapters it has also been argued that an ideal environment in the ordinary sense of the term is usually not sufficient to stabilize the self. Much effort is expended today in evaluating these methods of moral betterment. Perhaps it will be of some moment to enlarge upon these two methods of reform.

Objective sources of moral judgment

Sociologists, legislators, and those interested in practical social service might be expected to emphasize the objective conditions in reform. This we find to be the case. History affords us typical examples of reformers who combine the interests both of the legislator and of the moralist. Perhaps Jeremy Bentham would be considered a typical representative of this sort of man of affairs. Wise legislation is the chief moralizing agency for Bentham, and the happiness of the people is the true test of good legislation. Bentham, who is a typical representative of the earlier utilitarians, makes happiness the standard of moral judgment, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number the true aim of the legislator and the moralist alike. We are not here concerned with analyzing Bentham's theory of morals and legislation, beyond observing that it is he who makes pain and pleasure the factors in all that we do. In the opening chapter of his "Principles of Morals and Legislation" he has this to say:

> Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for these alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do, on the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.[1]

No brief statement could be found, in all the literature of the utilitarians from Bentham himself to Sidgwick, that would better summarize the main thesis of the pleasure-pain theory of morals. We quote from Bentham not because utilitarians of today accept this theory of ethical motivation, but chiefly on account of its clarity and historic significance.

Objective methods criticized

In conformity with what was implied in the previous paragraph with reference to objective conditions for securing the happiness of all, Dewey remarks:

[1] Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i, p. 1.

Aside from sympathy and love of peaceful relations and good repute, Bentham relied upon law, changes in political arrangements and the play of economic interests which make it worth while for the individual to seek his own pleasure in ways that would also conduce to the pleasure of others.[1]

Two comments may here be made upon Bentham's method of objective and practical moral philosophy. First, the happiness and interests of others seem to be based on a refined self-interest, or what is called enlightened egoism; secondly, legislation that improves economic and social conditions makes possible better morals and happiness; but Bentham seems to neglect the factor of inner motivation as a more reliable source of happiness and the first real source of moral judgment.

Inner motives

We shall now turn to those who would emphasize the importance of the direct development of inner motives as the means of reform or the source of moral judgment. Formal theorists and educators are more apt to emphasize the internal at the expense of the external. While the educator would not overlook the importance of wise legislation and wholesome law, the quality of the inner motive is of greater significance as a reformative agency than the quality of external law. Even the quality of man-made law depends upon the quality of the inner motive prompting the enactment of law. It is better that ethics should motivate the law than that the law should furnish the motives for ethics. Of all the theorists who have done much to put into practice ethical theory, John Stuart Mill would probably stand at the head of the list. His emphasis was not placed primarily on the objective features of the environment, but rather on the educational features — the implanting of motives and qualities. This is for Mill the prime function of the educator. Motives, when properly implanted, work themselves out, whereas the law works from without in.

The inner and the outer

If we may fairly mention Bentham as emphasizing the objective sanctions as making possible human happiness and better-

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 295.

ment, and if we may cite Mill as a typical example of the moralist who would emphasize the significance of ideals and desires, we shall be justified in pointing to Herbert Spencer as one who insists on the importance of both the internal and the external in the development of conduct and character. It is easy to see why Spencer is interested in both the internal and the external. Spencer, who defines life as an adjustment of internal relations to external relations, would be logically required to take into consideration both the internal and the external. This double aspect, which in Spencer has a real philosophical basis, is emphasized in all his writings. We are not interested in his metaphysics, but we are interested in finding out how this author correlates the inner with the outer in his account of conduct, or what we have termed the origin of the content of moral judgment.

Natural consequences

Spencer's method of giving due weight to the outer and the inner is especially conspicuous in his educational philosophy. Here the objective environment, whether it be the state, the school, the home, or other external sanction, will be effective to the degree that motives, desires, and interests are aroused. The law of supply and demand, we are told, holds in the field of education and morals as in the field of economics. When goodly motives are far in advance of the motives entertained by the social order, unhappiness will be the inevitable result. Natural sanctions are of greater worth than parental sanctions. This is the famous doctrine of natural consequences. This punishment through natural consequences is the divinely appointed method, because it sets up in the mind the proper relation between cause and effect, the sense of certainty and justice, and does not occasion unfriendly relations between parent and child — between the governors and the governed. The burn from the hot stove is a better form of punishment for playing near the fire than is parental disapproval in terms of spanking accompanied by unkind words. Spencer summarizes his method of natural consequences as follows:

Thus we see this method of moral culture by experience of the normal reactions, which is the divinely-ordained method alike for infancy and for adult life, is equally applicable during the intermediate childhood and youth. And among the advantages of this method we see: First. That it gives that rational comprehension of right and wrong conduct which results from actual experience of the good and bad consequences caused by them. Second. That the child, suffering nothing more than the painful effects brought upon it by its own wrong actions must recognize more or less clearly the justice of the penalties. Third. That, recognizing the justice of the penalties, and receiving those penalties through the working of things, rather than at the hands of an individual, its temper will be less disturbed; while the parent occupying the comparatively passive position of taking care that the natural penalties are felt, will preserve a comparative equanimity. And Fourth. That mutual exasperation being thus in great measure prevented, a much happier, and a more influential state of feeling, will exist between parent and child.[1]

A few more words from the pen of this famed moralist will be apropos in showing the order and nature of motivation.

It is a law of human nature, visible enough to all who observe, that those who are debarred the higher gratifications fall back upon the lower; those who have no sympathetic pleasures seek selfish ones; and hence, conversely, the maintenance of happy relations between parents and children is calculated to diminish the number of those offenses of which selfishness is the origin.[2]

A restatement

This completes our analysis of the second of the three factors in the origin of the content of moral judgment. The services of the will in matters ethical will be briefly explained. Earlier in this chapter it was stated that the will was of least importance in the interest of character and conduct. This assertion, however, was qualified when it was affirmed that the will, when properly understood and developed, might be of greater constructive worth in building character than either heredity or environment, even when we use the term *environment* in the broad sense, as in the present chapter. Of course, this statement

[1] Education, pp. 196–197. [2] Ibid. p. 207.

can hold true only when the individual inherits normal capacities and ability. Normal native endowment is assumed. The good will must have a fair chance, and the will as used in this chapter and book means nothing else than organized capacities. When environmental and educational forces organize capacities, we obtain what is called will power. This does not imply any subtle force not based on experience. In this sense of the term *will* man may attain as much real freedom as he chooses, and his range of choice is not appreciably limited.

The will as source of moral judgment

It is not uncommon to speak about the individualization of conscience. The content of moral judgment is largely the result of social approval or disapproval. When will comes to assume an important rôle in the building of character, disapproval or approval of one kind or another plays a less important part in the life of the individual. Paulsen says:

> All philosophy begins with the emancipation of the individual from commonly accepted opinions. And in the same way the individual's attitude to custom and to the opinions of his surroundings changes; he begins to follow his own bent and to mold his own life's ideals. The Sphere of free, individual action expands.[1]

For convenience of analysis and exposition we shall consider the will as functioning in three capacities. They are as follows: (1) The evaluation, selection, and actualization of individual motives and ideals of greatest worth. (2) The evaluation, selection, and actualization of social interests and ideals of greatest worth. (3) The bringing to the fullness of realization ideals and values not receiving the sanction of the social order. The first two would emphasize the will as a selective agency, whereas the last seems to imply a creative act.

Will in the interest of the individual

If it is at all in keeping with the dictates of the ethical and moral sciences to say that the will is instrumental in carving out moral personality, then this process must be based on one's ability to evaluate, to select, and then to bring to some degree of realization that which has been evaluated and selected. To

[1] A System of Ethics, p. 369.

be sure, this triple procedure may well be in harmony with what the social order approves, but it is enough to make it an act of will if there is evaluation, selection, and actualization of some motive, ideal, or process rather than indifference to values or even the purposeful sanction of less worthy motives. We will relate some actual examples of the point under discussion. One's will is functioning constructively when one realizes, in the presence of both good and bad, that the motive of benevolence is of higher worth than malevolence. When benevolence is seen to be of greater value, the second evidence of will is the decision to act benevolently; and the third evidence (and this is of more importance) is success in acting benevolently, and consequently in developing an abiding spirit of benevolence. The act of will now being explained does not imply the existence of a graded series of human motives, — from censoriousness, vindictiveness, and suspiciousness, the lowest, to the primary sentiment of reverence, the highest — as formulated by Martineau. Yet we must concede a degree of truth to Martineau's definition of right and wrong when he says: "Every action is right, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher: every action is wrong which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower."[1] What has been said of the functioning of will in reference to benevolence and malevolence might well be said of innumerable like situations.

Although it seems natural for one to criticize the motives of others before analyzing and criticizing his own motives, it is probably true that a person will employ his powers of evaluation, selection, and will for the advancement of his own interests before endeavoring to bring about social reform, or at least to evaluate, to select, and to adopt the best that society has to offer. It will now be our purpose to discuss the functioning of will in evaluating, selecting, and adopting, in terms of the content of moral judgment, that which society or the objective order has to offer.

[1] Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 270.

Will and prejudice distinguished

It takes appreciably higher qualities of intellectual and moral stamina and will power to make public one's willingness to evaluate, to uphold, and to bring to pass, in the interests of self or in the service of society itself, political and religious issues than merely to select and pass judgment on one's private motives. Many men live exemplary lives, always following the dictates of the best, and never venture to evaluate and to contribute to the political and religious orders. Of course we are not concerned with those who assume an active rôle in political and religious problems merely through prejudice. The mental process functioning in favor of bias and prejudice does not deserve to be called will at all.

Religion and the power to choose

Owing to the feelings and sentiments that have grown up around religious beliefs and doctrines it requires a fair degree of mental poise and moral integrity to be able to evaluate religious theses without prejudice, and it surely requires no less a degree of moral earnestness to determine the religious principles upon which we are to base our workable philosophy of life. Undoubtedly it requires no little degree of moral integrity, after having evaluated and knowingly selected those religious principles upon which life's values are to be based, to be consistent in the attainment of these chosen ideals. All this requires a sense of moral worth — an ability to give expression to moral judgment — and both are resultants of the power to choose.

We might further exemplify the origin of the content of moral judgment on the basis of evaluation, choosing, and consistent living in connection with the problems arising out of domestic, political, and industrial institutions. Social interests offer abundant opportunities for the exercise of the active moral will. A few words will now be devoted to showing how the realization of ideals not having the sanction of the social order may appreciably assist in the enlargement of the content of moral judgment. Surely this normally requires, on the part of the individual, ethical sanctions of the highest worth.

The truly creative will

In the account so far the will has been conceived as selecting that which is of greatest worth — that which is deemed of greatest worth from our own motives and impulses and that which is thought to be most valuable in the social, political, and religious orders. It is also not uncommon for one whose sense of right and wrong has become individualized to advocate constructive measures which have little or no social sanction. History affords many examples of great reformers in the interest of religion, education, and statesmanship. In religion Luther stands out as a reformer, Rousseau represents the interests of education, and Roosevelt stands typical among modern statesmen. The creative will is not always working toward moral reform, but will power combined with insight has made itself felt in every phase of human endeavor. Not all the examples of reform and creative will that history records have been examples of will power in the accepted understanding of the term. The truly creative will is more likely to be found working in the interest of the obscure person, and conspicuous public leadership is often the abnormal functioning of deep prejudices or compelling emotions that have taken the direction of social service or reform. The will which we are describing as working in the service of moral judgment is not a force compelling action but is the whole dynamic personality working in the interest of self or in the service of others.

This finishes the third topic of this chapter — the origin of the content of moral judgment — and the respective contributions thereto of heredity, environment, and education and of the selective and creative will. We shall now comment briefly on the sanctions of moral judgment. This will be the fourth and last topic of the present chapter.

4. Sanctions of moral judgment

Truly, there can be no sharp line of demarcation between the sanctions and the origin of conduct; yet, outside and beyond the narrow educational influences, writers on ethical theory and practice, such as Bentham and Spencer, have made capital out of the so-called sanctions — guardians, as it were, of what is

right and wrong. Every science has its unit of measure, and we may conceive of the sanctions as units of measure in respect to the standards of human behavior. For Bentham these sanctions guide conduct in terms of real or anticipated pleasures and pains, for him the equivalent of happiness. Bentham does not seem to be especially concerned with the influence of these sanctions in the development of motives. Spencer, on the other hand, employs the sanctions to make possible the rise of the moral consciousness. As to the four sources of pleasure and pain Bentham says:

> Considered separately, they may be termed the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious: and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed sanctions.[1]

The theory of human behavior which makes all actions depend upon the desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain is called psychological hedonism. We are not here concerned with pointing out the fallacies and inadequacies of this noted theory in the history of ethical speculation.

It is interesting to observe how Herbert Spencer makes the sanctions which he calls the political, the religious, and the social account for moral motivation. Spencer tells us that ethics has four aspects, namely, physical, biological, psychological, and sociological, and the author points out the services of these sciences to the theory and practice of ethics. Mind for Spencer consists of feelings and their relations to one another. This definition of mind gives a good clue to much of his moralizing — for instance, when he says: "Unquestionably the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings."[2] Also he observes that the three controls, political, religious, and social, lead men to subordinate proximate satisfactions to remote satis-

[1] Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 24.
[2] Principles of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 113.

factions. Spencer distinguishes between the external restraints and moral restraints, though the latter develop out of the former. The difference is made clear in the following words.

> The truly moral deterrent from murder, is not constituted by a representation of hanging as a consequence, or by a representation of tortures in hell as a consequence or by the representation of the horror of hatred excited in fellow men; but by a representation of the necessary natural results — the infliction of death agony on the victim, the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to his belongings. [1]

Spencer also believes that the sense of duty and moral obligation is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases. This conclusion would seem to be in accord with the common experience that duty is no longer irksome when its significance is fully appreciated.

This completes our survey of the subject matter of the present chapter. An attempt has been made to explain the meaning, content, origin, and sanction of what are usually called the virtues and the moral sentiments, and what we have seen fit to term the content of moral judgment. The next chapter will explain briefly the objects, agents, standards, and values of moral judgment.

[1] Herbert Spencer, Principles of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 120.

CHAPTER IX

THE SELF AND MORAL JUDGMENT: OBJECTS, AGENTS, STANDARDS, AND VALUES

Outline of chapter

In Chapter VIII an attempt was made to outline a fairly adequate account of the meaning, content, origin, and sanctions of what is technically called moral judgment as distinguished from scientific, or matter-of-fact, judgment. Four more phases of this same topic remain to be interpreted. They are (1) the objects of moral judgment; (2) the agents of moral judgment; (3) the standards of moral judgment; (4) the values of moral judgment.

Significance of ability to judge

The accuracy with which one is able to judge, to estimate, and to infer has often been made the test of mental ability. John Stuart Mill somewhere makes the ability to draw correct inferences from given situations the truest index of success in life. This sizing up of sundry situations, whether it be in the physical or in the social realms of experience, is not, of course, what we imply by the expression *moral judgment*. Even in meeting his class for the first time the teacher, if he has good judgment and insight into human nature, will, by noting casual remarks and attitudes, be able to determine with a considerable degree of accuracy the mental caliber of the students with whom he has to deal. In the same way the politician estimates political situations. The keen business man, by taking into account the supply and demand of certain commodities in which he is interested, will be able to estimate forthcoming prices. Thus the teacher, the politician, and the business man are required to judge certain objective situations. Here we are to concern ourselves with moral situations. A moral problem may well arise in connection with any interest in life. What do we understand by a moral situation?

Relation between intellectual and moral

Ethical theorists have always found it difficult to distinguish between the moral, the immoral, and the unmoral. It is also not an easy task to draw a sharp line between the intellectual and the moral. Every virtue has its vice. These distinctions are hard to realize, on account of the very nature of the organized self. The higher the attainment in mental organization and unity the more closely related will be the moral and the intellectual qualities. Not only is it interesting to note that it takes a higher degree of mental organization and discrimination to enable one to distinguish between the moral and the intellectual, but it is of equal interest to realize that the moment such a distinction is made intellectually possible, the real need of a distinction between the intellectual and the moral is rendered unnecessary. This means that in the highly organized self the intellectual implies the moral and the moral implies the intellectual. Any subject matter normally assimilated naturally humanizes the self. Many supposed distinctions in the physical world disappear upon closer analysis. How often distinctions among the mental processes vanish when brought within the reach of thought! The distinctions drawn between any two sciences are surface distinctions, and the more closely we analyze the apparent differences in mental phenomena the more readily they display underlying unities. Although it is possible to resolve many differences into likenesses, nevertheless there are real functioning differences between the moral, the immoral, and the unmoral.

Moral criteria

Inanimate objects are not instrumental in bringing about a moral situation. A stone tumbling down the mountain side and bringing death to human beings is not charged with moral culpability. In criticism of those who would personify the behavior of nature as moral, Mill, in his essay on "The Idea of God in Nature," says:

> In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature's everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws,

nature does once to every being that lives. . . . Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed.

Plants and animals are not objects of moral judgment. A poisonous herb may cause the death of a score, and a wild beast will devour a man with impunity. No one would consider these actions as either moral or immoral, and perhaps most of the actions prompted by the interests of responsible human beings would not be classed as moral or immoral; yet volition and social values are the truest sources of moral approbation or disapprobation. It would seem that before any act could become the true object of moral judgment it must be directly or indirectly sanctioned or motivated by a conscious human will. Although most moral situations have a social interest, there are numberless examples of real volition without moral bearings. My purposeful concentration on the task at hand through sheer force of will — the preparation of a lesson, the writing of a chapter — would hardly be considered proper subject matter for moral scrutiny, although anyone who fails to develop his just talents may well become the object of disapproval. One of the truest sources of a reliable moral character is the normal and progressive achievement of a life task in harmony with one's capacities.

A moral situation

Thus we seem to be led to the moral situation through the avenues of the volitional and the social. The volitional, the good will, and the social are always contributing forces in any moral situation. Green says: "No individual can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him."[1] Also: "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself. . . . This actual imposition, how-

[1] T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 387.

ever, of duties by a man upon himself precedes and is independent of a true conception of what duty is." [1] On page 463 we read: "The good will in one man has never failed to elicit or strengthen such a will in another." Who, then, may embody a moral situation, or what are the conditions under which character or conduct may become the objects of moral judgment?

Prerequisites of moral volition

If volition is the true source of acts or situations that are considered moral or immoral, then the conditions that make possible normal volition must be present. The more normal and the more highly organized the self which gives rise to motives and intentions, and the more nearly these are truly representative of the self, the more nearly complete is the number of those conditions that make possible normal volition. This all means that the moral self or agent must have attained a recognized degree of self-determination, or what is generally known as moral responsibility, and that this free moral agent must not be impeded in its actions by any external agency. True moral motives can hardly be said to exist before the age of early adolescence. We cannot recognize responsible motives as issuing from those who suffer mental alienation; sanity is necessary to make possible a moral situation. Conduct resulting from unavoidable circumstances foreign to the nature and inner purposes of the self cannot be made the normal object of moral judgment.

Extenuating circumstances

In addition to mental maturity, sanity, and the absence of external compulsion as important factors making possible normal motivation, certain extenuating circumstances are recognized which lessen the degree of moral culpability. The motives of persons who are handicapped with abnormal hereditary propensities and weaknesses are not so rigorously condemned as the motives issuing from those with normal hereditary qualities. Not only do the inherited qualities enter in to make one either more or less responsible for his character and conduct, but the

[1] T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 390.

environment and early educational opportunities are also determining forces in the eyes of the moralist, and such factors are even mediating influences in the hands of the law. We often overlook the motives of those who have not had a fair chance to develop moral personalities, and who have not had just opportunities in the race of life. The law is ordinarily lenient under similar circumstances.

1. The objects of moral judgment

We have now paved the way for an understanding of the object of moral judgment. When one is called upon to pass judgment on a certain situation, what is the thing judged? What is it that is made the object of approval or disapproval? Wherein does the praise or blame lie? We have already seen how volition, in some way or other, enters into the moral situation; there is no one true object of moral judgment. Moralists have been divided in their answers to these questions. A certain school of moralists has emphasized motives, whereas another school has just as tenaciously emphasized consequences and has neglected motives. Some have preferred to lay emphasis on character, and still others have seen fit to rely on conduct as the best moral representative. Before entering into any details of the discussion it may be well to state that each view is partly right and all are partly wrong. We may judge this problem as we should judge any of the various theories concerning the interpretations of history — the economic, the materialistic, the ideologic, the biologic, and all the rest; all are partly right, but no one theory is sufficient in itself. In discussing this problem of moral theory some writers use the expressions "the attitude" and "the content," "the formal" and "the material," "the disposition" and "the consequence." The problem will not seem impossible of solution if we keep in mind the ideal unity of the moral self.

Interrelation of motive, consequent, volition, conduct, and character

It will be of some interest and value to examine the views of a few representative moralists apropos of motive and consequent, volition, conduct, and character as accepted objects of moral judgment. Some value may attach to Muirhead's method

of resolving the antithesis between motive and consequent. In connection with the problem he says:

> Motive and consequent are not really opposed to one another in the manner supposed. The motive is the ultimate consequent as apprehended and willed. It is accordingly indifferent whether we say that the motive or the consequent is the object of moral judgment, so long as we understand what we are speaking about. Thus we may say that an act is good because the motive is good, but we shall be careful to note that by motive we mean, not a mere feeling but the end with which the will identifies itself in the action, and by so doing reveals its character. On the other hand, we may say that it is the consequences which give moral character to the act, but again we shall be careful to note that this is true only if by consequences we mean, first, consequences as preconceived, that is, as intended, and, secondly, those of the intended consequences for the sake of which the act is done, that is, the idea of which is the final cause of the act. A man cannot be held responsible for the consequences which he did not foresee, except in so far as he is held responsible for not seeing them.[1]

Thus, from the idea of the unity of the moral self, Muirhead, in addition to motive and consequent, makes conduct, or voluntary action, and volition, or act of will, which is the mark of conduct, and character, which is the general habit of will, all the objects of moral judgment.

Westermarck quoted

In continuing our discussion as to the relation of volition, character, and conduct we may recall the following quotation from Westermarck:

> The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions; and, since a man's will or character is a continuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed upon him in a particular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his character. We impute a person's acts to him only in so far as we regard them as a result or manifestation of his character, as directly or indirectly due to his will. . . . There is thus an intimate connection between character and conduct

[1] The Elements of Ethics, pp. 59–60.

as subjects of moral valuation. When judging of a man's conduct in a special instance, we judge of his character, and when judging of his character, we judge of his conduct in general.[1]

Westermarck also says: "What is perfectly independent of the will is no proper object of moral blame or moral praise." In Chapter IV of this work considerable attention was directed to the organization of the moral self. It is the result of the various methods of organization, as the mechanical, the logical, the organic, the purposeful, and the self-conscious, that one may properly speak of the continuity of volition, character, and conduct.

Integrity of motive and consequent

Good motives are sometimes said to have evil consequences, and evil motives are occasionally followed by good results. This seems to be in accord with the common experiences of mankind. Many parents have seemingly entertained the best of motives in making it possible for their children to attain a higher education, but surely it is not uncommon for the result to be disastrous both for the children and for the parents. In contrast to this generally accepted view an interesting relation of motive and consequent as objects of moral judgment is presented by Thomas Hill Green. This author would have us believe that if we take into account the real motive, and all the factors connected with the real motive, and all the far-reaching results in terms of consequences, it will be seen that when motives are good the consequences will of necessity be good, and also that evil motives will inevitably be followed by evil consequences. Ignorance, we are told, leads one to believe that good motives may be followed by unwholesome results.

The unique view presented in the previous paragraph may be reënforced by quoting from Green. He says:

> For it is only to our limited vision that there can seem to be such a thing as good effects from an action that is bad in respect of the will which it represents and that in consequence the question becomes possible, whether the morality of an action is determined by its

[1] The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 214–215. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

motive or by its consequences. There is no real reason to doubt that the good or evil in the motive of an action is exactly measured by the good or evil in its consequences, as rightly estimated — estimated, that is, in their bearing on the production of a good will or the perfecting of mankind. The contrary only appears to be the case on account of the limited view we take both of action and consequences.[1]

Green criticized

If in commenting on the conception just quoted we were to take the example noted in a previous paragraph relative to the self-sacrifice on the part of the parent to make possible the education of the child, we might well imagine Green's reply to a case like this to be that the real motive was not the self-sacrificing spirit of the parent, but upon investigation the really efficient cause or motive would be found to be the blind tendency of the age to educate those who do not have the requisite capacity to profit by education. It would be safe to pronounce Green's conclusion an extreme one; there is not sufficient degree of truth in the doctrine to enable the science of ethics to pronounce either the motive or the consequent as the object of moral judgment on the supposition that good motives must be followed by wholesome consequences. When carefully analyzed, Green's doctrine will be found to be based on a spiritual thesis which in itself requires unity and consistency not only in the cosmos but also in the experience of man. No philosophic belief can succeed in arguing away the possible conflict between a good motive and a bad consequence, on the basis that we have failed through lack of insight to search out real causes and effects.

Nature of voluntary act

John Dewey, with his characteristic originality and freshness of presentation, summarizes the inner and outer (the how and the what) aspects of voluntary activity as follows:

The fact that common life recognizes, under certain conditions, both theories as correct, and that substantially the same claims may be made for both, suggests that the controversy depends upon some underlying misapprehension. Their common error, as we shall attempt to show in the sequel, lies in trying to split a voluntary act

[1] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 352.

which is single and entire into two unrelated parts, the one termed "inner," the other, "outer"; the one called "motive," the other, "end." A voluntary act is always a disposition, or habit, of the agent passing into an overt act, which, so far as it can, produces certain consequences. A "mere" motive which does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine motive at all, and hence is not a voluntary act. On the other hand, consequences which are not intended, which are not personally wanted and chosen and striven for are no part of a voluntary act. Neither the inner apart from the outer, nor the outer apart from the inner, has any voluntary or moral quality at all. The former is mere passing sentimentality or reverie; the latter is mere accident or luck.[1]

Also the same author concludes:

We may begin the analysis of a voluntary act at whatever end we please, but we are always carried to the other end in order to complete the analysis. The so-called distinction between the "inner" and "outer" parts of an act is in reality a distinction between the earlier and the later period of its development.[2]

As Green endeavored to reconcile motive and consequent as objects of moral judgment, on the basis of a spiritualistic or idealistic background, so we also find Dewey making motive and consequent the beginning and the end of the same voluntary act, apparently not on the supposition that good motives must of necessity be followed by good results, or bad motives by unfavorable results, but on the basis of a philosophy (Dewey's philosophy) which seems to erase the dualistic conception of a distinction between the inner and the outer — mind being an inner principle and matter an external principle. Also we may detect pragmatic considerations entering into the solution. Motives are real only when they have a function to perform — actual consequences.

Formalists and empiricists

Enough has now been said to make clear how volition, conduct, and character may one and all be made the object of approval or disapproval on the basis of mental unity or organization. Likewise, we have explained the several methods em-

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, pp. 237–238. [2] Ibid. p. 239.

ployed to relate motive and consequence. So far little attempt has been made to differentiate and to isolate the two great schools of ethical theorists, who are divided on the basis of what they make the object of moral approbation or disapprobation. They are known as the formalists and the empiricists, or the intuitionists and the utilitarians.

Kantian formalism

Kant would probably be considered the best and most consistent representative of the formalists, and Jeremy Bentham a typical representative of the empiricists or early modern utilitarians. Kant's formal views are made conspicuous in his doctrine of the "good will" (which he considers the best thing in the world, without qualification), his doctrine of the categorical imperative, and the "inner sense of dignity," which may be interpreted as another name for conscience. Pleasures are not contributing elements in Kant's conception of duty and moral conduct. The pure formal motive is the only genuine object of moral consideration. Pleasure and happiness may well accompany the performance of duty, but in no case are they to be true moral sources. Man is responsible for his own perfection, but he is not responsible for the perfection of others. We do not go to another to find out the meaning of the categorical imperative, neither do we appeal to any other than our "inner" conscience for guidance in the face of temptation. We must be dutiful irrespective of consequences.

Utilitarians deny moral import to motive

The utilitarians, in judging a moral situation, emphasize consequences. This does not imply the nonexistence of motives, but claims that they have nothing to do with the morality of an act. The morality of an act is judged in terms of pleasure or happiness. According to Bentham and Spencer pleasures and pains are the only motivating forces. This theory of human action, which is known as psychological hedonism, would explain altruism and all the higher forms of moral endeavor in terms of the "solicitancy of pleasure and the repugnancy of pain." Pleasure and pain working in harmony with the laws of association are sufficient to account for the higher moral

concepts. This statement would seem to be sufficient to account for all the moral qualities advocated by Bentham and Spencer. Although some attempt was made by Mill to break down the rigor of the association psychology, he did not hold an exalted opinion of human nature in the original. In his essay on "The Idea of God in Nature" he says: "The truth is that there is hardly a single point of excellence belonging to human character which is not decidedly repugnant to the untutored feelings of human nature." He also says: "It remains true that nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct; and that there is hardly anything valuable in the natural man except capacities." Education and discipline, we must remember, are the great redeeming forces in man's moral life. Mill makes sympathy a natural instinct, but when uncultivated it soon degenerates into selfishness. He says: "Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory is want of mental cultivation."[1]

Mill distinguishes between motive and intention. The morality of the act, says Mill, depends upon the intention. When the motive makes no difference in the act, it makes none in its morality. When Mill places the morality of the act upon the intention, he is of course making the act the object of moral judgment, and the intended act is considered moral if it results in happiness. In the following paragraphs we shall briefly analyze a few of the more interesting conceptions of motive and motivation.

Motives defined

We are not now especially interested in analyzing motives either as the object of moral judgment or as its subject or agent; our interest attaches especially to the meaning of *motive* or *motivation*. If we are not too careful in requiring exact definitions, the term *motive* is usually taken to mean the instinct, desire, feeling, or purpose leading to action. Many well-known ethical theorists, however, have taken pains to give

[1] Utilitarianism, p. 20.

us more accurate definitions of motive. It will be instructive to consider a few of them. Muirhead sees fit to say:

> But seeing that the motive is that which moves, and the will is not moved until it chooses, it seems more correct to define motive finally as the idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will.[1]

It will be seen that this conception regards the motive as that mental process which is in harmony with the mind. Motive in this very true sense becomes a functioning of the personality. Green, in defining a motive, brings in the idea of the self-conscious factor, "a motive again being an idea of an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realize."[2] After telling us that a motive is not a mere appetite, he goes on to explain more in detail:

> It only becomes a motive, so far as upon the want there supervenes the presentation of the want by a self-conscious subject to himself, and with it the idea of a self-satisfaction to be attained in the filling of the want.[3]

According to Green a motive implies more than mere desire, appetite, or want; self-consciousness is a requisite; the desire or want must be intellectualized; self-consciousness must supervene. The desire or want is the dynamic factor, but the self-conscious supervention of the self is the spiritual element. There is no essential difference between this conception and that advocated by Muirhead.

Why people are misunderstood

The wholesomeness of Dewey's conception of motives is made plain in the following quotation:

> Motives are complex and "mixed"; ultimately the motive to an act is that entire character of an agent on account of which one alternative set of possible results appeal to him and stir him. Such motives as pure benevolence, avarice, gratitude, revenge, are abstractions; we name the motive from the general trend of the issue, ignoring contributing and indirect causes. All assigned motives are

[1] The Elements of Ethics, p. 58.
[2] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 100.
[3] Ibid. p. 101.

more or less post mortem affairs. No actuating motive is ever so simple as reflection afterwards makes it. But the justification of the simplification is that it brings to light some factor which needs further attention. No one can read his own motives, much less those of another, with perfect accuracy; though the more sincere and transparent the character the more feasible is the reading. Motives which are active in the depths of character present themselves only obscurely and subconsciously. Now if one has been trained to think that motive apart from attention, apart from the view of consequences flowing from an act, is the source and justification of its morality, a false and perverse turn is almost sure to be given to his judgment. Such a person fosters and keeps uppermost in the focus of his perceptions certain states of feeling, certain emotions which he has been taught are good; and then excuses his act, in face of bad consequences, on the ground that it sprang from a good motive. Selfish persons are always being misunderstood. . . . Only the habit of reading "motives" in the light of persistent, thorough, and minute attention to the consequences which flow from them can save a man from such moral error.[1]

Self-consciousness, self-regard, volition, motive

But one more conception of moral motivation in the light of its origin will be ventured. McDougall believes that a true moral motive can only be based on a proper self-regarding sentiment, and in respect to the relation of true volition, self-consciousness, and the self-regarding sentiment he says:

Before self-consciousness and a self-regarding sentiment are developed, conduct is determined by feelings and impulses or by ideas and the desires they arouse, either some one desire rising alone to consciousness and issuing at once in action, or through a conflict of impulses and desires, some one of which eventually predominates over the others and determines action; but actions issuing from such a conflict of impulses and desires is not true volition. Action is truly volitional only when the ideal of the self in relation to the idea of the end to be achieved by each of the conflicting tendencies determines the issue of the conflict.[2]

We first judge others

Enough has now been said to explain the meaning of the object of moral judgment in terms of motives and consequences;

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, pp. 257–258. [2] The Group Mind, p. 409.

also some of the more prominent conceptions of motive have been analyzed. So far in the interpretation of moral judgment we have assumed that the motive, consequence, conduct, character, or volition judged were those of some other person than ourselves. It is perfectly possible for one to pass judgment on his own motive, conduct, character, or volition. Martineau seems to imply that one judges the issues of his own mind before judging those of others. In so far as the present writer is able to analyze his own mental procedure, and also in so far as the opinions of moralists have been expressed, it would seem that we normally judge others before passing judgment on ourselves.

If there is any definite order at all in which one normally offers praise or blame, it would appear that one judges, first, the actions of others; secondly, the motives prompting these actions; thirdly, one's own behavior; and, last, his own individual motives and promptings.

Analysis of moral motives here

Teachers of the mental sciences know how difficult it is to get students to develop an interest in the analysis of motives. Only those who have already developed an abiding interest in the nature of the self will seek to analyze their motivating processes. It is difficult to analyze one's individual motives; it is still more difficult to get the average student to develop a lasting interest in so subtle a thing as a motive; and it is next to impossible for one to weigh and estimate his moral motives in the light of objective standards. Honest self-criticism may well be made an index of intelligence, but the persistent attempts to analyze one's inner mental processes is usually the sign either of unusual moral sincerity or of oncoming mental disease.

Character urges

In addition to the factors which have already been made the object of moral justification or disapprobation there are other elements of personality, not yet indicated, which may be made the objects of approval or disapproval. These qualities presently to be mentioned are not only factors which the practical moralist takes cognizance of in passing moral judgment; they are also formative agencies in the establishment of conduct, character,

and motives. They are positively and negatively regulative as well as constituent. We praise or blame people for their habitual moods, dispositions, and temperaments. They are truly borderline objects of moral judgment. Also readiness to become angry and quickness to forgive are of much ethical import. Moods and dispositions are in themselves minor morals. They are undoubtedly protean agencies urging character in one direction or another.

2. Agents of moral judgment

This completes the discussion of the first main topic of the present chapter, namely, the object of moral judgment. The second topic which we are now to discuss will be called the agents or perhaps, better, the instruments of moral judgment; and by the expression *agents* or *instruments* we are not to understand those forces, the environment, heredity, and education, which make possible the realization of moral concepts, but those so-called agents, whatever may be their true source and status, which proclaim and judge, as emotion, conscience, moral sense, intuition and the rest.

Emotion as moral agent

In respect to the agents proclaiming approval or disapproval we will first quote from Westermarck: "Whatever emotions may follow moral judgments, such judgments could never have been pronounced unless there had been moral emotions antecedent to them."[1] This means that in the individual, moral judgments have their origin in moral emotions, and these moral emotions are the agents that judge. We are told that these emotions have their prototype in public approval and disapproval, and that this public approval or disapproval is characterized by generality, disinterestedness, and impartiality. The nature and functioning of the moral agents about which we are speaking is well summed up by Westermarck when he says:

> Moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, because such judgments spring from moral emotions; because the moral emotions are retributive emotions; because a retributive emotion is

[1] Edward Alexander Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, p. 101.

a reactive attitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, toward a living being (or some one looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and because a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will.[1]

Although it is quite usual in referring to moral estimation to have in mind the motives and acts of someone other than oneself (and an especially good example was instanced in the immediately preceding paragraph), we shall now analyze the ethical theory of a famed writer on ethics whose chief interest lies in passing judgment upon his own inner tendencies or springs of action. We refer to James Martineau, who is perhaps the last of the great intuitionists.

Principles and consequences

In determining how the mind proceeds in estimating its own impulses and volitions Martineau says: "Every verdict implies preference; every preference, comparison; every comparison, things compared, and grounds of resemblance and difference between them." [2] Also we read:

The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this: that we are sensible to a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles, quite distinct from the order of their intensity, and irrespective of the range of their external effects.[3]

These competing motives are the moral agents in which we are now especially interested. This graduate scale of human motives, or inner agents, to which we have already referred, vary from the lowest passions (see Vol. II, page 266) to compassion and reverence, the highest. "The call to virtue consists simply in that felt superiority" of a higher over the lower of the two competing motives or agents. For instance, if the two highest motives of the list should compete, the "call to duty" would immediately decide in favor of reverence, as it possesses natural moral superiority over compassion. One is able to obtain a fairly

[1] Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, p. 314.
[2] Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 43.
[3] Ibid. p. 49.

adequate estimate of this system of ethics from the following concise generalization of his ethical principles:

> Thus, in the solution of all ethical problems, we have successive recourse to two distinct rules: namely, the Canon of Principles, which gives the true Moral criterion for determining the right of the case; and then, the Canon of Consequences, which gives the Rational criterion for determining its wisdom. The former suffices for the estimate of character; but for the estimate of conduct, must be supplemented by the latter.[1]

A concrete example

In the last quotation in the preceding paragraph the canon of principles is made the only source of moral character. The canon of consequences may under certain conditions enter to determine the way in which conduct may best function. Thus, while there is only one true source of moral determination, the nature of the form of the moral act may be carried out as utilitarian consequences dictate. To use a concrete example, if the love of culture were competing with the love of power, the canon of principles would determine that the former should take precedence over the latter, the love of culture being morally preferable to the love of power; but after moral preferability had been decided, the question of prudence might well arise as to what form the love of culture might take. If I am to make the pursuit of culture my life task, shall I pursue science, history, or literature? To answer this question I should need to investigate my ability and interest. This would be a matter for the canon of consequences to decide.

After this brief analysis and explanation of the views of Westermarck and Martineau in respect to the agents of moral judgment — the former emphasizing moral emotion and the latter setting forth a graduated scale of motives — we shall proceed to mention a few other representative moral agents.

Conscience as moral agent

If we take into account the whole history of moral speculation, there is probably no other concept of greater significance than

[1] Ibid. pp. 275–276.

that of conscience. We are not interested in analyzing its many meanings and interpretations, nor are we concerned with its significance as a moral agent. Whether conscience is innate or whether it is the result of individual experience we may well pass over, as this has been explained in an earlier chapter. For Butler, conscience seemed to be the ultimate moral agent. Whether one is estimating his own conflict of interests or impulses, or whether he is judging the behavior of others, it is this same conscience which is made the chief moral guide.

The career of conscience

Since the time of Butler, conscience has had a varied career. It has assumed many names. It has been privileged to function in terms of nearly all the mental processes. For Butler it was simply conscience, perhaps with a little more authority and dignity than self-love. It made up in right what it lacked in might. Moralists today do not doubt the significance of conscience; they simply deny it innateness. This conclusion is based on the undoubted fact that some people do for the sake of conscience what other people keep from doing for the sake of conscience. Many worthy moralists since the time of Butler, and perhaps a few before him, have used various expressions other than conscience to express the functioning of similar moral agencies. It will be well to mention a few of them.

Forms of intuition

Besides those ethical theorists who believe in the innateness of conscience, and besides the utilitarian school of theorists, there are the so-called intuitionists. Sidgwick mentions three stages of intuitionism: the perceptual, the dogmatic, and the philosophical. Perhaps no clear distinction can be drawn between conscience and intuitionism. The intuitionists may hold to the direct knowing of moral truth, where moral virtue is directly known without any mediate intellectual process. This form of intuitionism may well be considered dogmatic, as no explanation is offered except that moral knowledge is directly given. It is seriously to be doubted if this form of intuitionism can be distinguished from conscience. Most of the great intuitionists did not hold to the immediateness of moral truth, but

rather believed in its mediateness. The Cambridge Platonists, who were influenced by the "ideas" of Plato, made moral truth a matter of reason or mathematical calculation. Among the more prominent of the Cambridge Platonists may be mentioned Cudworth, Clarke, and Price.

Opposition to Hobbes

This school of moralists made intuition, with its rational basis, the agent of moral judgment largely in opposition to Thomas Hobbes, the egoistic hedonist, who maintained the doctrine of man's innate selfishness, and who made the State the source of what was right or wrong.

Kantian intuition

Perhaps no better example of moral intuition can be found in the history of ethical thought than the system of Immanuel Kant, who made intuition a matter of moral reason — a form distinct from theoretical reason. His famous categorical imperative is the best expression of the moral or practical reason. For Kant this moral reason becomes what we have called the agent of moral judgment. Conscience also seems to function in the Kantian ethics in the sense of an inner dignity. There are still other agents of moral judgment, which we will casually mention.

Moral sense

Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in particular made use of the so-called moral sense as an agent of moral judgment. This moral sense seems to function as an inner sense — a natural endowment of man. The functioning of this moral faculty seems to be immediate, and in this respect differs from the intuition as advocated by the rationalists or intellectualists, who made the moral process more or less mediate. From the fact that this moral sense seems to have no history, and that its immediate apprehension of right does not involve other mental processes, it will probably not be amiss to make it an example of dogmatic intuition about which we spoke recently.

Sympathy

Still other mental faculties have had a share in apprehending moral situations. Moralists of one school or another have found it convenient to make use of all or nearly all the processes in which psychology is interested. Adam Smith, one of the most

conspicuous of the psychological moralists, made sympathy the basic instrument in determining moral worth. It is through the agency of sympathy that one approves or disapproves the motives and actions of others or of self. Adam Smith seems to make the doctrine of sympathy a purely psychological phenomenon and seemingly a psychological phenomenon with an empirical human basis.

Compassion

It is interesting to note how Arthur Schopenhauer makes pity or compassion function in a similar capacity; for Schopenhauer the quantum of compassion with which an individual happens to be born is not subject to change. Man's goodness or badness is made to depend upon this quantum, and education is unable to change man's inner nature. Punishment may cause us to conform to the good; but punishment, inasmuch as it works no change in one's compassion, works no change in one's inner character. Schopenhauer's doctrine seems to have a cosmic support, as was usual with most moralists of the time, whereas there seems to be no such implication in that of Adam Smith. Of all the agents of moral judgment there is none, in modern times at least, so significant as prudence. Prudence is only another name for the utilitarian theory of morals.

Prudence and moral judgment

According to this theory utility is the source of virtue. Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick would on all counts be considered the greatest and most influential of modern utilitarians. Utilitarianism is only another name for the modern form of hedonism, which has taken a social or universalistic trend. The prudential, or utilitarian, conception of morals as an abstract theory does not imply, of course, on the part of a moral agent, a personal calculation in terms of pleasure and pain. It simply implies that the moral concepts, justice, honor, and the rest, have developed out of utilitarian situations. It is perhaps true that sordid utilitarianism does make personal calculation the basis of much behavior that assumes the name of morals. Since the days of Bentham this process has been known as the hedonic calculus.

Refined utilitarianism

The utilitarian theory of moral judgment, either as it was molded in the hands of its greatest disciples (namely, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick) or in its more refined dress, is held by those who consider happiness as the standard of moral judgment; but when happiness is made the standard of moral judgment, then prudence, or utilitarianism, is held in disguise. Many of us are not pleased to entertain utilitarian conceptions of morals, although, with Thomas Hill Green, we are pleased to acknowledge the practical value of utilitarianism. Thomas Hill Green, although admitting the great practical value of utilitarianism as advocated by Bentham and his disciples, nevertheless denied its substantial verity.

Those who entertain the more refined view of utilitarianism, of course, do not consciously make pleasure or the usefulness of an act the reason for its performance. Psychological hedonism has long ago been discarded. Nevertheless it remains true that utilitarian ethics has a true and substantial basis. Virtue is useful. Virtue survives for no other reason than its usefulness. Biological considerations have long ago put to flight the intuitional and the moral-sense ethical theorists. Conscience still holds its own, as it rightfully should, not because it rests on a citadel of innateness but because it is functionally useful, the resultant of plastic human nature under social pressure. Thus one is justified in making prudence the agent of moral judgment, and perhaps it is the truest agent that has been devised by man, not because one normally employs calculation in imposing moral judgment but chiefly because human nature guarantees the usefulness of concepts that have a history.

Similarities in theories

So far an attempt has been made to enumerate the various agents employed in imposing moral judgment. It must be understood, however, that the similarities among these several theories are as much in evidence as their differences. Who is able to make clear the distinction between reason, conscience, intuition, and the moral sense? The real difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Writers have sought to draw valid

distinctions but usually to no great purpose. Conscience is sometimes said to refer to one's own motives, and the other moral faculties to the actions of others. Not infrequently intuition has been interpreted as mediate, and in other cases as immediate. Several meanings may be read into the moral sense. Martineau, in criticizing the moral-sense theory of Hutcheson, sees no good reason to give it anything more than a hedonistic basis. All theories seem, surreptitiously to be sure, to bring in the element of pleasure, happiness, or utility as a constituent factor in moral behavior. Even Kant failed to put ethics on a purely formal basis.

To illustrate the reconciliations touched upon in the preceding paragraph it will be interesting to note three instances in which ethical theorists of the highest order have either consciously or unconsciously combined supposedly opposite and contradictory systems. We make specific reference to Mill, Spencer, and Sidgwick.

Mill's ethical heresy

No one would deny John Stuart Mill an honorable place among the utilitarians. Mill intentionally makes pleasure and pain the source of action. This is conformity with orthodox hedonism, which makes the quantity of pleasure a factor of prime consideration. But Mill perhaps unknowingly passes from the pure-pleasure theory when he says:

> Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.[1]

When Mill makes a qualitative distinction, between pleasures, he of course passes from the principle of hedonism, which in itself is quantitative. To make clear his adherence to pleasure as a principle of action he also says:

[1] Utilitarianism, p. 12.

Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain or for both reasons united . . . and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.[1]

Hedonism and intuition in Spencer

It is interesting to note how Herbert Spencer poses as a utilitarian. He would not admit any other principle than the "solicitancy of pleasure and the repugnancy of pain" as sources of action. But in spite of this we find him proclaiming:

So do I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continual transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of moral science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them.[2]

A criticism

Spencer bases his moral intuitions on the inheritance of acquired nervous modifications. We are not here concerned with investigating the validity of such a procedure. In passing it might be well to note that modern biology does not admit the inheritance of acquired nervous modifications. But, be that as it may, our interest is simply in Spencer's attempt to reconcile utilitarianism with intuitionism by bringing in the factors of inheritance and evolution. These so-called intuitions of which Spencer speaks, modern moralists would be inclined to attribute to the experiences of the individual rather than to those of the race. Most present-day theorists would not hesitate to put all the other moral faculties on the same basis. This does not imply, of course, that social approval or disapproval in itself is sufficient to account for man's conscious moral experiences.

[1] Ibid. pp. 57–58. [2] Principles of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 123.

But social pressure working in conjunction with interests, egoistic or altruistic and the rest, may be considered sufficient to account for all the agents of moral judgment.

Intuitionism and utilitarianism

One more reference may be made to a recognized system of ethics which knowingly reconciles utilitarianism and intuitionism. After making a rather elaborate comparison of the utilitarian and intuitional methods Sidgwick goes on to say:

> We have found that the common antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians must be entirely discarded: since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with a Utilitarian system, but even seem required to furnish a rational basis for such a system.[1]

This brief statement from the master moralist is clearly self-explanatory. Another quotation will be enlightening:

> And further, even if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made completely rational.[2]

Utilitarianism and intuitionism are reconciled on the basis of the doctrine of rational benevolence. According to this doctrine, which we have explained before, when one admits happiness to be the standard of moral judgment, it must be immediately acknowledged that universal happiness must be included as well as that of the individual. Sidgwick makes this process as purely intuitional as the ethical reasoning earlier employed by Clarke, a typical representative of the Cambridge Platonists.

3. The standard of moral judgment

Of no less significance to those interested in the analysis of moral judgment is the so-called standard of moral judgment or standard of moral values. As every moral judgment implies a motive, an act, or a character judged, and as every such process requires an agent or subject judging, whether this agent be

[1] The Methods of Ethics, p. 495. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company. [2] Ibid. p. 497.

called conscience, intuition, moral sense, or prudence, so likewise there are standards, practical or theoretical or both, that moralists have explicitly or implicitly accepted as a measuring rod in imposing moral judgment. This does not necessarily imply that each time it becomes necessary to pronounce moral judgment one must consciously have in mind some accepted standard presently to be mentioned, but it does mean that ethical theorists have speculated as to what ought to be the standard for determining what is right or wrong, or what is the end, good, summum bonum, or purpose of life.

The problem stated

Perhaps it would be correct to say that a standard of moral judgment has gradually developed through the period of ethical speculation into some standard or end or purpose of life. What is it that all men normally seek? What is the good? Surely, if the standard of what is right or wrong is the beginning of a process which ends in a good or purpose, the beginning and end of a historic process, then a standard of right or wrong must have as its aim the fulfilling of a real and lasting good. This means that if the actions of others and those of the self are today governed by a standard, then this standard is sanctioned in the interest of attaining an ultimate good. The remaining portion of the present chapter will be largely devoted to tracing and explaining the shiftings in the standards of moral value.

Historically speaking, at least, man's actions have been largely controlled by forces outside and beyond himself. History illustrates this fact, and it is no less true in the life history of every individual today. We are controlled by others before we control ourselves, and it is of no little ethical import that the wisdom with which we have been controlled early in life will largely determine the success which we shall attain in controlling ourselves later in life. The chief aim of external control is to make possible the attainment of an inner control. The aim of philanthropy is to help people to help themselves. It will be interesting to trace briefly the standards of ethical values as they gradually pass from an external to an internal source of control.

From law to personality

The expression "the standard of moral judgment" may be used interchangeably with "the standard of value," implying, of course, ethical values. When man is required to conform in his behavior to the commands of some external agency, as God or the State, it is perhaps more in accord with accepted usage to adopt the expression "the standard of moral judgment"; but when man begins to think for himself, to express his own personality (not necessarily at variance with the dictates of objective authority), when he essays to meditate upon the purpose of life — the end or good — then it is more in accordance with custom to employ the expression "the standard of value" rather than "the standard of moral judgment." We shall endeavor to preserve this distinction.

Law, happiness and perfection

The history of ethical practice, no less than the history of ethical speculation, has recorded three general standards — three concepts which have governed man's behavior. We may term these the concept of law, the concept of happiness, and the concept of perfection.

Foundations of worth

Thoughtful man in the past, as well as thoughtful man in the present, has not always had any one of these three standards or concepts in mind when prompted to embark upon the day's duty, the performance of a kindly act, or even the choosing of a life purpose or ideal. We normally say that man acts, or chooses, or decides in accordance with his established mode of behavior, or, as has been amply demonstrated in the second main topic of this chapter, that man acts in accordance with the agent of moral judgment, conscience, intuition, and what not, and not expressly on account of law, happiness, or any notion of perfection that he may have in mind. During the earliest stages of his progress man has judged it best to be obedient to law or established authority. Later he deemed it better to emphasize happiness as the standard of value. Some have seen fit to make perfection the true good. When one estimates his own motives or contemplated acts or the motives or contemplated behavior of others, or his own overt deeds or the overt deeds of others,

whether they be good or bad, one does not normally pronounce judgment upon them in accordance with the standard concept, the obedience to law, conformity to happiness, or conduciveness to perfection. These three concepts, standards of judgment, or standards of value simply serve as a substantial background of judgments of worth.

Philosophy as a standard

We may find a rather close analogy in some of the standard philosophies. Some men conceive the world to conform to the inevitable laws of sequence — a mechanical world of cause and effect, a world governed by no cosmic purpose. Man, the microcosm, is considered no exception to the working of the macrocosm. He is considered a part of the universal mechanism. To carry out our analogy with the standard of moral judgment: the materialistic conception of man and the world does not consciously determine at any one time man's practical mode of life; as if he were not a free moral agent responsible for his every deed and action, but a materialistic age will in time effect its influence in consciously or unconsciously urging materialistic philosophies of life, and institutions of a similar character. Materialistic philosophies have a tendency to eventuate in materialistic institutions. In a similar way man's personality and his institutions tend to conform not immediately but mediately to the dominant standard of moral judgment.

Idealism and value

An analogy of equal worth may be said to hold between the idealistic philosophy and a standard of moral value — happiness, for instance. Institutions springing up during the reign of an idealistic philosophy soon come to be ingrained with idealistic tendencies. Likewise, he who holds to an idealistic philosophy of life is controlled at any one moment of his conscious experience by motives not appreciably unlike those governing the materialistic, but in the long run his outlook and reactions upon life will tend to conform to purposes of idealism rather than of materialism. When it is generally appreciated that happiness is the standard of value among men, man will gradually endeavor to make happiness possible and real.

Law as a standard

A brief account of the three standards already mentioned will be of some value to the reader. Law was the first standard of moral judgment. Obedience to law was the measure of man's righteousness. Duty, obedience, sense of obligation are important virtues when objective law is the standard of that which is right. The concept law has had a varied history even from the standpoint of moral judgment. With the Hebrews, law as a standard was conceived to have a superhuman origin. The Ten Commandments were divinely sanctioned and handed down for the guidance of man. Obedience to creeds and doctrines that sprang up during the early Christian centuries in the interest of the Christian religion has also served in a similar capacity. Until recent times moral and religious righteousness has also been measured by its conformity to man-made creeds.

Stoic law

The concept law as a standard of human behavior has had a unique place in the Stoic conception of man and nature. Man's welfare in this world was conceived to be proportional to his cognizance of and obedience to the laws of nature, or the divine order, or reason. Laws of nature, reason, the essence of reality, all seem to be synonymous in the experience of the early Stoic.

The state as moral standard

In addition to laws divinely sanctioned and laws inherent in nature, political, or man-instituted, law has been conceived as the standard of moral judgment. Hobbes made the State the standard of moral judgment. Even in the eyes of Hobbes the efficient laws of the State were conceived as necessarily conformable to the laws of nature. Of course, no sharp line can be drawn between formal law as a recognized standard of that which is right and the so-called modern sanctions, the religious, the political, and the social, which were earlier discussed in Chapter VIII. The sanctions as employed by Bentham and Spencer were conceived as formative agencies rather than as objective standards in the sense in which we are now using the term. All classification in the field of ethical speculation represents points of view rather than clear differences of subject matter.

It will suffice if we mention one or two concrete examples of moralists who have recognized the significance of law as a standard of moral judgment. No one would fail to include Immanuel Kant, who sets forth the categorical imperative as a law of practical moral reason. Here is an extreme example of a case in which a moral law — a law, though born from within — has absolute and unconditional authority to command obedience.

Objective standards and subjective agents

It will be sufficient to state in passing that since the time of Butler, or perhaps for a considerable time prior to his formulation of an inner conscience, the notion of an established objective standard, or law, became converted, in the hands of a considerable number of moralists, into a subjective law, known as conscience, intuition, moral sense, etc., which we discussed under the topic "Agents of moral judgment." Objective standards were converted into subjective agents.

Laws of life

Considerable significance may attach to our reference to a single moralist, Herbert Spencer, who, though primarily making pleasure or happiness the source of activity as well as the standard of value, nevertheless expressly states that morality must be grounded in the constitution of things. He says:

> And I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.[1]

Here we have a first-rate example of an ethical theory which recognizes pleasure and happiness as the only valid reason for moral determination, though such an achievement is to be attained only on the basis of law — mental, biological, social.

This completes our discussion of law as a standard of moral reference. We shall next briefly mention happiness as a standard of value. In this connection happiness is deemed the thing of greatest value. Happiness becomes the summum bonum.

[1] Principles of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 57.

Happiness as standard

Happiness as a standard of value has had a long history. It is not the purpose of the present writer to enter into a detailed account of this resultant of ethical speculation. In order to do justice to the concept of happiness in connection with ethical theory and practice it would be necessary to analyze the pleasure theories of the early Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who made pleasure in some form the source of human behavior. The present distinction between pleasure and happiness found no place among the ancient thinkers. Happiness as a standard of value is also closely related to happiness or pleasure as the source of human behavior. There is not only a logical relation between happiness as a standard of value and happiness as a source of human behavior, but there is also a historical relation between the two uses of the term. In analyzing happiness as a standard by which actions are to be judged it would seem perfectly natural that among early writers happiness should not be differentiated from pleasure. It seems natural to make happiness or pleasure the source of action before making it the standard of action or value. It is one thing to be guided in one's actions by a certain interest; it is quite another thing to conceptualize that interest into a standard of action. And it is to be expected that man would long delay his analysis of the real source and significance of happiness. As the concept law preceded the concept happiness in matters of ethical value, we might naturally expect that happiness would receive a religious sanction before it would receive a sanction primarily biological. History seems to confirm this conception. Christian utilitarians like Paley did considerable to make possible happiness as a standard of value. According to Christian utilitarians, God desires His creature to be happy. Later empirical utilitarians, with whom we usually associate the pleasure and happiness theories, did not resort to the deity to find sufficient reason for the inculcation of human happiness.

Psychological hedonism

It will not be departing from ordinary usage to treat the pleasure or happiness theory from two points of view, namely,

psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism will first receive brief attention. Psychological hedonism is the belief that all human behavior has its origin in the desire for pleasure or the aversion to pain. The fallacy lurking in this theory of human behavior has often been pointed out. Undoubtedly much of our daily behavior is, as a matter of fact, sanctioned by the anticipation of pleasurable results, but many actions are executed irrespectively of any thought of pleasantness or unpleasantness. The normal person will play, work, and study, and will often carry on long and intricate mental processes, apparently without ever becoming conscious of the satisfaction that may result from such a procedure. Only the spoiled and sophisticated permit pleasure to be a guiding factor in their daily actions. The normal child and youth unconsciously endeavor to incorporate the whole world. In a sense the child may be said to possess the attributes of the true artist; his interests are truly objective. He has some of the attributes of the genius. Turck defines genius as perfect objectivity, that is, objectivity in terms of interest. But alas! how soon the average child's objective interests become transformed into calculated selfishness! How often we are disappointed when we observe his natural altruism translated into sentimentalism! The psychologist and the philosopher endeavor to make the whole world integral to the self without thought of pleasure and pain; yet there is no greater source of lasting satisfaction than mental organization and expansion. Interest in the self is not necessarily a selfish interest. Perhaps no other aspect of human endeavor is farther removed from the snare of psychological hedonism than the activities pertaining to self-investigation.

Hedonism institutionalized

If one were in search of a dependable index of strength of character, it would be difficult to find more reliable evidence than the absence of a persistent and conscious search for pleasure. Even pleasure and pain are limited as guiding principles. Though there is always an unconscious endeavor to attain an agreeable state of consciousness, as was indicated in the early

part of this work, nevertheless there is no better index of oncoming moral degeneration, and even of irremedial forms of mental abnormality, than the presence of a too persistent search for pleasure. We do not need to search for conspicuous examples of the practical functioning of pleasure philosophies. Such practices are the more disastrous to the real happiness of the individuals so occupied, and to the best interests of the social order, from the very fact that the evil effects consequent upon these practices are far separated in time and space from their real causes. It is an accepted fact that the evil effects of mental dissipation are always far removed from their true causes; that is, the evil effects of mental dissipation are rarely felt immediately. In a similar manner the evils — intellectual, moral, social, and spiritual — of the tendencies frequently found in our educational institutions, both public and collegiate, are not immediately realized, at least in their full consequences, but their deadly and disintegrating effects will inevitably appear during the coming decades and in future generations. In respect to emotional influences our educational institutions are sinning against the youth of the present age, though perhaps unconsciously, and the whole of mankind will inevitably suffer the consequences. Emotions too frequently indulged and pleasures too early experienced make impossible the normal maturing of the moral self.

Mental and moral flabbiness

Perhaps a few words will be necessary to make clear my present thesis. The laissez faire policy so conspicuously manifest in many of our educational institutions since the beginning of the present century, and especially noticeable during the last decade, is inevitably working evil effects not only in the direction of mental inefficiency, but, what is of much greater moment, in that of moral flabbiness. The moral self is no longer receiving its just deserts. Moralists have long since discarded the doctrine of psychological hedonism, but the after effects of the theory which makes pleasure the source of human action continue to function in formal educational circles. In the field of moral

values unwholesome reaction often follows in the wake of a discredited and disproved philosophy.

Empirical hedonism

We may now turn from an interpretation of the meaning and evil effects of the pleasure philosophy to a brief survey of its chief historic methods. We are still using the term *pleasure* and *happiness* interchangeably. Bentham makes clear the values of pleasures and pains which anticipated actions incur by the words *intensity*, *duration*, *certainty* or *uncertainty*, *propinquity* or *remoteness*, *fecundity*, *purity*, and *extent*, and one is to take into account the number of persons concerned in experiencing the pleasures and pains.[1] The hedonic balancing of the calculated pleasures and pains in an anticipated action will, according to this scheme, determine its moral advisability — the true source of the good, pleasure, or happiness, or that which will occasion pain, evil, unhappiness.

A qualification

The preceding paragraph presents the formal aspects of the famous hedonic calculus. It is not to be supposed that all who entertain the view that pleasures and pains are the only guiding principles exercise such due caution before embarking upon a certain enterprise; nor is it the usual thing that an individual should formally proceed in accordance with the pleasure-and-pain calculus before pronouncing moral judgment upon the motives or actions of his neighbor. This qualifying statement leads us to a second method employed by hedonic philosophers, and, as a matter of fact, the method actually employed by philosopher and plain man alike — the objective method, which is one step removed from Bentham's calculus.

Objective hedonism

Even so rigid a moralist as Immanuel Kant tells us that man is endowed with three dominant motives or desires: the desire for power, the desire for glory, and the desire for renown. The politician may be more interested in gaining renown than in being of active service to the State. Even in the former case he may have no direct thought of the pleasure or happiness that comes with fame. Those who succeed in attaining greatness

[1] Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 30.

seldom take time to enjoy their greatness. The man amassing great wealth is a hedonist. Wealth and worldly goods are not calculated in terms of equivalent pleasures, though possible pleasures may well be in the background of consciousness.

Hedonism and perfectionism

To be sure, there is no sharp line of demarcation between objective hedonism and perfectionism as a standard of moral judgment — a criterion of morals which we shall analyze in due season. The student who earnestly seeks to develop his moral self may do so because he realizes the pleasures and satisfaction that will probably come to him. Most great scientists, moralists, and philosophers have, early in life, entertained dreams of greatness. Psychological hedonism, as it is ordinarily understood, has never been the immediate stimulus to the perfection of personality, the creation of new forms of art, or the inception of world-stirring ideas; but expanding personality, creativeness, and growing ideas are in themselves self-urging processes. The man who accumulates considerable wealth normally does so from a sense of thrift or perhaps on account of a feeling of economic security.

Scientific hedonism

If it is desirous to make still closer distinctions in the pleasure philosophy called hedonism, we may speak of scientific hedonism. Herbert Spencer may well be honored as a typical representative of this form of hedonism when he states (as quoted earlier in this chapter) that the function of the moralist is to deduce from the laws of life those conditions which inevitably produce happiness, such as moderate biological and mental functioning, and that when these laws or deductions are known, they are to be followed irrespectively of anticipated pleasures.

Definition of terms

At this stage of our analysis it will be well to make clear the meaning of a few expressions common to ethical discussion. When the pleasure philosophy is applied to the pleasure of the individual himself, the phrase *egoistic hedonism* is used. Here Thomas Hobbes would be a typical representative. Altruistic or universalistic hedonism is used in speaking of the pleasures or happiness of all. *Utilitarianism* is a term substituted for

altruistic hedonism or *universalistic hedonism*. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are utilitarians.

Ethical hedonism

We shall next turn to a brief analysis of ethical as distinguished from psychological hedonism. And by ethical hedonism we are to understand the theory which makes happiness the criterion of morals, or the standard of values, or, if we choose to employ the phrase which is ordinarily used, the standard of moral judgment. The reader will do well to recall that law was made the first of the standards of moral judgment analyzed earlier in the present chapter.

Happiness as standard of value

Ethical hedonism, or happiness as a standard of value, differs essentially from psychological hedonism in that it does not make pleasure the end of every desire. The formal psychological hedonist is one who would make pleasure the only motive for striving, but the ethical hedonist would make pleasure or happiness the good, or the criterion, or the measuring rod of an action, a theory, or a life. Happiness is always a standard, a resultant, but pleasure or happiness has nothing to do with immediate motivation. Utilitarianism is substantiated on the basis of happiness as the criterion of life and action, but not on the basis of pleasure as the only true source of motivation.

To illustrate ethical hedonism, or happiness as a standard, we would mention Bentham's and Spencer's methods of making happiness the test of good laws or efficient legislation. Spencer likewise makes happiness the only true test of right educational method. He asks, Does mental assimilation afford immediate satisfaction? One could well go farther and say that the moral test of a successful career would be, Has it resulted in happiness? This conclusion might well be contested by those who refuse to make happiness the standard of value.

Pleasure and happiness distinguished

After having approached happiness as a standard of value by first reviewing the three methods of psychological hedonism — the empirical, the objective, and the scientific — it will be well for us to come to closer quarters with the distinction between pleasure and happiness. Modern moralists make a clear distinc-

tion between pleasures that are fragmentary and isolated and happiness as a general state of being — the mental state resulting from the fullness and harmony of mental and bodily functioning. Dewey concludes his discussion of happiness as a standard as follows:

> (1) That happiness consists in the fulfillment in their appropriate objects (or the anticipation of such fulfillment) of the powers of the self manifested in desires, purposes, efforts; (2) true happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers of the self which are of higher quality; (3) that the man of good character, the one in whom these high powers are already active, is the judge, in the concrete, of happiness and misery.[1]

Utility and virtue

As before noted, utilitarianism is the ethical theory which makes happiness applicable to all. Usefulness, then, in the form of happiness must become the foundation of all the fundamental virtues. An acceptable ethical theory, like an acceptable philosophy, must offer a satisfactory solution to all one's problems. If utilitarianism is an acceptable moral philosophy of life, it must furnish an adequate account, on the utilitarian basis, of the development of wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, etc. Man cultivates these attributes or moral symbols of happiness on account of their utility. John Stuart Mill concludes his discussion of the concept of justice on the utilitarian, or happiness, basis as follows:

> It [justice] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words without rational significance, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one, might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary.[2]

From what has been said it is not to be concluded, of course, that in any particular case one would necessarily be courageous,

[1] John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 280. [2] Utilitarianism, pp. 92–93.

or practice justice, simply because it would be prudent to do so; but nevertheless, in the long run, man has found it to be a matter of prudence to practice such virtues. And for the same reasons society has found it universally profitable to accept these moral standards; generally speaking, these standards are conducive to happiness. This completes our discussion concerning happiness as a standard of value, the summum bonum, the good.

Perfection as standard of value

A third and last standard of value, or standard of moral judgment, remains to be discussed. Sidgwick, in accordance with his characteristic honesty, says:

> I shall therefore confidently lay down that if there be any Good other than happiness to be sought by man, as an ultimate practical end, it can only be the Goodness, Perfection, or Excellence of Human Existence.[1]

Theories related

Ethical theories, not unlike philosophical theories, are not clearly distinct; they overlap and interpenetrate. There is much in common between happiness as a standard and perfection as a standard, and there is no clear line of cleavage between perfectionism and the theory that makes obedience to law the standard of moral righteousness. If it is possible to point out real differences between happiness and perfection as standards, it would seem that happiness emphasizes rather the feeling side of human consciousness, while perfectionism emphasizes will and reason. Mackenzie, in commenting on three standards of law, happiness, and perfection, says:

> To some extent the three great peoples, the Hebrews, Romans, and Greeks might be taken as representing these three ideals. With the Hebrews the law of righteousness is supreme. The Romans were also devoted to law, but in a different sense. The law which interested them most was rather that by which the mechanical conditions of life are regulated, and which provide the material of happiness. The Greeks obviously represent the ideal of perfect development of personality.[2]

[1] The Methods of Ethics, p. 115. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

[2] A Manual of Ethics, p. 160.

Greek perfectionism

Perfectionism has its origin among the Greeks no less than the pleasure and happiness theory. One may trace its beginnings from Socrates to the Cynics, and from the Cynics to the Stoics. The element of human perfection is conspicuously present in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. Perfectionism with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle is much more than a mere ethical theory. In the great triad of Greek ethicists it becomes a real functionalism. The whole-mindedness of the Greeks is an index of their perfectionism. For Socrates, perfectionism resides in the functioning of the concept in the service of virtue and character. This virtue and character functions in the interests of the good, the beautiful, and the true. For Plato this perfectionism finds its fulfillment in the cardinal virtues, whereas in Aristotle its essence is manifest in the doctrine of the golden mean.

Perfectionism eclectic

With the advent of modern philosophy perfectionism follows closely in the wake of the great rationalistic systems. It is consistently manifest in the writings of Spinoza, where wisdom is the good and ignorance the root of all vice. With the coming of the great idealistic systems of philosophy it seems to lend itself to the interest of absolutism in the writings of Hegel and Thomas Hill Green. In more recent times perfectionism seems to have no definite philosophical home that it may logically call its own. Rationalist and empiricist, idealist and materialist, refined utilitarian and pragmatist, all accept perfectionism as the true standard of ethical value.

Trinity of moral value

Although perfectionism as a criterion of ethical value received its modern inception in the home of the permanent self, it is no longer neglected by those moralists who do not entertain the integrity of a permanent self. Perfectionism has become democratic in its intentions. Irrespectively of any psychological creed or theory of knowledge, whether the self is permanent, empirical, or illusory, its first principle is the development of all one's natural capacities, both in the interests of the individual and in the interests of all others. Perfectionism, obedience to law or

conformity to righteousness, and the happiness of the utilitarian constitute the true trinity of moral value.

4. The values of moral judgment

The fourth and last topic of this chapter, the values of moral judgment, will receive brief attention. We shall interpret these values from the standpoint of the standard of moral judgment. If ethics may rightfully be made a real science, it is quite imperative that there be recognized standards, or units of measure. There must be set standards in accordance with which man's life is to be lived. These three moral units of measure — law, happiness, and perfection — have already been subjected to analysis.

Centers of moral gravitation

It will be convenient to compare, from the standpoint of valuation, the objects and agents of moral judgment, each in their turn, by the standards of moral judgment. It must be admitted that what we have called the standards of moral judgment are the rightful centers of moral gravity. All practical and theoretical moral interests center about these three concepts. Early in this chapter we considered motive and conduct or motive and consequence as the chief objects of moral judgment. Now, when we are making the standards of moral judgment the center of moral gravitation, it will readily be perceived that motives, conduct, character, consequence, etc., when morally acceptable, must conform to established standards and must, qualitatively speaking, be substitute expressions for law, happiness, or perfection. Similarly, the agents of moral judgment — conscience, intuition, moral sense, and the rest — naturally gravitate in the direction of the three acceptable standards. This means, of course, that such expressions as intuition, conscience, and moral sense are but symbols representing, pointing in the direction of, and making possible obedience to law, happiness, and perfection.

Value of obedience to law

A brief statement may be made in regard to the value of each of the three standards. Law seems to be a necessary element in any order of human experience. The integrity of the natural order is dependent upon natural law. It is no longer necessary to be skeptical of spiritual and moral laws. Though obedience

to law is no longer, as such, a recognized standard of moral righteousness, nevertheless law has served and does serve well the interests of the world. Though the older type of moralist made exemption from the natural order necessary for the development of human responsibility, some modern moralists, on the other hand, reverse the process, and make mechanism a necessary condition of freedom and human responsibility. In regard to the modern conception of mechanism and determinism Sidgwick says:

> On the Determinist side there is a cumulative argument of great force. The belief that events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them, is now held by all competent thinkers in respect of all kinds of occurrences except human volitions. It has steadily grown both intensively and extensively, both in clearness and certainty of conviction and in universality of application, as the human mind has developed and human experience has been systematized and enlarged. Step by step in successive departments of fact conflicting modes of thought have receded and faded until at length they have vanished everywhere, except from this mysterious citadel of will. Everywhere else the belief is so firmly established that some declare its opposite to be inconceivable: others even maintain that it always was so. Every scientific procedure assumes it: each successive science confirms it.[1]

Our conclusion concerning obedience to law as a standard of moral righteousness would be that conformity to law is only the means and not the end of human behavior. Obedience to law that makes real the development of moral responsibility is, strictly speaking, not an enforced obedience at all. Conformity to law, natural, divine, or civil, which promotes moral growth can hardly be considered an example of obedience. The moral man is not obedient to law. He is law. Moral growth is the only true obedience.

If obedience to law is the first standard of moral judgment, and if conformity to law is pronounced too formal as a criterion

[1] The Methods of Ethics, pp. 62–63. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

of ethical value, and if, as we concluded, the only obedience to law is obedience to moral growth, we may likewise be privileged to pronounce judgment concerning the value of happiness as a criterion of human action.

Values of happiness

If criticism is to be directed toward happiness as a standard, it is to the effect that happiness is too often confused with pleasure, and happiness as a standard of value is confused with pleasure as the only motive of human action. And if one overlooks these objections, it may also be pointed out that happiness is but a state of mind and beyond the reach of scientific analysis. Also there is little in happiness that is symbolic of progress. The most shiftless of people may well be the happiest. We may recall how Spencer makes the complete adjustment between the interests of the individual and the interest of society the source of real happiness; but a little reflection soon leads one to see that this state of affairs would result in the complete negation of happiness. But even in the face of criticism happiness still remains the best index of the harmony between man's physical, mental, and social interests. Any ethical system not accepting in some form the standard of happiness cannot expect to survive. The confirmed ascetic is happy in his asceticism. Happiness is the common-sense test of efficiency.

Perfectionism and happiness

In the light of the difficulties we have mentioned, and even in the face of the virtues that may well attach to the two criteria of morals already passed in review, the most fashionable standard or criterion of morals today is perfectionism, or, what amounts to the same thing, self-realization. Irrespective of criticism directed against other theories there are positive reasons why we should look to perfectionism as the summum bonum. Biological and psychological interests and the present conception of efficiency would naturally emphasize the interests of the self and personality. While perfectionism subsumes all these interests, it is at the same time the true source of happiness. Perfection is an antecedent of real happiness.

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CHAPTER X

THE SELF AND PERSONALITY

Stages and Agencies of Development

Outline of chapter

In all the nine preceding chapters an attempt has been made to present in various forms the logic of the self and personality. In some degree we have estimated the contributions of biology, psychology, sociology, and moral judgment to the building of moral character. Our interest in the present chapter is primarily genetic. We shall trace briefly the stages through which the self normally passes on its way to mature personality. We shall likewise evaluate the contributions of the three great agencies that figure in the attainment of personality. These agencies are science, art, and metaphysics. The following five interests, in the order presented, will constitute the main subject matter of this chapter: (1) stages in development of personality; (2) science and its contribution to personality; (3) art and its contribution to personality; (4) metaphysics and its contribution to personality; (5) personality and self-value. The reader will bear in mind that the five stages represent the growth of personality from early years to at least relative maturity.

1. Personality:
a. Stages
b. Requisites
c. Foundations

Personality may be said to pass through three fairly well-defined stages — the passive, the active, and the creative. Creative personality, under ideal conditions of growth and development, represents maturity. It will be convenient, for purposes of exposition, to treat our first main topic, the three stages of developing personality, from two points of view, namely, the requisites and the foundations of maturity; and by the requisites of maturity we are to understand the fundamental needs of man's personality. We find that there are

four major, or requisite, needs, as follows: (1) man needs happiness; (2) man needs character; (3) man needs achievement; (4) man needs a philosophy. These four needs are relatively applicable to each of the three stages of growth — the passive, the active, and the creative.

The foundations of maturity

Likewise, we may maintain the view that the foundations of maturity — those forces working in the interest of happiness, character, achievement, and a philosophy — are, respectively, belief, moral evaluation, purpose, and a standard. Or, more concretely stated, belief makes happiness possible; evaluation is a requisite in the funding of character; a resolute purpose is the truest source of achievement; and, finally, a standard is the forerunner of a personal philosophy of life. It must also be held in mind that these four foundations, making possible the achievement of maturity, are, in due form, applicable to each of the three stages representing the growth of personality.

Relative maturity

Having laid bare the scaffolding of personality as analyzed in the immediately preceding paragraph, it will now be our task to picture the interrelations of the foundations of maturity to its requisites as attained in the first, or passive, stages of personality. There is a stage of maturity normal to each stage of growth. This is what we are to understand by relative maturity. In tracing the processes in the unfolding and building up of the self it will be to our advantage to adopt unconditionally the traditional divisions or biological epochs of life, namely, childhood, youth, and maturity.

A word of warning

We are not here analyzing the continued development in each of the three stages; we are simply taking an inventory of what one would normally expect to find in ideally developed childhood, in youth fully realized, and in maturity fully ripened. At this vital point in our analysis of character it will be well to warn the reader that we are describing the self functioning in terms of personality. We are not simply portraying human activity. We are describing that aspect of individual experience, intellectual or moral, which represents something more at any one time than

mere reflex action. It will be well to say that we are describing that something which is readily translated into intellectual and moral reserve — not something static, though capable of measured repose, but something potentially dynamic when it needs to be, and, as Huxley says in describing a liberal education,

> ... ready, like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is stored with the knowledge of the great and fundamental Truths of nature and of the laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself.[1]

Intellectual and moral reserve

If intellectual and moral reserve is to be taken as the essence of personality, it is easily seen why personality is passive in the child, active in the youth, and normally creative in the adult. We are now to observe how happiness, character, achievement, and a philosophy, which are made the normal requisites of maturity, are applicable and organic to the passive, or first, stage of life. Also how belief, evaluation, purpose, and a relative standard make possible such requisites.

Double values

There are at least two sets of values attaching to belief, evaluation, a growing purpose, and a relative standard, which are integral to the funding of a moral self. Growing personality always represents a funding process. The first set of values to be derived from the four foundations just mentioned are those that grow out of constructive action, namely, (1) the simple value of believing, (2) the expansion of intellectual and moral sensitiveness through evaluation, (3) the constructive attitude resulting from growing purposefulness, and (4) the unifying effects of a relative standard. The second set of values, growing out of the same four foundations, are content values, or, more explicitly, (1) the moral significance of the object of belief, (2) the intellectual and moral content to be derived from the

[1] Science and Education, p. 86.

objects estimated and evaluated, (3) the implicit values of a high purpose in itself, and (4) the intrinsic worth of an ideal standard as such.

In addition to the two sets of values resulting from the four foundations mentioned it will now be interesting to see to what degree the requisites of maturity are manifest in the first, or passive, stage of developing personality. To what degree are happiness, character, achievement, and a philosophy in evidence during the later stages of childhood?

Belief and happiness

In what sense is happiness in childhood the foundation of the moral self? It can hardly be said that happiness in childhood is the kind of happiness which is the foundation of moral judgment. On the contrary, it is the kind of happiness resulting from explicit belief. The happiness in later life growing out of functioning capacities cannot be perpetual and continuous unless the self is well grounded in some fundamental belief. It is the happiness resulting from belief as such rather than from any specific kind of belief. It is the belief opening up new storehouses of energy. Belief always implies a constructive state of mind, and a constructive, active mind is always happy. This thesis in itself is of course not sufficient to establish the moral self. Too often mere beliefs are but symbols of passivity. The belief that we are talking about is that which serves as a moral propædeutic. It will be recalled that we made belief one of the four foundations of maturity, and happiness one of the requisites of maturity.

Belief in parents

It will not be difficult to find an object of belief which, when well grounded and organized, will serve as one of the chief guardians of moral character, while at the same time it will lay well the foundations of continuous happiness. The child, before the advent of adolescence, must develop and retain unquestioned belief in his parents. They must represent virtue in tangible expression — his growing ideals personified. The child who distrusts his parents will, during adolescence, lay the foundations of a distrust in humanity. An unfriendly feeling against the

occupants of the home becomes a hostile attitude toward man. Simplicity on the part of the child, and wholesome consistency on the part of the parent, are the true sources of the lasting belief about which we are speaking.

Evaluation and character

We shall now see to what degree character as a requisite of maturity and evaluation as its chief foundation are evidenced during the first, or passive, stage of moral growth. Character, of course, is gelatinous, and evaluation is little more than the comparison of childhood likes and dislikes. Childhood likes and dislikes are but the reflex, normally speaking, of the sanctions of parents, teachers, and a few intimate acquaintances. Perceptual evaluations are gradually preparing the way for later conceptual evaluations. Intellectual and moral reserve is little in evidence. The absence of false beliefs, the presence of normal bodily sensations, many-sided objective interests, spontaneity, sensitiveness to normal moral sanctions, and the absence of overscrupulosity are the normal conditions making possible the beginning of moral evaluation. Normal evaluation stands second to wholesome belief as the foundation of moral personality.

Purpose and achievement

The third requisite, namely, achievement, and its corresponding foundation, purpose, need but a moment's attention in our survey of the genesis of the moral self. In addition to the two requisites already mentioned, achievement might well be recognized as the third contributing element of moral significance. And by achievement one would naturally infer the fulfillment of an interest or purpose, intellectual or moral. It is not only the achievement as such that counts in the growth of personality; it is the sense of achievement. We may even go farther and say that, in addition to the attainment of some projected purpose, and the sense of satisfaction resulting from such an attainment, the third and most important moral resultant of the accomplishment of a set task is the substitution of a higher intellectual and moral universe for a lower. Many forms of intellectual and moral delinquency can be traced to arrested development. There scarcely ever is a plateau in the growth of

moral conduct. Likewise, we may affirm with a fair degree of confidence that in the field of moral integrity, just as in the field of scientific integrity, gaps are unthinkable. We may conclude the present paragraph by saying that it would be proper to speak of moral growth in the child; it would be in accordance with good use of the English language to refer to the attainment of morals in the adolescent; but we should only speak of moral achievement in adulthood. We shall soon have reason to see that growth is additive, that attainment is a reaching-out process, whereas achievement is creative. The function of childhood is growth — physical, intellectual, and moral.

A philosophy of life

Our fourth and last requisite of maturity, a philosophy of life, is perhaps of least importance during the stage of life about which we are speaking. Human life may more properly be said to culminate in a philosophy than to begin with a philosophy, but an acceptable standard of action is necessary during the early years if a workable and dependable philosophy is to guide us later in life. The value and destiny of adulthood, ethically speaking, is more to be determined by close attachment to little principles that gradually grow into largeness and significance than the later mechanical adherence to forces of recognized worth. He who does not embrace a standard or philosophy until the will is mature enough to receive sanction through the avenue of the intellect will hardly find such a philosophy of more than nominal value. Moral sanction in the form of a practical philosophy must always take precedence over intellectual sanction.

The happiness, character, achievement, and philosophy of life attained at the close of childhood can only be such as childhood belief, evaluation, purpose, and immature standard can render possible. Though childhood is an age of intense intellectual and physical activity, there is nevertheless, during childhood, only a minimum of intellectual and moral reserve. Personality may fittingly be described as passive.

Adolescence and moral reserve

It will be worth while to trace the changes that take place in the genesis of the moral self or personality during the second

epoch of life, or adolescence. We shall note briefly how the requisites of happiness, character, achievement, and a philosophy of life advance to a higher plane as the result of qualifying changes wrought within adolescent belief, evaluation, purposes, and standards. The unmoral self becomes converted into moral personality. Moral interests are reënforced by a moral reserve. One may observe how the parents, the good mother and the honest father, the indispensable requisites of normal childhood, the child's first heroes, are supplemented, though not supplanted, by the counsels of a wider social order.

A social ideal

In the present chapter we are not especially interested in presenting the qualities of the adolescent mind; we are interested only in those changes and qualities that have moral implications. The three great molding factors of this age are social interests, social approval and disapproval, and the social ideal. In the attainment of moral reserve, our criterion of moral personality, we may consider the first two factors as being of minor importance when compared with the one major principle of a social ideal. Let us observe how these forces prepare a moral setting which tends to bridge the gap between a personality that is relatively passive and one that is ideally creative.

Beginning of adolescent reserve

The wider social interests of the adolescent are not in themselves the primary sources of a moral reserve. Such interests are the advance agents of moral personality, or in a very true sense they may be said to be close accompaniments of personality. No one is truly good because he is inclosed by the good; no one is actively righteous simply because the precepts of righteousness are approved and enjoined by the social milieu. The social interests of the adolescent self and the moral precepts of the social order simply make possible the growth of motives and ideals which in themselves cannot be said to have a social origin. This thesis does not in the least militate against the significance of the social environment. Moral theory as well as tangible experience would lead one to believe that commands, injunctions, and precepts, negatively or positively affirmed, could

never in themselves become the true sources of moral reserve. As an isolated feeling, apart from a major interest, can never become a constructive force in personality, so no memory of a command or moral injunction can ever in itself advance moral integrity without first being associated with an already established motive or impulse. This motive or impulse is born from within and has no true home in the objective world. In relation to such motives the social environment may serve in one of two capacities; it either nourishes or kills. Our jails, penitentiaries, and various institutions of moral delinquency are mute evidence of the blighting forces of the social order. The adolescent, more or less unconsciously, goes out in search of the good, but all too often he returns laden with the bad.

Adolescent faith

We shall now return to a brief consideration of the four requisites of maturity, and shall note their adolescent status. One who is keenly observant of adolescent interests cannot fail to note that happiness as a requisite of normal adolescence finds its sustenance in abiding friendships. The child who has explicit faith in his parents will as an adolescent entertain implicit faith in chums and friends. To lose faith in a few choice friends is to lose faith in humanity. Faith in humanity is not far removed from faith in a religious order, and the denial of one is usually accompanied by the neglect of the other.

Resolutions

As to adolescent character and evaluation many and important changes are taking place. Rapidly changing ideals demand constant evaluation. Adolescent comparisons are legion. Personality is funding. Moral reserve is tending to manifest itself. Character is beginning to conceptualize. Character is beginning to expand not on account of high resolves and purposes as such but in spite of resolves and intentions. It may be said with a considerable degree of truth that the value of social and moral resolutions is inversely proportional to their publicity and explicitness. The explicitness of a resolve is an index of a goodly purpose, but no less a symbol of moral weakness. Moral earnestness does not readily lend itself to verbal expression.

Moral corroboration

We characterize the personality of childhood as unmoral, gelatinous, and passive; the adolescent self, though relatively active, is in a state of unstable equilibrium. The moral self is not yet sufficiently funded to rise above the level of its environment in case of necessity. The need of constant corroboration is a sign of moral immaturity, whereas the conscious eliciting of approval is a semblance of weakness.

Achievement

The desire for achievement is no less conspicuous in the life of the adolescent. This desire to enter into some active occupation is to be capitalized in the interest of the ideal already discussed. Constructive character cannot exist without occupation, and, furthermore, one's active occupation must always conform to the interests of life's ideal. Government assistance in the establishment and maintenance of vocational schools is clear evidence of the recognition of this fact. Active interests are seldom aroused after the close of adolescence. After this age nature has little more to offer in the form of new beliefs, ideals, purposes, and occupational desires. Maturity can only enlarge upon what has already been exposed in the form of insistent urges. Moral creativeness awaits maturity.

Standards

For present purposes there remains but a single requisite of adolescent integrity, namely, a practical philosophy of life. As we have explained in previous chapters (VIII and IX), such standard or practical philosophies have been called duty (or obedience to law), happiness, and even perfection. The adolescent will normally, under suitable conditions of mental and moral enlargement, embrace one of these standards. These practical standards may have their roots deeply embedded in more fundamental notions such as idealism and materialism, which will be briefly analyzed later in this chapter.

In our genetic account of the three stages in the attainment of maturity two stages, the passive and the active, or childhood and adolescence, have been passed in review. The third or creative stage will detain us for a few moments. We shall also see how the requisites of maturity — happiness, character, achieve-

ment, and a philosophy of life — are made real by adult belief, evaluation, purpose, and a life standard respectively. The facts and ideals to be presented are not imaginary and utopian, nor are they usually realized by the average adult, though it is not at all uncommon for mature personality to attain intellectual and moral creativeness. Moral creativeness is the major interest of maturity.

Though the values of normal maturity cannot be disentangled one from another (the unified nature of a highly organized self would make sharp distinctions impossible), nevertheless it is possible to refer to distinct requisites of maturity.

The thesis maintained in this book, that some fundamental belief is a requisite for happiness, holds true. The happiness of maturity would, ideally if not normally, rest on one of three foundations.

Three foundations of happiness

The happiness of maturity may well be based on an implicit faith in the ordering of the universe, and in that case religious belief results; or it may rest on a firm faith in the achievement of the social order or humanity — a moral expectancy not dissimilar to the meliorism of James. A third foundation of matured individual satisfaction is acquired; it rests upon a firm belief in the integrity of self, or moral personality. This basis of satisfaction is not to be identified with self-confidence as such, but with confidence in the ability of the self to meet successfully intellectual, social, and moral issues. No creeds and dogmas need cluster about these three foundation stones of matured values. This last phase of matured experience is an intimation of intellectual and moral creativeness.

Moral creativeness

Careful reflection reveals three stages of character evaluation, the parental and the social, already analyzed, and, third, the creative, the ideal evaluation of maturity. Out of the two earlier forms is developed a third and last, the most significant in the expansion of personality. Without moral creativeness man would not rise above the level of his environment. Seldom does the adolescent advance beyond the range of social approval and

disapproval, and perpetual corroboration is necessary to provoke moral integrity. Not so, however, for the matured self; here, the self having attained a goodly degree of moral reserve, character for the first time functions creatively.

Achievement and moral worth

Man needs achievement as well as character. Achievement, whether it be industrial, scientific, or philosophical, is a kind of creativeness. Indeed, achievement that is truly worth while is a real ally to moral attainment. The labors of the scientist who spends a lifetime in the perfecting of a mechanical principle, of the philosopher who synthesizes the phenomena of mind and nature, as well as of the man who through insight and calculation makes a fortune, all are valuable not only as a source of satisfaction to the individual and to humanity at large but, what is of greatest significance, as the chief means by which the maturing self attains moral creativeness. This is the only achievement worthy of the adult. The nobility of the world's greatest characters has its source not in formal teaching as such but rather in gradual achievement extending over the greater portion of a life span. All moral greatness is an achieved greatness. The unsuccessful, whether he be plain man, pseudo-scientist, or promulgator of false philosophies, rarely possesses the quality of moral greatness.

Meaning of philosophy of life

But one requisite of maturity needs to be mentioned. The experiences of childhood and youth normally develop into a philosophy of life. A philosophy of life is characterized by its beliefs, objects of value, and purposes. It can be said that a philosophy of life is that which functions in terms of belief, values, and purposes. Also it may be said that the three foundations of maturity make possible a philosophy of life. More accurately expressed, a philosophy of life is not an isolated principle making possible any procedure of life's activities, but an expression standing for and incorporating certain consistent beliefs, values, and purposes. It is but another name, then, for the plan of life which includes that which we make the objects of belief, those things in life which are most valued, and the

purposes for which we live. A philosophy of life may be defined as a progressive system of beliefs, values, and purposes, functioning in ever-widening expressions of happiness, conduct, and moral achievement. When beliefs, values, and purposes are relatively passive, personality is unconsciously receptive; when they are active, personality is consciously selective and constructive; and only when beliefs, values, and purposes are creative can personality be truly said to possess the quality of intellectual and moral reserve, the acme of moral endeavor.

Kinds and sources of philosophy

It may be of significance to note that when happiness, character, and achievement have their foundation in beliefs, values, and purposes sanctioned by reality or the world order, we have what is usually termed a religious philosophy of life. So also we have a social philosophy of life when the same requisites and foundations of maturity have their first source in the social order. Likewise, when the values of life are not conceived to be organically conjoined to any unseen world order, on the one hand, and are not cognizant of the sanctions and disapprovals of man in normally constituted society, then man is said to embrace a materialistic philosophy of life. An active philosophy of life normally has its source in that nexus of the world's forces which initiates, motivates, and actuates those values in which man is most interested.

2. Scientific contributions to personality

Our discussion of the three stages in the development of personality is finished. The second main topic for discussion will be science and its contributions to moral personality. No definite lines can be drawn between the next three topics, namely, the contributions of science, art, and metaphysics to moral personality. The reader will recall that the main portion of this work has been devoted to the contributions of biology, psychology, and the social sciences to the moral self. We found the chief contributions of biology to be motives and capacities; the contributions of psychology were chiefly laws of mental organization, whereas the contributions of the social sciences were expressed in terms of social standards.

Man's three interests

It may be said with a considerable degree of truth that there are three great sources of human interest. Man's three major interests are God, the world, and the self. It matters little which is paramount. An abiding interest in any one of the three inevitably leads to a derived interest in the other two. As our main purpose throughout this work is to trace the roots and fountain heads of moral character, it will be fitting for us now to show how the scientific interpretation of the world contributes to our storehouse of moral values.

Species of worlds

In pointing out the contributions of the world to moral character it will first be necessary to understand what is implied by an interest in the world and what is included in the concept world. The worlds contributing to character are many. First, there is the world as known to science, the typical world of chemistry and physics, the sciences par excellence; secondly, philosophical world; thirdly, a world of the imagination; fourthly, a world of religious experience; and last, but not least, a subjective world, a self-creative world, a world incorporating the values of all other worlds, though not subject to their limitations.

These worlds represent diverse aspects of individual experience. Their possible virtues are many; their limitations and vices are unlimited. Personality and character may thrive in the interests of the one and perish as the result of life attachment to another.

The self-creative world

As our purposes are primarily ethical, it will be of interest to us to note that the values of humanity obtain sustenance in one or more of the several worlds mentioned. There are numerous examples of life philosophies founded almost exclusively on some one world alone, as the world of the sciences, philosophy, imagination, or religion. Man has attempted to build his personality on one, to the neglect of the others. Our present thesis is to show that the fullness of personality can only be the resultant of an abiding interest in all. The economy of the developed moral self is such that its fullness of expression demands elements contributed respectively by the worlds of the sciences,

philosophy, creative imagination, religion, and, what is of greatest significance, the self-contributing world, which grows out of scientific, philosophic, and religious interests, but also which self-creativeness makes possible and toward which it especially impels us.

Some interest will attach to our brief analysis of each of the five species of worlds outlined. We shall note how the world of self-creativeness tends to compensate for the failures and misgivings of all the other worlds. For instance, it will be our purpose to note how quality compensates for quantity, how concreteness replaces abstraction, how satisfaction dispels dissatisfaction, and what values are to be derived from the conjoining of the finite with the infinite.

a. The world of science

In our review of each of the five species of worlds anticipated it will not be our purpose to portray their general values to humanity at large. We are interested only in the contributions of strict moral worth. What are the moral values of chemistry and physics, the typical experimental sciences? The moral value of chemistry is a conceptual value; it is a quantitative and not a qualitative moral concept. The world of chemistry has no place for moral qualities as such; qualities are ideally reduced to quantitative proportions. The discoveries in chemistry have greatly advanced the possibilities of the civilized world. Chemistry is supplying the world with necessities and has even added untold luxury; it has relieved the coarser species of suffering; but in spite of all this its moral value is negligible. Likewise, the contribution of physics to humanity is a quantitative one. Physics has made real many interests, pleasures, and conveniences of the whole civilized world. Interests, pleasures, and conveniences are not in themselves primary servants of the moral self. Physics has provided the world with the first foundations of moral responsibility, namely, order, law, and mechanisms. Without the concepts of order and law a consistent moral personality would be impossible, though law and order are not appreciably conducive to the establishment of moral per-

sonality. Mechanism, then, does not negate the possibilities of moral character, but lays well the first foundations thereof. A true moral value can have no other source than in introspective evaluation.

b. The world of philosophy

If, in the realms of science, it is true that chemistry, on the one hand, furnishes us the concept of quantity and not original indestructible qualities, and that physics, on the other hand, endows the world with mechanisms and not with freedom, it is likewise true that the world of philosophy immediately provides moral personality with the concept of abstract unity and not with concrete realities. In the sense in which we have used the term *philosophy* its value is mediate and not immediate, conceptual and not perceptual; its values spring from appreciation and not from description; they lie not in the processes of synthesis but in the resultants of the products of synthesis. From our present point of view, that is, of unity and its bearing upon the establishment of moral character, philosophy does much to bridge the gap between the observed unity developing from within the self and the objective sequential unity in the scientific world, and the unity necessarily required in the lives of social beings. This means that the unity which we observe to develop from within and the unity which has its source from our study of the scientific world are sublimated in the interests of a unified social and moral order. Our conclusion, then, is that philosophy serves moral personality in so far as it harmonizes conceptually the subjective, objective, and social orders.

c. The world of imagination

Though the sciences and philosophy supply man with quantity, order, and unity, more is required to satisfy man's varied nature. The world of imagination is no less real than the worlds of science and philosophy. Man is a dissatisfied being, and imagination is a ready servant of dissatisfaction. Imagination is the advance agent of the sciences and philosophy, and also the chief handmaiden of art. In the solution of world problems it does not hesitate to monopolize the function of the intellect. In the field of philosophy and religion it becomes an ally of feel-

ing in the interest of mysticism; in science it favors faith; in the mentally unstable it becomes reality; to the amelioration of the present or to the service of the future the world of imagination never fails to contribute. In service to moral personality the world of imagination is directly proportional to its obedience to the findings of science and philosophy.

d. The world of religion

In addition to the worlds of science, philosophy, and imagination there is another world, that of religion. This world has played a much more important part in the history of mankind than any of the worlds just mentioned. At the present time our interests are primarily moral and conceptual. We are principally concerned with showing the moral resultant of the chief concepts entertained by the exponents of religious beliefs. If the concepts of science and philosophy are primarily those of quantity, order, and unity respectively, what are the contributing religious concepts? For our purposes the chief religious concepts are the ultimate postulates of life, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; also the lesser concepts of perfection, interdependence, and eternal justice. Our main question is, What is the functional value of these various concepts for moral personality? Are these constituent elements in the upbuilding of the moral self? Are they substantial and lasting moral forces or are they chiefly nominal and ephemeral?

Religious values

The moral values resident in these various religious categories may be said to be threefold in nature, namely, the value of satisfaction or happiness, the value of an ideal, and the value culminating in moral action. The first is primarily a feeling value, the second is chiefly an intellectual value, and the last is a moral value. As explained earlier in this chapter, a fundamental belief is the first foundation of happiness, and happiness is the first and necessary groundwork of moral character. Without belief in the permanency of an objective order there is little human satisfaction. Belief, then, in the categories of religion, is at least a safe propædeutic to morals. Not infrequently is the fact of belief of more value than the content of belief.

Conclusions

It may be affirmed with some certainty that religion contributes less to moral personality on the basis of conceptual ideals than on the basis of beliefs just stated. An ideal is nearly always the fountain source of intellectual and moral growth, but most of the formal concepts of religion are not such as to assume the status of ideals. The concepts God, immortality, eternal justice, etc. are beliefs, sources of satisfaction and of happiness, rather than ideals. Our conclusion is, then, that conceptual religion is of less moral value as an ideal or system of ideals than as a system of beliefs. If this is true, then the third or practical value of religion is equally limited. Formal religion is of greatest value as a source of belief, of less value as a source of ideals, and of least value as a source of moral action. Our final conclusion would seem to be that the chief contributions of religion to moral character do not come appreciably from formal beliefs, ideals, and actions, but that the religion of chief concern in the integrity of the moral self is that which is learned at the mother's knee.

Change of status

We have now finished our account of the scientific, or conceptual, offerings of the four worlds to moral personality — the worlds of science, philosophy, imagination, and religion. Before we endeavor to analyze the fifth and last of the worlds which contribute little or much to the storehouse of moral reserve it will be worth our while to note that the four conceptual worlds already discussed are gradually changing their status from the conceptual to the experimental, and this largely for practical and moral purposes. Physics and chemistry have long been recognized as the experimental sciences par excellence, but experimentalism is still in its infancy in the fields of philosophy, imagination, and religion. Philosophy, however, is beginning to enter the experimental laboratory through the door of social and moral statesmanship. Creative imagination is beginning to knock at the door of experimentalism, indirectly through the plastic arts and directly through the art of moral creativeness. Religion is likewise seeking admittance to practical experimentalism.

e. The self-created world

In our continued search for the contributing sources of moral personality we have repeatedly met disappointment. The sciences have contributed quantitative mechanism, philosophy has contributed abstract unities, imagination is found to be based on dissatisfaction, and religion, a world too far removed from human experiences. Our fifth and last world to be described, the self-creative world, will incorporate all the satisfactions of the four worlds just passed in review, with the dissatisfactions left out. Likewise, quality will take the place of quantity; freedom, of mechanism and determinism; concrete experiences, of philosophic abstractions; satisfaction, of dissatisfaction; the world of appreciative finiteness will assume authority over the world of unlimited and far-off expectancy.

The world that we create for ourselves is no less real than the worlds that we have already portrayed. We choose to live in one or more of these worlds. Without these worlds the subjective world would have no existence. The objective laboratories make possible and real the subjective laboratory. The objective laboratory must antedate the subjective, but the latter must take moral precedence over all other worlds. We shall briefly analyze the nature of this subjective laboratory which makes possible this self-creative world. Such a world must not be at variance with our scientific, philosophic, artistic, and religious interests. It must supplement and add to these worlds. The reader will do well to bear in mind that the self-created world is more than mere fancy. It is a world of concrete reality — a substantial world. It molds the environment into conformity with itself.

Origin of real world

For clearness of exposition we may conveniently portray this subjective laboratory in which our most real world is fashioned by considering in order (1) its normal equipment, (2) its instruments, (3) its raw materials, (4) its methods, and (5) the resultant.

Normal equipment

In accordance with our projected outline we may consider the normal, or natural, equipment of the laboratory which we are describing. The efficacy of this subjective laboratory, not

unlike others, does not depend so much upon the costliness of its equipment as upon its suitableness for the experiments to be performed. Normal memories and capacities are the only native requisites. Conscientiousness and "sticktoitiveness" are the only later acquisitions. The mind endowed with great brilliancy of memory and genius is normally not the mind in which moral creativeness has the best chance. What holds true of the equipment of the mind is found to hold true for some of our extravagantly equipped schools, whether they are scientific, philosophic, artistic, or even religious. Such laboratories are not sufficient in themselves to vouchsafe moral character, and it is moral character which the subjective world alone has the prerogative to attain.

Instruments of the self

From normal and natural equipment we may turn to the necessary instruments which make possible the realization of the self-created world. In addition to memories and capacities there are the instruments of purposes and ideals. Purposes and ideals are the active instruments which mold memories and capacities into higher products. Again, the highly polished instruments of the most costly laboratories are easily dulled and blemished, while the more commonplace instruments of less costly laboratories may easily be sharpened. Likewise, the honest and implicit ideals and purposes of the normally constituted mind may far outdo the brilliant explicitness of the highly endowed. These simple purposes and ideals, though they have their first inception in the home and are later organized and directed under the influence of the worlds of science, philosophy, art, and religion, assume their rightful rôle in the economy of the moral self only when they become the instruments of a creative personality.

Raw materials of created world

In addition to the native equipment and the instruments required for the building of a personality there is also the necessary raw material. This is the third important consideration in the self-created world. The raw materials of such a world have no other source than the various worlds which we have been

evaluating. The curricula of the sciences, philosophies, art, and religion all serve in the development of the self. The measured quantities of the various sciences, the unities supplied by philosophy, the dissatisfactions of the present state of existence, which lie at the basis of creative imagination, and the promises of religion, are the indispensable requisites in the building of one's own world. The quantitative conceptions of the sciences become a qualitative appreciation in the self-created world. Determinism is converted into freedom. The abstract conceptions of the various philosophies become fountains of æsthetic satisfaction. Creative imagination is the magic wand which substitutes the beautiful for the ugly. The religion far removed from the actual needs of man becomes the religion of inner peace and harmony.

Higher universes: trinity of interests

From our discussion so far it may be inferred that the method of man-making, which is but another name for the process which we have been describing, is no other than the substitution of higher values for lower values — the substitution of higher universes for lower universes. It is only through the continuous process of substituting, of valuating and evaluating, that the self incorporates the world of science, philosophy, and art, the world of the self, and the world of God — the true trinity.

3. Art and its contributions to personality

We shall now consider our third main topic of this chapter, namely, art and its contributions to moral personality. It will be convenient, and more or less in accordance with fact, if we present (1) the pedagogical significance of art, (2) art from the more practical utilitarian point of view, and (3) the philosophical expression of art. Our aim is to point out the moral implications of art. When our purpose is one of method, we may conveniently employ the three stages mentioned as the inductive, the creative, and the deductive. Again, from the standpoint of content the three methods refer respectively to the fine arts, the industrial arts, and the abstract philosophical ideals. These division lines, in regard to both method and content, are in no respect distinct. The reader will also bear in mind that we are

to resolve our conception of art as a pedagogical agency into three fairly distinct stages, the perceptual stage, the associational stage, and the stage of exemplification.

a. Pedagogical significance of art

We shall begin our discussion of the pedagogical significance of art by a brief analysis of its first stage, or division, namely, the perceptual. But first a word as to the meaning of art.

It is the prerogative of the specialist in his particular field to perceive laws and principles and sequences that make no impression upon the mind of the amateur. The artist detects fineness of truth and of beauty nonexistent in the eyes of the plain man. Likewise, the philosopher and the scientist recognize unity of the higher order, truths that are nonamenable to the mind wholly engrossed with the tangible objects of existence. Is not the man of God sensitive to subtle forces that make no visible impression upon the mind not attuned to spiritual values? For the psychologist the laws of the mind are no less appreciable and exacting than are the laws of nature to the scientist. Moral truths supervene upon the mind of the moralist — virtues that are nonexistent in those with conscience seared.

Art and the artist

In the face of these undeniable facts the question may be appropriately asked, Who is the artist and what is the nature of his art? The artist is not only the one to whom truths are uniquely presented in rhythm, in tone, in color, and in literary appreciation; the statesman, the scientist, the psychologist, and the philosopher are no less deserving of the calling of the artist. He who synthesizes for man form and content and the laws of nature and of mind in the service of the good, the beautiful, and the true is the artist.

The perception of art

In this chapter we are primarily interested not in the production of art in any of its various forms but rather in the appreciation of art in so far as it serves as a moral agency. It is sometimes said that unless the child at frequent intervals perceives harmonious combinations of colors or rhythmically recurring tones, or, in other words, unless the child's environment offers frequent opportunities to perceive in tangible form

the various expressions of art, it is not at all likely that it will serve as a moral agency later in life. It is true that art is not the only agency in the service of moral personality, but our contention is that art is a useful vehicle in the inculcation of morals.

Moral appreciation

The question may now be asked, Why is art useful in the service of morals? Truth, in whatever form it may be presented, has little power to impress itself upon those who are not prepared to appreciate it. The study of abstract truth and goodness may well repel the soul rather than enrich it. It is only truth and goodness that are appreciated that become integral to the moral self. It is for this reason alone that art may serve well a moral mission. For a similar reason Churchill makes personality the medium by which all truth is revealed, by which the current of religion, the motive power in all history, is transmitted.[1] For long ages the Church has not been unmindful of the rôle which musical themes have played in the inculcation of morals and religion. No amount of direct moral instruction in the form of precepts or abstract principles could be substituted in the service of moral efficacy for many of the great masterpieces of literature. Where could the lessons of evil and sin be more effectively portrayed than in that great cosmic epic, Milton's "Paradise Lost"? How could a belief in the rewards of a virtuous life be more effectively ingrained in one's moral nature than by appreciative contemplation of the character of the village preacher in Goldsmith's "Deserted Village"? The moral law formally resides in the concise expression of the Commandments, but their truth and vitality are concretely revealed only in terms of living personality.

Art and moral suggestion

The moral values of art do not reside alone in sense perception, although the good, the beautiful, and the true may be directly perceived; art serves rather as a moral agency in terms of subtle associations. The pedagogy of moral representation and association does not differ essentially from that of moral

[1] Winston Churchill, The Inside of the Cup, pp. 432–434.

presentation. All moral lessons that come through the medium of art in any of its various forms are lessons of appreciation. They are never mere matters of description. The greatest moral lessons, as well as the greatest intellectual lessons, are often veiled. Nature hides her secrets. The portraits of Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and many others serve as relay stations of moral values. As a word or symbol preserves and organizes meaning, so the sculptor and the artist preserve and organize the moral virtues of an age. Moral maxims, precepts, and theories are of little value when found within the pages of formal textbooks, but how much more vital are moral themes when they spring from a living personality or from one carved in marble, painted on canvas, or embodied in one of the great and living autobiographies of literature — a Franklin, a Darwin, a Spencer, or a John Stuart Mill! He who does not avail himself of the privilege of reading and appreciating the representative moral masters of every age misses an opportunity to reorganize and reënforce his moral personality for which nothing can be an adequate compensation.

The arts of man are not the only sources of high resolves and noble purposes. The arts of nature are more impelling than the poetry of Milton, the sonnets of Shakespeare, the spirit of friendship expressed in the lines of "In Memoriam," or the subtle verse of a Browning. The starry heaven above was the source of moral inspiration for Immanuel Kant. The persistence of force and the immutable laws of nature were matters of admiration and of awe for Herbert Spencer. Who can deny the moral earnestness of a Spinoza when he endows the world with the attributes of God?

Nature and moral appreciation

Not only is there an urge to be good (at least for those who are capable of moral appreciation) in the natural grandeur of nature, as well as in the arts of man, but likewise there is a sense of moral reënforcement in one's mental ability to grasp the functioning of nature's laws. The integrity and inevitableness of nature's laws, when once fully appreciated, cannot but reën-

force moral earnestness. In a very true sense, appreciation is about the only source of moral reënforcement. Human behavior is not the only object of appreciation. We appreciate the accurate demonstration of a difficult mathematical problem no less than a kindly deed; so also the scientist and the philosopher experience a real delight in the calculation of a solar eclipse; and does not the concrete realization of such an accomplishment serve as an unconscious moral urge? The realization of the continuity of nature inevitably occasions intellectual unity and order, and it is the opinion of the present writer that intellectual and moral continuity reënforce one another.

Moral and immoral exemplification

If perception and suggestion or association represent two steps in our pedagogical conception of the influence of art upon moral conduct, a third and final step, namely, exemplification, may be considered the acme of any moral influence, whether it be nature, art, man, society, conscience, or deity. The perceptual and associational stages can never be more than a preparation for a higher stage, which we term the stage of exemplification. Exemplification means that the recipient of a moral influence must consciously strive to attain a standard or ideal perceived or suggested in the field of art or otherwise. This may fairly be called the self-conscious stage of moral realization. It will not be difficult to make our meaning clear by reference to the drama or even to fiction. Exemplification, however, may be as conducive to evil as to good. The three stages of moral influence, or what may well be unmoral or even immoral influence, are easily traced to the drama of today. It is undoubtedly easy to trace sinister influences to such a source. The idea which we wish to present is that if art may and does become the source of evil influences, ideals may equally well become the source of wholesome moral effect. But wholesome moral lessons can never have unmoral or immoral settings, as they are so often assumed to have. There may well be cases in which ignorance is bliss, but nowhere is the immoral the source of a true blessing.

Moral literature

When we turn from the drama to fiction and to literature, we meet with concrete instances of the good and evil effects of art,— instances in which persons endeavor to exemplify the ideas or ideals, good or bad, which either have had a perceptual origin or are the results of subtle suggestion. It is undoubtedly true that the good and evil results of art expressed in the form of literature are more indirect than the consequences of the art of the theater. Every great thinker or philosopher has a host of followers. No adolescent can permit himself to pursue the pages of Darwin, John Stuart Mill, or Spencer without being led to think in categories similar to those entertained by these great thinkers. Our best moral literature, including certain selected biographies and autobiographies, might well be used to greater advantage in the teaching of moral lessons.

b. Art and utility

The reader will recall that in accordance with our outline we were to consider art from three points of view: the pedagogical, the utilitarian, and the philosophical. We shall now survey art from the more practical, or utilitarian, point of view. Art, as we have shown, is based on disinterested motives; at least, art in the narrow sense of the term — the fine arts. Our interests will now shift from the fine arts to the industrial arts. Likewise, we are to divert our attention from the perceptual, the associative, and the exemplificatory to the gratification of the desire for activity, the fulfillment of human wants, and the inculcation of human virtues. As heretofore, our interests are of a moral nature, the contribution of industry to moral personality.

Purposes of industrial arts

Perhaps no clear distinction can be drawn between the motives making possible the fine arts and the motives underlying the industrial arts. Art as ordinarily understood is sometimes said to be its own reward, but the arts of industry are primarily for the purpose of satisfying human wants. Still the principle is clearly shown that when a trade or profession is pursued too exclusively for the pecuniary and quantitative results, the results, whatever they may be, are inferior in value, whether such products are estimated in terms of quantity or of moral

character. The carpenter, the mason, the cabinetmaker, the teacher, and the minister, when pursuing their respective callings, realize the fullest satisfaction when they are conscious of work well done rather than when too much attention is directed to the satisfaction of human wants. Even in the face of this recognized fact the industrial arts exist for the express purpose of satisfying human needs. Our interest, however, is to point out the three contributions of the industrial arts to moral character.

Industry and moral citizenship

The first and most fundamental fact about a regular profession or occupation is that it directs and organizes one's native tendencies to act. It is well established that the intellectual processes follow closely in the wake of action. To control action is to control feeling and thought. A constructive moral personality is simply impossible without a definite occupation. Spencer makes definiteness of action a correlative of moral integrity. Idleness breeds moral disintegration. The industrial arts are constituent elements in moral citizenship.

Moral and industrial continuity

We now pass from the first to a second source of moral influence. An occupation should make possible the gratification of man's major desires and wants, at least all that the physical rewards of an occupation can naturally satisfy. Our most thoughtful educators and moralists have advocated the learning of a worthy trade for no other reason than the one just mentioned. The emphasis today on trade and industrial education has its origin in a moral background. Poverty and crime are to a degree sequential. The sense of economic security is a worthy one. Economic independence is a source of moral strength. A feeling of dependence is conducive to moral laxity. It is a source of strength to give to the worthy, but to receive without economic merit hastens moral flabbiness. Normally there is a degree of continuity between the industrial and the moral orders. Success in one's occupation leads to a sense of worthiness.

Industry and moral inculcation

The third moral result of the normal functioning of the industrial arts is but the continuation of the two already mentioned.

Moral products of synthesis are always the result of moral processes of synthesis. This means that the virtues are not self-initiating but are the accompaniments of the activities and gratifications such as we have explained. Virtues grow in meaning and value so long as life's activities continue to organize and life's desires continue to be refined and gratified. When one ceases to engage in an active occupation, not only does the moral life cease to advance, but acquired virtues are in danger of disintegration. If the moral life of earlier and later adolescence needs reënforcement and corroboration from without, it is in a measure true that the more deeply ingrained virtues of the seasoned adult need the reënforcing effects of continued constructive activities. Morally speaking, no one has a right to retire from active duties.

We may readily enough find corollaries to the principle advanced in the immediately preceding paragraph. To cease to admire is to court moral deterioration. Hope makes the future appear better than the past. He who has no goal recedes into the past instead of advancing toward a better future. Following in the wake of victories, individuals, like nations, that have won easy laurels are all the more exposed to destructive influences from without and moral degeneration from within. In the paragraphs immediately following, some attention will be devoted to the philosophical sources of art.

c. Art as philosophic expression

In our discussion of the different phases of art it has been tacitly understood that the function of art is to gratify some motive, interested or disinterested. Art in the limited sense and art as ordinarily understood concretely exemplify truth and realizable ideals. The poet expresses in words and song the truths that he really feels and perceives, and likewise the sculptor sees ideals embedded in marble; but the artist endowed with philosophic vision does not perceive his models in the world of tangible experience. Although ideal truth may have no existence tangible in the lives of men, nevertheless the concept truth beckons one to ever higher orders of appreciation.

The Platonic "idea" may have little sustaining power in the lives of those too much engrossed with mundane experiences; nevertheless it remains a truth well worthy of consideration that it is just such concepts as those entertained by Plato, the poet-philosopher, that make life on this earth a little nobler. Truth that is built up from below is reënforced by the ideal that comes from above.

Platonic justice

At this point in our discussion of art a brief explanation will be in order, to make clear Plato's application of his philosophic art to the practical realities of life. Only the seasoned philosopher, we are told, may apprehend and appreciate the standard types of existence. Only the philosopher may truly comprehend the good, the beautiful, and the true. The lesser classes of society, the soldiers and the artisans, are to conform to the dictates of the philosophers. Justice in the experience of the individual and justice in the social order are the resultants of the philosophic vision of justice as a divine type. It is by analogy, then, with the so-called Platonic love — the impulse to attain an ultimate ideal — that we have seen fit to make clear the philosophic expression of art as distinguished from the fine arts and the industrial arts. Indeed, in the artistic vision of Plato the arts of man may function well only under the guidance of the "idea."

4. Metaphysics and its contribution to personality

Plato's conception of the "idea," and our use of this term as the groundwork for the philosophical expression of art, may well serve as an introduction to our fourth main topic, metaphysics and its contribution to personality. The Platonic "idea" is an unmistakable example of pure metaphysics. We may touch lightly upon the subject of metaphysics from three angles: (1) metaphysics and the self, (2) metaphysics and reality, (3) metaphysics and agencies of intervention. By metaphysics will be understood a reality or realities that may function in the world of man otherwise than through the natural channels of experience. It is not our purpose to enter into an investigation of metaphysical verities; that is, we are not concerned with

the objective truth of such realities; we are simply concerned as to how far man's belief in the existence of such realities contributes to moral personality. Otherwise stated, What are the moral implications of metaphysics?

a. Metaphysics and the self

If metaphysics be defined as reality indirectly reflected in the world of experience, we may, without departing too radically from our definition, make application of this concept to the self as historically understood. The reader must bear in mind that we are not discussing modern or even recent conceptions of the self, but the fundamental belief that the self is an independent entity — a spiritual reality not grossly dependent upon the variability of human experience. Objection may be made to the endeavor to apply our concept of metaphysics to the self, even if the self is conceived as the pure "I," "ego," "soul," or what not, because it has often been said, as seems to have been the case with Descartes, that one's experience of the self is the most direct and certain of all experience. Even though the assertion be granted, such a certified experience does not come through the ordinary channels of human experience; therefore we shall feel at liberty to speak about the possible metaphysics of the self. Nor is this view of the self necessarily in harmony with that conception entertained by the writer of this book. We are simply concerned with analyzing the moral values (if there are any) of a metaphysical interpretation of the self. It will be well to note in what sense moral values may be entertained.

It has been said that there is nothing valuable in the world but man, and that there is nothing valuable in man but mind. John Locke says that a sound body and a sane mind are indispensable, and that in the absence of either the other is of little value. Pope affirms in no uncertain voice that the proper study of mankind is man, and since the days of Socrates and Plato man has been busily engaged in the discovery of self.

Ethics and religion

Most of the older psychologists and moralists of the past and a few writers of recent date believe in the spiritual integrity

of the self. Not infrequently both have built on a metaphysical foundation. Plato among the ancients, and Spinoza, an early modern philosopher, gave ethics a metaphysical basis. Even when the idea of a metaphysical basis for ethics is not recognized, it is commonly believed that morals could not well survive except through religious reënforcement. While it has thus not been uncommon to make that which ought to be, namely, ethics, largely dependent upon metaphysics or the postulates of religion, the process has occasionally been reversed and the realities of religion have been made contingent upon that which ought to be. In this connection we should mention Kant and Sorley, a modern moralist.

Possible virtues and vices of metaphysics

We shall now return to our immediate thesis, namely, the metaphysics of the self. If belief is at all a criterion of any considerable moral worth, it cannot be doubted that more or less significance must attach to the belief that the self is not wholly of empirical origin. He who believes the self and the soul to be immortal will inevitably build upon such a belief for better or for worse. Likewise, he who believes the self to be metaphysically endowed with the attributes of unity, continuity, and identity will naturally entertain a more reverent respect for the self than the individual who is convinced that his so-called self is but the product of reflex mechanisms that are highly complex. One would not be considered an extremist if he were to assert that the present-day laxity in moral earnestness might in some measure be traced to a materialistic conception of the mind. On the other hand, it may be as firmly asserted that morals too deeply concerned with metaphysical and religious interests can never rise to such a pure height of ethical attainment as morals grounded on interests that are primarily biological and that have little to do with religious and metaphysical considerations. We have already given expression to the idea that an interest in the expansion of the moral self as such, without regard to any ulterior values, is the surest sustainer of happiness and the one true index of developing moral integrity.

b. Theories of reality

In order to round out our conception of the moral self it will be worth our while to review the four fundamental metaphysical theories of reality. These theories of reality are usually known as materialism, idealism, dualism, and agnosticism. Our only question for consideration is whether a belief in any one of these world hypotheses is conducive or nonconducive to moral personality. Does one's view of the cosmos and its ordering appreciably influence character? Are the theses relative to any one of the four great ontologies, or theories of reality, more or less favorable to the development of character than any of the others? We shall briefly sketch a few of these theses.

The theses of materialism

The materialistic conception of reality will first receive brief notice. According to the doctrine known as materialism the essence of reality is matter. Mind or spirit does not exist. There is no substantial self. This world of matter is a ceaseless mechanism. Man, who is a real part of the world of matter, is also a determined machine. Thus there is no God, no freedom, and no immortality. These are all fundamental principles of materialistic metaphysics. Are these several theses inimical to moral personality?

Character of materialist

No one has ever been able to show that the moral personality of the materialistic philosopher is any the less wholesome on account of his materialistic conceptions. The reader must bear in mind that we are now discussing the morals of the materialistic philosopher as such and not the morals of those whose behavior is in harmony with materialism. The life morals of the seasoned materialistic philosopher are to be attributed not appreciably to his conceptions of the world and of man but more largely to his early training. Thus we may conclude that the argument in favor of materialism on the basis of the character of the materialistic philosopher would not be a cogent one. Then again, some truth may well attach to the statement that the character of the materialist may be noble in spite of his materialism rather than on account of the theses espoused.

There are many reasons for concluding that the materialistic

conceptions of life are not favorable to the best attainment of morals, not on account of the main thesis which we have outlined but more especially on account of more sinister beliefs or half-beliefs that follow in the wake of materialism. Chief among these deteriorating influences is the persistent life of pleasure and excitement. He whose chief interest it is to search for pleasure and excitement can never be happy and consistently moral, no matter what views he may half-heartedly entertain concerning the destiny of man and the world. The heart of practical materialism is pleasure-seeking. It is the arch enemy of moral attainment.

Idealistic metaphysics

If the evils of materialistic metaphysics are reducible not especially to its main theses but rather to unsuspecting materialistic practices, so the main theses of idealism, the converse of materialism, are not especially conducive to the highest moral attainment. In a word, idealism as a metaphysics denies materiality to the world. The world is a spiritual system; there is purpose in the ordering of the universe; the self is a substantial entity; and the motive leading to this conception of the world is primarily a religious one. Idealism may be said to maintain the belief in the integrity and continuity of human values.

Virtues and vices of idealism

It will be interesting for us as students of ethics to analyze the first evidences of moral worth that may be attributed to the principles of idealism. No one is ready to assert with any degree of confidence that the great formulators of idealistic metaphysics have been especially renowned for their virtues. This is perhaps mute evidence of the fact that ethical values can always be traced to early childhood influences and not to abstract philosophies, whether idealistic or materialistic. It can be rightly assumed, however, that the theses of idealism are generally conducive to moral growth. Idealism is a philosophy of hope and confidence. As a moral thesis it advocates a life of virtue rather than a life of pleasure. We are not at all concerned with proving or disproving the validity of idealism. No abstract philosophy such as idealism can greatly influence one's

motives. Our conclusion in respect to idealism is somewhat similar to our conclusion in respect to materialism. The idealistic metaphysics is conducive to moral betterment not primarily on account of its belief in a universal spiritual system but more especially on account of its wholesome attitude toward life. On the other hand, the refusal of idealism to recognize the true enormity of evil is a negative chapter in its eventful history. There is some truth in the assertion that idealism is guilty of breaking down the distinction between the good and the bad. Its optimism has often been unwarranted.

The dualistic metaphysics

Only a few words are necessary to give the dualistic metaphysics a moral setting. Dualism which advocates the reality of both matter and mind is the common-sense view of the world. Matter and spirit, it is held, are real for good purposes. It is the plain man's view of the world. This is the ontology which seems to have been most in harmony with the principles of the Christian religion. It was natural to believe that the good has its origin in the spiritual order, and no less natural to believe that the bad is somehow connected with matter. Medieval theology has a dualistic foundation ; indeed, the literature for a thousand years or more, including some of the world's greatest masterpieces, such as Milton's "Paradise Lost," seemed to have a dualistic setting. Christian ethics has its home in the dualistic ontology. The Christian belief in God, the literal acceptance of the teachings of Christ, the belief in immortality, and, with a few exceptions, the belief in the freedom of the will, are all in harmony with dualism.

Values of dualism

The fact that the dualistic philosophy has been satisfying until quite recent times is perhaps a good commentary on its value as a system of metaphysics. Some of the world's greatest thinkers and moralists, such as Descartes and Locke, have been upholders of dualism. The common man will continue to believe in that which he can understand. The human intellect always tends in the direction of the greatest simplicity and the least complexity. The logic of a few great minds will succeed in

theoretically maintaining such philosophies as materialism, idealism, and agnosticism, but the common-sense man (and most men are governed by common sense) will continue to embrace dualism. Space does not permit us to analyze the agnostic metaphysics in its relation to morals.

c. Metaphysics and intermediation

We pass finally from the metaphysics of the self and the metaphysics of reality to metaphysics and the agencies of intervention. Here we may presume to describe some of those forces or agencies which for convenience may be designated as metaphysical — forces which are believed to mediate between God and his world and man's mind or self. Theology, no less than science, has seen fit to establish agencies of one kind or another. The forces of the scientific world, even if we are permitted to employ the category of force, allow no disruption in their continuity. Without these centers of activity the functioning of the laws of nature (gravity, for instance) would be unthinkable. Likewise, in the field of Christian experience, does not Christ mediate between God and man? Does not the Holy Ghost impinge upon the soul of man? Did not Plato of old conceive of the Demiurge? We find a simple example of the doctrine of intermediation in the conception of the Logos. We are interested in the metaphysics of intermediation only in so far as it serves as a moral agency.

Man and God

Man has found innumerable ways to bridge the gap between God, on the one hand, and man, on the other hand. Man was not satisfied to let God remain far removed from his world; so, sooner or later, perhaps unconsciously, he devised the scheme of identifying God with the world, as in pantheism, or the idea of making the world the expression of the all-embracing consciousness of God, as in idealism. In each case we see the inevitable tendency of the mind to bridge the gap between man and his Maker. The mystic does not rest satisfied in the mere contemplation of God; he must directly experience God.

Stoic brotherhood

Thinking man has not infrequently conceived of his relation to the world or to God as a dynamic one. This dynamic relation

has been conceived in various ways. For the early Stoics man was considered a participant in the essence of the world, namely, reason. This granted man so privileged the right of universal brotherhood — an ethical consideration. This was perhaps one step in the direction of the later Christian principle of love. The concept justice as incorporated in common law had its first beginning in the Stoic concept of reason common to man and the world.

God as intelligence and will

Man has not only pictured the world as embodying a rational order, as did the Stoics, but he has considered it the best of all possible worlds. The world has been judged purposeful, a world interested in the welfare of man. Teleology has either been attached to the world as such or else man has believed that there was purpose in God's plan in his creation of the world. Kindly intentions to God have been attributed in his governance of the world. Man has read in God's kindly intentions the manifestations of a good will, or he has believed that God's insight and intelligence are gradually revealing themselves in man and his institutions. In the philosophy of Hegel the absolute reason is gradually revealing itself in nature, in man and his institutions, in man's art, in man's religion, and in man's philosophy itself. Fichte, on the other hand, conceives God as a divine will or ego ; thus man's chief duty is a moral one. Ethics becomes man's highest art.

Evidence of a metaphysical order

Likewise, man has either attributed his moral behavior to the will of God, as did the Christian utilitarians, such as Paley, or he has conceived of God's goodly nature as the true source of man's moral action. Man frequently has conceived his destiny as enmeshed in the workings of a divine Providence. Even the modern theory of evolution has been given a teleological background. Man's resort to prayer is the surest evidence of his faith in a metaphysical order.

Thus we may conclude our fourth topic of this chapter, namely, metaphysics, and its contribution to personality by saying, first, that man has conceived his own self or soul as

endowed with attributes of a metaphysical order — a self that is capable of profiting by the influences of a higher order than self; secondly, that man has not infrequently seen fit to interpret the world in terms of a rational order created and sustained by an all-wise Creator; and, thirdly, that man has had many reasons for believing that God, through metaphysical agencies, still continues to direct the interests of man.

5. Personality and self-values

We may now conclude our discussion of the present volume by a few summary statements in regard to personality and self-values. In past chapters we have made little use of philosophy and metaphysics in order to find the true roots of human nature, the repository of man's fortunes and misfortunes. Fortunate is the personality that is endowed with the ideals of the good, the beautiful, and the true; more fortunate is that personality that divines the sources of the good, the beautiful, and the true; but most fortunate is that personality whose ideals and sentiments are based upon the natural experiences of normal childhood. The moral value of undeveloped personality is directly proportional to the transparency of its early sources, but the dynamic value of mature personality is directly proportional to organized choice. Mere goodness may be present in childhood; virtue may be characteristic of the adolescent; but personality can result only from creative choice.

Unity of moral personality

In past chapters we have amply demonstrated the unified character of the moral self. Unity seems to be the order of the universe; and what is originality but the perception of new unities, and what is intelligence but the responsiveness to new relationships? In terms of unity we should define the science of ethics and æsthetics in a similar way. True art harmonizes the material and the spiritual. It will be recalled that the early Greeks identified the good, the beautiful, and the true. There cannot be a triple order of excellence. The virtuous man is the man of integrity, and integrity means moral unity; and, as Palmer says, he who does not become more beautiful while in the presence of the beautiful surely needs protection. Is it any

wonder that the alluring of great ideas is the chief function of art? True art is true law, and its essence is obedience.

This book has conceived personality as a moving equilibrium, a push forward, a movement onward — dynamic and not static. As a doctrine of the moral self it stands for unity, continuity, and identity; conceived as the product of human culture it appreciates the good, the beautiful, and the true. Socially it reflects the best in our religious and political experiences.

Characteristics of personality

The question may now be asked, and properly so, What are the characteristics of a true moral personality? Earlier in this book we have defined personality in terms of intellectual and moral reserve. Tennyson makes self-reverence, self-knowledge, and self-control the highest phases of individuality. I should prefer to designate self-consciousness, self-freedom, and self-realization not only as the highest pinnacles of individuality but also as the highest reaches of a creative personality par excellence. Self-freedom is the most worthy achievement of personality.

Stages of moral personality

It will be recalled that the first part of this chapter was devoted largely to the task of outlining the three stages of personality. The unconsciously passive, the consciously active, and the dynamically ideal or creative were the successive stages of development. The first stage, or that stage in which personality takes root and buds with the utmost secrecy, is of primary importance, and its importance is proportional to its secrecy; the second stage of its growth, which we characterize as a selective choosing, though relatively unstable is valued in terms of individual choice and social approbation. During adolescence, personality, as was said, becomes a moving equilibrium, for without continuous intellectual and moral nourishment it soon topples and decays.

It is only as we pass from adolescence to spiritual maturity that we find real qualitative changes in the chosen personality. The instability of adolescence gradually becomes the stability of adulthood, as cosmic approval takes the place of social ap-

proval. Character is no longer fragile and many-sided, but permanent and enduring. Man's moral reserves have been tapped, and human personality, the highest gift of conscious choice, has assumed its rightful heritage.

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